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Abstract and Keywords
My project explores war weariness in the First World War, especially as it
pertains to the Canadian Corps. My first two chapters on the legal, disciplinary, and
medical systems encountered by the Canadians in the war look at the army policies,
structures and personnel in place to deal with morale, discipline, endurance, motivation,
and medical problems. These structures served to 'measure' the problems facing
individual soldiers and their units, and attempted to address these issues before they
became more widespread and intractable. Policies were also put in place to mitigate
emerging problems and to ensure that sufficient troops were in the line and able to
perform their duties adequately. Unfortunately, these systems were often insufficient to
deal with these emerging problems, and thus my next two chapters explore how these
problems played out for the Canadian Corps in two periods: April-August 1917, and JulyNovember 1918. These periods provide much insight into the contributing factors to the
onset, development, and negative consequences of individual and collective war
weariness, as well as mitigating factors that helped offset it. These two periods were also
chosen to highlight the comparative nature of this project, whereby the experience of the
Canadian Corps was juxtaposed with other major armies on the Western Front, as well as
with Canadian forces over the course of the second half of the war. Just as other armies
were suffering 'wear and tear' and indicating manifestations of incipient breakdown, the
Canadians were able to carry on without substantial reductions in fighting effectiveness or
large-scale indiscipline. The reasons why the Corps was able to prevail despite the
emerging and collective war weariness will be explored in this project.

Keywords: war weariness, morale, discipline, combat motivation, endurance, combat
effectiveness, shell shock, psychiatric casualties, PTSD, war neurosis, military medicine,
military law, inability, reluctance, unwillingness, Western Front, Canadian Corps,
Canadian Expeditionary Force, campaigns, Vimy Ridge, Hundred Days Campaign,
mitigation, Western Front
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Epigraph

“…war isn’t worth the sacrifice…no war! It’s hell and I often say to myself why does
God allow all this?...I hope and trust that He will work wonders before many more weeks
have gone, and that the war will end before our brave men who are in the trenches are
doomed…We all want to see Germany crushed. That is so, but I hope and trust that
something will happen that the struggle will be finished without much more bloodshed.”
-Private Bert Cooke, First World War Diary, 159-160

“I can’t truthfully say that I felt any great sorrow at leaving the old bunch as there were
very few of the old mob left due to casualties, also the food is much better and the
quarters more comfortable…besides, in my opinion, I had already put in enough time ‘up
the line.’”
-Gunner Frank Byron Ferguson, Diary, 153
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Dedication

This project is dedicated to my grandfather, Arnold James Chase,
who was born on 19 March 1927, and passed away on 29 August
2017 while I was still working on this dissertation. It is also
dedicated to Dr. Brock Millman - a great educator, historian, and
man.
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Introduction
The Canadian Corps and the larger Canadian Expeditionary Force (CEF) of which
it was a part played an important role in the First World War. Some have argued that the
Canadian Corps, the fighting branch of the CEF which by mid-1916 was composed of
four infantry divisions plus affiliated units, arms, and services, played an outsized role for
its relatively small size and strength. The Canadians were of course merely a constituent
part of the larger British Expeditionary Force (BEF), and the British Army itself was but
one of the major Entente powers in the war. The British Army also expanded rapidly
during the course of the war, but there were growing pains related to this massive
expansion. This was also a world war that had global implications and amounted to
perhaps the first truly modern, industrial war. Numerous surveys and general histories of
the war1 attest to the developments both prior to and during the war itself, and the impact
this had on the combatants and armies between 1914 and 1919. This was an exceedingly
complex and multifaceted war, and entire volumes have been written, and continue to be
published, on relatively narrow aspects of the conflict.
The industrialised nature of the war, the intersection of old and new military ideas
coupled with the enormous wealth and technological prowess of the combatants, ensured
a particularly bloody war. Furthermore, the recent military experience of the colonial
powers and the atrophying of tactical thinking on the part of the Entente also played a role
in the duration of the conflict. The advantages of the defensive over the offensive, aided
by the use of quick-firing rifles and artillery with smokeless powder, barbed wire,

General histories of the war include: Ian F.W. Beckett, The Great War: 1914-1918 – Second Edition (Harlow: Pearson
Education Limited, 2007); Niall Ferguson, The Pity of War: Explaining World War I (New York: Basic Books, 1999);
Peter Hart, The Great War: A Combat History of the First World War (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2013); Holger
H. Herwig, The First World War: Germany and Austria-Hungary 1914-1918 – Second Edition (London: Bloomsbury,
2014); John Keegan, The First World War (Toronto: Vintage Canada, 2000); John H. Morrow Jr., The Great War: An
Imperial History – Centenary Edition (Abingdon: Routledge, 2014); Michael A. Neiberg, Fighting the Great War: A
Global History (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2006); G.W.L. Nicholson, Canadian Expeditionary Force,
1914-1919: Official History of the Canadian Army in the First World War (Ottawa: Dunhamel, 1962); William
Philpott, War of Attrition: Fighting the First World War (New York: The Overlook Press, 2014); Robin Prior and
Trevor Wilson, The First World War (Washington: Smithsonian Books, 2004); G.D. Sheffield, Forgotten Victory – The
First World War: Myths and Realities (London: Review, 2002); David Stevenson, 1914-1918: The History of the First
World War (London: Penguin Books, 2012); Hew Strachan, ed., World War I: A History (Oxford: Oxford University
Press, 1998) and John Terraine, The Western Front: 1914-1918 (London: Hutchinson & Co., 1964).
1

2

machine guns (MGs), trenches, and other defensive features, ensured this was a long,
drawn-out attritional war. Millions would lose their lives before a decision was forced.
Advances in communications and logistics allowed enormous concentrations of troops to
be well-supplied with all the accoutrements of modern war. Vast improvements in the
ability to wage, finance, and sustain war, however, were not matched by improvements in
the ability of human beings to withstand war.
Combat on the Western Front put enormous pressures on the individuals and units
expected to carry out orders and maintain cohesion in the face of trauma and mortal
danger. This reality was a far cry from colonial skirmishes against mismatched and
technologically inferior enemies. Because of the new reality of modern war and
especially combat, soldiers were driven to, and beyond, the breaking point in
unprecedented numbers. Psychiatric casualties and the detrimental impact of traumatic
events had been noted in the past, such as railway and industrial accidents in the 19th
century, and war neuroses in the American Civil War. But this was on an entirely
different scale. For the soldiers who did not succumb to shell shock and become
debilitated in the long-term, many became war weary. War weariness can be said to have
affected many of those very soldiers who were pushed to, but not yet beyond, the
breaking point. It is these soldiers, primarily, that this project will assess.
The infantry at the front, especially, were exposed to several forces that constantly
undermined their powers of resistance, and compromised their health and well-being.
Trauma and terror, lice and vermin, the claustrophobia and privation of the trenches,
explosions, snipers, gas, MGs and artillery, aerial bombardment, deprivation and
hardship, the lack of proper sleep and food, and witnessing and participating in traumatic
events all served to attack the morale and discipline of the soldiers. Individual soldiers as
well as entire military units – and indeed, even whole armies and nations – could be
described as war weary. War weariness is a concept that several historians discuss and
secondary sources make use of,2 but they seem to take for granted what this phenomenon

One historian, for instance, made reference to the “war weariness and despondency” of the French nation which
spread to its troops during the mutinies. Another referred to the “war-weary veterans” of the PPCLI, and another to
British troops as “war-weary” in the Hundred Days. References to “general war-weariness” in the German Army and
2
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was and how it impacted the individuals and military units. Other historians sidestep the
issue entirely, or only discuss it in passing. But what exactly is war weariness, and how
did it impact the soldiers on the battlefield? Moreover, did war weariness look the same
for every unit and every army that participated in the war? How did the war weariness of
combatant soldiers at the front differ from the phenomenon as it developed behind the
lines and on the lines of communication, if at all?3

War Weariness in the First World War – Definitions and
Parameters
War weariness at its most general and most basic can be understood as a negative
reaction to the war, combat, and its effects. It might also be interpreted as a growing
reluctance and unwillingness to continue, despite all the practical, legal, and social forces
keeping soldiers with their units and at duty. Many soldiers at the time made use of
particular expressions which reflected the erosion of strength and commitment to the war,
even if they had been volunteers and formerly dedicated and keen. Some soldiers, for
instance, stated that they were sick or tired of the war, that they were burnt-out,4 or that
their nerves were at the breaking point. Others suggested that they were fed up5 and
unwilling to continue. One infantry subaltern recalled General Haig’s address in March

the increase in desertion rates in the Russian Army “under the twin impacts of war weariness and excessive casualties
suffered to little or no avail” were also made. See Anthony Babington, For the Sake of Example: Capital CourtsMartial 1914-1920 (London: Leo Cooper, 1983), 117; David J. Bercuson, The Patricias: The Proud History of a
Fighting Regiment (Don Mills: Stoddart Publishing Co. Ltd., 2001), 68; Jonathan Boff, Winning and Losing on the
Western Front: The British Third Army and the Defeat of Germany in 1918 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press,
2012), 15, 93, 113; Dennis Showalter, “World War I,” in The Reader’s Companion to Military History edited by Robert
Cowley and Geoffrey Parker (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Company and The Society for Military History, 1996), 521526 and Hart, The Great War, 247.
3 This dissertation will focus primarily upon the combat infantry and other soldiers at the front, but examples and
comparisons with other forces, arms, and services can also be instructive.
4 Many soldiers also made reference to weariness as exhaustion and physical fatigue, especially as it negatively affected
attitude, behaviour, and decision-making. See, for example, Cate, ed., A Soldier’s Memoir of World War I, 48, 64.
5 A soldier of the 13th Battalion said that during the final months of the war “everybody was fed up of course” by that
point in the war. Another recalled that “I was getting pretty fed up and thinking that I’d sooner be going to the rear than
[back] to the front.” And one wrote in the final months that “the war is lasting too long…we’re fed up! Everybody! All
fed up!” LAC, RG 41 B III 1, Volume 9, Interview with W.P. Dodds of the 13 th Battalion, Interview 1 of 2, page 15;
Ibid, Volume 7, Interview with Guy Mills of the 4th Battalion, Interview 2 of 2, page 2, and LAC, MG 30 E 113, ‘Back
to Blighty,’ George V. Bell Diary, 112.
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1918 to his “battle-worn troops in the darkest hour of the war.”6 And a civilian observer
in Berlin made reference to the German Army as “tired and worn-out,”7 reflecting the fact
that collective war weariness caused problems by the final months of the war. Still
another soldier admitted that the troops of the 20th Canadian Battalion were “weary and
depressed by the losses sustained” at Cambrai, and that the troops were experiencing
“combat-weary disillusionment” in the latter stages of the war.8 And even before 1918,
soldiers were expressing discontent and a desire to an end to the war,9 or at least their
own participation in it. Duncan MacDonald, for example, wrote on 8 September 1917 to
his daughter Margaret that “I feel particularly ‘fed up’ with this job today and wish the
war was over, or that I was going to Canada for furlough.” A little over a fortnight later
he wrote that “I would like to see peace and get home safe again, as well as anybody, but
I would hate to quit without beating the Germans decisively,”10 highlighting this tension
facing most soldiers. Despite the war weariness of the troops, many were still committed
to the cause, even if they no longer personally wanted to participate in the war.11 And
archival sources and firsthand accounts also made reference to “war worn officers,” a
“war-sick army,” “battle wearied troops” in the Hundred Days, and the “weariness of

6

Charles Douie, The Weary Road: Recollections of a Subaltern of Infantry (Stevenage: The Strong Oak Press Ltd.,
1988), 3. Another soldier wrote of “battle-weary French and British” units which limited the success at Amiens in
August 1918. Walsh, The First World War Diary of Private Bert Cooke, 154.
7 Princess Evelyn Blücher, An English Wife in Berlin: A Private Memoir of Events, Politics, and Daily Life in Germany
throughout the War and the Social Revolution of 1918 (New York: E.P. Dutton & Company, 1920), 277. This phrase
was also found in archival sources pertaining to Canadian troops. See, for example, LAC, RG 9 III C15, Volume 4675,
Extracts from Chaplains’ Reports, ‘Work of Chaplains in France, R.C.’
8 Major D.J. Corrigall, The History of the Twentieth Canadian Battalion (Central Ontario Regiment): Canadian
Expeditionary Force in the Great War, 1914-1918 (Toronto: Stone & Cox Limited, 1935), 265 and Audrey and Paul
Grescoe, eds., The Book of War Letters: 100 Years of Private Canadian Correspondence (Toronto: McClelland &
Stewart Ltd., 2003), 6. See also Scott, The Great War as I Saw It for expressions of “weary” men.
9 See, for example, McGrath, World War I Diary of William Hannaford Ball, 108, 148. And when he finally left
Liverpool for home, he wrote “we are realizing what we have looked forward to for many a long day.”
10 On 31 July MacDonald also wrote that “I wish that I was home to pay a visit.” Dalhousie University Archives and
Special Collections [hereafter DUASC], Duncan Chisholm MacDonald Fonds, Collection No. MS-2-520, Box 1, Folder
1-3, Letters of 31 July 1917, 8 September 1917, and 24 September 1917.
11 This was a view also reflected by the Canadian Corps Commander Sir Arthur Currie after the war. He stated that
“you cannot understand how sick we all were of the war, nor our anxiety of finishing it as soon as possible, if there was
any chance of success. Your sons and brothers wanted to see it out. They wanted to be done with this cursed thing. They
never want to see any more war.” John Robert Colombo, ed., Colombo’s Canadian Quotations (Edmonton: Hurtig
Publishers, n.d.), 135. Private James Brown of the 89th Battalion also wrote that “the more we see of war and its results
the less a man wants to see of it and the more he feels that we have got to win and put an end to the idiotic delusion that
war is a method of settling disputes.” Grescoe, The Book of War Letters, 187.
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war.”12 Many euphemisms suggested war weariness, without actually making use of the
term itself.13 War weariness might also include physical elements, such as exhaustion and
fatigue, but was more a state of mind, reflecting emotional, mental, or psychological
exhaustion. And of course all soldiers grumbled, groused, and complained, which partly
acted as an outlet for stress, but it was sustained criticism of the war and its prosecution,
continued ill-feeling toward the army or its officers, a lack of enthusiasm, and cumulative
stress that wore down even the most committed volunteers which reflected war weariness.
It must also be understood that not all those individuals who were war weary
necessarily desired an end to the war. Revolutionary agitation and pacifism affected some
soldiers, to be sure, but certainly not the majority. Many of these war-weary soldiers
remained committed to the cause and loyal to their governments, but were realistic about
their own abilities to continue at the front. In a sense, then, the personal acknowledgment
of war weariness and its negative implications was actually an act of patriotism and
loyalty, as these soldiers understood that increasingly war-weary troops were a liability to
others in the unit – and to themselves. This individual expression of war weariness,
moreover, was often more about their own participation in the war, not opposition to the
war itself, though it did sometimes transmute into an anti-war or pacifist attitude.14

Another document instructed chaplains of the need to “cheer and hearten the soldiers in their privations and perils,”
as “this will be the most critical period of the war. For weariness cannot but fill our men after so long a period of
hardship and endurance.” Moreover, “weariness can best be combated by garrisoning the soul of the Army. The war has
now become a combat of endurance…[and the men need] strength of will to endure to the end.” See LAC, RG 9 III B1,
Series 3, Volume 941, E-72-3, Establishment Canadian Corps Reinforcement Camp, ‘Canadian Corps M.G. 9-2/304, 15
June 1918;’ LAC, RG 9 III C15, Volume 4666, Chaplain Service, Last 100 Days, ‘The Final Advance (7 th October to
11th November);’ Ibid, Volume 4648, England 1917-1919, ‘Administration’ and Ibid, Volume 4663, Publicity, various
newspaper clippings; Cate, ed., A Soldier’s Memoir of World War I, 61, and Steward, An Infantryman on the Western
Front, 166.
13 For primary source references see Rogers, ed., Gunner Ferguson’s Diary, 126. Secondary source references to war
weariness, without actually using the term, are found in John Baynes, Morale: A Study of Men and Courage – The
Second Scottish Rifles a the Battle of Neuve Chapelle 1915 (London: Cassell and Company Ltd., 1967), 101; Rachel
Duffett, The Stomach for Fighting: Food and the Soldiers of the Great War (Manchester: Manchester University Press,
2012), 220, 233; Martin Gilbert, The Battle of the Somme: The Heroism and Horror of War (Toronto: McClelland &
Stewart Ltd., 2006), 246; Richard Holmes, Firing Line (London: Jonathan Cape Ltd., 1985), 215, 325 and Maj.-Gen.
F.M. Richardson, Fighting Spirit: A Study of Psychological Factors in War (London: Leo Cooper, 1978), 34, 75-77,
121-122.
14 One soldier, for instance, wrote of “the ghastly senselessness of ‘civilized’ warfare.” Another admitted that “I for one
think war is an awful thing in these enlightened days,” and wondered why disputes cannot be settled without bloodshed.
Another admitted in late 1917 that he became “a confirmed pacifist from this time on.” And another wrote “damn this
dirty, lousy, stinking bloody war” in his diary. See Charles C. Cate, ed., Notes: A Soldier’s Memoir of World War I
(Victoria: Trafford Publishing, 2005), 40; Milly Walsh and John Callan, We’re Not Dead Yet: The First World War
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Private Bert Cooke, for instance, wrote during the final months of the war that “war isn’t
worth the sacrifice,” and hoped the war would “end before our brave men who are in the
trenches are doomed.” He reaffirmed his belief in the cause, however, writing that “we all
want to see Germany crushed…but I hope and trust that something will happen that the
struggle will be finished without much more bloodshed.”15 Protests and collective
indiscipline could have a political or revolutionary element, but more often than not were
based on mundane issues such as the inadequacy of leave, poor rations, ineffective
leadership, unsuccessful tactics, and the like.
War weariness was also related the impact of the war on individuals, whether that
manifested itself in medical, political, disciplinary/legal, or social problems. Most soldiers
and civilians existed on a spectrum, whether in the war zone, along the lines of
communication, or on the home front far from combat. Historians often examine the
soldiers on the extreme ends of the spectrum, but this project seeks to interrogate the
experiences of those in the middle but perhaps approaching breakdown. This not only
constituted the majority of soldiers during the war, it also seems to be a group that has
heretofore been largely ignored. On the one extreme end of the spectrum were the
soldiers best described as ideal warriors or happy soldiers: those who were able to endure
war and combat for extended periods of time without undue health problems, and perhaps
even came to enjoy killing and combat.16 The other extreme end of the spectrum included
the soldiers who were debilitated by combat, made useless by acute exposure to intense
stimuli or the cumulative impact of the stresses and strains of war.17 In many cases, war-

Diary of Private Bert Cooke (St. Catharines: Vanwell Publishing Limited, 2004), 157; Rogers, ed., Gunner Ferguson’s
Diary, 128 and LAC, MG 30, Volume E 113, ‘Back to Blighty,’ George V. Bell Diary, 135.
15 Walsh, The First World War Diary of Private Bert Cooke, 159-160.
16 One researcher argued that only around 2% of soldiers were able to stand sustained combat, and these were those
who were predisposed toward “aggressive psychopathic personalities.” Lieutenant Colonel Dave Grossman, On Killing:
The Psychological Cost of Learning to Kill in War and Society – Revised Edition (New York: Back Bay Books, 2009),
44. Another historian defines the ‘Happy Warrior’ as those soldiers who were confident and cheery “despite the grim
ordeals of battle.” Philpott, War of Attrition, 114.
17 Some works on shell shock include: Richard A. Gabriel, No More Heroes: Madness and Psychiatry in War (New
York: Hill and Wang, 1987); Peter Leese, Shell Shock: Traumatic Neurosis and the British Soldiers of the First World
War (Houndmills: Palgrave Macmillan, 2002); Paul Lerner, Hysterical Men: War, Psychiatry, and the Politics of
Trauma in Germany, 1890-1930 (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2003); Fiona Reid, Broken Men: Shell Shock,
Treatment and Recovery in Britain 1914-1930 (London: Continuum Books, 2010); Ben Shephard, A War of Nerves:
Soldiers and Psychiatrists in the Twentieth Century (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2001) and Alexander
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weary soldiers were at a point prior to shell shock debilitation, were being worn down and
becoming less effective soldiers, but had not yet reached the point of complete futility. In
this sense, war weariness was the penultimate step before complete breakdown.
Another way to look at this spectrum is to identify the healthy, committed, ‘fresh’
troops on the one extreme end, and total shell shock debilitation and uselessness as a
soldier on the other. Those suffering from war weariness, however, fell somewhere in
between, but likely closer to breakdown.18 War-weary troops could carry on and continue
to be effective soldiers, but might be less committed, were reluctant, or unwilling to
follow orders as closely as in the past. Perhaps the main distinction was that war-weary
soldiers were mostly able to carry on with duty, though they might be increasingly
reluctant and unwilling, whereas debilitated shell-shocked soldiers were largely unable to
continue at the front. In my estimation, this is the best way to approach the concept of war
weariness and the impact of combat, and the war more generally, on the individual; it is
also the main definition or understanding of war weariness that I will use throughout. One
of the main issues addressed in this project thus examines when willingness to continue
became the unwillingness to endure. This was of course different for every individual, but
general trends and patterns can be discerned.
It is also important to understand that there were both contributing factors and
preconditions for war weariness, as well as manifestations and its effects. The context and
situation was crucial. To provide but one example, heavy casualties could both contribute
to, and mitigate the worst effects of war weariness. In terms of contributing to the onset of
war weariness, heavy casualties could have an enormous psychological impact on the
surviving troops who perhaps witnessed the death of close friends and comrades, but also
put more pressure on the remaining soldiers of the unit. But heavy casualties also had the
effect of removing the most war-weary and worn-down soldiers, leaving more space for
younger or less-experienced, and thus less worn, troops.

Watson, Enduring the Great War: Combat, Morale and Collapse in the German and British Armies, 1914-1918
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2008). See the bibliography for journal articles and other sources as well.
18 Historian Joanna Bourke suggested that there was a fine line between war weariness (apathy, indifference, and
fatalism) and shell shock. Joanna Bourke, Fear: A Cultural History (Emeryville: Shoemaker & Hoard, 2006), 216.
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War weariness could affect individuals, combat soldiers and non-combatants, and
entire military units. Moreover, although it is largely outside the scope of this project, war
weariness impacted both soldiers in uniform, and civilians on the home front.19 The
phenomenon played out somewhat differently on the home front, but soldiers and
civilians faced hardships and pressures due to the war which undermined commitment
and morale. The prospect of ultimate victory and tangible successes on the battlefield,
however, helped the Entente sustain support longer than their Central Power opponents.
War weariness also afflicted the other national armies in the war. In the Russian army, for
example, there was an enormous gap between officers and other ranks and the harsh
conditions facing the regular Russian infantryman eroded confidence in the officer corps.
These issues were also compounded by other deep-rooted problems in the Russian army
and wider society. The Belgian army experienced the negative long-term effects of war
and occupation, and the Italian and Austro-Hungarian20 armies also exhibited growing
signs of war weariness by the final years of the war. Indeed, as historian William Philpott
argued in War of Attrition: Fighting the First World War, despite perceptions of relative
strength “the reality was that all armies were on their last legs come 1918, with the
exception of the slowly growing and green American army and the small Belgian
army.”21
Individual war weariness could lead to or contribute to numerous problems
amongst soldiers at the front. Long-term service in the army, and especially at the front,
contributed to issues such as apathy; loss of will, commitment, or endurance;
psychological breakdown; undue caution or recklessness; fatalism;22 health problems
such as psychiatric injuries, and other aspects that undermined the effectiveness of the
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See Haste, Keep the Home Fires Burning, 2-4, 141. Rationing, censorship, endless casualty lists, food and fuel
shortages began to take their toll on civilians, and entire societies and nations became war weary. Ultimately, the
commitment toward the war effort and the ruling regime began to become more tenuous and provisional. Unions and
other groups exploited this situation to extract concessions from the government, though most civilians continued to
remain largely loyal and only refused further support after the failure and futility of the war became evident.
20 Fiona Reid and Christine Van Everbroeck, “Shell Shock and the Kloppe: War Neuroses amongst British and Belgian
Troops during and after the First World War,” Medicine, Conflict and Survival, 30, 4 (2014): 252-275.
See also Herwig, The First World War, especially chapter 9 for the Habsburg forces.
21 Philpott, War of Attrition, 311.
22 See, for example, Lord Moran, The Anatomy of Courage: The Classic WWI Account of the Psychological Effects of
War (New York: Carroll & Graf Publishers, 2007), 31, 44, 51, 119 and Caughill, ed., Letters to Janet, 125.
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soldier. A contemporary poem on apathy provides a good glimpse into some of the
negative implications of this attitude and emotion at the front:
In lies in the valley of what’s-the-use,
In the province of Let-er-slide,
That tired feeling is native there,
It’s the home of the listless I-don’t-care
Where the Put-it-offs abide.23
This lack of concern and commitment on the part of apathetic and disinterested soldiers,
worn down by years of service, could be detrimental to his unit, even compromising the
ability to follow orders and do one’s duty. Apathy and exhaustion could also undermine
commitment, with a soldier of the 13th Battalion commenting that “I lost all interest in the
war…I just wanted to sit down and be allowed to rest awhile.”24
Collective war weariness had similar attributes, but could be even more dangerous
as large numbers of troops decided that their commitment to the war was increasingly
uncertain. This collective war weariness could thus lead to large-scale collapse,
manifesting in voluntary surrenders or disciplinary problems, or poor performance on the
battlefield. More dangerously, however, collective war weariness could contribute to the
adoption of apathetic, anti-war, anti-government, or even revolutionary attitudes. Some
soldiers came to question the war itself, as well as its purpose, prosecution, cost, and
implications. The case of Germany and the German Army in the final months of the war
is an example, as is the Russian disintegration and slide into revolution which were both
directly and indirectly related to the war effort.
War weariness was also directly and indirectly related to the morale, discipline,
combat motivation, battlefield effectiveness and efficiency, and endurance of the soldiers.
War weariness can be understood broadly as the erosion of strength, endurance, and
commitment of the soldiers afflicted, and the increasingly tenuous support for the war and

LAC, RG 9 III C10, Volume 4555, Folder 4, File 3, Poems, ‘In Flanders Fields, No. 10 Canadian Field Ambulance,
CAMC.’ John Becker also expressed apathy in the late stages of the war. He also wrote that he was “fed up.” See Norm
Christie, ed., Silhouettes of the Great War: The Memoir of John Harold Becker 1915-1919 (Ottawa: CEF Books, 2001),
196-197.
24 LAC, RG 41 B III 1, Volume 9, Interview with K.G. Blackader of the 13 th Battalion, Interview 1 of 2, page 14.
23
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one’s own continued participation in it. The factors contributing to this phenomenon were
various, and included heavy casualties; exhaustion and the lack of proper rest and
insufficient leave and rotation policies; the mental and psychological state of the soldiers;
the nature, pace, and intensity of combat on the Western Front; and the rhetoric
employed, expectations, and orders issued by superiors and the High Command. War
weariness also manifested itself in numerous ways, including disciplinary and legal
problems, such as insubordination and indiscipline, cowardice, desertion, self-inflicted
wounds (SIWs); collective decline; heavy casualties; poor performance on the battlefield;
medical problems; apathy, the lack of enthusiasm or vigour of the troops;25 the words,
actions, and attitudes of the soldiers; increasing caution and reluctance to perform regular
duties; unwillingness and the reduction of participation; the desire to evade duty or escape
the trenches;26 morale issues; and eventual breakdown. If war-weary soldiers were forced
to remain at the front and pushed beyond the breaking point, it seems that shell shock
debilitation and serious health and medical problems were all but inevitable. This was just
one reason why the medical and military authorities needed to be cognizant of these
problems, and to monitor and if necessary intervene to prevent war weariness from
transmuting into serious shell shock and other problems.
War weariness also affected entire armies, nations, and societies after a certain
period of time. There was of course no definite amount of time that needed to pass before
large groups of people became war weary; each case was different, and each army and
nation faced unique and general challenges pertaining to the war. In Russia, for instance,
by 1917 and certainly early 1918, the people were suffering from exhaustion, bankruptcy,
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Prior to going into the line for the first time, James Adams of the 26th Battalion was nervous but excited. By midSeptember 1918, however, he wrote that since arriving in France “I have not always been in the best of spirits,” but still
did not regret being sent to the front. And in late September he wrote that any “spark I brought to this adventure [was]
all but gone…[and] some rest will surely send it roaring again. But for now it is a struggle to merely keeping it lit.”
Caughill, ed., Letters to Janet, 127, 134.
26 The evasion of duty and the desire to escape the trenches and continued service at the front could take various forms.
One soldier wrote that during a period of action some soldiers “ran about bewildered, and some ‘just naturally’
disappeared, to be rounded up later covered in mud and dirt.” Cate, ed., A Soldier’s Memoir of World War I, 39.
Soldiers could desert, go AWL, or refuse to participate in action, for example, or could remove themselves from combat
through SIWs or self-inflicted illnesses. Other soldiers sought to willingly surrender to the enemy, or feign sickness or
illness. Some war weary and shell shocked troops, moreover, decided on a permanent solution and took their own lives.
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and starvation,27 all contributing factors toward war weariness and the defeat of its Army
on the Eastern Front. Other indicators and manifestations of war weariness amongst the
Russian civilian and soldier population were evident as well. The development of war
weariness in the Russian Army was based on internal difficulties, but also as a response to
external realities and the wider war situation. The Russians were seriously outclassed by
the German Army, and when the latter launched Operation Albion in October 1917 it
“promote[d] war weariness and despair amidst the Russian ranks.”28 And another
historian argued that the mutiny in the 223rd Odoevskii Regiment in the autumn of 1916
was “caused primarily by battle fatigue and war weariness rather than revolutionary
agitation” amongst the troops.29 This ‘revolutionary agitation’ would come later, and also
affected rear-echelon units and army administrative personnel. The Russians were the
first to collapse because of the cumulative stresses and strains on the people, its army,
economy, and social institutions, but they were not the last. General Erich Ludendorff, the
de facto ruler of Germany’s army by 1918, also wrote of problems on the home front30
and amongst his troops. Further fighting relied heavily on the maintenance of morale and
discipline, and the soldiers needed strength and determination to counter increasing Allied
(material) strength. The problem, however, was that “the armistice offer had had an
unfavourable effect on the men’s spirits, and war weariness had increased”
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Charles F. Horne and Walter F. Austin, eds., Source Records of the Great War: Volume VI 1918 (Unknown Place of
Publication: National Alumni, 1923), xiv.
28 Hart, The Great War, 302.
29 Beckett, The Great War, 522.
30 This is an issue discussed by historians in secondary sources as well. Herwig, for instance, wrote that hunger, “war
weariness,” and uneven food distribution hurt the ‘public mood’ in Germany over time. He wrote, moreover, that
industrial strikes in 1918 were caused by hunger, cold, and war weariness. Herwig, The First World War, 287, 366.
Another historian noted that the German nation will was undermined after the acceptance of the justice of the war
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significantly.31 Other historians have also made references to war weariness in the nations
and armies of Italy, France,32 Bulgaria, Austria-Hungary,33 and Great Britain.
The experience of war weariness in the British Army is particularly instructive, as
the Canadians were part of the British Army and there were substantial cultural,
historical, and social connections between the two countries. Canada at the time was also
legally and culturally a part of the wider British Empire. The Canadian forces were
modelled on the British Army, and shared much of the same equipment and weapons.
Much of Canada’s First Contingent, moreover, was British-born and British-led. The
English-speaking soldiers in the Corps included many Anglophiles; many still had family
or friends in the UK. Some of the lessons for the British Army could also be applied to
the Canadian forces. Historian David Englander, for instance, argued that leave was more
“than just a respite for war-weary troops,” as it also reaffirmed their humanity and
individuality.34 Another historian noted the connections between the home front and
battle front. Soldier morale and the will to continue fighting, for example, could be
eroded by war weariness and “flagging support at home.” And despite the hardships and
growing war weariness on the British home front, the pro-war consensus was maintained

General Ludendorff, My War Memories 1914-1918 – Volume II (London: Hutchinson & Co., 1919), 745. Historian
Nick Lloyd also wrote that after the failure of the German Spring Offensives to end the war, confidence and high
morale gave way to “extremely widespread war-weariness, glumness and despondency.” And by October 1918 German
POWs were ‘war-weary and war-sick.’ Nick Lloyd, Hundred Days: The Campaign That Ended World War I (New
York: Basic Books, 2014), 91, 203.
32 For war weariness in France and the French Army, see Hart, The Great War, 339 and Philpott, War of Attrition, 291,
who argued that the French mutinies were “one manifestation of the general war weariness that gripped Europe during
1917.” Regarding Italian war weariness, one researcher noted that propaganda targeted “war-weary” Italian conscripts
to great effect. Charles Roetter, The Art of Psychological Warfare 1914-1945 (New York: Stein and Day, 1974), 76.
33 War weariness in Austria-Hungary and its armies has also been noted by historians. Mark Cornwall, for example,
referred to “general war-weariness” and the “rigours of army life” as combining with problems on the home front to
hurt the morale and discipline of the Habsburg forces. War weariness and food crises hurt morale, and troop morale was
also compromised by war weariness, nationalist agitation, food and clothing shortages, and nurtured by enemy
propaganda. Mark Cornwall, “Morale and Patriotism in the Austro-Hungarian Army, 1914-1918,” in State, Society and
Mobilization in Europe during the First World War edited by John Horne (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press,
1997), 177, 181, 188. Another historian noted that people on the home front, especially amongst the Central Powers,
were “war weary,” and that there was growing war weariness “within the European belligerents’ populations” by the
end of 1917. A decline in the support for the war and a general strike was “inspired by” war weariness. There was also a
naval mutiny in February 1918 and industrial strikes in the heartland. Philpott, War of Attrition, 253, 281, 317. The
Bulgarian collapse in late 1918 has also been attributed to “war-weariness, poor morale and a shortage of food and
clothing,” but there were other factors as well. G.D. Sheppard, “Aleksander Stamboliski and the Bulgarian Contract,”
History Today, 65, 9 (September 2015): 28-30.
34 David Englander, “Discipline and Morale in the British Army, 1917-1918,” in State, Society and Mobilization ed. by
Horne, 137.
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by censorship, propaganda, and war prosperity. Furthermore, despite a “considerable
degree of war-weariness” late in the war, fighting spirit was preserved at sufficient levels
at least until the cessation of hostilities.35
The onset of war weariness in the British Army was also acknowledged by
medical and military authorities. A December 1917 report on the British armies in France
concluded that “war-weariness there is, and an almost universal longing for peace but
there is a strong current of feeling that only one kind of peace is possible and that the time
is not yet come” to end the war.36 Therefore despite war weariness, some troops found the
inner strength, coping mechanisms, and moral props to carry on with duty, even if their
performance was compromised. And as more soldiers became war weary and the war
continued into 1918, there was increasing evidence of poor performance on the
battlefield. Historian Alexander Watson argued that the poor performance of the BEF in
the spring of 1918 was based on “the legacy of despondency and war weariness”37 from
Third Ypres and other pyrrhic victories.
The experience of war weariness illustrates another important point regarding the
phenomenon, namely that it affected both victorious and defeated armies. Success
certainly helped mitigate the worst effects of war weariness on both an individual and
collective level, but it was no panacea. The prospect of ultimate victory in the war and
evidence of success on the battlefield helped sustain some soldiers, but the stresses and
strains of combat wore them down nonetheless. In many ways, the Canadian soldiers and
the Corps itself was successful and ultimately victorious despite the onset and negative
consequences of war weariness. Indeed, by 1918 all armies were worn out, perhaps save
the American forces.38 The comparison between the worn-out Entente forces and their
new American allies was made by other historians as well. Anthony Kellett argued that
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Anthony Kellett, Combat Motivation: The Behaviour of Soldiers in Battle (Boston: Kluwer Nijhoff Publishing,
1982), 177, 180, 265. Another historian also wrote of “times of profound war-weariness in the British Army”
throughout the war. Gerard Christopher Oram, Military Executions During World War I (Houndmills: Palgrave
Macmillan, 2003), 169.
36 Oram, Military Executions, 95.
37 Watson, Enduring the Great War.
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US troops in mid-1918 were “markedly enthusiastic compared with their war-weary
allies,” and Canadian soldier Coningsby Dawson stated that the troops at the front looked
to the US for firmness and resolve “for the reason that she is not [yet] war-weary,” unlike
the Entente forces and their soldiers.39
The study of war weariness is aided by recognition that this phenomenon also
affected the Canadian home front and had an impact into the post-Armistice period. After
years of war and with no end in sight, the Canadian home front became increasingly
affected by war weariness. As historian Jack Granatstein argued, “Canadians at home
were weary of war” by 1917.40 The seemingly endless casualty lists, shortages,
prohibition, corruption, and profiteering were all contributing factors. Following the
cessation of hostilities with the signing of the Armistice in November 1918, moreover,
evidence of war weariness continued, despite the fact that the war was all but over. The
soldiers, however, were experiencing the inevitable reaction from years of combat and
were still in khaki, far from home, and still subject to military discipline. As a member of
the 31st Battalion explained, by March of 1919 he was “fed up” with army life and just
wanted to be demobilised and return home.41 Moreover, disciplinary problems and
‘disturbances’ in the post-Armistice period involving Canadian troops, such as that at
Witley and Rhyl Camp in the UK, suggest lingering discontent coupled with the absence
of a cause to fight for. One officer explained the problems:
In dealing with troops at the present stage, the psychological factor enters very
materially into the proper control of the men, i.e. it is essential to understand the
man’s peculiar attitude of mind produced by the relaxation of war strain and his
desire for his home and work.42
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40 Jack Granatstein, The Greatest Victory: Canada’s One Hundred Days (Don Mills: Oxford University Press, 2014),
76.
41 Marjorie Barron Norris, ed., Medicine and Duty: The World War I Memoir of Captain Harold W. McGill, Medical
Officer, 31st Battalion CEF (Calgary: University of Calgary Press, 2007), 341. Another soldier remembered that by the
end of the war “I had had about enough by that time” and just wanted to return home. LAC, RG 41 B III 1, Volume 12,
Interview with F.W. Kirkland of the 29th Battalion, page 8.
42 LAC, RG 9 III B1, Volume 1778, D-18-14, Discipline Generally, A.D.M.S., England, Report dated 27 February
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This war-weary attitude seemed to be based on the fact that the war was won, but not yet
over. The soldiers were expected to remain at duty well into the new year, and they were
still far from their homes and loved ones. In this period, prior to demobilisation and
transport back to Canada, the soldiers “simply wanted to go home” as soon as possible.43
The problems that affected Canadian troops following the Armistice also affected
the other victorious powers as well. The British, for instance, were unwilling to commit
too heavily to the Western intervention in Russia on behalf of the White Army.
According to one historian, by 1919 Britain “was weary of war,” as the “carnage and
privation of the First World War had drained all enthusiasm for large-scale military
ventures” and operations.44 Because war weariness affected both victorious and defeated
armies, and was present on multiple home fronts, it is safe to conclude that it also affected
the Canadian Corps, despite claims to Canadian exceptionalism and the fact that they
were ultimately victorious. These concepts are not mutually exclusive, and it seems the
Canadians were successful despite war weariness. This dissertation will explore war
weariness in the Corps and how this impacted both individuals and military units.

The Important Connections between the Home and Battle Fronts
In addition to the impact of war weariness on combat soldiers, the phenomenon
was also experienced by non-soldiers and civilians on various home fronts affiliated with
the war effort. All troops were exposed to the stresses and strains of war, and thus faced
the impact of war weariness, but this also affected the collective. An examination of war
weariness in other armies allows for a comparison with the experiences of the Canadians.
Indeed, as the other main combatants on the Western Front, the British, French, and
German armies – having been in the field in substantial strength since 1914 – could be
said to have experienced substantial and widespread war weariness amongst its troops
prior to the extensive development of the same phenomenon amongst Canadians. And as
the Canadian Corps and the wider CEF was but a constituent component of the British
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Army, one can also interrogate the experiences facing the British armies to get a better
understanding of specific members of those armies, such as the Canadian troops. And
though a majority of Canada’s First Contingent were British-born,45 over time the
proportion of Canadian-born troops increased, and throughout the war there was certainly
a perceptible increase in awareness of a unique (or at least distinct) Canadian identity and
nationality.
An examination of the various home fronts also provides the historian with the
opportunity to chart the growth and increasing impact of war weariness on these fronts, as
well as identify the important connections between the home front and battle front.
Censorship documents and reports on civilian morale allow the researcher to gauge the
level of motivation and commitment to the war effort amongst civilians and others at
home. The opinions and well-being of serving soldiers, and essential war workers and
others, was crucial for the maintenance of the pro-war consensus. This evidence,
suggestive and anecdotal but likely never comprehensive, provides a window into the
negative effect of war weariness on the home front, and the erosion of endurance and the
real, tangible impact of the war on the civilians at home. And though there have been
arguments and debates as to whether the war was a genuine total war, it is undeniable that
this conflict placed unprecedented demands on regular members of society back home.
The frequent casualty lists, the loss of loved ones, the disruption of regular life, the
shortages and hardships, the suspicions and anxiety, the rationing, and sense of
uncertainty wore on even the strongest members of society.
The various links between the home fronts and battle fronts is also an important
aspect in assessing the impact, extent, and implications of war weariness. An increase of
war weariness on the home front, manifested for instance in an outbreak of food riots or
worker grievances (sometimes political in nature), could also have a negative impact on
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the troops of that nation stationed at the front, or in even in the armed forces more
generally. After the Treaty of Brest-Litovsk in 1918, for example, German and other
Central Power troops in transit from the Eastern to the Western Front were exposed to the
increasingly tough conditions facing civilians and even military personnel in the Reich.
Moreover, despite the best efforts of censorship officials and political indoctrination46 or
propaganda, the curtailing of leave, and the increasing armed forces control over the
civilian population, discontent on the battle fronts came to be known on the home fronts
as well. The fall of commitment and worsening of conditions on one front could not have
failed to impact the other front, in myriad and increasingly disruptive ways. In this sense,
war weariness on the home front could induce, encourage, or reinforce that same
development on the battle front, and vice-versa. And as the First World War was a global,
total war, these links had an increased importance compared with earlier, limited,
localised, or rapidly-concluding conflicts. The importance of the links between the home
and the battle fronts was articulated elegantly in the words of historian Brock Millman,
…modern warfare is not a conflict of armies so much as a contest of societies.
Defeat can come as much from the collapse of the home front as from military
failure. The maintenance of a nation’s will to fight is as important as its physical
ability to continue the struggle. Total war….broadens the scope of the conflict and
links aspects of the contest in an organic manner, to the point where weakness
anywhere can become weakness everywhere. Lack of military success can easily
give rise to dissent on the home front, which, taking the form of industrial unrest,
may deprive the army of those things it requires to prevent new and greater
defeats. Failure on the home front is therefore as likely to produce total disaster as
is defeat at the battle front.47
And historians M.L. Sanders and Philip M. Taylor argued that the reality of total war
ensured that large segments of the population now had a direct interest in, and direct
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impact on, the fighting and combat on the Western Front. The fighting in Europe now
came to affect these civilians on the home front in unprecedented ways as well. They
asserted that “during the war, sections of the community which had previously remained
uninvolved in the exigencies of national survival had found themselves directly affected
by events at the front line,” and that in a total war the gap between soldier and civilian
“narrowed substantially.”48
And as the war was also a modern, industrial war, requiring the mobilization of
the entire resources of the state, the importance of the home front for the fighting forces
only increased. As British historian Bernard Waites argued in A Class Society at War:
England 1914-1918, the attritional strategy of the war guaranteed much loss of life and
increased stress on the population and resources of the home front. This was crucial to the
overall development of the war, as “the elusiveness of a resolution to the war on the
battlefield meant that the home fronts acquired ever greater significance as the stalemate
was prolonged.”49 The nature and extent of the conflict ensured an increased importance
of the home front on the soldiers in the line and on the lines of communication. The links
between the home fronts and battle fronts can only be taken so far, however. Civilians
back home in Germany, for example, faced some different problems than their soldier
counterparts fighting at the front. Moreover, the nature of military service and the
practical realities of soldiering meant that war weariness was partly manifested in
different ways on the battle front as opposed to the home front. The political tools used to
mitigate or attempt to neutralise the worst effects of war weariness on the home front
might also have differed from the institutional methods of the nation’s military leaders to
deal with the similar problems at the front. Additionally, the powers and extent of military
authority were partly different from those of political or national authority in Germany,
though it could be argued the militaristic nature of German society and the increasing
sway of military leaders over the political realm nullified this distinction over time.50
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The war weariness on the home fronts and in each national context provide some
insights into the phenomenon of war weariness itself, especially its contributing factors,
examples and instances, consequences of its onset and development, and some lessons for
the Canadian Corps and the historian. War weariness was noted by both contemporaries
and historians in the context of Russia,51 France,52 Italy, Austria-Hungary, Great Britain,
and Germany. It should also be noted that at times it can be difficult to distinguish
between the causes of war weariness, and its symptoms. To take but one example, it
seems that food shortages, rationing, and labour strikes on the home front could be a
cause or contributing factor to the onset of war weariness, as it could lead to discontent
among regular civilians and act as a disruptive force. Conversely, however, labour
militancy or industrial strikes could also be a manifestation or example of widespread war
weariness, as workers and others expressed their dissatisfaction with the war or how it
was being prosecuted.53 Contemporary records and subsequent historical analysis suggest
that this civilian and home-front war weariness affected all the major European combatant
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nations and their societies by mid-1917, and certainly by 1918. This was true for Russia,
France, Great Britain,54 and perhaps most importantly, Germany.55
The experience of civilian and home-front war weariness allows the historian to
draw some general lessons from these various national contexts. First of all, these
different home-front experiences illustrate that there were general and specific, short-term
and long-term, and internal and external contributing factors to the onset and
development of war weariness. These causes could be either material, such as a lack of
food or medical supplies, or non-material, such as a rise in pacifist or defeatist attitudes.
France and Belgium had to endure German occupation as well as the general strains of
the war effort, whereas all combatant nations suffered through rationing, shortages, food,
and supply issues. How the nation’s military and political leaders reacted to these
problems and addressed the grievances of the population was an important consideration
in assessing the endurance of each nation at war. This was especially true as national
service, whether that be in uniform or as a productive member of society, was based on
the idea of a ‘contract’ or reciprocity. There were limits to duty and loyalty, and
governments would be wise to appease members of society to ensure loyalty and
economic production. Civilians and soldiers were expected to do their duty, but in
exchange the powers of the state, particularly the government, were to provide for the
needs of the people, including but not limited to, protection from enemy attack, adequate
food and housing, and sufficient supplies and consumer goods. Hunger, uncertainty, and
malnutrition in Germany made both soldiers and civilians susceptible to disease and
demoralisation, and compromised the ability and willingness to endure.56 As was the case
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with Russia, the inability of the government to provide for the people’s needs shattered
the pro-war consensus and unleashed discontent that had been boiling below the surface
for decades, but was then exacerbated by the stresses and strains of the war.
The second main lesson to be drawn from these case studies is the important and
complex connections between the home and battle fronts during the war. Each nation’s
armed forces were drawn from their parent society, ensuring that these connections
remained paramount throughout the conflict. The home front was vital to the war effort,
ensuring social, political, and economic support for the soldiers on the battle front.
Moreover, the armed forces relied upon the industrial and economic output of the home
front, and the lack of supplies at home could directly hamper the prosecution of military
goals and the wider war effort. The problems at the home front could also reinforce,
reflect, or initiate problems on the battle front, and this also went both ways; it was a
dynamic process, and despite the muzzling of opposition groups, counter-espionage
efforts, censorship, and propaganda, these problems on the home front could not be
contained or kept quiet indefinitely. The links between the home and battle fronts are also
evident in the complex and at times adversarial relationship between the nation’s political
and military leaders. In some cases, such as in Britain, the military leaders were legally
subordinate to political oversight, which caused problems, especially related to questions
over the best way to prosecute the war effort. In Germany, on the other hand, the military
leadership of the country was in ascendency, which caused problems of its own.
The third and final lesson to be drawn from these home-front experiences is that
any combatant nation’s political and military leaders needed to be cognizant of these
developing problems and address them as soon as possible. The government, in
conjunction with military and other leaders, thus had to be prepared to intervene to
protect its own interests, often at the expense of individual or civil rights. It was
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important, for instance, to deal with growing dissent and the emergence of anti-war or
anti-government groups and ideas. In Britain, the government established and then made
use of the National War Aims Committee (NWAC) to address war weariness,57 silence
dissent and portray anti-war voices, or even those seeking a negotiated settlement, as
dangerous and even treasonous. Both civilians and soldiers needed outlets and ‘safety
valves,’ and without proper ways of dealing with both acute and cumulative stresses and
strains of war, these problems could develop into more serious expressions of dissent.

Difficulties of the Project and Problems Facing the Historian
Assessments of military actions and individual conduct on the battlefield are
difficult at the best of times, but for events that took place a century ago, these problems
were substantial. All armies and military forces are composed of both material and nonmaterial forces. The latter included myriad factors like doctrine, strategy, morale,58 public
opinion, attitude, commitment, and other intangible forces. Material, or physical forces
and factors included transport arrangements, weapon systems, and the men (and women)
who wielded these weapons. Historians can examine systems, as well as structures and
contingencies, but we cannot ignore the individuals who compose these systems and drive
historical change. As a wealth of primary59 and secondary literature60 has made clear, the
human, individual factor in war and combat will always be crucial, if not decisive. In
addition to this, these human factors have enormous explanatory power and potential.
Even with the increasing sophistication and automation of the battlefield in today’s world,
the human factor still plays an important role throughout the process of military
preparation and activity.
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Comparisons between different armies and military forces and an appraisal of
combat performance is also useful when considering the experience of the Canadians.
Long-serving soldiers, military units, and armies in the field help illuminate the
increasing problems facing the Canadian Corps over time, especially as the reality of
manpower problems set in for Entente high commands and the Corps was used in an
increasingly important role.61 Nevertheless, the other military forces provide some lessons
for the historian, and provide contemporary lessons for the Corps itself in the final years
of the war, in a process that came to be known as the ‘learning curve’ coupled with
doctrinal and tactical development.62 And though the Canadians were largely successful
militarily in their various engagements, the experience of success and defeat in other
military forces allows for insight into the nature and impact of morale, discipline, combat
motivation, endurance, and ultimately war weariness. Official government and army
reports, eyewitness and firsthand accounts, and other contemporary material provides
extensive examples and evidence of the negative effects of war weariness, the erosion of
endurance, breakdown in combat, and the impact of cumulative and/or acute exposure to
war and battle. It should also be noted that there are various levels of assessment we can
attempt to access, to determine how combat impacted individuals, military units, and the
war situation more broadly.
Historical inquiry always includes some measure of difficulty; there are always
certain gaps and distances between those writing about historical events and processes,
and those who lived through them. Furthermore, personal views on experiences never
remain static. Veterans and participants viewed the past through the lens of their own
experiences but also through the realities of the time in which they are recalling. This is
especially true of a subject that occurred a century ago. Moreover, there are some
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differences between those who actually witnessed or participated in an event, and those
who were merely alive at the time. Historians and researchers of the 21st century will
never be able to truly experience what happened and what it was like to experience it. The
past, moreover, is also manipulated for our own various ends.63 There are both general
and specific difficulties with a project such as this, and especially related to source
material,64 memory, the candour and representativeness of the soldiers, perspective,65 the
intangibles of war and the human experience, and the nature of historical study itself. As
historian Robert Engen argued, it is difficult for historians to evaluate “what takes place
on the battlefield at the personal level,”66 regarding those who were actually and
physically there.
And yet not all historical analysis rests upon official accounts and institutional –
such as government or army – sources. There is certainly use for non-traditional sources,
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as well as ephemera and sources which go beyond the written word. My research, for
instance, has made use of some personal and very narrow perspectives and accounts,
which examine how individuals experienced and reacted to vast historical processes and
important events. Soldier memoirs, diaries, letters, and journals,67 for example, provide
unique insight into how a single person and their immediate primary group viewed and
dealt with the stresses and strains of war. Home-front studies,68 more private and personal
accounts,69 and plays and novels70 also help our understanding of the war and its impact
on individuals. As one historian has noted, many war stories are not fully ‘evidencebased,’ but are still useful, as they tell us about ourselves and how we understand war.71
One of the main difficulties of this project surrounds the candour of source
material. Some authors of official accounts were unable or unwilling to fully recognise
the realities of combat on the Western Front, and its impact on those who had to endure
such experiences. Historian Rachel Duffett in The Stomach for Fighting: Food and the
Soldiers of the Great War, for example, argued that it is “difficult to locate references to
food shortages in the army’s contemporaneous records,” especially as “this would have
been a subject unhelpful both at home and abroad.” Anecdotal and suggestive evidence,
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combined with firsthand accounts and other archival sources, however, suggest that there
were shortages and food problems. There were gaps between army policy and practice,
and “failures in feeding were glossed over in the official army statistics,” lest an
“acknowledgment of the military’s inability to provide for the most basic of human
needs” prove embarrassing for authorities.72 Another historian argued that “whether from
patriotic or professional motives, military writers have been reticent about discussing
panic” on the battlefield.73 There was a reluctance to draw attention to medical or
disciplinary problems, or to those soldiers who were unable to endure at the front. Clear
and candid appraisals of the developments in combat and the reactions of individuals
helps with the post-battle assessment of historians, but the confusion and ‘fog of
uncertainty’ present in armed conflict militated against such complete and tidy
understandings.
To this end, it is important to read between the lines of source material and
identify gaps in the literature,74 as well as to assess the euphemisms and indirect
references to problems encountered on the battlefield. It is difficult to uncover clear and
candid appraisals of individual war experience, in part because the soldiers at the front
practiced a form of self-censorship75 and likely did not want to worry loved ones at home.
Dwelling on the stresses and strains of wartime service would concern those at home, and
remind the soldiers themselves of the problems they encountered on a daily basis.
Frederic Manning in Her Privates We even argued that there was a soldier “conspiracy of
silence” which lasted into the 1920s. Because of this, historians have to “dig deep
between the lines of everyday banalities of letters from the front to find a hint of the
fearsomeness of the fighting,” the trauma and terror. The use of euphemisms to downplay
the realities at the front also complicates the job of the historian. Manning, for instance,
remarked that “my mates have gone West” to denote their deaths, or that “we had a
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roughish time” to indicate heavy casualties.76 And historians Chris Bell and Bruce
Elleman argued in Naval Mutinies of the Twentieth Century that contemporary military
authorities made use of euphemisms “in order to downplay the significance of these
episodes.”77 And thus in this process mutinies became strikes, incidents, protests, unrest,
or disaffection.
Another difficulty pertains to the problems of memory and firsthand accounts. Not
all soldiers captured their thoughts and feelings on any given subject. Moreover, for those
who did want to capture their own personal viewpoint, would they always be able and
willing to do so? Memory and firsthand accounts are necessarily limited and subjective,
and some soldiers were inhibited and unwilling to express their own perceptions.78 There
were also limitations based on literacy, opportunity, materials available, preservation, 79
lack of education or ability to articulate one’s views,80 and similar issues. Some soldiers
captured their feelings on a subject at the time, whereas others only sat down to capture
them in the months or even years following the event in question. As one British soldier
argued, there were limitations to his memory, “which has become blurred and unreliable
owing to the lapse of time and the crowded events of the last few years”81 which obscure
and confuse. Over time, memory and the ability to properly recall past events gets
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distorted and weakened, and for veterans in Legion halls across the country, perhaps a
rehearsed or theatrical element to stories developed over time as well.82 Certain aspects of
stories got polished, exaggerated, left out entirely. One historian has noted that two
people could interpret the same event or experience in quite different ways. Moreover, the
time between the event in question and its recollection could distort memories, even at the
subconscious level.83
Another problem with memory and firsthand accounts is the question of
representativeness. Not all recollections and views of the soldiers survived, and some
were against recording their opinions for posterity or publication, happy with personal
letters and diaries. Other soldiers, however, actively sought to publish their views on the
war, and this necessarily involved some measure of selection and editing. In a time of
substantial letter and printed correspondence, it would be impractical to publish all the
letters of any given soldier. It is certainly problematic that a smaller group of former
soldiers now speaks for those who “have neither the ability nor the desire to impart to
others” their own personal experiences.84 And as historians we must also be wary of those
seeking personal profit in exchange for their war experiences.
It was and remains important to capture and preserve as many personal and
authentic views as possible, but the question of representativeness of these accounts poses
particular problems for the historian. Were the war poets,85 famous in the interwar years
for their stark presentation of the war and their anti-war or pacifist poetry and prose,
really representative of all the lower-class (and lower-ranking) soldiers? The evidence

One editor of First World War memoirs argued that there were problems with memory, and “their stories may have
become a little coloured or tarnished with time, but the general, overall vivid picture of it is still very real to them.” See
Gordon Reid, ed., Poor Bloody Murder: Personal Memoirs of the First World War (Oakville: Mosaic Press, 1980), 3.
83 Kellett, Combat Motivation. 13. This was also a problem with oral history and interviews. As one historian put it,
“postwar oral testimony from veterans must also be treated carefully, as years of reflection and Legion-hall storytelling
invariably reshaped memories decades after the fact.” Iarocci, Shoestring Soldiers, 12. Other problems with oral history
included ignorant interviewers, leading questions, poor recording or transcription, etc.
84 One infantry subaltern seemed to understand “the temperament and mentality of the soldiers,” including their
“reactions to the war as a whole and to the immediate dreadful circumstances in which they found themselves.”
Moreover, he “voices the feelings and sentiments which the great majority have neither the ability nor the desire to
impart to others.” Douie, Recollections of a Subaltern of Infantry, xviii-xix.
85 In the years following the First World War, debates raged surrounding the interpretation, motivation, and reputation
of those involved in the war. For the war poets, see Siegfried Sassoon, Memoirs of an Infantry Officer (London: Faber
& Faber, 1965); Robert Graves, Goodbye to all That: New Edition, with a Prologue and Epilogue (London: Cassell &
Company Ltd., 1957) and the works of Wilfred Owen and Edmund Blunden.
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does not support the war poets as being representative, and there were literally millions of
different viewpoints86 to emerge from the war. We as historians should try not to
privilege certain accounts because they are more articulate or resonate better with our
current social and cultural understandings. Unfortunately, historians sometimes have to
extrapolate to the many the views of the few,87 and this is another problem pertaining to
source material and firsthand accounts.
As Winston Churchill also wondered, was it possible to trust the opinions of the
‘chateau generals?’88 Everyone has certain motivations in writing, and it is thus important
to understand the background and context to any first-person account of the period.
Nevertheless, was it still possible to trust military history written by former officers which
tended to be “highly biased”89 accounts? These sources and interpretations are still
important, as they provide a unique and inside view of the inner functioning of a military
unit, from one who was actually there. Furthermore, these accounts provide insight into
how someone in a leadership position understood things and responded to developments
in the unit, and at the front. And finally, these highly subjective accounts can be balanced
with other viewpoints, and with secondary source material. It is for these reasons that
historians need to be wary of official histories and highly hagiographical accounts.90
Another problem inherent in this type of historical inquiry surrounds the
intangibles of war and the difficulty of understanding certain concepts and ideas. How
could the soldiers themselves find “the right words to portray the indescribable?”91 And

The problem is how to organise these numerous individual accounts into a ‘cohesive narrative.’ This is where theory,
methodology, historiography, comparisons, and case studies prove useful. Engen, Canadians Under Fire, 12.
87 Although most soldiers obeyed army authority, there were some who did not. One book explores “that fraction – a
dozen here, a hundred there, and ultimately many, many thousands – who at one time or another, laid some challenges
to authority.” Douglas Gill and Gloden Dallas, The Unknown Army (London: Verso, 1985), 10. And the soldiers who do
write their experiences might not be representative. Kellett, Combat Motivation, 13. It was also problematic to paint a
“broad-brush picture” with a limited source base, but this could not always be avoided. Nic Clark, Unwanted Warriors:
The Rejected Volunteers of the Canadian Expeditionary Force (Vancouver: UBC Press, 2015), 12.
88 Churchill referred to these chateau generals as “uniformed functionaries who in the seclusion of their offices had
complacently presided over this awful process,” and the victory they presented to their political masters “proved only
[slightly] less ruinous to the victor that to the vanquished.” Churchill, The World Crisis, 546.
89 Gunther E. Rothenberg, The Army of Francis Joseph (West Lafayette: Purdue University Press, 1976), x.
90 For the problems pertaining to official histories, see Tim Cook, Clio’s Warriors: Canadian Historians and the
Writing of the World War (Vancouver and Toronto: UBC Press, 2006). For a hagiographical biography, see A.M.J.
Hyatt, General Sir Arthur Currie: A Military Biography (Toronto: University of Toronto Press in Collaboration with
the Canadian War Museum, 1987), ix.
91 Walsh, The First World War Diary of Private Bert Cooke, ix.
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as historian George Bruntz argued in Allied Propaganda and the Collapse of the German
Empire in 1918, how can historians quantify and measure contributions to victory? How
can we “weigh imponderables” and certain contributions with other, yet equally
important, contributions? Can we say, for example, that air power was responsible for
40% of the victory over Germany in 1918?92 Furthermore, how can historians understand
the intangible aspects of war such as morale and other ideas? Morale is an elusive notion,
and is “all too frequently defined through generalities,”93 or meant different things to
different people at different times. It is thus important for historians to be clear with their
working definitions and to place their work into the wider context of the pre-existing
historiography. It is also important to acknowledge that there are some aspects of the
battlefield and the impact of combat on the individual that will always be unknowable to
the historian. The confusion and complexity and the ‘fog of uncertainty,’ coupled with the
fact that soldiers on the lower end of the military hierarchy rarely understood the ‘big
picture,’94 ensured some ignorance of those trying to make sense of a battle or
engagement long after the smoke had cleared.
The nature of historical study itself also presents difficulties to historians tackling
topics such as war weariness. As historians, the desire is to understand and present the
past in a comprehensible way. The problem is that it can be “dangerous and [is] usually
simplistic to seek general causes” to complex historical events and concepts.95 The causes
of war weariness, for example, are complex and multifaceted, just as war weariness itself
is complex, dynamic, difficult to pin down, and contextually contingent. Though certain
trends, common elements, and patterns emerge, each historical case was different, and
should be treated as such. This also points to the importance of comparative studies,96 and
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George G. Bruntz, Allied Propaganda and the Collapse of the German Empire in 1918 (Stanford: Stanford
University Press, 1938), 217.
93 Gill and Dallas, The Unknown Army, 77. Another historian noted the difficulties in understanding other intangibles of
war, including cohesion. Iarocci, Shoestring Soldiers, 272.
94 Engen, Canadians Under Fire, 12. The ‘fog of uncertainty,’ often erroneously referred to as the ‘fog of war,’ is a
concept taken from Carl von Clausewitz, On War - Edited and Translated by Michael Howard and Peter Paret
(Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1976).
95 Geoffrey Till, “Preface” in Naval Mutinies of the Twentieth Century: An International Perspective edited by
Christopher M. Bell and Bruce A. Elleman (London: Frank Cass Publishers, 2003), xviii.
96 One historian questioned, for instance, whether the experience of the British Army was unique. This only raises the
importance of comparative studies and an understanding of context. As Travers wrote, to be valid, conclusions
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to look at events or concepts over time. In many cases, historical analyses are too
simplistic, eschew complexity, or fail to take into account all the factors at play. 97 One
historian noted that history and hindsight can obscure the difficult realities that decisionmakers at the time faced. The officers and commanders, and the units themselves, were
affected by “the strategic imperatives of the moment”98 and other considerations we
cannot now understand, let alone fully appreciate.

Research Questions, Outline, and Theses
This project will focus on the development and impact of war weariness on both
an individual and collective level. To this end, some questions guided my research. What
was war weariness, and how did both contemporaries and later historians ‘measure’ it?
How did it affect individuals and how did they come to terms with this phenomenon?
How did the collective, in this case the military unit, deal with the problems associated
with war weariness? What was the Canadian experience of war weariness? Did war
weariness play out differently based on nationality, culture, or other considerations? Did
medical and military authorities recognise war weariness as a distinct issue that
undermined the dedication and morale of soldiers? Or did these same authorities simply
subsume this concept into already-existing understandings of health and discipline? How
did culture and social reality impact how soldiers understood and dealt with war
weariness? Did war weariness impact infantry and combat soldiers at the front differently
than non-combatants or those on the lines of communication? How has our understanding
of war weariness changed over the years and decades since the end of the war? How did
the experience of the Second World War shape our understanding of war weariness, but
also affiliated concepts such as battle exhaustion, combat fatigue, and shell shock? The

regarding British Army performance “must themselves be put in context by comparison with French and German
military reactions to the same problems faced by the British army. In short, the key question is, was the British
experience unique?” And if so, how and to what extent was it unique? Tim Travers, The Killing Ground: The British
Army, the Western Front and the Emergence of Modern Warfare 1900-1918 (London: Allen & Unwin, 1987), 243.
97 See, for example, this criticism made in Andrew Godefroy, “The 4 th Canadian Division: ‘Trenches Should Never be
Saved,’” in Vimy Ridge: A Canadian Reassessment edited by Geoff Hayes, et al. (Waterloo: Wilfrid Laurier University
Press, 2007), 213.
98 Iarocci, Shoestring Soldiers, 233.
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pages that follow will attempt to address these questions and others that emerged
throughout the research, reflection, and writing for this project.
At this point it would be prudent to comment on why I have organised this project
the way it is, and why I have chosen to analyse two non-contiguous time periods, AprilAugust 1917 and July-November 1918. The first two chapters explore the administrative,
legal, disciplinary, and medical structures in place to identify, measure, and address
problems such as war weariness and ultimately shell shock. These were the institutional
and army structures designed to deal with problems in a preventative manner, but also as
they emerged over time; they were of varying success, and were not always able to
properly address the problems facing both individuals and military units on the Western
Front. These systems also suggest that the medical and military authorities were aware of
these problems, even if they were not always able or willing to address them
appropriately. There were, however, some policies in place to help mitigate the negative
effects of war weariness and attendant problems. It became evident to these authorities
that it was best to preserve the fighting strength of the soldiers, despite the negative
effects of long-term service.
The next two chapters explore how these systems and structures actually played
out in two periods important to the Canadian experience in the war. The original plan was
to examine the final twenty months of the war, between April 1917 and November 1918,
which included the Third Battle of Ypres and the German Spring Offensives, as well as
the operations actually covered below. But the two selected time periods took precedence
due to space limitations, the important comparative power of the chosen periods, and for
what these periods represent to the armies involved – namely, a certain amount of time in
the field from which we can assess decline. An examination of these time periods also
allows for an assessment of war weariness, its contributors and manifestations, as an
historical problem, and not just an administrative, legal, or medical one. By 1917, the
large continental armies and the British Army had been fighting for 30 plus months which
provided ample time for the decline and destruction of each nation’s professional forces,
and coupled with inconclusive fighting and terrible casualties wore down these armies on
the Western Front. The Canadian Corps, on the other hand, by 1917 had been in the field
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for a rather shorter period of time compared to their Entente and Central Power
counterparts; the large victory at Vimy – a rather short campaign compared with
operations of 1918 – also helped offset embryonic war weariness in the Corps in 1917,
just as other armies were suffering from collective war weariness, wear and tear, and
beginning to break down. But by 1918, when the Corps had been in the field for over 30
months (dating back to April 1915), it was largely able to avoid the most pernicious
effects of general and collective war weariness. This can be explained in part by the
effective operations of the latter half of 1918 and the surprise victories therein. The Corps
was able to take advantage of German decline and implement important organisational,
tactical, and technological changes that helped overcome defensive positions and enemy
action. Luckily for the soldiers of the Corps, things went well on the battlefield and the
authorities were able to check war weariness right when it was needed most. The sense of
progress, the prospect of ultimate victory in the war, the fact that battlefield operations
were successful (liberation of civilians and inhabited areas), the capture of enemy POWs
and equipment, and the fortunate timing of the Armistice also help explain how war
weariness was kept at bay in the Canadian forces. I also felt it useful to compare the Vimy
period with the Hundred Days, which is less well known. Moreover, Vimy was an intense
battle, and the Hundred Days was a period of sustained combat, making them fertile
ground for the study of war weariness. And furthermore, this project is not, nor does it
claim to be, a comprehensive account of war weariness in the Canadian Corps. Rather, it
is a foray into the field, using two time periods as case studies.
The first part of the dissertation, Chapters 1 and 2, will outline the most important
structures in place in the British Army and Canadian forces designed to deal with the
health and disciplinary problems of the troops. In chapter 1, the legal and disciplinary
regimes of the Canadians will be assessed, and in Chapter 2 the military medical system
of the period will be explored. War weariness and shell shock were serious problems for
the medical and military authorities, and how these structures dealt with these problems is
an integral part of the story. Chapter 3 begins the second part of the dissertation, and will
provide the reader with the first of two chronological sections. In this first one, the period
of April to August 1917 will be assessed, including the battles and engagements
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pertaining to Vimy Ridge. This chapter will identify some of the contributing factors
toward, as well as manifestations of, war weariness amongst the Canadian soldiers.
Chapter 4 will provide the reader with a similar discussion for the July to November 1918
period, when the factors and forces contributing to war weariness were arguably even
greater than in earlier periods. This is interesting because by August of 1918 there were
tangible indicators of battlefield success and the prospect for ultimate victory had never
been higher in the war. And yet, discontent and war weariness continued, despite these
positive developments.
War weariness on the home fronts also illustrate how this affected soldiers,
civilians, and war workers. Even in the civilian realm, military matters played an
important role, especially in this industrialised, total war. The importance of the
connections between the home and battle fronts must therefore be taken into account.
Those at home had loved ones in uniform, and despite censorship and propaganda,
information was passed between the two fronts regularly. And each army was drawn from
and tied to its parent society. The problems on the home front, for instance, served to both
reflect and reinforce the problems at the battle front for the soldiers. I argue that for
armies to be successful in the long-term, they needed a robust civilian home front and
society able and willing to endure the long years of suffering and uncertainty.
Furthermore, the army and armed forces themselves needed strength and a measure of
flexibility to identify and adapt to these problems inherent to 20th century warfare.
And though beyond the scope of this project, evidence of discontent and collective
and individual indiscipline in the months following the Armistice also suggest the
continued importance of assessments of behaviour, attitude, leadership, and officersoldier relations. Even after the cessation of hostilities, soldier grievances continued, but
without the mollifying impact of ‘the cause’ and appeals to duty and service. Moreover,
the slight but insufficient relaxation of army discipline allowed problems that had been
simmering below the surface for months or years to boil over into mutiny, strikes, and
indiscipline following the Armistice.
In the chapters on the legal, disciplinary, and medical aspects of First World War
service I argue that these systems were unable to properly deal with the enormous number
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of discipline and health problems as a result of wartime service, though many attempts
were made. Moreover, the structure and priorities of the legal/disciplinary and medical
system of the British and Canadian forces both contributed to, and helped deal with, war
weariness. Ultimately, the courts martial system and medical arrangements were unable
to prevent war weariness, and its limited means to react to these increasing problems
actually alienated many and exacerbated the condition of those worn down by frontline
existence – in some ways, army policies could actually backfire and make matters worse.
Those pushed to, and subsequently beyond, the breaking point were not always treated
with sympathy and understanding; they were sometimes depicted as criminals, slackers,
or malingerers. It was crucial that chaplains, commanding officers, and medical personnel
be well-acquainted with their subordinates so they could intervene successfully on their
behalf before general war weariness transmuted into shell shock debilitation.
Unfortunately for the soldiers caught up in the war’s maelstrom and unable to carry on
despite their best efforts, the collective was prioritised over the need for recovery of the
individual soldiers. The medical chapter illustrates the stresses and strains imposed on the
soldier’s mind and body, and that the often-rigid army medical system had difficulty
distinguishing between war-weary and shell-shocked troops, let alone dealing with them
appropriately. A one-size-fits-all model of military medicine and notions of duty were
insufficient to deal with these ‘problem’ cases. Some war-weary soldiers fell through the
cracks of army medicine and became more of a problem down the road as a result.
In the two chronological chapters presented here, it will be argued that the
operations of the Canadian Corps, and what happened between them, contributed to war
weariness and in many cases shell shock debilitation. There were, however, also various
forces designed to address and mitigate the worst effects of war weariness. Psychiatric
casualties and shell-shock cases did not always begin as war weariness, but there was
overlap in the causes and contributing factors in both phenomena. Moreover, the nature
and intensity of the war ensured that there was little genuine respite from the stresses and
strains of war. Leave and rotation out of the line proved insufficient, and other ranks at
the front were expected to carry on until seriously wounded or killed. In the First World
War there were no ‘tours of duty;’ a soldier signed up for the duration of the conflict, plus
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another six months, and was expected to do his duty unto death or victory. The heavy
casualties suffered, and the added pressure this placed on survivors, wore down the
soldiers to the point of medical and disciplinary problems. The reality of combat on the
Western Front, and the experience of witnessing or participating in horrific and traumatic
events, wore down even the hardiest volunteers. The strategic and tactical considerations
of the time, moreover, put added pressure on the soldiers, especially in the final months of
the war when it was decided to give the enemy no respite from Entente attacks. This
meant, of course, very little respite for the attacking soldiers as well.
Ultimately, war weariness is a useful and effective way of understanding the
experiences of those in the First World War. This concept can be applied also to noncombatant but vital soldiers on the lines of communication, as well as to all manner of
combatant troops. War weariness affected every soldier who spent any significant amount
of time in combat or the army generally, to varying degrees. War weariness was also not
confined to infantry. Artillery troops, machine gunners, tank crews, pilots, miners,
engineers, and those of the gas service all faced different risks and sources of danger, but
they had things in common as well. The physical, but also emotional and psychological
exhaustion affected those experiencing hardship and privation. The inability to legally
escape the sources of danger on a regular basis drove some soldiers to go AWL, desert,
voluntarily surrender, or administer a SIW. Most soldiers, however, remained committed
to the war effort and did not want to let their comrades, their family, their unit, their
superiors, or their nation down. Many of these soldiers found the inner strength to carry
on, and relied upon fortifying forces to keep going; these soldiers were willing, but
increasingly unable to continue with duty because of the development of health problems.
Other troops, however, were physically (though perhaps not otherwise) able to carry on in
combat, but were increasingly reluctant to do so, even if they did not always act on this
reluctance, for various reasons. It is this dynamic between inability and reluctance that
will be explored in the following pages.
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Chapter 1 - The Legal and Disciplinary Systems and
Aspects of Service for the Canadian Corps in the First
World War
One of the ways in which military authorities controlled and shaped the behaviour
of the troops under their command was through the legal and disciplinary organisation in
the forces. These systems were an important aspect of army control, and played a role in
maintaining the health and fighting prowess of the soldiers during the war. It seems that
legal and medical aspects are only interpreted as an issue when they are problematized.
Much has been written about the miscarriage of justice and the problems of the legal and
disciplinary system facing British (and Dominion) forces in the years since the First
World War,99 but it is important to remember that counterfactuals and anachronistic
judgments are less than helpful in current historical inquiry. Things could have been done
differently, and the British could have modelled their legal apparatus and disciplinary
regime in other ways, but this did not happen. The German Army, for instance, officially
executed far fewer of its soldiers than did the British Army, though historians generally
agree the Germans were more likely to make use of summary executions without trial.
And the Australian government refused to apply the death penalty to its soldiers at all.
These cases are instructive in terms of comparison, but each system must also be judged
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well as primary sources and firsthand accounts. See, for example, Babington, Capital Courts-Martial; David Englander,
“Mutinies and Military Morale,” in World War I: A History ed. by Hew Strachan (Oxford: Oxford University Press,
1998); A.B. Godefroy, For Freedom and Honour? The Story of the 25 Canadian Volunteers Executed in the First
World War (Nepean: CEF Books, 1998); Thaddeus Holt, “Military Justice,” in Reader’s Companion to Military History
ed. by Cowley and Parker; Nico Keijzer, Military Obedience (Alphen aan den Rijn: Sijthoff & Noordhoff, 1978); Chris
Madsen, Another Kind of Justice: Canadian Military Law from Confederation to Somalia (Vancouver: UBC Press,
1999); Craig Leslie Mantle, ed., The Apathetic and the Defiant: Case Studies of Canadian Mutiny and Disobedience
(Kingston and Toronto: Canadian Defence Academy Press and the Dundurn Group, 2007); Gerard Christopher Oram,
Military Executions during World War I (Houndmills: Palgrave Macmillan, 2003); Julian Putkowski and Julian Sykes,
Shot at Dawn: Executions in World War One by Authority of the British Army Act (London: Leo Cooper, 1992);
Leonard V. Smith, Between Mutiny and Obedience: The Case of the French Fifth Infantry Division during World War I
(Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1994); R.A.J. Tyler, Bloody Provost: An Account of the Provost Service of the
British Army, and the Early Years of the Corps of Royal Military Police (London: Phillimore & Co. Ltd., 1980);
Desmond Morton, “The Supreme Penalty: Canadian Deaths by Firing Squad in the First World War,” Queen’s
Quarterly 79, 3 (Autumn 1972): 345-352; Clare Rhoden, “Another Perspective on Australian Discipline in the Great
War: The Egalitarian Bargain,” War in History 19, 4 (2012): 445-463 and Captain David Schlueter “The Court-Martial:
An Historical Survey,” Military Law Review, 87, 129 (1980): 129-166.

38

in its own right. The British system of control, discipline, and legal structures developed
in its own way, and was historically contingent upon the experience of colonial wars and
naval discipline. Moreover, applying our modern sensibilities to a conflict that began over
a century ago is inappropriate, to say the least. The legal and disciplinary, as well as the
military medical systems, usually functioned adequately behind the scenes or in the
background. After all, hundreds of thousands of soldiers were ‘processed’ through the
legal and medical systems during the war, though there were some problems.
The legal, disciplinary, and medical systems and structures pertaining to the
Canadian forces in the war were complex and incorporated many different elements.
These were multifaceted systems, which had some flexibility and dynamism, with some
changes taking place during the war itself. Adaptations were based on the reality of
warfare generally, and combat specifically. Lessons learned from other armies were also
incorporated into the systems, though less thoroughly. Pre-war ideas and preconceived
notions played a large role in how these systems were organised and justified after the
start of the war in August 1914. These were not static, unchanging systems, but prejudice
and personalities, politics and propaganda, prevented the rapid alteration of these systems
during the war itself.100
There are different ways to understand and assess the legal/disciplinary and
medical aspects pertaining to the Canadian forces during the war. For example, how did
the medical and military authorities and structures react to problems amongst their
subordinates after the mobilization and enlistment phase? One such way to understand
these responses is to present a series of binaries. Were these reactions largely proactive,
or reactive? Were these responses primarily individual/personal in nature, or more
structural? How often were these reactions informal – such as when a commanding
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officer (CO) or medical officer (MO) used sympathy and discretion – or institutional,
making use of the formal army disciplinary system and courts martial? Were these
responses dealt with internally, at the local level, by the CO or MO, for example, or more
externally, beyond this level, by the larger army system as a whole? It is clear, moreover,
that the military hierarchy in general tended to view specific behaviours as leaning
towards a more medial issue; on the other hand, some authorities interpreted these same
behaviours as more legal or disciplinary issues.101 How much overlap was there?
It is my contention that there was indeed much overlap between these
legal/disciplinary and medical aspects and responses to the problems facing Canadian
soldiers in the war. These systems and structures, in large measure, were designed with
the same goals in mind, namely the close control of the soldiers under command to ensure
the maximum number remained at duty for the maximum amount of time.102 Though on
the surface it seems that these two military systems – the legal/disciplinary and the
medical – had seemingly opposite goals (the former to punish, shape behaviour, and
remove troublesome soldiers, and the latter to heal and ensure soldiers stayed healthy and
fighting fit), these two systems had much overlap too. The legal/disciplinary system was
also designed to ‘heal’ soldiers from their misdeeds and their issues which undermined
their abilities as a soldier, and the medical system often took the form of punishment, and
was also designed to shape behaviour and thinking. The medical and legal/disciplinary
distinction made by historians is perhaps a false dichotomy.
This chapter will examine the control of soldiers in relation to the military legal
and disciplinary systems and structures. The legal and disciplinary regimes worked in
tandem with the medical system, with both seeking ultimate military victory and hoping
to ensure the soldiers remained fighting fit, and obedient. Both these structures were also
systems of man-management, to reinforce army (and government) authority. And
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regardless of officer training, upbringing, or attendance at medical school, these MOs,
officers, and leaders of the military units were largely the same people. These COs and
MOs, and the officers who sat on courts martial, had similar class backgrounds. These
similarities ensured that the reactions to a war-weary or shell-shocked soldier were also
similar.
When the legal/disciplinary system was working properly and efficiently, officers
were able to apply discipline and punishment to the units under their command. These
punishments could be informal, summary, and short-term, or more substantial like a
month of field punishment. Moreover, the courts martial system was used to deal with
more serious cases, such as desertion and absence without leave, though there were some
irregularities at times. If a unit had performed especially poorly, if there had been an
increase in disciplinary problems, or if a new or particularly exacting CO sought to send a
message or make an example of a soldier or unit, some soldiers might be sent for a court
martial for crimes committed. The CO had some discretion on how to deal with these
breaches of discipline, but only had so much leeway when it came to enforcing discipline
on subordinates. However, when things were not functioning as smoothly, such as when
there was a backlog of cases, too many crimes at key times (such as a major offensive),
too many issues in a single unit, or a loss of trust in the officers or the system generally,
this system could break down. A lack of faith in a unit’s officers or in the
legal/disciplinary structure could contribute to the onset of war weariness, undermine
morale and combat motivation, negatively affect discipline, and compromise the
performance of both individuals and military units. The same was true for the military
medical system.103
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There were problems, for instance, with the reality of shell shock, war neurosis, and psychiatric casualties. One
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This chapter will provide a foundational structure for the chronological chapters
below. This and the following chapter will outline some of the key army and military
structures and systems operative during the war, and which had a direct impact on the
experiences of regular soldiers in the military hierarchy. They will sketch how these army
systems reacted to, and dealt with, legal, disciplinary, and medical problems during the
war. The use of field punishment, as well as courts martial, medical classification boards,
and the medical system more generally, were also aspects of these structures and their
responses to a complex war that lasted years. And finally, this chapter will allow for an
understanding of how these structures and systems play out in the chronological time
periods below.

Legal and Disciplinary Aspects of the BEF and CEF in the First
World War
The legal and disciplinary system facing Canadian soldiers in the war sought to
ensure that those under army command followed orders and were obedient to authority.
These structures dealt with discipline – and indiscipline – in certain ways, and addressed
military crimes and breaches of conduct within the context of the war effort. The general
definition of discipline I use constitutes three main aspects: punishment, the threat of
punishment (often used as a deterrent), and a system of man management. The Oxford
English Dictionary presents discipline as both a noun and verb, with the noun being “the
practice of training people to obey rules or a code of behaviour, using punishment to
correct disobedience,” and “a system of rules and conduct.” When used as a verb,
discipline involved “train[ing] (someone) to obey rules or a code of behaviour, using
punishment to correct disobedience” and also to “punish or rebuke formally for an
offence.”104 These definitions are appropriate to our purposes here.

The Anatomy of Courage and Sir Andrew Macphail, Official History of the Canadian Forces in the Great War 19141919: The Medical Services (Ottawa: F.A. Acland – Printer to the King’s Most Excellent Majesty, 1925), 278.
104 These definitions were found online at https://en.oxforddictionaries.com/definition/discipline. See also Victor
Hanson, “Discipline,” in Reader’s Companion to Military History ed. by Cowley and Parker, 134-136.
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Discipline was part of a system to control behaviour and thinking. Lord Moran
interpreted discipline as an important aspect of military service, but was also a means to
an end – the end presumably being the solid performance of the soldier, and ultimate
victory. Moreover, discipline was depicted as “control from without,” which could only
be relaxed if it was replaced by control or discipline from within.105 Discipline could also
take the form of either punishment or persuasion,106 and drill and training could
contribute to the development of discipline, but this only prepared the troops to a certain
point.107 Army discipline was part of the system of both control and punishment, and the
even application of discipline was more effective, and more humane, than its uneven
application.108 This discipline could also be tailored and applied to local circumstances,109
and take into account the needs of the unit and other factors that fell outside official
discipline.
And just as discipline needed to be tailored to local circumstances and military
units, there were different types of discipline employed to further the army’s goals.
Discipline could be more informal, for example, allowing the CO, officers, and NCOs to
adjust policies to make them compatible to the needs of the individuals and the unit as a
whole. This informal discipline allowed authority figures to use discretion and even act in
a sympathetic way toward the troops, understanding what they had been through and what
they still had to endure. The MO of the 31st Battalion stated that despite his shortcomings
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as a military leader, General Richard Turner was well liked by the men of the 2nd
Division, as he did not insist on the formal discipline so common in the British forces at
the time.110 This informal discipline and demeanor allowed for a closer working
relationship between officers, NCOs, and ORs, and the formal discipline111 expected of
the men was often interpreted as demeaning, difficult, and impractical (especially in the
trenches). This emphasis upon formal discipline often took the form of demanding
“smartness, punctuality, thoroughness, avoidance of waste, general conduct and
appearance of officers” and NCOs.112 The problem with this emphasis, of course, was that
in many cases the authorities came to believe that ‘smartness’ would directly translate
into, and ensure, success on the battlefield and fighting prowess. Using unit discipline as
a direct proxy for military performance, however, was problematic.
Informal discipline was also an important part of the officers’ toolkit, as formal
discipline could be a rather blunt instrument. In addition to this, the imposition and
insistence on formal discipline could remove members of the unit from duty when they
were most needed – and this was especially true when units were in the line or engaged in
operations. Colonel Cy Peck of the 16th Canadian (Scottish) Battalion, for instance, used
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discretion while his unit was fighting at the Canal du Nord and Hindenburg Line, in the
autumn of 1918. Instead of sending all the unit stragglers up for courts martial, and thus
removing them from combat, he rounded them up and established an emergency reserve
force.113 This ensured that there were some soldiers on hand to deal with military
emergencies and to help reconstitute the unit after heavy casualties, and giving these
soldiers the opportunity to redeem themselves. In another instance of avoiding formal
discipline, a Canadian artillery officer used physical violence on a subordinate soldier,
explaining that that “was better than getting him a court martial for refusing to obey an
order.”114 The use of the formal disciplinary and legal system was time-consuming,
removed the offending soldier from the unit, and could be a drain on army resources.
The disciplinary system and the legal structures in place were designed, in part, to
prevent war weariness – including dissent and reluctance – from spreading and reaching
collective proportions. This system, however, was better placed to react to war weariness,
its occurrences, and manifestations. The phenomenon was not fully understood at the
time, hence the original focus on discipline and punishments, rather than positive
inducements to behaviour and especially behaviour in combat. These structures,
moreover, did not adequately address those who were fed up and war weary, but found
the strength to carry on; rather, they focussed on those who evaded duty and exhibited
disciplinary problems.

A System of Discipline and Control
Both informal and formal discipline were used to punish,115 deter, and as part of
the man-management system to control the troops. These were deemed crucial to the
proper functioning of any unit, both on the parade ground and in combat itself. Moreover,
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many of these views on discipline emerged from the pre-war Canadian forces, namely the
(non-permanent active) militia in Canada. These policies were then adapted to the current
war conditions. A 1915 training manual, for instance, instructed that officers and ORs:
will adopt towards each other and their subordinates such methods of command
and treatment as will ensure prompt obedience, respect for authority, a deep sense
of self-respect, a high sense of duty. [Furthermore] bullying, swearing or
intemperate language must be avoided. It is the duty of a soldier to obey all lawful
orders given by superior authority.116
The problem with this automatic obedience to authority, however, was that it served to
undermine independence of thought,117 which could prove devastating in the event of
casualties during an attack or defensive operation. When officers and NCOs were killed
or wounded during operations, subordinates had to take their place during the heat of
battle. Without guidance from above and with the inability to make spontaneous decisions
for the good of the group, the operation could fail. This could have mortal consequences,
or even imperil the wider military situation.
The justifications for army authority and discipline were multifaceted, and were
an integral part of army life. The British society from which many of the Canadian
soldiers emerged was much more class-conscious and deferential than ours today. And
though Canadian society in the early 20th century was less class-based than its British
counterpart, respect for elders and social superiors was well ingrained; this made the
transition to army life easier for some. Army discipline was predicated on the need for
obedience and maintaining the chain of command. This deference to authority entailed
the “immediate and implicit obedience of orders, both on and off parade,” and respect for
and adherence to the orders and rank of superiors and the military hierarchy. 118
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Some soldiers took to this top-down authority and discipline rather easily, whereas
others chafed at the idea of this control but still accepted the need for discipline, however
problematic it could be. Still other soldiers were not thoroughly convinced of the need for
the type and severity of discipline as practiced by the British and Canadian armies during
the war. Coningsby Dawson who served on the Western Front, for instance, wrote in
April of 1918 that “army discipline is in many ways silly and old-maidish.” He then
recounted a story of a soldier punished for asking a colonel to hold his horse while he
mounted it; he wondered what the sense was in punishing this “chap who’s faithful, wellconducted and honest.”119 And yet, it was a widespread belief that army orders needed to
be obeyed, and it was not the prerogative of the soldier to question these orders.
Important mediators and intermediaries like NCOs, MOs, and chaplains, who helped
connect the upper echelons of the military hierarchy with the rank and file, also played an
important role in ensuring obedience to proper military authority. Chaplains, for example,
assisted with army discipline and the man-management system in part by helping ease
tensions and reinforcing that orders needed to be followed, especially unpopular ones. As
one chaplain explained in a report:
I would discuss the matter [of discipline] with them in my talks at the Sunday
services and do all in my power to change their hostile attitude to one of ready
acceptance and obedience to the order…I don’t believe in discussing or explaining
orders to the men, but in obeying them. Orders are orders and must be
obeyed…my love and sympathy with my lads are boundless, but my influence is
always exerted in maintaining obedience to those in authority.120
This paternalistic chaplain helped reinforce and legitimise army discipline, and made use
of the ideas of self-sacrifice and self-control to help in this task. Some officers and unit
leaders, though, were hesitant to discipline their men to the extent that the army desired.
This discipline, however, was depicted as an integral step “in the process of converting
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other ranks into soldiers,”121 and was important for the proper functioning of the unit.
And it was with these soldiers that the war would be fought, and either won or lost.
The legal and disciplinary system of the Canadian forces in the war relied upon
certain soldiers to uphold these policies and regulations. The Corps of Military Police
(MP), for instance, had myriad duties, including enforcing march discipline and directing
traffic, tracking down offenders, and working with COs, assistant provost marshals
(APMs), and courts martial in the application of military justice itself and to ensure that
punishments were laid down and enforced.122 All of these duties helped ensure that army
discipline was carried out on the troops. Medical officers, COs, sergeants and NCOs,
chaplains,123 and other authority figures and intermediaries all played a role in ensuring
the troops were familiar with all the army orders, military laws, and regulations, and that
these were enforced.
All levels of the military hierarchy had a role to play in the application and
enforcement of discipline and military law. Indeed, the system could not function without
it. All soldiers in uniform were subject to military discipline, but accepted it more readily
than others. One British soldier, for instance, was horrified with the firing squad he was
involved in, and found that his sleep was disturbed as a result.124 He accepted the need for
discipline, even if it was distasteful at times. This acceptance was made easier when the
officers of each unit prepared the soldiers for it. As an officer of the 31st Battalion
explained, while in barracks his troops took to discipline rather easily “for the men were
quite prepared for it, understood its necessity, and conformed to the requirements of [the]
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situation more readily and with less friction than could have been reasonably
expected.”125 Adherence to discipline while in barracks, however, would have to survive
the shock of battle and the stresses and strains associated with combat and its aftermath.
Officers and NCOs played an important role in ensuring the legal and disciplinary
regimes were upheld both in barracks, and while on active service. The discipline of the
unit was overseen by its CO, who set the tone for the unit’s training and morale;126 the
other officers and unit NCOs proceeded accordingly. The unit’s officers played a key role
in the system of man-management, set examples for their troops, especially in terms of
dress and deportment, enforced the rules of service, held inspections and parades,
oversaw discipline, and upheld censorship regulations,127 amongst other duties.
Competent leadership and drill were but two ways in which officers could instil their
views on discipline to their subordinates. Drill, for instance, was important as “a means to
an end,” training the troops to follow commands and trust authority.128 Discipline was
closely related to leadership and command, which highlighted the “necessity of [a]
system of command so as to ensure continuity”129 in the unit. This also meant that heavy
casualties could disrupt this continuity, and thus undermine the unit’s cohesion and
connection between leadership and the led.
Aside from training, drill, and good leadership practices, there were other ways in
which to convince the troops of the need to obey authority and follow orders implicitly.
Lectures, training courses, and the use of route marches (to stress march discipline), for
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example, served to reinforce these lessons, and “every effort [was] made to ensure that
they [the other ranks] realise the seriousness of the situation.”130 If simple explanations
and discussions failed to properly motivate the troops, there were always more practical
means of shaping behaviour and thought. Promises of leave, or conversely threats to
cancel upcoming leave, could certainly act as a powerful way to shape behaviour. Threats
of punishment could be made to the entire unit,131 a collective approach to the
enforcement of army discipline and standards of behaviour, or could be done in a more
personal, individual way. At times these personal approaches to discipline entailed
actually threatening the soldier with physical harm if orders were not obeyed. Deward
Barnes of Toronto, for example, wrote in his journal that during an attack in August of
1918 “one or two of the draftees [conscripted soldiers or MSA men]…refused and I
threatened to shoot them if they didn’t dig” during the operation.132 These types of threats
seemed to work most of the time. Some soldiers, however, were unwilling to conform to
these rules and regulations, whatever the cost.

Military Laws and Expectations
The system of army discipline was based on military laws, expectations, and
procedures. There were, of course, problems and limitations to this system, which were
identified by both contemporaries and by subsequent historians, legal experts, and other
researchers. After a soldier signed his declaration and took his oath upon attestation, he
was subject to army law and military discipline. Special rules applied to soldiers actually
in the war zone and at the front, but all soldiers, whether in Canada, the UK, or on the
lines of communication in France and Flanders were subject to army discipline and law.
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During wartime and while on active service, the troops were under the authority of the
British Army Act, the British Manual of Military Law,133 the King’s Regulations and
Orders (KRO),134 and other statutes, orders, and even civilian legal structures. Canadian
soldiers were also subject to Canadian laws, aspects of the Militia Act, and regulations
specific to their own branch of service,135 provided they did not conflict with other legal
norms.
The Army Act outlined the military crimes and breaches of conduct under which
soldiers were charged, punished, and brought before a court martial.136 For example, the
crime of cowardice fell under Section 4 (7) of the Army Act, which stated that a soldier
was guilty of cowardice when he showed “an unsoldierlike [sic] regard for his personal
safety in the presence of the enemy,”137 such as by deserting his post, casting aside or
laying down his arms. And there were different definitions and understandings of what
constituted desertion, especially while on active service. The Army Act covered all
conceivable military crimes, including those pertaining to refusing orders (section 11),
theft and looting (section 6),138 desertion, including participating in, assisting, or failure to
inform the CO of (section 14), and AWL (section 15).139 And to give COs, officers, and
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other authority figures some leeway when it came to charging soldiers, there were also
more ‘catch-all’ charges under which soldiers could be tried and punished. Section 40 of
the Army Act, for example, covered ‘conduct to the prejudice of good order and military
discipline,’ giving COs some flexibility in punishing soldiers for breaches of conduct that
were not necessarily covered by pre-existing laws.140 This charge, aside from the
flexibility it afforded COs, also gave authorities some assurance that undisciplined
soldiers could be punished, even if their ‘crime’ or breach of conduct fell outside more
specific military laws found in the Army Act and other documents.
The legal and disciplinary regime facing Canadian soldiers during the war was
composed of both official and unofficial policies and procedures, as well as certain
documents that formalised these policies and monitored soldier behaviour.141 Generally
speaking, these were all designed to deal with those who experienced war weariness, but
also those whose war weariness reached into outright refusal and evasion of duty. In
many ways war weariness is a difficult concept to pin down; it describes those soldiers
who were fed up, worn down, and increasingly questioning their role, but did not
necessarily cross over into refusals and serious disciplinary problems. There was a fine
line between war weariness and rejections of legitimate army authority, and there were
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slightest symptom of ‘cold feet’ to be punished by authorities, even if there was no formal charge or crime. PPCLI
Archives, 34 (1) – 8, Infantry Battalion Training Notes, November – December 1914, and ‘Hints from France.’
141 Important paperwork pertaining to military discipline and army law included APM charge reports and sheets, which
identified the crime (ex. “Drunk”), place and date, name of witnesses, punishment, and ‘by whom awarded.’ When a
soldier was charged with a crime, there emerged correspondence and instructions regarding his care, confinement,
outlined the punishment, and included requests for routes and warrants for the offender and his escort. Army Form B.
252, moreover, was the standard charge sheet under the King’s Regulations, and was sent to the APM when a soldier
committed a crime. And a soldier’s conduct sheet, service history, and disciplinary record were also used at times to
call for either greater leniency, or as justification for a harsher sentence based on past experience/performance. All
documents, including the charge sheets, accompanied the soldier in transfer/transit. For courts martial members,
moreover, the ‘Notes for Guidance of Presidents’ (of courts martial) was also crucial. See LAC, RG 9 III B1, Volume
392, C-26-1, Volume 1, Charge Sheets and Volume 2; LAC, RG 9 III B1, Series 2, Volume 661, D-79-2, Discipline,
‘14th Reserve Battalion;’ Volume 662, D-102-2. Discipline, Canadian Postal Corps; Volume 1778, D-17-4, No. 3
Canadian Sanitary Section, Discipline and PPCLI Archives, Courts Martial and Discipline, Part II, File #: 30 (22) – 5.
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many forces that could push any individual soldiers from war weariness into more serious
problems. These policies and procedures were intended to prevent war weariness from
transmuting into more serious and collective disciplinary issues.
Army Form B. 2069, for instance, was the ‘Offence Report,’ for use in field
service only. This document outlined the regimental number, name, and rank of the
offending soldier, the particulars of the crime, including place and date, the crime itself,
by whom it was reported, and witnesses; the CO needed to initial it, a punishment levied,
and signed by an officer.142 In terms of procedures, the courts martial, particularly the
field general courts martial (FGCM), was the main body used to settle military legal
issues. These issues could be settled locally and summarily, within the military unit itself,
or for more serious crimes a court martial would be convened. Recidivist soldiers and
repeat offenders, moreover, might also be sentenced under a court martial, even if their
crimes were relatively minor. These military courts included officers, called witnesses to
testify, gathered evidence, investigated crimes, examined documents and the soldier’s
service record, and ultimately decided upon the guilt or innocence of the accused, as well
as the recommended punishment.143 These courts martial, and courts of inquiry, had clear
rules and procedures to be followed.144 Policies were in place to ensure these courts
proceeded efficiently, and in conformity to military law and justice, but also to ensure
there was some protection for the accused soldier; the latter included, for instance, the
provision for a legal assistant or ‘soldier’s friend’ to help in his defence.145 And it was

The soldier’s charge sheet would also have to be updated to include this information, and any remarks also provided.
LAC, RG 9 III B1, Volume 1778, D-17-4, No. 3 Canadian Sanitary Section, ‘Discipline.’
143 LAC, RG 150, Volume 242, No. 1 Canadian Field Bakery, Canadian Army Service Corps, 13/6/17.
144 For example, the army sought to dispose of courts martial cases as quickly as possible, but only if it did not
negatively affect or interfere with “active operations.” There were attempts to stamp out “irregularities regarding
discipline,” and ensure that proper punishments were awarded, as “illegalities in this respect” were “subversive to
discipline.” Another procedure to be followed was that witnesses needed at the trial were not to be “allowed to proceed
on leave before [the] trial.” And there were also rules regarding the distinction between AWL and Desertion. See
PPCLI Archives, Sub-Series 30, Nominal rolls, Courts Martial and Discipline, Parts I and II, File #: 30 (21) – 5; LAC,
RG 9 III C10, Volume 4554, Folder 2, File 12, Routine Order No. 302 and Volume 4563, Folder 1, File 3, ‘Circular
Memorandum 26,’ dated 30 October.
145 Those going to trial for capital crimes were not always given a fair chance at defending themselves. A ‘friend of the
accused’ would be provided, but only “whenever practicable.” This suggests that this was not always the case, or that
the military situation or military expediency could further disadvantage the accused. Rules also outlined certain
procedures that had to be followed in order to bring a charge against a soldier through a court martial. Reports and
letters of the PPCLI, for example, lamented that sometimes convictions were quashed because “charges were laid under
the wrong section, or the prosecution failed to produce sufficient evidence.” It seemed, moreover, that the author of
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British Army policy to publish the results of courts martial in brigade, battalion, and other
units’ daily or routine orders.146 This was done, in part, to act as a deterrent to others, to
stigmatise and embarrass the offending soldier, and to reinforce military discipline and
army authority.
The legal and disciplinary system did not always run smoothly, however, and at
times it may have actually caused more harm than it prevented. There were problems
related to the courts martial system,147 for instance, and also regarding the unequal
application of discipline and punishment. An inequitable or overly harsh disciplinary
regime may have actually undermined the soldier’s confidence in the military hierarchy
and system, rather than work as a contributor to unit cohesion and fortitude.148 And some
of the policies reflected in the disciplinary system, though not officially enshrined in it,
also served to compromise unit cohesion and solidarity. An infantry training manual for
the Canadian Militia, and also used during the war, stipulated that

these reports worried that men were failing through the cracks and going unpunished. These documents suggest that if a
soldier could not be charged with desertion for lack of evidence, then they should be at least charged with cowardice or
AWL. See LAC, RG 9 III B1, Volume 1778, D-17-4, No. 3 Canadian Sanitary Section, ‘Circular Memorandum;’
Volume 390, B-11-1 and LAC, RG 9 III C15, Volume 4669, Chaplains Reports, Hospitals 1 and PPCLI Archives,
Courts Martial and Discipline, Part II, File #: 30 (22) – 5, ‘Circular Memorandum A.8.,’ 36th (Ulster) Division, Scale of
Punishments, dated 23 November 1915 and 30 (21) – 5.
146 See, for instance, LAC, RG 9 III C9, Volume 4530, File 14F, ‘Orders: Daily Part I (2 nd Canadian Divisional Train),’
1-1-18 to 30-4-18. Moreover, it seems the army authorities made a concerted effort to ensure that all pertinent orders,
instructions, rules, policies, and procedures were published regularly, and clear for all troops to see and be made aware
of. This meant, for example, that orders that had been published in the past were often re-published, as the issue was
deemed pertinent again or to remedy recent problems. Documents from Shorncliffe Hospital, for instance, make it clear
that important orders, rules, and instructions were often repeated to the troops, both verbally and in writing, multiple
times. In one example, the orders were repeated three times in one month. LAC, RG 9 III B1, Series 2, Volume 662, D107-2, Discipline, Hospitals Generally and D-100-2, Discipline, Princess Patricia’s Red Cross Hospital and LAC, RG 9
III C9, Volume 4537, File 3, Routine Orders, 25 September 1916.
147 The accused was allowed to make statements and call witnesses, but it seems it would be hard to defend yourself
because of the army hierarchy, presence of superior officers, and the shame/stigma associated with indiscipline. And
when the accused was provided with a soldier’s friend, the latter often had little time to prepare or familiarise
themselves with the case. One officer admitted that “this principle is absolutely wrong.” Another document is quite
telling in this regard: “the attendance of a friend of the accused in no way relieves the court of its responsibility for
safeguarding the interests of the accused, and eliciting all facts which may tell in his favour,” suggesting that there were
abuses. PPCLI Archives, Sub-Series 30, Nominal Rolls, Courts Martial and Discipline, Parts I and II, File #: 30 (21) – 5
and LAC, RG 9 III B1, Volume 1778, D-17-4, No. 3 Canadian Sanitary Section, ‘Circular Memorandum.’
148 One soldier wrote about misguided discipline and priorities, complaining that his punishment for having an extra
webbing belt should have been overlooked, especially “with all the shells and bullets flying around” and other more
pressing concerns. Caughill, ed., Letters to Janet, 112.
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a soldier having a complaint to make will make it to his company commander
through his company sergeant major. He must not go direct to an officer to
complain or request indulgences.149
Though part of the justification for this policy was practicality, it also served to reinforce
the army hierarchy as sacrosanct. Some of these measures, however, seemed to run
counter to harmonious relations between all ranks. An officer from No. 6 Canadian
General Hospital, for instance, stated that “any man who addresses an officer without
being accompanied by an N.C.O. will be severely dealt with,”150 further reinforcing this
chain of command.
Military discipline and the army legal system were problematic in other ways as
well. Though it is clear that military law and civilian law differed in fundamental
respects,151 it seems that those in charge of overseeing military law did not have the time,
resources, or even inclination to give all cases – especially those concerning ORs – a fair
assessment.152 The military situation, the state of discipline in the soldier’s unit, the
soldier’s own history,153 and the need to uphold morale could all take priority over the
particulars of a case. In one situation, for example, a soldier of the 5th Reserve Battalion
was punished for going AWL, but subsequent reports made it clear that the officer
commanding (OC) did not have the authority to punish the soldier in this way.154 And
even if the CO lacked the authority to apply sentences to certain crimes, these sentences
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The Military Museums, W.A. Howard Library and J.E. Child Archives, TMM F0038, Gordon Gilmour Fonds,
Folder 1, Booklet: ‘Infantry Training for use of Canadian Militia, 1915.’
150 LAC, RG 9 III C10, Volume 4574, Folder 1, No. 6 Canadian General Hospital, Daily Orders, May 1916 –
September 1917, File 4.
151 Soldiers were governed by different laws and priorities. Moreover, military law was more about upholding the
edifice and authority of the military hierarchy and chain of command, and about manpower and morale, than about
justice and due process as in civilian courts.
152 Officers were treated more leniently than ORs, as evidenced by the conviction rates for both general and field
general courts martial. 74.02% of officers were convicted in general courts martial, whereas ORs faced a conviction rate
of 82.25%. The disparity in field general courts martial were even greater. Officers were convicted in 75.92% of cases,
but ORs faced a conviction rate of 86.90%. See Godefroy, For Freedom and Honour, 77, citing Putkowski and Sykes,
Shot at Dawn and Oram, Military Executions during World War I.
153 This could work both for and against the accused soldier. If the soldier had a clean record, had been loyal and
dedicated, and if the courts martial officers were aware of the stresses and strains facing this individual and his unit,
they might take this into account and offer some leniency in judgment and deciding punishment. On some occasions,
the soldier might even be given the benefit of the doubt. If, on the other hand, the soldier had a questionable conduct
history, was in a unit renowned for indiscipline, or if examples needed to be made, this might all act against the soldier.
154 LAC, RG 9 III B1, Series 1, Volume 661, D-85-2, Discipline, 5th Reserve Battalion.
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could remain. As one officer of the 12th Reserve Battalion explained, “unless it would
appear that an injustice had been done to the accused, it is not considered that the
sentence should be interfered with,” and thus should remain. The author then requested to
superior authorities that in this particular case “please grant the necessary authority to the
officer commanding 12th Reserve Battalion to make this award a legal one.”155 And
though reserve units were not subject to field general courts martial – as they were not
actively serving in the field – they could still be punished with other types of court
martial.
The mistreatment of accused soldiers and legal irregularities occurred in other
ways as well. One chaplain, for instance, visited the APM compound to check on some
prisoners, and “found the most serious abuses and ill-treatment taking place to[ward]
Canadians and others” in detention there. The chaplain spoke up on their behalf,
disgusted that the men were “suffering from a sense of injustice” and harsh treatment.156
Some officers and courts martial members, moreover, went into these trials with
preconceived notions of military law and discipline. It must also be emphasised that
military law was not really about justice; it was always about maintaining discipline and
upholding the needs of the armed forces above that of the individual. To a certain extent
this could not be helped, but when dealing with capital cases where a soldier’s life was on
the line, this was problematic. One such traditional view, especially prevalent early in the
war and amongst disciplinarians, was that good soldiers simply did not commit crimes or
breakdown. These soldiers, the view went, did their duty to the utmost, and suffered the
stresses of war stoically and silently.157 One such contemporary view stated that
malingering was a crime, and was not committed by “those governed by higher ethical
conceptions,”158 suggesting that only certain types of soldiers committed such actions.
These views on predisposition were problematic, as was relying too heavily on the past
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Ibid, Series 2, Volume 661, D-88-2, Discipline, 12th Reserve Battalion.
LAC, RG 9 III C15, Volume 4674, DCS London, Correspondence with No. 1 Canadian Infantry Base Depot.
157 Joanna Bourke wrote of racial, national, or cultural explanations for enduring. For the British, there was the notion
of the stiff upper lip’ mentality, “bulldog endurance,” or ‘British phlegm.’ Bourke, Fear: A Cultural History, 217.
158 Thomas W. Salmon, The Care and Treatment of Mental Diseases and War Neuroses (“Shell Shock”) in the British
Army (New York: War Work Committee of the National Committee for Mental Hygiene, 1917), 30.
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service record of an accused soldier to judge current culpability in crime. After all,
warfare is an evolving and dynamic process; there was certainly room for individual
improvement, especially as new soldiers became acclimated to army life and discipline,
and there were extenuating circumstances as well that needed to be taken into account.

Breaches of Conduct, Punishments, and Courts Martial
Crimes and breaches of discipline came in all varieties.159 Breaches of discipline,
for instance, included both those pertaining to omission and commission,160 so soldiers
could be charged for committing unlawful behaviour, or for failing to do something that
was expected of them. Moreover, the refusal to obey an order was distinguished from
neglect to obey an order, though it is not clear just where the distinction lay.161 There
were also more general and flexible charges that could to be used to discipline soldiers,
especially when their conduct fell outside clearly-defined crimes and parameters. One
Canadian soldier was disciplined, for example, who while on active service was in
“contravention of routine orders; appearing at exercise outside company lines improperly
dress[ed].”162 A similar charge covered “disobeying a lawful command given by his
superior officer,”163 which gave COs some measure of flexibility in punishing
subordinates.
Of the more serious and clearly-defined crimes, absence without leave and
drunkenness were common. However, reports, daily orders, and other documents suggest
that the punishment could vary widely, based in part on whether the soldier was on active
duty while the crime was committed, and whether the unit was in the battle zone.164 AWL
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Canadian artillery officer Ernest Black noted in his memoir all the different crimes and breaches of conduct he
observed. He noted, for example, the disregard of orders, theft, scavenging, looting, including of corpses, the playing of
Crown and Anchor, though it was forbidden, disobedience, and insubordinate language. Black, I Want One Volunteer,
19, 52, 99, 100, 148, and 166-171.
160 Norris, The World War I Memoir of Captain Harold McGill, 36.
161 See, for example, LAC, RG 9 III B1, Volume 2179, D-2-26 Volume 1, ‘Headquarters, Canadians, Bramshott.’
162 LAC, RG 9 III C9, Volume 4530, Folder 14E, ‘Daily Orders No. 178.”
163 LAC, RG 150, Volume 242, No. 1 Canadian Field Bakery, C.A.S.C., 13/6/17.
164 Ibid, Volume 241, 1st Canadian Field Butchery, 18 February 1915 and 10 May 1917. One soldier charged with AWL
was given four days CC [confined to camp] and forfeited two day’s pay. Another soldier was absent for approximately
12 hours, and was given Field Punishment No. 1 for two weeks, and forfeited one day’s pay.
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and desertion were considered especially serious crimes, as they represented a breakdown
of authority, could compromise the cohesion and fighting prowess of the unit, and could
even imperil the military situation more generally if units became unreliable in the line.
These crimes were also particularly despised because they seemed to privilege the
individual over the collective, a serious problem when trying to manage masses of
soldiers. This meant that courts martial officers were often keen on punishing soldiers for
AWL and desertion to the utmost. And even if there was no evidence that the soldier
absented himself to avoid a specific duty, one officer stated that the court was “bound to
assume that an accused intended the natural and probable consequence of his actions,”
namely to avoid a certain duty. If there was, however, proof that the soldier’s absence led
to the avoidance of (a particular) duty, the court would presume he “absented himself
with that object in view.”165 This is troublesome, if only because the court was adding
intention to a soldier who might not have had such forethought. But again, military law
was distinct from civilian legal systems in that there was no belief in innocence prior to
conviction, and it was the duty of each accused individual soldier to prove that he was not
guilty. AWL and desertion were taken especially seriously prior to large offensives, and
soldier claims that they were unaware of any upcoming operation were often
dismissed.166 It was important prior to attacks that all units were up to strength and
available for service; absent or deserting soldiers not only undermined the strength of
these units, but also offered the enemy a valuable source of intelligence if they were
apprehended by the Germans.
Military punishments related to army discipline could take various forms, and
often had different goals as well. Some punishments were simply about removing the
troublesome soldier from his unit or the front lines, lest he negatively affect the morale,
discipline, and combat motivation of others. Other punishments, however, were designed

PPCLI Archives, Sub-Series 30, Nominal rolls, Courts Martial and Discipline, Part II, File #: 30 (22) – 5.
Courts martial charges of AWL in March of 1917, for instance, were not inclined to believe an accused’s testimony
that they were unaware of any future operations. The court argued that any soldier near the front would have been well
aware that there was a big ‘show’ coming up. The months of preparations, the constant movement, and increase in
activity were dead giveaways. Being aware of upcoming operations and then leaving one’s comrades anyhow was
deemed particularly reprehensible, and was therefore often punished more severely. PPCLI Archives, 34 (1) - 6,
Battalion Orders, Daily Orders Part II, 1 January – 31 December 1917.
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to humiliate or even inflict pain on the accused.167 Field Punishment (FP) No. 1, for
example, certainly fell into this category. According to the British Manual of Military
Law, Field Punishment No. 1 and 2 could be awarded by courts martial and COs. The
latter punishment included “extra fatigue duties,” and the soldier “may be subjected to the
like labour, employment, and restraint, and dealt with in like manner as if he were under a
sentence of imprisonment with hard labour.”168 Field Punishment No. 1, moreover,
included these extra duties, as well as the added humiliation and discomfort of being kept
in irons, “in fetters or handcuffs,” and “may be attached for a period or periods not
exceeding two hours in any one day to a fixed object,”169 like fence, post, wagon or gun
wheel. The Manual stipulated that “every portion of a field punishment shall be inflicted
in such a manner as is calculated not to cause injury or to leave any permanent mark on
the soldier,”170 and yet this was not always avoided.
Other punishments had a more deterrent effect, and were designed to make an
impression on the accused’s comrades and unit. There were concerns, for instance, that
the application of insufficient punishment on soldiers would have a deleterious effect on
unit discipline. One report noted that “the army commander considers that if field
punishment were more rigorously carried out, it would act as a greater deterrent to crime
than is the case at present.”171 Without this ‘rigorous’ application of punishment, soldiers
might take liberties if they felt that their actions had no negative consequences. The
author of another report on discipline stated that COs must “do their utmost to prevent
looting,” and that any soldier caught in this act must be severely dealt with as a deterrent
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The use of Pill No. 9, for example, might fall under this category. British MO Andrew Davidson referred to this as a
colocynth extract that purged the system. It was basically a laxative that was given as punishment to ‘clear’ hangovers
and the like. Martin Pegler, moreover, stated that the ‘No. 9’ was “the universal purgative pill for soldiers on sick duty.
A universal laxative pill, given when no other remedy seemed suitable.” See Davidson, A Doctor in the Great War, 56,
Bell, Canada in War-Paint, 57 and Martin Pegler, Soldiers’ Songs and Slang of the Great War (Oxford: Osprey
Publishing, 2014), 135.
168 British War Office, Manual of Military Law (London: Printed for His Majesty’s Stationary Office, by Harrison and
Sons, 1907), 598-599. This version was found online at https://archive.org/details/manualofmilitary00greauoft.
169 Ibid. The cover of Craig Leslie Mantle, ed., The Apathetic and the Defiant: Case Studies of Canadian Mutiny and
Disobedience contains an illustration of a soldier undergoing Field Punishment No. 1. One British MO remembered FP
No. 1 as ‘in fetters,’ and FP No. 2 as ‘in fetters and tied to a gun wheel.’ Davidson, A Doctor in the Great War, 33.
170 British War Office, Manual of Military Law, 599.
171 PPCLI Archives, Courts Martial and Discipline, Part II, File #: 30 (22) – 5.
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to others,”172 which suggested that punishment and deterrence were the emphasis, not
justice or reform. The deterrence factor was one reason why charges and punishments
were published in daily orders for all soldiers of the unit to see.173 Whether this directly
affected future discipline and incidence of crime, however, is another matter entirely.
The emphasis on deterrence and the effect of discipline on the unit also helps
explain critiques about sentences being too lenient,174 suggested punishments, and army
policies on minimum sentences. An army memorandum issued in February 1917 reflected
this concern for supposed leniency, and instructed COs not to dismiss charges laid by
other authorities, such as MPs. This “mistaken leniency” was problematic, especially as it
meant duplication of orders and undermined the efforts of MPs to enforce discipline.175
Indeed, one subaltern recalled that as a member of a court martial, he was reprimanded by
superior officers for recommending two years imprisonment for the accused, rather than
execution.176 The military authorities also provided officers and courts martial members
with suggested punishments for specific crimes. These were guidelines and were meant to
apply to first offences only. For example, for the crime of ‘absence when warned for duty
in camp or billet,’ the soldier should receive two years imprisonment with hard labour;
for cowardice, and desertion, when warned for duty in the trenches, the punishment
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LAC, RG 9 III B1, Volume 1778, D-17-4, No. 3 Canadian Sanitary Section, Discipline. This might also explain why
seemingly innocuous crimes, like very short-term AWL, were punished so severely. One soldier, for example, was
sentenced to 10 days Field Punishment No. 1, and forfeited one day’s pay, for being absent from duty for about three
hours. In another case a Private was given 14 days F.P. No. 1 and forfeited 28 days’ pay, for being AWL while on
active service for roughly 25 minutes. LAC, RG 150, Volume 243, 4th Canadian Division Supply Column (2), ‘Part II
Daily Orders’ and 3rd Canadian Division Supply Column (1917-18), ‘Daily Orders Part II,’ 24 April 1917.
173 LAC, RG 150, Volume 243, 1 st Canadian Divisional Train (3), ‘Daily Orders.’
174 It must be acknowledged here that there were also many examples of critiques of army discipline and punishments
being too harsh and disproportionate.
175 LAC, RG 9 III B1, Series 26, Volume 2180, Folder D-2-26 Volume 6, ‘Confidential: Circular Memorandum,’
February 1917. In other cases, it seems that certain punishments were deemed of little value. Brig-Gen. G.J. Farmar, for
instance, considered that CB (confinement to barracks) and CC (confinement to camp) to be “of practically no
disciplinary value,” and these punishments should therefore be discontinued, or at least reserved for “the most trivial
offences.” Awarding these punishments might reinforce the idea that soldiers could nearly get away with indiscipline
and poor behaviour. These punishments of CC and CB, and placing areas out of bounds, were punishments designed to
restrict the movement of soldiers, for various reasons. Granting or withholding leave also acted as a powerful way to
shape behaviour; all soldiers looked forward to leave, and therefore might be inclined to behave so as not to lose their
privileges. The use of leave privileges could be used as inducement to good behaviour (carrot). LAC, RG 9 III C9,
Volume 4530, Folder 4, ‘Canadian Corps A.19-0-17;’ DUASC, Clearing: The Tale of the First Canadian Casualty
Clearing Station, BEF, 1914-1919, by Thomas Brenton Smith, MS-2-432 – SF 44-1, page 49; LAC, RG 9 III C9,
Volume 4533, File 1 ‘Correspondence,’ 16-1-15 to 29-1-19, ‘Dishonoured Cheques,’ and LAC, RG 9 III B1, Series 2,
Volume 661, D-93-2, Discipline, Canadian Ordnance Corps, 5 September 1917.
176 Reid, ed., Personal Memoirs of the First World War, 204.
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recommended was death; and for disobedience, or ‘showing a wilful defiance of
authority,’ three years penal servitude was suggested.177 For recidivists, or “in subsequent
or aggravated cases the sentences might be proportionally increased”178 in an effort to
maintain discipline. Brigadier-General G.F. Farmar of the Canadian Corps headquarters
explained it:
As a general rule, in fairness to a man and in order to maintain discipline as a unit,
it will be found more beneficial in every way, to inflict a substantial punishment
in cases where a man has been given every chance to reform, but persists in
rebelling against discipline.179
The previous conduct of the soldier, his service and disciplinary record, were but one
factor in deciding the punishment applied to troops. Past behaviour at times meant the
difference between a capital sentence and lesser punishments. In theory, at least, the CO
and courts martial officers should have taken into account: the accused’s character, “from
a fighting point of view as well as from that of behaviour;” his previous conduct in action;
the opinion of his superiors; and the state of discipline in his unit.180 This last point was
especially important, as even soldiers with good service records could be sentenced to
death if it was deemed important to make an example of the accused and send a message
to his unit. In this case, as in so many others related to army life, the collective trumped
the individual.

PPCLI Archives, Courts Martial and Discipline, ‘Circular Memorandum A.8.,’ 36th (Ulster) Division, Scale of
Punishments, 23 November 1915. Another list of offences and recommended punishments suggested that for soldiers
contravening orders regarding alcohol prohibition, they should receive five days F.P. No. 1 for the first offence, and 10
days for the second offence. And for soldiers in hospital for VD, it was recommended that the soldier forfeits his field
allowance, and placed under stoppage of pay at the rate of $.50 per diem while in hospital undergoing treatment. LAC,
RG 9 III B1, Volume 1778, D-17-4, No. 3 Canadian Sanitary Section, Discipline and LAC, RG 150, Volume 199,
C.M.P. Shorncliffe, ‘C.M.P. In the Field.’ See also Morton, Fight or Pay, 40.
178 PPCLI Archives, Courts Martial and Discipline, ‘Circular Memorandum A.8.,’ 36 th (Ulster) Division, Scale of
Punishments, 23 November 1915.
179 PPCLI Archives, Sub-Series 30, Courts Martial and Discipline, Parts I and II, File #: 30 (21) – 5, report of G.F.
Farmar and LAC, RG 9 III B1, Volume 1778, D-17-4, No. 3 Canadian Sanitary Section, Discipline, 16 February 1918.
180 PPCLI Archives, Courts Martial and Discipline, Part II, File #: 30 (22) -5, ‘Memorandum – Desertion.’ The soldier’s
past and conduct sheet could determine the level of punishment. The CO could increase the days of pay forfeiture, for
example, based on previous convictions and the man’s “character.” It was suggested that each case should be judged on
its own merits, taking into account: length of service, previous record, the “excuse the offender may have to offer,” and
“the present circumstances which prevail.” Attempts were made to acknowledge and factor in mitigating aspects, but
this was not always possible. In one case, an officer claimed that the accused should receive only an ‘Admonishment,’
“in view of the fact that Piper McLean bears a very good reputation…[and] there did not seem to be any wilful deviance
of authority.” Intention thus was taken into account. LAC, RG 9 III B1, Volume 1778, D-17-4, No. 3 Canadian Sanitary
Section, Discipline, A.W.L. Charges and Series 2, Volume 661, D-79-2, Discipline, 14th Reserve Battalion.
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Some COs and courts martial officers were more lenient and sympathetic, and
sought to acknowledge mitigating factors and the reality of the situation on the ground.
One officer of the 8th Reserve Battalion, for instance, explained in February of 1918 why
he let a soldier off with only a warning. He explained that the accused “has done splendid
work both in France [in the army zone] and here,” his CO spoke highly of him, he had a
clean conduct sheet, and was usually very good at saluting.181 Other COs and officers,
however, seemed more concerned with their own reputation, or that of the regiment
(battalion or other unit). Having high rates of crime and indiscipline might reflect poorly
on the leadership and effectiveness of these officers. Captain Ralph Bell, for instance,
recalled that one officer threatened a subordinate with a FGCM, adding “then you would
be shot!” The officer, however, ended up dealing with the soldier at the local level,
explaining that “I shall not permit the name of this battalion to be besmirched by you” by
sending him up for a court martial.182 Ultimately, the army itself and the officers who
upheld it were concerned about the ‘big picture,’ and ensuring that sufficient troops were
in the line to achieve military goals. Discipline policies and courts martial were concerned
about this wider view of the situation, about optics, about the collective over the
individual and what was in the best “interests of discipline,”183 rather than what was best
for the soldier himself.
Other punishments were designed to permanently remove soldiers from their units
and from the forces, and from society more generally. In the most serious cases, the
punishment was death - execution by firing squad. Of course, not all those who were
charged under a capital offence or who were sentenced to death had their punishment
actually carried out. In the BEF during the First World War, 3,080 soldiers were formally
condemned to death; of these 346 (or 11.23%) were actually shot by firing squad.184 The
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fact that a soldier failed to do his duty to the utmost could result in execution was one that
all ranks were cognizant of. One infantry subaltern, for instance, wrote that the troops
became adept at following orders without qualm, and the soldiers
dropped naturally into the habit of implicit and unquestioning obedience. He
might grumble, but the job was done. The consequences of hesitation or
disobedience [in the field] were serious, they were death.185
Aside from hesitating or failing to follow orders, acts deemed cowardly or ‘unsoldierlike’
were also punished severely. As Charles Harrison in Generals Die in Bed: A Story from
the Trenches explained, if the soldiers ran or deserted, they would be greeted by the firing
squad.186 Another soldier wrote bluntly that “in the First World War you either went
forward [in battle] or got shot.”187 Though not every soldier who ran or deserted was
executed, let alone apprehended, the fear of death and of the shame associated with
execution could act as a deterrent. It need hardly be said that few wanted to be executed,
though as with suicide there were some who saw that any way out was preferable to the
trauma and pain they were experiencing. Few, moreover, wanted to participate in these
firing squads, though it must be admitted that some soldiers relished the opportunity to
take part in these executions, believing that cowardly or deserting soldiers needed to be
punished for their behaviour whilst their comrades managed to carry on. And in the
army’s desire to make the greatest impression on the accused’s unit, the soldier’s own
comrades often made up the firing squad.188
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Morale, Combat Motivation, Endurance, and Military
Effectiveness
The legal system and disciplinary regime used by the British Army had both direct
and indirect impacts on the morale, combat motivation, endurance, and the military
effectiveness of the soldiers. Regarding morale, the traditional army opinion, which
survived to some degree throughout the war, was that units with good morale would not
face extensive disciplinary problems, and those with good discipline would also have
solid morale. The two concepts reinforced one another. An army memorandum of
February 1917 indicated that “in regiments where discipline is strict, these irregularities
[regarding slackness in saluting] do not take place.”189 In this view, reinforcing unit
discipline and insisting on punishment would necessarily lead to solid, positive morale
that would help all in the unit. And good morale would all but guarantee good results on
the battlefield. This, of course, was a specious argument at best. Disciplinary problems in
a given unit did not definitively mean that its soldiers were bad, but may have pointed to
the reality of combat and trauma on the Western Front, and inadequacies of rotation or
leave policies. Contemporary documents and anecdotal evidence suggests, however, the
army belief that some soldiers were simply ‘bad apples,’ troublemakers, had “bad
character,”190 and were unable (or perhaps unwilling) to follow discipline properly. The
attitude and personal history of some individuals certainly made them less amenable to
military life, but to suggest that entire units were bad was reductive. Issues of leadership,
unit operations and casualties, equipment and supplies, cohesion and comradeship all
played a crucial role in performance in combat.
The legal and disciplinary aspects of army life also played an important function
in the combat motivation of the troops. With a legal structure designed with certain goals
in mind, and with discipline used sparingly and sensibly, soldiers felt more comfortable
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doing their duty to the utmost, knowing that if they were driven to or beyond the breaking
point, they would be treated with sympathy and leniency. This was not always the case,
however, and the problems pertaining to the legal/disciplinary system of the British and
Canadian forces may have compromised the motivation and commitment of the average
soldier. The motivation of soldiers could be impacted by both carrots and sticks, or the
promise of reward and the threat of punishment191 to induce or discourage certain
behaviour. Training and lectures, moreover, could also assist in the process of motivating
soldiers to fight. Training had several purposes, including strengthening discipline,
assisting in fitness, developing self-confidence, and increasing the offensive spirit.192 And
even when soldiers were out of the line, in need of a respite from the strains of war, this
training continued. A soldier of the 26th Battalion wrote on 11 September 1918 that “we
have had training almost every day of what is supposed to be our rest” period.193 And as
the author of one training document suggested, “there can be no repose for any of us until
the object before us – the defeat of the enemy – is accomplished.”194 The defeat of the
enemy, as well as the desire to finish the war and return home, served as strong
motivating forces for soldiers in the war. This motivation, and discipline of the troops,
however, could be undermined by many factors, such as inclement weather,195 supply
problems, ineffective leadership, futile attacks or the general lack of success in
operations. For a soldier who had already been in the war for months or years, and with
no apparent end in sight, sticking it out until the defeat of the enemy was a tall order
indeed.
The legal and disciplinary aspects of soldier life in the war also had an impact on
the endurance of the troops at the front and behind the lines – these had a direct bearing
on the ability, and willingness, of the men to endure at the front. First-hand accounts and
primary sources, and subsequent secondary analyses, illustrate that there were things
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soldiers did in an attempt to stay in their unit and not go sick, or do something more
drastic like desert or administer a self-inflicted wound (SIW). The use of alcohol and
other drugs as coping mechanisms and fortifying forces was but one example of attempts
to endure what was, in many ways, an unendurable existence. Scrounging for food to
supplement meagre or monotonous army rations, as well as the receiving and sharing of
food parcels from home also helped. Sufficient food, water, and alcohol helped with both
the morale and health of the troops, both of which positively contributed to the ability of
the soldier to remain at the front. Time out of the line, concerts and drinking, music and
shows all helped in this process, and in the words of one MO, good food and company
“did much to make us forget, for the time being, the squalor and dreariness of our
surroundings and duties.”196 The question, however, was whether these distractions and
coping mechanisms would be enough over the long-term.
Soldiers unable to endure, however, might be driven to commit a crime or do
something drastic to escape the trenches and find a reprieve, even if it was brief or illegal.
For instance, there were accusations that some soldiers purposely became infected with
VD, likely after visiting brothels or prostitutes on leave.197 A member of the No. 10
Canadian Field Ambulance stated that VD should be punished, as “with but very few
exceptions venereal disease is contracted in immoral sexual connection.”198 The
implication was that these soldiers got what they deserved, and should be punished. It is
impossible to determine the veracity of these comments, especially the purposeful
contraction of VD, and it is difficult to understand the motivations of a soldier who would
purposely endure the shame and discomfort. An appreciation of the terrible trauma at the
front, the sight and stench of bloated and discoloured corpses, and the other stresses and
strains of war help us in this understanding, however. A soldier pushed beyond the
breaking point might try almost anything to escape the horror of the front, and might even
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risk serious debilitation, court martial,199 and other negative aspects for a much-needed
reprieve.
It seems, moreover, that wilful SIWs also fall into the category of a soldier, driven
by desperation, doing something drastic to get removed from combat. The medical and
military authorities, however, were aware that SIWs or ‘left-hand wounds,’ as they were
sometimes known colloquially, were a well-known method of escaping the trenches and
active service. In the words of the historian of the 1st Canadian Casualty Clearing Station:
The penalties against men who deliberately made themselves casualties were
heavy, and precautions were taken to apprehend such men. Consequently, all
patients suffering from accidental or self-inflicted wounds were accompanied by
documents, explaining the origin of such injuries. The breaking of a dental plate
[for example] was always regarded as a highly suspicious case.200
Even accidental SIWs could be punished due to negligence. If a soldier shot himself (or
another) while cleaning his rifle, for example, he could still be charged for failing to
follow orders properly. And if conclusive evidence regarding the SIW could not be found,
the soldier could still be punished under the catch-all charge of “conduct to the prejudice
of good order and military discipline” (section 40 of the Army Act).201
Contemporary evidence indicates that authorities believed discipline had an
important role to play in the prevention and treatment of casualties. One of the most
common problems in the trenches was trench foot. This condition, described by a
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contemporary MO as constituting “dead-white, doughy feet that will later go black, with
spongey, swollen soles,”202 became a serious problem for the authorities. Dr. Robert
Atenstaedt in The Medical Response to the Trench Diseases in World War One wrote that
trench foot mostly attacked the toes, but could also cause swelling up to the knees, and
large blisters could form.203 The problems associated with terrible trench and frontline
conditions, coupled with the “neglect of personal cleanliness,”204 ensured a steady stream
of these casualties. Exposure to wet conditions, above freezing temperatures, also played
an important role in the development of this affliction.205 Casualties could make both
individuals and military units highly inefficient,206 which could in turn negatively impact
the overall military situation in any given sector. Trench foot seemed to peak in winter
months, not surprisingly, and during the war there were forty-one deaths from this
affliction, and 10,000s of hospital admissions; this acted as a “severe drain on
manpower,” and ultimately “constituted a grave problem in the British army” and
affiliated units.207
The prevention of trench foot entailed keeping feet clean and dry, and the frequent
issuing of warm socks, which was not an easy task in the front lines. Furthermore, the use
of good waterproof boots, the use of braziers in the trenches, the application of anti-frost
grease, foot powder, and especially whale oil on the feet, and taking off the boots and
puttees periodically to massage the feet all helped in prevention208 It was also important
that MOs inspected feet frequently, and this “close surveillance by the military
authorities” assisted in this process. The problem, of course, was that MOs could not fully
control the conditions in which the men served, they were themselves under the authority
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of unit COs and HQ, and the health of the troops was often subordinate to larger military
goals.209 The most important aspect of prevention, however, was probably the need for
periodic rest away from the conditions of the trenches. This was particularly difficult
under active service conditions, especially as contemporary doctors suggested that tours
of duty in wet or water-logged sectors should not exceed twenty-four to thirty-six
hours.210
The military authorities, though, seemed to believe that discipline was the most
important factor in the prevention of trench foot casualties, and in the healing and
treatment process for other casualties as well.211 As one MO argued, “the prevention of
this disease [trench foot] is almost entirely a matter of discipline, and can only be carried
out by the cooperation of the company and battalion officers” with the MO.212 The
principles of prevention were published in general routine and standing orders, so that the
soldiers would be aware of the precautions to be taken. COs, however, were “responsible
that the instructions were carried out,” and that soldiers were equipped with the proper
clothing and equipment to do so. One such instruction was that the troops were to remove
their boots (and change their socks if possible) once every twenty-four hours.213 But just
how possible or realistic was this under active service conditions? Units often spent
several days at the front lines, and without proper dugouts and shelters, the use of funkholes was widespread and it was a practical difficulty to properly care for feet with shells
dropping and snipers on the prowl. Soldiers had sentry duty and working parties, and
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there were also raids and patrols which occupied their time, energy, and attention. Prior to
going into the trenches, moreover, soldiers were to wash, dry, and apply grease to their
feet.214 Grease and clean dry socks were not always available, however, and officers
simply could not monitor every single soldier under their command to ensure that the
proper precautions were taken.
The legal structure and disciplinary system that applied to Canadian troops also
had a direct bearing on their military effectiveness and efficiency. Training documents
and after-action reports, for instance, stressed the importance of discipline to the morale,
combat motivation, and military prowess of the troops. One document on defeating
enemy counterattacks stated that:
If the discipline of the [machine gun] detachment is good, and if the men keep
cool, they are bound to break up the enemy’s attack…[the success in defeating
counterattacks depended on] tenacity, discipline, and bravery…it must therefore
be impressed upon all machine gun detachments that, unless they have specific
orders to the contrary, they are to remain in action even if surrounded.215
The implication of this, of course, was that the sheer bravery and discipline of the
defenders could defeat any counterattack; moreover, it was understood that troops should
fight until surrounded, and to the death, if need be. Those who failed in their duty were
often greeted with little to no sympathy, and even with a firing squad. This was the reality
of life for soldiers on the Western Front, and was reflected in contemporary and post-war
poems, literature, and other accounts, both patriotic and pacifist. The British novelist and
poet Gilbert Frankau, for example, explored some of these themes in his poem “The
Deserter:”
‘I’m sorry I done it, Major.’
We bandaged the livid face;
And led him, ere the wan sun rose,
To die his death of disgrace
The bolt-heads locked to the cartridge;
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The rifles steadied to rest,
As cold stock nestled at colder cheek
And foresight lined on the breast.
‘Fire!’ called the Sergeant-Major.
The muzzles flamed as he spoke:
And the shameless soul of a nameless man
Went up in the cordite-smoke.216
This poem suggests that these executed soldiers died in disgrace, were quickly forgotten
(a “nameless man”), and his comrades had turned away from his suffering and plight
(“…colder cheek”). Extenuating circumstances were taken into account, at times, but
generally soldiers were expected to do their duty until they were (physically) debilitated,
or killed. As the CO of the PPCLI Agar Adamson explained, his long period of service in
France began to take its toll on his health and ability to withstand the conditions at the
front. He wrote in a letter to his wife Mabel in January of 1918 that “my nervous strain
both in and out of the line is considerable; if anything goes wrong I will be hanged
[executed], which is a minor matter personally, but a serious one to the Regimental
records.”217 And despite the hyperbole of Adamson, he seemed to accept the need for
discipline and punishment, as a good officer would have, and was more concerned with
the reputation of his regiment than his own personal safety.
It is important to remember, however, that discipline did not equate with military
effectiveness or military prowess. The Australian soldiers, for instance, “were generally
looked down upon by most of the Allies as tough and undisciplined, though hailed as
great combatants” at the front.218 A Canadian artilleryman, furthermore, wrote that
military executions were “generally speaking quite useless.” He explained that “the rest
of us [in the unit] did not need the example, and the poor fellows who were shot for the
most part could not help what they did,” in a rather sympathetic and thoughtful
understanding of the situation. This soldier furthermore argued that:
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I doubt if any man ever did his duty from fear of being shot…[and] I am quite
sure that the fact that he was pardoned three times after sentence of death never
resulted in one single man deserting or shirking his duties.219
This is of course just one example, but illustrates that not everyone in the military
hierarchy believed that discipline was the most important aspect in fighting effectiveness
and dedication to duty.

Legal Aspects, Discipline, and War Weariness
Discontent at the legal and disciplinary system which applied to the troops could
be a contributing factor to the onset of war weariness. The unequal application of
discipline, and the punitive nature of the military legal system could act as a demoralizing
force, eroding the faith soldiers had in the system. Furthermore, the unfamiliarity of new
soldiers, especially reinforcements and replacements, with the unit history and traditions
made the maintenance of discipline more difficult,220 and could also compromise the
morale of the individual and collective. Competent, paternalistic leadership was also
important in the combat motivation of the soldiers and the disciplinary system of the unit;
without solid leadership, unit cohesion and endurance suffered as a result, which only
served to make the troops more vulnerable to war weariness and associated problems.
Even volunteers might find that their commitment to the war effort and dedication to duty
began waning after months, and then years, of war and combat. Repeated promises of
victory came to naught. The situation was even worse for conscripts, whose commitment
to the war effort, and their own personal involvement in it, were already questionable.221
The enormous casualties suffered at the front, and the lack of tangible military
gains, at least until the final months of the war, reinforced the notion that survival in the
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war was minimal, and fleeting. Some soldiers were driven mad by the war, debilitated by
shell shock, broken by mental health problems, war neuroses, and psychiatric casualties.
Other soldiers, however, decided that they would rather risk the stigma associated with
the failure to do one’s duty than attempt to carry on at the front. Firsthand accounts and
other evidence illustrate that some soldiers actively sought a Blighty wound;222 others
administered a SIW or contracted a self-inflicted illness; some troops became apathetic,
overly cautions, or took to malingering; and still other soldiers sought to escape the front
and active service by going AWL or deserting their units.223
The reality at the front and the stresses imposed on the soldiers also contributed to
the onset of war weariness amongst individuals and the unit. The lack of proper food and
other shortages, demoralization, discomfort, death and disfigurement, and a host of other
factors all contributed to this sense of futility or the erosion of commitment to the war
effort. One soldier wrote that after months and years of war and with no end in sight, the
troops were hungry, downhearted, and “talk becomes mutinous”224 as soldiers expressed
their displeasure with the way the war was going, as well as their own personal
involvement in it. The manifestations of war weariness, moreover, reflected this erosion
of commitment to the war effort on both an individual and collective level. One Canadian,
for example, admitted to disobeying orders of a superior officer, explaining that he was
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exhausted and “fed up.”225 This ‘fed up’ attitude was an important indicator of war
weariness. A Private Cushman, moreover, was described in medical documents as “fed up
with the Army,” and that he was “depressed and at times reckless of authority and
discipline,”226 illustrating that this attitude began to shape the soldier’s behaviour as well.
Personal and internal coping mechanisms allowed many soldiers to continue with duty,
but there also needed to be institutional and external ways to ensure soldiers carried on at
the front. The legal and disciplinary regime in place could not possibly deal with the
myriad problems facing both individuals and military units. Indeed, some of the army’s
responses to infractions and insubordination were problematic, and actually exacerbated
pre-existing problems. Without sufficient and appropriate supports, the war-weary soldier
was liable to take drastic action to remove himself from harm’s way. The lack of a proper
response to the phenomenon of war weariness was bad enough, but the inappropriate
responses and insufficient understanding of shell shock and other negative impacts of the
war on the individual were even worse. It is to these health and medical problems that we
will now turn in the next chapter, especially as there was much overlap between the
contributing factors toward war weariness.
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Chapter 2 – The Medical Aspects of Service
The medical system that confronted the Canadian soldiers during the war, like the
military legal system, allowed problems in the realm of health to be dealt with at a more
local and personal level, or through more official institutional channels. Decisions had to
be made as to whether the soldier was fit to return to duty, and if so, in what capacity.227
The medical and legal authorities also had similar goals, namely, to defeat the enemy
using all available means, which included ensuring that sufficient soldiers were at the
front and on the lines of communication to carry out operations and attain common goals.
So long as soldiers were deemed useful, and soldiers could do myriad tasks aside from
combat, they were considered important cogs in the vast war machine. Only the worst
soldiers or the most serious medical cases were discharged. In addition to this, the army
medical and legal systems were designed to monitor the soldiers, punish them for
breaches of conduct, treat them for ailments keeping them out of the trenches, and
ultimately ensure they did their duty to the utmost. And finally, both of these systems
only paid lip service to the issues of motivation and intention; a disobedient soldier who
committed a crime while under active service needed to be punished for the good of the
unit, overall system, and chain of command – regardless of why he committed this breach
of conduct. Mitigating factors and circumstances could be taken into account, but the
emphasis was always on the collective (over the individual), and the ends seemed to
justify the means of motivation and persuasion.
This section was guided by several research questions pertaining to the medical
structure of the British and Canadian troops during the war. How did this military medical
system deal with the more problematic, and rising, evidence of war weariness? How did
this medical system address indiscipline, and how did it interact with the army’s legal and
disciplinary structures? And finally, how did this system actually deal with the casualties
and reality of war, and how did this play out on the battlefield, especially in the periods of
April-August of 1917, and July-November of 1918? This section will attempt to answer
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these questions, and identify the connections between the onset and manifestations of war
weariness and the medical aspects of the war. And though war weariness and shell shock
are not the same phenomena, they both reflect the impact of combat on the individual,
and there is also overlap between their contributing factors and manifestations. Moreover,
shell shock was a more serious problem than war weariness, although the latter was more
widespread and concealed the cumulative decline by veteran soldiers. My project seeks to
examine those soldiers who were pushed to, but not quite beyond the breaking point,228
and how they were able to carry on despite their war weariness.
Primary and secondary sources suggest that the medical system and reality for
soldiers on the Western Front could be an indirect contributing factor toward the onset of
war weariness. A sense of injustice regarding military medicine, for instance, could
contribute to this fed up, apathetic, or cautious attitude that were indicators of war
weariness. Moreover, in the military medical system the individual was nearly always
subsumed into the collective; this dehumanization and loss of individuality may have led
soldiers to question the war effort, or at least their own personal involvement in it. In
addition to this, the routines and regulations regarding the medical aspects of service
might have become tedious. The tendency of the military medical staff, as well as other
authorities, to focus on the minutiae of discipline and medicine, rather than on larger
issues such as the provision of adequate supplies and proper use of these resources, might
also have demoralized the troops. Why focus on the health and physical well-being of the
soldiers if the military authorities could not figure out a way to cross No Man’s Land with
sufficient force to seize and consolidate positions against German counterattack? The
health and sanitation229 of the troops was inconsequential if they lacked the technology or
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For those troops driven to the point of breakdown, collapse, or shell shock debilitation, see Mark Humphries, A
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2018).
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techniques to accomplish their military objectives. Medical problems during the war, such
as disease, illness, and physical and non-physical wounds, all served to erode the health
and fortitude of the troops. The medical and health problems of the troops, in both
combatant and non-combatant branches of service, depleted the ranks, depressed morale,
and decreased combat motivation and efficiency.230 Some medical problems, moreover,
might also be partial manifestations of war weariness. After months and years of service
at the front, even the most dedicated, strongest volunteers showed clear signs of wear and
tear. Some soldiers, it seems, decided that they had simply had enough, and took steps to
reduce or eliminate their participation in the war. Over time, most human beings
eventually succumbed to the strains associated with service, and there were tangible
indicators of an erosion of endurance and staying power at the front. Many war-weary
soldiers, moreover, seemed to have been on the very cusp of shell shock, debilitation, and
breakdown. Or, put another way, many of these soldiers indicating manifestations of war
weariness were pushed to, but not yet beyond, the breaking point. However, there was
some overlap between shell-shock debilitation and war weariness, and at times there was
a fine line between them. Most war-weary soldiers were able to carry on, reluctant though
they might become, whereas those troops debilitated by shell shock were unable to
continue with service, though they might very well desire to stick it out. Their medical
problems merely prevented them from doing so.
There was also much overlap and similarity in the forces and factors that
contributed to the onset of both war weariness and shell-shock debilitation. The long-term
and near-continual exposure to war, and the trauma of combat in particular, both
contributed to these two understandings of personal reactions to combat. War weariness
can be understood as the reluctance (or unwillingness) to continue in combat, whereas
shell shock debilitation was the inability to endure further combat. Aside from longer
exposure to the stressors associated with battle, acute or intense exposure to trauma might

Folder 111, File 1, No. 1 Sanitary Section, ‘Historical Records’ and LAC, RG 9 III C1, Volume 3865, Folder 100, File
6, ‘Organisation and Establishment Sanitary Sections.’
230 Englander, “Discipline and Morale in the British Army, 1917-1918,” in State, Society and Mobilization ed. by
Horne, 135. Another soldier admitted in September 1918 that “I had been so long on the job I was losing my
efficiency,” obviously undermining military performance. Teed, ed., Uncle Cy’s War, 254.
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also accelerate the process of breakdown. The lack of proper rest, respite from trauma,
and the inadequacies of the leave and rotation system also contributed to the development
of both these problems.
Military medicine was distinct from civilian medicine and peacetime medical
practices and priorities. Military medicine was more concerned with the issues of overall
numbers, manpower, and morale. The health, recovery, and wishes of the individual
soldier were relegated to secondary consideration behind the need to maintain sufficient
force to attain objectives. The army medical system, and other aspects of army life,
prioritised the collective over the individual; military medicine was not really about the
genuine health and long-term recovery of the individual patient/soldier as an end in itself,
but rather as a means to an end. This also harks back to the discussion on the legal system
facing the Canadian troops during the war – military law was also a means to an end,
prioritised the collective over the individual, and was about discipline rather than on
justice. Moreover, relapsing troops were certainly an issue for the authorities, and efforts
were made to minimise the number of soldiers who had to be taken out of the line for
treatment for previous health problems. The military reality, however, often necessarily
took precedence over the well-being of the troops. This is reflected in the fact that
soldiers were often returned to the front prior to their full recovery, as was the case
during the emergency of the German offensives beginning in March 1918.

Military Medicine as Surveillance and Control
In addition to ensuring proper numbers in the firing line and on the lines of
communication, the military medical system was also about the control and surveillance
of troops. This ensured that there was a disciplinary and paternalistic element to the
system. The well-being of the soldiers was important only in the context of the wider
army itself and the attritional struggle that was the First World War. It was not as though
the army, its officers, and medical authorities were necessarily callous and indifferent to
the plight of the soldiers under their command and care, but rather that the individual was
simply less important than the survival and victory of the Entente and way of life over the
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alternative. Individual soldiers were a means to an end, and perhaps more cynically mere
cogs in the vast impersonal war machine that developed to defeat the Central Powers.
The concepts of proximity and immediacy were integral to the organisation of the
army medical system. This might actually have prolonged war weariness and medical
problems, however, as soldiers were unable to properly escape the source of trauma and
gain genuine respite. The army sought to reduce the number of soldiers evacuated from
the front, and from the war zone more generally, in order to maintain unit numbers.
Proximity ensured that soldiers would be treated as close to the front lines as possible,
whereas immediacy entailed sorting and treating casualties quickly (triage). Corps and
divisional rest stations were designed to ensure that those soldiers worn down from
combat, but without serious (physical) wounds, would be able to recover promptly. These
rest areas sought to “save wastage in minor medical cases,” and only those who were
“expected to require only a few days treatment medically are sent there.”231 The army
emphasis on manpower and the control of troops was designed to reduce ‘wastage’ rates,
for illness, wounds, and even psychiatric casualties. Minor cases, and also those labelled
as NYDN (Not Yet Diagnosed - Nervous), a label for shell shock, or “overwrought
mental conditions requiring a short period of treatment, will be retained in the divisional
area.” The author of this report indicated that “it is [only] more serious cases that are sent
to the special hospital”232 for war neurosis. This reflected the army’s desire to keep troops
close to the front and their units, but also illustrates the acknowledgment that
‘overwrought mental conditions’ could be directly attributable to service. And yet despite
this acknowledgement, this classification also suggested that the medical authorities were
reluctant to make a definitive judgment on the issue, and even sought to blame the soldier
himself (as being predisposed to these problems or just simply ‘nervous’). The army
sought to husband its resources, and prevent any apparently minor cases from slipping

LAC, RG 9 III B2, Volume 3752, Folder 2-9-4-8, File ‘1st Divisional Rest Station.’ Moreover, in relation to the
conditions of Trench Fever and Pyrexia of Unknown Origin (P.U.O.), soldiers were only transferred back to the UK if
there was no improvement after a long observation period. Ibid, 3-1-1-14, Neurology, War Neuroses, ‘A Report on
Invalidism Caused by Trench Fever.’
232 Ibid, Folder 3-1-4-2, ‘Treatment of Shell Shock Cases at the Front.’
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through the cracks and being evacuated to Blighty. Any soldier who might recover in
relatively short order was to be kept close to the front lines.
And yet, many cases were indeed evacuated to Britain, a problem that was
identified by authorities by at least 1916. The MO T.P. Woodhouse wrote in November
1916 that he was concerned that casualties of a ‘lighter’ nature were being evacuated too
readily back to England. He argued that around 5% of these lighter casualties evacuated
were
of such a slight nature that recovery is effected within a period of about a
fortnight…[and after recovery these soldiers were sent to reserve units, but] steps
should be taken to avoid this great delay in getting men back to the fighting
line…[some will inevitably be evacuated unnecessarily but] during normal
periods, no slight case should be allowed to leave this country…I would therefore
be glad if you will take steps to treat such cases in Convalescent Depots, instead
of evacuating the[m] to England.233
In many instances, it was war-weary soldiers and those experiencing the beginnings of
shell shock who needed this rest and could recover in as little as two weeks. Inadequate
rest only exacerbated this problem and encouraged more permanent breakdown. The
army medical system was designed to ensure adequate control over the troops, but also to
shape their behaviour and thinking. The many regulations to which the troops were
subject convinced many reluctant soldiers that nearly every aspect of their existence was
monitored or subject to bureaucracy. In terms of sexual conduct, for example, it was the
duty of officers, NCOs, chaplains and MOs to ensure that all soldiers were aware of army
rules and consequences for breaches of discipline. Instructions issued by the CAMC in
March of 1915 ordered officers to supervise the men closely, to carry out regular and
surprise inspections, and to provide lectures on prophylaxis and the benefits of early
treatment.234 This was in the best interest of the individual soldier, but also helped with
the manpower and morale issues in the army itself.
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The monitoring of the soldiers, and the careful control of their movements, took
other forms as well. The severity and increasing number of psychiatric casualties became
a serious problem for the medical and military authorities. To deal with this problem, and
to minimize wastage and evacuation of soldiers, the British insisted on the use of the
NYDN label for these casualties, in part to suggest that any diagnosis was only
temporary, and also to reject the notion of psychiatric casualties altogether. As the British
Army general routine order No. 2384 indicated, soldiers who were made militarily noneffective but without any visible wound were to be diagnosed as NYDN.235 This was
ostensibly to prevent the ‘needless’ evacuation of casualties or misdiagnosis, but also an
attempt to reject non-physical wounds entirely. Nevertheless these cases were to be kept
near the front under army discipline, as well as monitored closely, to look for signs of
recovery, relapse, or malingering. The medical services were instructed to be very careful
with the use of nomenclature and diagnosis, lest all these psychiatric and non-physical
casualties be listed as wounded or battle casualties.236 Only when the issue was serious
enough to warrant evacuation to the UK or if the director general of medical services,
based on “the recommendation of a neurological board at the Granville Canadian Special
Hospital,” decided this was to be classified a battle casualty.237
And even if soldiers were evacuated to hospitals or convalescent centres, their
progress was monitored closely. This was the case because the army needed to maintain
sufficient numbers in each unit at the front. During the German spring offensives
(Kaiserschlacht) beginning March 1918, the authorities were concerned that there were
not enough troops in the line to stem the tide of German attacks. Because of these
concerns, and the fact that “men were urgently wanted for the front,” there was much
pressure on the medical services to ‘heal’ the soldiers promptly and send them back to

helped reinforce army authority. See, for instance, the photographs taken at No. 7 Stationary Hospital in Europe.
DUASC, No. 7 Overseas Stationary Hospital, PC2-26-56, War Hospitals, Photos.
235 LAC, RG 9 III B2, Volume 3618, ‘25-13-6, G.R.O. 3867,’ 25 April 1918 and ‘G.R.O. 2384.’
236 Ibid, Folder 25-13-7 to 25-13-10, Mental Cases, ‘Procedure to be Followed in Deciding Whether or Not an Officer
or Soldier Suffering from Nervous Disorder Without any Visible Wounds Shall be Classified as ‘Wounded.’’
237 Ibid.
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their units as soon as possible. As one report for the Canadian Special Hospital at Witley
indicated,
It was a time of stress at the front, and the number of days a patient spent in
hospital was that number of days’ delay in training and taking his place in the
firing line. For this reason hospital days were carefully watched, and all attempts
made not to lose time…[while men were in hospital, they could not help defeat
the Germans] it had long been felt that patients were wasting a great deal of time
while in hospital. The average stay in hospital of a patient at this time was about
five weeks. Many patients, of course stayed longer. The parades for treatment and
physical training did not take up a great deal of their time, and they tended to lose
physical condition and morale.238
This was but another example of the military taking precedence over the medical, and the
collective gaining priority over the individual. And though this was understandable given
the situation, it likely alienated some individuals and undermined recuperation efforts.
Soldiers suffering from wounds or problems deemed of a “slight nature” were to
be returned to the front as soon as possible.239 Even more serious psychiatric casualties
were kept in France and Belgium, especially if they were not definitively diagnosed as a
battle casualty. Medical arrangements for the British XVII Corps in May 1918, for
instance, noted that “ordinary sick,” NYDN cases, “slight gas cases,” and “trivial
wounded” will be evacuated to the divisional rest station, and not to the casualty clearing
station.240 The medical authorities apparently believed these cases were not serious
enough for evacuation, and should be grouped in with other ‘slight’ cases. 1st Canadian
Division Medical documents of March 1918 also stipulated that NYDN cases were to be
sent to the No. 46 Field Ambulance, along with “sick (other than serious cases)” and
“wounded (trivial)” casualties, and not to No. 8 Casualty Clearing Station. The MO also
stated that the field ambulance “will only retain such cases as will be fit for duty within 3

LAC, RG 9 III D1, Volume 4717, Folder 110, File 22, Canadian Special Hospital, Witley, ‘Historical Records,’
documents of March 1918.
239 Graves, Goodbye to All That, 147 and LAC, RG 9 III C10, Volume 4563, Folder 1, File 3, Circulars, Report of
D.D.M.S., dated 10 November 1916.
240 LAC, RG 9 III C10, Volume 4541, Medical Arrangements, C.A.M.C., 1 st Canadian Division, 4-6-10 to 21-7-18,
‘XVII Corps, Medical Arrangement No. 9.’
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days time.”241 Again, this suggests that psychiatric casualties, and those worn down by
acute stress or cumulative exposure to combat, would be fit for duty in a relatively short
period of time, and were depicted as less serious than other casualties. Removing the
soldier from frontline service and especially the source of their stress, even if only for a
short while, did show positive results for many. For these troops, the transition from war
weariness to shell-shock debilitation had not yet been completed. The failure to remove
war-weary soldiers or those pushed to the breaking point, however, could lead to even
further medical and disciplinary problems, as a desperate soldier sought any means of
escape from the horror of the trenches.

Treatment, Punishment, and Army Medical Facilities
Many cases, however, required more than just rest and removal from combat. The
types of treatment were nearly as varied as the ailments, problems, and types of casualties
affecting soldiers.242 Treatment, however, often contained elements of army discipline,
and even punishment. More traditional authorities believed that soldiers, invalided out of
the line due to their own carelessness or neglect of orders, needed to be punished, under
close army supervision and discipline, until ready to take their place in the line again.
Others suggested that more stoic or dedicated soldiers would rather not leave their unit to
go sick at all, but only if a serious (physical) wound or injury prevented them from
continuing at the front. Captain Ralph Bell of the 1st Battalion refused to add the names of
“at least half a dozen well-known scrimshankers to the roll of sick, lame, and lazy,”243
which would remove them from duty, at least for a short while. Of the thirteen soldiers

Ibid, ‘A.D.M.S., 1st Canadian Division,’ 30 March 1918.
There were advances in plastic surgery and facial reconstruction, as well as in the realm of prosthetics during the
war. Other treatments included: surgery, the use of drugs, physical and remedial training, massage, electrical treatment,
and use of games, training, and exercises to build physical strength. In the UK treatments included: remedial
gymnastics, physical training, massage, hydro and electro therapeutics. Of course, there was a class and rank element to
all this, as officers and ‘gentlemen’ were generally treated with more respect and sympathy than their lower class and
OR counterparts. This also applied to non-physical casualties, with shell shocked officers generally diagnosed as
Neurasthenic, but other ranks as suffering from Hysteria. See LAC, RG 9 III B2, Volume 3597, 24-1-7 (Volume 4),
Returns Only, Remedial Treatment and Volume 3493, 11-1-15 to 11-1-21, ‘Report of the Work Done in Remedial
Gymnastics, Physical Training, Massage, Hydro and Electro Therapeutics in the C.A.M.C.’
243 Bell, Canada in War-Paint, 54.
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who showed up for sick parade, nine were given medicine and duty, one was given light
duty, and another removed from duty altogether. And of those forced to remain at duty,
many were also required to take the hated No. 9 Pill, a general purgative, sometimes
interpreted as a form of punishment. And to further discourage the nine who showed up
on sick parade from trying to avoid duty in the future, they were given a nine-mile route
march in heavy marching order; Bell noted approvingly that “next day there were no
representative of ‘A’ company on sick parade.”244 The deterrence appeared to work
splendidly.
The army medical system incorporated different treatment centres to deal with the
myriad types of casualties encountered in a war of this magnitude.245 Convalescent
hospitals handled recovering soldiers prior to their return to the front, reinforcement
depot, or unit. There were also hospitals dealing with specific aspects of service, certain
types of casualties, or for particular patients. Special hospitals dealt with shell shock cases
and other kinds of casualties.246 The CAMC in conjunction with the RAMC ran these
facilities, and by war’s end there were dozens of hospitals and treatment centres under
Canadian authority, which treated Canadian and other Entente troops.247 These facilities
were a vital aspect of preserving the health and effectiveness of soldiers worn down over
time.
For a soldier wounded at the front, their treatment and evacuation followed a
definite pattern248 designed to deal with these cases as efficiently as possible. Leaving the
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wounded at the front was detrimental to morale, and might also impede military
operations. The severity of the wound or injury, coupled with the soldier’s service record,
also determined how far they were to be evacuated and how much sympathy they were
given. An infantryman with a serious battle wound, who had performed his duties in the
past and did not have a history of (even suspected) malingering, for instance, could be
evacuated out of the battle zone, toward the coast, and even to Britain and beyond.
Soldier treatment also depended greatly on the prevailing circumstances. During active
operations, medical personnel had less time for treatment and triage, and added a sense of
urgency to procedures. Of course, these policies might actually exacerbate war weariness
in some soldiers, and even promote its transformation into more serious neurosis. The
diary of a British doctor explained that:
In the military [in contrast to civilian practice], your duty as a medical officer is
not to put the patient first, but the battalion. Malingerers must be weeded out,
‘swinging the lead’ reported, the wounded patched up and sent back to action,
even if it worsens their condition. Triage on the battlefield is a necessity,
prioritising treatment for those most likely to fight again, leaving those beyond
help to die.249
The casualty clearing station (CCS) and other facilities in close proximity to the
front lines were operated by the field ambulance (FA) of each unit at the front.250 The
most serious cases were sent to the CCS, a facility more equipped to deal with a larger
number of patients,251 and a crucial cog in the medical evacuation and treatment system.
The CCS worked in conjunction with other facilities, and was designed to relieve the FAs

284; LAC, RG 9 III B2, Volume 3602, 24-3-2, Medical History of the War, ‘The Care of the Casualty’ and Norris, The
Memoir of Captain Harold W. McGill, 329.
249 The editor of this diary noted that “this was a long way from the Hippocratic Oath.” In this passage the italics are
mine, used for emphasis. Davidson, A Doctor in the Great War, 33.
250 One MO described the field ambulance as having 11 officers and 232 ORs, and as a “versatile, mobile unit, able to
serve three [infantry] battalions at once because it was divisible into three independent sections.” Moreover, “each
section had a stretcher bearer subdivision for collecting the wounded and a tent subdivision for treating them. In
addition to setting up advanced dressing stations and main dressing stations, not far from the front, field ambulances
operated divisional and corps rest stations at the rear.” LAC, RG 9 III B2, Volume 3602, 24-3-2, Medical History of the
War, ‘The Care of the Casualty’ and Norris, The World War I Memoir of Captain Harold W. McGill, 329.
251 The CCSs were at first found in buildings and other permanent structures. But as the war went on, as destruction
accumulated, these buildings became scarcer. Eventually, the CCS came to incorporate tents and huts. Macpherson et
al., Medical Services – Hygiene of the War Volume I, 278.
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of their sick and wounded. The MOs, nursing sisters,252 orderlies, and other doctors at
these locations provided care for patients, and decided upon as well as organised their
evacuation, return to duty, or further treatment. From the CCS, ambulance trains would
take casualties to larger, more permanent hospitals closer to the coast. In the First World
War these centres were often busy, with each handling thousands of patients each year.253
The staff of the CCS faced serious difficulties in the performance of their duties. Aside
from the horrific wounds associated with combat, medical personnel were also exposed to
the stresses and trauma of war, without the ability to retaliate against the source of this
trauma (the enemy). Being in range of enemy shell fire, the exposure to poison gas, and
enduring German air raids all took their toll on medical staff. In addition, facilities often
became overwhelmed with casualties, especially during and following operations.
Hospitals and CCSs were “very full after the Vimy show,” for instance, and medical staff
and resources were taxed to the utmost.254 This also served to exacerbate medical and
manpower issues during the war, and illustrates the enormous pressures on both soldiers
and medical staff. The lack of respite, rest, and the reality of exhaustion were all
contributing factors to war weariness and medical problems.
The CCS was important in the treatment and evacuation system, as it was
connected with rest areas and convalescent centres. These facilities were established to
deal with cases not yet ready for return to action at the front, yet deemed not serious
enough for further evacuation down the line. There were both divisional and corps rest
stations, where the MO “detains those not quite well and those who need a short rest,”255
rather than hospitalization. The 1st Divisional Rest Station, for example, was established
to “save wastage in minor medical cases…[and] cases as are expected to require only a

“The Nursing Sisters of Canada,” Veterans Affairs Canada, Government of Canada, last modified 28 November,
2017, http://www.veterans.gc.ca/eng/remembrance/those-who-served/women-and-war/nursing-sisters.
253 To provide but one example, the 1st Canadian CCS during the war handled 65,441 cases, and of these 6,053 were
returned to duty, 1,536 died of their ailments, 170 were sent to rest stations, 4,417 sent to other hospitals and facilities,
and 53,265 were evacuated to base (hospitals). See Macpherson et al., Medical Services – Hygiene of the War Volume I,
278 and DUASC, Clearing: The Tale of the First Canadian Casualty Clearing Station, BEF, 1914-1919 by Thomas
Brenton Smith, MS-2-432 – SF 44-1, pages 2, 230, 310.
254 LAC, RG 9 III B2, Volume 3752, Folder 6-3-1, Hospitals, France, Generally, ‘No. 3 Canadian General Hospital
McGill.’ The presence of influenza in these facilities compounded the problem, especially as the virus spread amongst
personnel and patients, despite the best efforts at quarantine and treatment.
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few days treatment medically are sent to this.”256 What constituted a ‘minor’ case was
ambiguous, but retaining cases in the army area helped ease the burden on military
hospitals. Rest areas were crucial to the continued functioning of the armed forces; a short
rest out of the line, and especially respite from the direct sources of trauma, helped
mitigate the worst effects of war weariness. These rest centres also minimised the overall
numbers of sick and wounded. Some of the more understanding MOs, for instance,
argued that it was better to send “exhausted men” to these facilities close to the front,
rather than further down the line.257 This concept of proximity (to the front) and
immediacy (in treatment) became important aspects of the army’s approach to psychiatric
casualties as the war progressed. Further down the line and closer to the coast,
convalescent depots were also designed to rehabilitate soldiers prior to their return to
active duty. These supposedly “slighter” cases were retained “pending return to duty or
transfer” to other medical facilities.258 These centres were reserved for “Canadians who
are likely to be fit for service again…and given the opportunity to recover their strength”
before being sent to reserve battalions or appearing before medical boards259 - and thus
were appropriate for many war-weary troops. Moreover, each stationary and general
hospital sent its recovering patients to facilities for further convalescence.260 These
centres espoused military discipline, incorporated training, and were often understood as
the penultimate step before a soldier returned to his place in the line. Convalescent
centres and camps, furthermore, sought to make use of these soldier patients for labour or
other purposes.261
The most seriously wounded or ill patients would be evacuated to, and treated at,
the more permanent hospitals furthest from the front. Along the lines of communication
and at the French coast bases there were general,262 stationary, special, and convalescent
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hospitals, all serving a different purpose or different type of casualty. For those requiring
further evacuation, or who were permanently debilitated, hospital ships conveyed these
patients across the Channel to Britain,263 and from there to Canada, if need be. 264 Special
hospitals were organised to treat particular types of casualties, those requiring more
resources, attention, or specialist equipment. These hospitals were established in the war
zone itself, along with neurological centres inspired by French practices, and
incorporating the idea of proximity. Special hospitals were also established in the UK for
longer-term treatment, and for “patients suffering from the more obviously psychological
effects of shell-shock and war neuroses.”265 The idea was that psychiatric cases and
functional nervous disorders could be treated, and perhaps even ‘cured,’ obviating the
need for long-term disability or discharge from His Majesty’s forces.266 The
understanding of war weariness was not quite as advanced, but policies to address
incipient shell shock also helped with war-weary soldiers.

Medical Personnel, Arrangements, and Evacuation
The medical system required substantial personnel to ensure that it functioned
according to guidelines laid down. Yet the medical personnel were still often overworked and were liable to exhaustion or worse. A letter from the OC No. 3 Canadian
General Hospital to (Nursing) Matron Margaret Macdonald, for example, lamented
proposals to increase the capacity of the hospital as problematic. Each hospital had only
so many MOs and staff, and “with the very active work which we are carrying on here, it
is very trying to every one of these who are taking on additional work.” The officer and
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hospital administrator continued, writing that after the loss of a key member of the staff,
who had yet to be replaced, “Captain Rhea is doing the sanitary work in addition to his
pathology, so you can see how his efforts are being considerably taxed, and…I am rather
afraid that unless something is promptly done in this matter, that he will break down.”267
This seems to be a clear acknowledgment that exhaustion and overwork could have
serious and potentially long-term health effects on those subject to pressure. In addition to
the MOs attached to each infantry battalion, there were also medical specialists who
worked at the military hospitals in the war zone, along the lines of communication, as
well as back in the UK. Moore Barracks Hospital in Shorncliffe, for example, employed a
specialist in ‘mental diseases,’ who oversaw wards 24 and 25.268 Other specialist doctors
that fell under the ‘mental diseases’ category were those such as Captain E. Ryan, an
expert in ‘insanity.’269
These doctors and specialists were supported by the Canadian Chaplain Service,
the Canadian Army Service Corps (CASC), and private organisations such as the YMCA,
Red Cross,270 and similar groups. The Canadian Chaplain Service, unit chaplains, and
padres assisted with the health and well-being of the troops by providing them with
comforts and entertainment while out of the line, but also in assisting with medical duties
at the front and during operations. Chaplains helped organise sporting contests, concerts,
and other events, and ensured that soldiers were given material comforts, such as
chocolate, hot coffee, cigarettes, stationary to write home, and a place to relax behind the
lines. In this sense, the chaplains assisted with the morale and mental health of the troops,
which obviously contributed to their overall (physical) health and ability to endure the
stresses of war. And during attacks and other operations, chaplains could be found
helping with the wounded at dressing stations and field hospitals, and were also known to
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go forward with the infantry (or just after), to assist in the care and removal of casualties
from the battlefield.271 Chaplains could also be found at base hospitals and convalescent
centres, along the lines of communication, and wherever soldiers were located. As the OC
Buxton Military Hospital argued, chaplains rendered “important and valuable services,
and I do not see how we can possibly do without them, or even release one.”272
The army medical system and its evacuation procedures were designed to remove
the most serious cases from the front lines, lest their presence undermine soldier
morale,273 discipline, and endurance. During battles, frontline casualties were sent down
the line using the FAs and stretcher bearers,274 and would pass through regimental aid
posts (RAPs) where triage was performed. Some of the wounded were quickly patched
up, others sent back to the firing line, and still some were left alone, being “beyond
help.”275 Those able to walk on their own were sent to the advanced dressing stations, and
also to the divisional walking wounded collection stations. Stretcher and more serious
cases were sent via lorries to the main dressing stations, and ultimately to the larger
hospitals beyond.276 This system of evacuation worked better during static trench warfare,
when lines of communication had been worked out and medical facilities established in a
more permanent manner. Routine and predictability aided in this process. During more
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open and mobile warfare, such as during the Hundred Days campaign, the movement of
the troops complicated matters.
Aside from evacuation, the CAMC and medical services had policies in place to
address manpower and morale issues in the war zone. One way in which authorities
attempted to reduce the overall number of casualties and those forced down the line or
evacuated was to hold regular sick parades and inspections. These voluntary parades
allowed troops who were sick or injured to be inspected by the unit’s MO, who would
then decide whether they should be sent down the line for further treatment. This was a
regular part of any medical officer’s duty,277 and was designed to be the ‘first line of
defence’ for the authorities. However, there were some problems with this system. First
of all as casualties mounted, especially during periods of heavy combat, there was only so
much a battalion MO could accomplish, and only so much time he could devote to
individual soldiers. This meant that hasty diagnoses were commonplace. This also meant
that some soldiers genuinely deserving of a rest away from the stresses of the front fell
through the cracks and were forced to remain at duty. Secondly, there was the problem of
separating legitimate casualties requiring further treatment and evacuation, from those
who were simply trying to escape the front, for whatever reason. As one MO noted, some
soldiers seemed to “seek treatment too readily,” thus clogging up the system.278 The third
problem, however, was the opposite of this, namely, that some dedicated soldiers avoided
these parades altogether, even if they did have a genuine medical issue, “refusing to
accept [that] they are ill” or wounded.279 There were myriad reasons why a soldier would
reject medical treatment, including a stoic or traditional British ‘stiff-upper lip’ attitude,
leadership responsibilities, a sense of commitment and duty, the unwillingness to let one’s
comrades down, optimism, the fear of being viewed as weak, or plain denial.
If soldiers were deemed unfit for further service at the front, there were certain
procedures to be followed during evacuation and treatment. All patients undergoing
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treatment and evacuation were required to have certain documents on their person. To
provide but one example, all cases of “mental diseases” at Camp Bramshott were sent to
No. 12 Canadian General Hospital, and were to be accompanied by Army Form B.179
(medical history of an invalid) and Army Form B.183.280 These were to accompany the
soldier in order to track their medical history and treatment, but also to ensure that certain
types of casualties were not evacuated to Britain. For many medical and military
authorities, there was a suspicion of, and hostility to, psychiatric casualties, war neuroses,
and shell shock. The understanding of the very real effects of trauma on the human body
and mind were underdeveloped, though the horrors of the Somme, Third Ypres, and
similar battles provided many lessons regarding these casualties. Ultimately, however, the
upper echelons of the military hierarchy and the generals only paid lip service to
psychology during the war.281 The understanding of war weariness, moreover, was also
underdeveloped, ensuring that pre-existing problems were exacerbated by the army
medical system.
The medical bureaucracy also included army medical boards, which were tasked
with deciding the fate of many a wounded or sick soldier. Those who seemed to require
(at least) six months of treatment were brought before these boards, sometimes with a
“recommendation for invaliding back to Canada,”282 which would ease the burden on
medical personnel and resources, at least in Europe. For soldiers requiring long-term care,
but who were not invalided back to Canada, doctors would be kept informed as to the
status of patients. The soldier’s stay in hospital was dependent upon the nature and
progress of the case, as well as the wider military situation. Moreover, there were regular
re-evaluations of patients to prevent shirking and to maintain manpower requirements.283
Ultimately, however, the goal of the CAMC was to ensure that there were sufficient
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troops in the line, and along the lines of communication, to accomplish military
objectives and keep the enemy at bay. The role of the CAMC was to make men effective
soldiers. It was evident that
the first and greatest duty of the Army Medical Service is to keep the man well
and fit. The second duty is, if sick or wounded, so to treat him that he will become
effective again with the shortest possible delay.284
It is telling that the MO who wrote this used the term ‘effective,’ rather than ‘healthy;’ the
needs of the army took precedence over the well-being of the individual soldier. This
ensured that many war-weary soldiers were unable to gain proper respite which promoted
the transformation into more serious shell shock.
Only the most seriously wounded soldiers were discharged from the forces
permanently; others were expected to return to duty once they had recovered. As soldier
Charles Douie wrote in his memoirs, it seemed that it was always the best leaders and
bravest who died first, as they volunteered for the most dangerous duties and were often
in the vanguard. These troops, “wounded time and again, they returned to the front”285
only to be wounded once again, or ultimately killed in battle. For perceptive and
reflective soldiers, it appeared that death was inevitable the longer one stayed at the front.
This helps explain the adoption of a fatalistic attitude amongst combatant soldiers, but
also the development of war weariness in ever larger numbers. The army desired to send
soldiers back to their units as soon as possible after wounding, and there was a lack of
appreciation for the nature, extent, and severity of psychiatric casualties. MOs had to
decide those “who were likely to be fit for duty within a reasonable time” so as to retain
them in the army area.286 It was the duty of the MO to balance the needs of the collective
with those of the individual. This was made all the more difficult with long-serving
soldiers, especially those “who because of long service in the front line needed a rest,”287
but had no other medical problems to justify transfer or time out of the line. Without this
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rest, a war-weary soldier might very well descend into more serious shell shock. Military
authorities, however, believed these soldiers should stay with their units and remain at
duty until rotated out of line with their comrades or granted leave. The problem with this
approach was that by that time it might be too late; the soldier may have already been
pushed beyond the breaking point. But MOs could help prevent this through their “timely
insistence on a man’s transfer to a rest camp or light duty in the rear area…[and through
which they] could avert a tragedy.”288 Superiors did not always accept these
recommendations or interventions, however.
Intervention on the part of MOs, commanders, and chaplains was crucial, but they
were not always given leeway to ensure soldiers got the rest they needed. MOs were
restricted in their diagnoses to prevent the evacuation of certain casualties,289 even if such
evacuation could prevent more permanent breakdown and was thus better for the army as
a whole. Addressing war weariness early on was preferable to more permanent
debilitation and shell shock, though it was, admittedly, difficult to do so. Instructions
issued to field ambulances and unit MOs admonished medical personnel to do whatever
possible to reduce the sick (and presumably wounded) numbers at the front. Officers were
to pay attention to “all matters that can conduce to the health of the troops,” including
“securing all possible rest for the men whilst not in the trenches or on necessary duty.”290
The problem, of course, was that there were times where the rest and rotation out of the
line should have been given priority over trench and other ‘necessary duty.’ Even when
troops were not in the trenches, they had many duties behind the lines, and still found
themselves exposed to danger and stress.291 That further duty only exacerbated problems,
and further contributed to their war weariness. Surely periodic and genuine rest from the
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strains of warfare to extend the ‘shelf life’ of the soldier was preferable to premature
breakdown and long-term debilitation. The authorities, however, did not necessarily see it
this way.
Medical officers also had to contend with the medical classification system.
Medical personnel and boards were instructed to ensure that “all men proceeding to the
front are physically fit to carry on with their respective units,”292 but what of
psychological fitness for duty? This stubborn understanding of fitness as purely physical
was perhaps naïve, and was certainly counterproductive in many ways. Clearly the
military authorities were uncomfortable with the idea of psychiatric casualties in general,
and did all they could to will the problem away. There was concern, for example, that
merely acknowledging or mentioning the problem would actually legitimise it and
increase its occurrence. This is, however, not really surprising given the traditional and
unsympathetic understanding of these casualties from authorities of all stripes.293 Other
MOs were reprimanded for trying to explain why soldiers had “failed in their duty” and
for diagnosing soldiers with certain medical conditions “without due consideration of the
military issues at stake,”294 emphasising the military over the medical. And the confusion
and debates surrounding shell shock also complicated the role of the MO. There were
disagreements and varying viewpoints as to the use of the term itself, its symptoms,
treatments, long-term implications, and other aspects.295 Even the British War Office
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Committee of Enquiry into ‘Shell-Shock’ of 1922 only developed a rather ambiguous
understanding of the problem in the years following the war.296 If the military authorities
themselves could not agree on what constituted shell shock and related afflictions, it was
even more difficult for MOs to grapple with the problem. War weariness, moreover, was
a more difficult concept to understand, and the army medical policies, the emphasis on
manpower and morale at the expense of nearly all other factors, served to exacerbate preexisting conditions and encouraged the development of war weariness into shell shock.

Different Types of Casualties, the Categorisation and Classification
of Soldiers
Diseases and illnesses297 were problematic because they could be communicable,
could make soldiers vulnerable to other health problems, and ultimately undermined the
overall health, morale, endurance, and well-being of those in uniform - all of which could
contribute to war weariness. Some diseases also affected the soldiers both physically and
mentally. Syphilis, for instance, could lead to serious mental and neurological
impairment. And the scourge of tuberculosis, as well as its treatment, could have a
marked “mental effect” on the soldier patients.298 Long periods spent in hospital could be
demoralizing, especially if troops felt they were letting their comrades down or if they
missed a big ‘show’ (battle).
Diseases/illnesses served to compromise the health and endurance of soldiers, but
could also undermine commitment and morale, acting as a contributor to war weariness.
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Suffering from disease or other medical problems did not guarantee the development of
war weariness, but it did make soldiers more susceptible to it. These wounds, illness, and
other problems illustrate the difficulties facing the soldiers, on both an individual and
collective level. But they also suggest that the soldiers’ powers of resistance were
weakened over time and contributed to the activation of self-preservation behaviours, not
to mention self-reflection and calculations regarding long-term chances of survival.
Because of the bloody nature of the war, and the fact that prior to the autumn of 1918
there was no end in sight, soldiers might very well determine that their best chances of
survival were to evade duty299 or escape service altogether. It was under these conditions
that war weariness thrived.
Especially problematic were the non-physical casualties, and the debates over
what constituted a genuine wound and battle casualty. Shell shock, hysteria,
exhaustion,300 and neurasthenia cases, depending on the MO, could be classified as either
directly caused by (or related to) combat or frontline service, or alternatively, blamed on
the soldier and attributed to his weakness, predisposition, mistakes, or similar defect. War
weariness, though a very real phenomenon and reaction to combat, was more ambiguous.
Those who were deemed honourable soldiers, who had done their duty and were wounded
during service, were treated more sympathetically than those who were depicted as weak,
cowards, or shirkers. There were, of course, rank, class, and cultural dimensions to this
false dichotomy, as evidenced by both diagnoses and the awarding (or not) of pensions.301
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The disagreements over what constituted a battle casualty highlights another issue,
namely, how soldiers should be classified and what role they should play based on their
health and strength. Some soldiers, due to their age or wound/illness, for instance, were
no longer fit for frontline service. This was especially true for infantrymen, who were
most exposed to enemy fire. These were the soldiers at the ‘sharp end’ of combat.302 Yet
despite debility, these troops could still be useful along the lines of communication, in the
CASC or similar units.303 These categories were developed to maximise manpower and
efficiency, as well as to ensure that frontline units always had enough troops to carry out
their duties. Because of this, some soldiers who should have been granted a temporary
rest were forced to carry on. The classification system had five separate categories, from
“A” to “E,” each of which also had sub-categories. Category “A” men,304 were deemed fit
for general service, whereas “B” troops were deemed fit for overseas service, but not in
combat units. These “B” troops thus could join forestry or labour units, as well as do
sedentary work (such as clerks).305 “D” troops were considered temporarily unfit for
service, while “E” troops were inadequate for military service of any kind, and were
awaiting discharge.306 “A” soldiers needed to be able to withstand long marches and
heavy physical exertion, to see properly (to fire a weapon), to hear well (to be able to
respond to verbal orders), and be “able to stand active service conditions.” This last point
was particularly problematic, as it was nearly impossible to screen-out those predisposed
to breakdown – if there even were such individuals – and even good, loyal, hard-working,
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service. LAC, RG 9 III B2, Volume 3686, 30-0-0 (Volume 4), June 1918 – December 1918, General Correspondence,
‘Instructions for Medical Officers,’ dated 21 August 1918.
305 The PPCLI saw their active strength decrease as Private Robert Christie (Reg. # 51106) was downgraded from
category “A” to “B1,” due to Neurasthenia. He was thus transferred to the Canadian Labour Pool and “struck off
strength of the P.P.C.L.I. accordingly.” PPCLI Archives, 34 (3)-6, Battalion Orders, Daily Orders Pt. II, 1 January – 31
December 1918.
306 LAC, RG 9 III B2, Volume 3686, 30-0-0 (Volume 4), June 1918 – December 1918, General Correspondence,
‘Instructions for Medical Officers,’ dated 21 August 1918.
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and strong soldiers could break down due to acute or cumulative stress at the front.307
And in many ways, ‘active service conditions’ were dynamic and unpredictable.
Soldiers suffering from psychiatric casualties, or made militarily ineffective from
combat but without physical wounds, were not always diagnosed as battle casualties. This
meant these troops were often treated unsympathetically or prevented from escaping
further frontline service, despite their inability to endure further combat and their
potential for permanent and long-term debilitation.308 And in order to reduce the number
of shell shock diagnoses, and to prevent the impression that authorities were sympathetic
to these cases, there were certain rules and guidelines surrounding classification.309 Some
MOs, for instance, were reprimanded by superior authorities for being too generous and
too liberal in diagnosing certain (psychiatric) casualties as shell shock cases. In the
experience of the No. 10 Canadian Field Ambulance, some believed this diagnosis of
shell shock was “being abused [by medical officers].” Medical Officers were reminded
that they needed to follow orders and regulations as “in some divisions a diagnosis of
SHELL SHOCK is not permitted without an accompanying confirmatory note from [the]
officer commanding, unit.”310 This simply reinforces the point that the needs and recovery
of the individual soldier/patient were secondary to those of the army, especially
manpower and morale considerations. Moreover, it also illustrates that medical officers
were limited by army rules and regulations and, at least in this case, the commanding

The editor of one soldier’s journal wrote that “even among those who seemed steady and solid under the constant
danger from enemy fire, the stress of service at the front had a cumulative effect on the soldier.” Roy, ed., The Journal
of Private Fraser, 15.
308 Practically speaking, this meant that these psychiatric casualties and shell shock cases might not be treated as
traditional battle casualties, such as gunshot wounds, and could thus be denied pensions and further government support
following discharge from the forces. One report, for instance, made it clear that the Army sought to limit government
support for these types of casualties, and feared giving the impression to other soldiers that they were sympathetic to
these cases. The author stated that “soldiers discharged from [the] Army for psychogenetic conditions (Neurasthenia,
Shell Shock, Psychasthenia, Psycho-Neurosis, etc.) should not receive a ‘pension’ but rather a temporary allowance.
The word ‘pension’ has too permanent a sound.” LAC, RG 9 III B2, Volume 3618, 25-13-6, ‘G.R.O. 3867,’ 25 April
1918 and ‘Report on Visit to Special Hospitals for Nervous Cases.’
309 Routine Order No. 298 clearly outlined rules regarding the diagnosis and classification of casualties. Those listed as
NYD [Not Yet Diagnosed] Gas were not to be listed as battle casualties, unless and until they were “definitely
diagnosed as cases of gas poisoning” by a more senior officer. The report continued, stating that “the diagnosis of
M.Os. in charge of fighting units cannot be taken as final.” This suggested that there was a rather high burden of proof
for certain casualties, and that the medical authorities were not always trusted to do the right thing for the needs of the
army (manpower and morale). LAC, RG 9 III C10, Volume 4554, Folder 2, File 12, ‘Routine Order No. 298.’
310 Ibid, Folder 1, File 4, ‘Notes to Medical Officers, No. 10 Canadian Field Ambulance,’ 28 May 1916.
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officer (and not the MO) had the final say regarding the health and diagnosis of the
soldiers. Nevertheless, due to the sheer volume of psychiatric casualties and other nonphysical cases during the war, the British Army developed a treatment and classification
system for shell shock casualties, in order to maintain “prompt and efficient treatment”311
to ensure they returned to duty as soon as possible.
This classification and categorisation system was important for a few reasons.
First of all, it meant that some troops were transferred to other units, for good or ill, or
that they could be discharged from the forces entirely. When manpower demands were
elevated, for instance during the German attacks of 1918, service and non-combatant
units were ‘combed out’ for those who could undertake infantry duty at the front. A report
of 15 April 1918 indicated that due to manpower demands the CO of a CASC unit would
interview troops in the hopes of determining if category “A” soldiers could be released
and replaced by “B” men. The idea was to select “for employment those men of the
lowest category of physical fitness compatible with carrying on the work [of the service
corps] required” of the unit, but also ensuring the “economy and efficiency of personnel
desired.”312 Another report argued category “A” soldiers under the age of 40 currently
serving in CASC units could be released and sent to the infantry.313 This classification
system was also important as the misdiagnosis of soldiers could mean they were
discharged from the forces prematurely or unnecessarily.314 In the interests of manpower,
this was not an ideal arrangement.

311

Class I cases, for example, were given treatment from a few hours to several days. After which they were transferred
to Class II, the “semi-convalescent class,” where soldiers were given further treatment and military training, such as
fatigues, marches, and physical training. From there, they were sent to Class III, the convalescent section. In Class III
the patient was returned to regular wards, as “up to this time the shell shock patients had been segregated from the other
patients.” According to the author of this report this system apparently worked, as “75 per cent of the patients were
returned to duty with very few relapses or recurrent cases.” LAC, RG 9 III C10, Volume 4562, Folder 5, File 3, ‘Work:
Resume of No. 3 Canadian Stationary Hospital,’ 1-5-17 to 10-7-18.
312 LAC, RG 9 III C9, Volume 4533, File 1, ‘X.R. 27261,’ ‘To the OC No. 1 Canadian Field Butchery, BEF.’
313 Yet before CASC personnel were dismissed from the service it was important to ensure that they could not do
another, presumably less strenuous, job instead. The report stated that “care should be taken to consider the man power
situation and the difficulty of securing satisfactory replacements.”
314 The officer in command of the Moore Barracks Canadian Hospital Shorncliffe, for instance, complained that “there
are some cases suffering from mental disease who are now invalided to Canada and subsequently recover their mental
balance.” He continued, writing that “this recovery sometimes takes place within a short time,” and thus they could still
be useful as soldiers in some capacity. LAC, RG 9 III B2, volume 3618, Folder 25-13-7 to 25-13-10, ‘Moore Barracks
Canadian Hospital Shorncliffe, 25 July 1917, officer i/c Hospital to A.D.M.S. Canadians Folkestone.’
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Secondly, this classification system attempted to keep pace with the overall
declining standards and requirements for frontline service over time. The system, after all,
was established in part to make the most out of the available manpower and to ensure
there were enough of each category of soldiers. Though often a source of ridicule on the
part of serving troops,315 the decline in medical standards was a reality of the war, and the
Army did what it could to ensure continuity of calibre, especially for the combat arms and
services.316 Thirdly and finally, this categorisation ensured that medical officers, unit
COs, and especially medical boards had an enormous influence on the fate of thousands
of young soldiers. To provide but one example, the medical board at the British base at
Étaples and the ‘Inspector of Drafts’ were to scrutinise all Canadian troops arriving in
France, to re-classify those rejected from these drafts, as well as those returning from
hospital and those sent to the base as temporarily or permanently unfit by MOs at the
front. This medical board was “responsible that all men proceeding to the front are
physically fit to carry on with their respective duties,”317 though it seems their emotional
and psychological fitness were not taken into account. This, of course, was problematic
for the individual troops as well as their units at the front, especially if the soldiers were
unable to withstand the strains of combat. In such a situation, the war-weary soldier could
quickly become more seriously shell-shocked, and ultimately, debilitated. For the military
authorities, however, the health and well-being of the soldier in the long-term was
subordinate to the collective needs of the army. After all, the medical services were
designed to return men to duty as quickly as possible,318 despite the long-term
consequences on the individual.

Various Authors, Mr. Punch’s History of the Great War (New York: Frederick A. Stokes Company, n.d.), 157.
For declining medical standards, see LAC, RG 9 III C9, Volume 4533, File 1, ‘Disposal of Unsuitable CASC
Personnel’ and ‘CASC Reinforcements.’ These documents indicated that “it is not to be expected that former standards
of reinforcements can be maintained,” and that “new arrivals were not in many cases capable of carrying on.” See also
Nic Clark, Unwanted Warriors: The Rejected Volunteers of the Canadian Expeditionary Force (Vancouver: UBC
Press, 2015), Appendix A, B, and C (for example).
317 LAC, RG 9 III B2, Volume 3751, Nos. 10 and 12 (British) FLD AMS, ‘Asst. Inspector of Drafts, Etaples.’
318 To provide but one example, experiments were conducted with oxygen chambers in an attempt to return soldiers to
combat as soon as possible. The chambers were used on gassed soldiers in the hopes of making them “more ‘fit’ and
capable of withstanding the strain,” which spoke to the wider function of the medical services, namely, that soldiers
were merely a means to an end. LAC, RG 9 III B2, Volume 3618, Folder 25-13-6, Gas Poisoning, December 1915 –
May 28 1918, File ‘The Use of Oxygen in Gassed Cases.’
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Shell Shock, PTSD, War Neuroses, Psychiatric Casualties, and
Breakdown
Despite some harsh and rather unsympathetic attitudes toward breakdown and
psychiatric casualties among the military and medical authorities, as the war dragged on it
could not be denied that these casualties were real, and becoming a real problem. There
was, for instance, a sense of inevitability toward breakdown,319 as though it was only a
matter of time before all soldiers succumbed to the stresses and strains of war. And
because both acute stimuli and cumulative exposure to the trauma of combat and war
could elicit this breakdown, no troops, whether they were in combatant services or
otherwise, were exempt from these dangers. Canadian MO Andrew Macphail, infamous
for writing that shell shock was merely a manifestation of “childishness and femininity,”
admitted that even the best soldiers could ultimately suffer from “anxiety neurosis” after
years of war.320 And unlike previous conflicts, the First World War was a unique war in
which for frontline soldiers the periods of genuine respite were insufficient, if not lacking
entirely. This was a point made by the British MO Lord Moran, who argued that lack of
respite drained the soldiers of their inner reserves and led inevitably to the “breaking of
men” in uniform.321 For the troops stationed at the front, tours of duty in the trenches
could be extended, and in contrast to previous wars, there was little break in the winter
when the campaigning season was put on hold. The nature and intensity of the conflict,
and during the final months of the war the pace of the conflict as well, served to assault
the health and well-being of the troops regularly.

It was also true that for every soldier there came a time “when he can endure no further.” They may still be healthy,
but there will soon come a day when he will break, and “the certainty that the break is coming fills him with dread,” and
he betrays this dread in “little ways” that are noticeable to the perceptive officer. Laffin, Soldiers’ Stories from France
and Flanders, 268. One British veteran recalled that during an attack or under an artillery bombardment “the noise
would grow into a crescendo and at a certain point your nerve would break.” This suggests that there was a sense of
inevitability about this, and it was not a question of whether their nerve would break, but rather when. Moreover, the
feelings of helplessness or hopelessness, and the inability to strike back at your tormentor, could accelerate this process.
One MO wrote that “the war is becoming a slow slide into inevitability – inevitable wounding, maiming, death,
destruction.” Arthur, ed., Forgotten Voices of the Great War, 235 and Davidson, A Doctor in the Great War, 228.
320 Macphail, Medical Services, 278 and 277.
321 Moran, The Anatomy of Courage, 75.
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Shell shock and breakdown affected all types of soldiers and personalities – just as
war weariness did – and even dedicated, hard-working, and strong individuals could be
pushed to, and sometimes beyond, the breaking point. Canadian officer Ernest Black
acknowledged this, writing that “courage, or lack of it, had nothing to do with shell
shock…I never knew a braver man than” the one who succumbed to it in his battery.322
Some broke down and suffered from psychiatric casualties after a particularly harrowing
or intense traumatic experience, such as being buried alive or watching a pal get torn to
bits by shells, whereas others experienced this only after months, or in some cases, years
of combat.323 And Captain Harold McGill noted in his memoirs the warning signs of
impending exhaustion, and the potential for more permanent breakdown. He explained
that “the recent heavy work and extra exertion [of working parties on top of other duties]
had brought these men, some of whom had given many months of excellent service, to
the stage of rendering them medically unfit”324 for duty. This was not a case of lazy,
unwilling, or malingering soldiers refusing to carry on with work, but rather dedicated
troops being pushed too far and their bodies (and minds) giving in. The issue of shell
shock was compounded by the fact that soldiers could be made medically unfit and
militarily useless even without a physical wound. For some, the shock and trauma of
combat overwhelmed their powers of resistance and endurance. One Canadian soldier, for
instance, wrote of the pressure and concussion of artillery barrages
that damages some men, some more than others. They don’t have a mark to show
[on their bodies], but they are hurt. There was nothing wrong with a fellow who
couldn’t stand it [any longer]. Some were just more mentally prepared than others.
It was like a man who has led a scholarly life all of a sudden getting involved in a
gang fight. It could be quite a scary experience.325
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Black, I Want One Volunteer, 83-84.
The MO Captain McGill wrote of his experience with a hysterical soldier. This man was in a state of agitation and
stress at incoming shells and he explained in his memoir that “he was a brave soldier too, but it must be a harrowing
experience indeed to lie helpless in a trench with shells exploding in all directions.” This was a case of a good soldier
merely being pushed to the breaking point. Norris, The World War I Memoir of Captain Harold W. McGill, 111 and
Black, I Want One Volunteer, 83.
324 Norris, The World War I Memoir of Captain Harold W. McGill, 162.
325 Reid, Personal Memoirs of the First World War, 172.
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Though this reflects a rather sympathetic understanding of breakdown in combat, no
amount of mental preparation could make any normal, rational individual immune to the
effects of the war and the cumulative and acute strains of combat to which they were
exposed. The results could be both devastating and pitiful.326
As with more traditional and physical wounds and illnesses, psychiatric casualties
had both general and specific causes and contributing factors. The same pressures,
stresses and strains that led to the onset and development of war weariness – the death
and dying, hardships, exhaustion, sense of helplessness and hopelessness – also
undermined soldiers and contributed to psychiatric casualties. Indeed, these two
phenomena were on the same spectrum. But unlike physical wounds, it was not always
easy to identify why a particular soldier suffered breakdown when he did. Put another
way, the threshold for war neurosis and shell shock debilitation was not consistent, and
some soldiers suffered breakdowns despite the fact that they never directly came in
contact with the enemy. In this sense, both combatant and non-combatant troops suffered,
provided they were exposed to sufficient trauma and were denied an outlet or ‘escape’
from this trauma.
The general service conditions under which soldiers existed contributed to their
emotional and psychological problems. The intensity of the war, as well as the nearconstant exposure to the stresses associated with combat, ensured even the toughest
volunteers and veterans were worn down over time. One MO made the link between
“frayed nerves,” exposure to combat, and health problems, whereas others noted the
“physical and psychological horrors of combat.”327 After all those serving in the war,
even along the lines of communication, would be exposed to death and disfigurement on
a regular basis. Furthermore, aside from frontline infantry and those in the combat
services, support troops were exposed to mortal danger, but lacked the ability to directly
retaliate against the enemy.328 Even the less sympathetic and traditionally-inclined MOs

See, for instance, the Wilfrid Owen poem “Mental Cases,” found in Waters, Poetry of the First World War, 180.
Davidson, A Doctor in the Great War, 226 and Norris, The World War I Memoir of Captain Harold W. McGill, viii.
328 These labour and supply troops had a less “spectacular” job than the infantry or artillery, but were no less important
to the war effort. With these duties “not only is the labour involved very considerable but the danger is constant.” This
might encourage psychological casualties or a sense of helplessness as these troops could not directly respond to enemy
326
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came to acknowledge that “the stress of war” was a direct contributing factor toward the
onset of psychoneuroses, and that “active service conditions” could explain hysteria and
other afflictions.329 Temporary conditions, based on the strains of war combined with the
lack of rest and respite, could become more permanent if the soldier was not allowed
rotation out of the front lines and away from the sources of trauma. Relapses were
common, and worn -own soldiers could become permanently debilitated if not treated
with care.330 A war-weary soldier, fed up with the war and worn down by long-term
service, could become a more permanent casualty as war weariness transmuted into shell
shock over time.
Aside from the strains associated with general and active service conditions, the
cumulative exposure to the stresses and trauma of combat, as well as the lack of rest and
respite, contributed to psychiatric casualties. British MO J.C. Dunn wrote that soldiers
could become “temporarily unable to stand the strain,” and that he himself was “worn out
through physical and mental strain” by 1917/1918.331 John Becker of the 75th
(Mississauga) Battalion also noted the detrimental effects that cumulative strain imposed
on the individual. He wrote that after exhibiting undue caution during an artillery barrage,
“I realized then that my nerves were going and that I wouldn’t be much good in action if I
kept at it many weeks longer.”332 With this candid admission that his ‘nerves were
going,’333 Becker acknowledged that the stresses and strains of combat were, over time,

fire or ‘fight back.’ Moreover, ‘flight’ from danger was certainly not a legal option for them. Another officer argued
that even troops not at the front, or indeed even in a combat role, could break down from the war. He wrote that “the
men at the front do the showy work, and may get some honours and promotions, whilst men [behind the lines] who do
heavy steady work until they break down receive no recognition.” My italics. See LAC, RG 9 III D1, Volume 4714,
Folder 104, File 5, Canadian Corps Ammunition Park, ‘Narrative of Operations,’ 2-14 June 1916 and LAC, RG 9 III
C15, Volume 4656, Mediterranean Expeditionary Force, letter/report by C.W. Shelly.
329 Macphail, Medical Services, 276 and LAC, RG 9 III B2, Volume 3618, 25-13-7 to 25-13-10, ‘Medical Report of an
Invalid.’
330 In one case a soldier had been exposed to intense stimuli and suffered a breakdown, and that “if [he] continued under
the stress of active service conditions a permanent mental condition will ensue.” My italics, to illustrate that even
regular service conditions had a certain level of stress and strain involved which could erode the powers of dedicated,
otherwise-healthy soldiers. LAC, RG 9 III B2, Volume 3618, 25-13-7 to 25-13-10, ‘Medical Case Sheet.’
331 J.C. Dunn, The War the Infantry Knew, 1914-1919: A Chronicle of Service in France and Belgium with the Second
Battalion, His Majesty’s Twenty-Third Foot, the Royal Welch Fusiliers (London: Jane’s Publishing Company Limited,
1987), xxxv-xxxvi.
332 Christie, The Memoir of John Becker, 203 and Chartrand, The Canadian Corps, 16. Fraser wrote of a shell-shocked
soldier whose “nerves and control were absolutely gone” at Vimy. Roy, ed., The Journal of Private Fraser, 268.
333 A Private Robert Duncan of the 102nd Battalion also wrote that after a battle “I was so exhausted that I was almost
delirious…the cooks had a hot breakfast for us and we ate like wolves but all the time we ate the lot of us cried like
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eroding his ability to withstand duty at the front. The pressures placed on infantry were
bad enough, but all soldiers334 required not only a physical rest away from the sources of
danger, but also a psychological respite from these sources of trauma. The “symptoms [of
exhaustion]…largely depend upon the kind and amount of work done in a given time,” as
“repeated and prolonged exposure” to the stress of combat “produce[s] continuous
cumulative stress, to which the human organism is compelled to give way” over time.
Cumulative strain was especially problematic, and yet the reality of combat helps explain
the prevalence, intensity, and unpredictability of psychiatric casualties during the war.
Most Canadian soldiers serving in Europe were not the hardened frontiersmen, hunters,
voyageurs, and lumberjacks of myth and lore, but were simple middle-class clerks and
urban workers.335
Over time the cumulative stress and strain of wartime service led to war weariness
and ultimately shell shock, but intense, unusual, or particularly traumatic experiences
could also initiate or accelerate this process. The sense of absolute terror and helplessness
that accompanied being trapped in an artillery barrage, for instance, was something that
many veterans and contemporaries referred to. Captain Ralph Bell of the 1st Battalion
wrote that being trapped in an artillery bombardment could lead to the onset of shell

babies…I couldn’t have told you why I cried excepting that my nerves were completely gone.” Grescoe, eds., The Book
of War Letters, 169.
334 Medical reports on the effects of flying on the human body and mind illustrate just how serious the impact could be.
Pilots and other aircrew could face a shock, especially going from warmth to “intense cold; from relative quiet to a
continual rush and roar; from a state of equilibrium to one of instability; from muscular and mental rest to highly-skilled
and nerve-trying [situations]…from safety to possible death…[these pilots were] subject to intensive, intermittent and
cumulative stimuli of a degree to which men has never been exposed before…[and] these unfavourable, afferent
impulses produce perceptions of the most trying character, so that the individual’s RESERVE FORCE RAPIDLY
BECOMES USED UP, and after many shows [or sorties] he becomes, to use his own expression, ‘dud.’ He lacks
resolution, loses confidence in himself, becomes stale, and if he is not withdrawn for a rest usually comes to grief.”
Capitalised in the original. LAC, RG 9 III B2, Volume 3493, 11-2-7/11-2-8, Reports Medical Officer DGMS, ‘Reports
Medical Aspect Air Service.’
335 Even if they were volunteers and healthy, dedicated young men, the nature, pace, and intensity of the fighting eroded
even the strongest individuals. According to the British War Office, troops could be used for employment on the home
front, including (former) “A” soldiers discharged “owing to nervous breakdown resulting from service in the present
war.” Another officer (a chaplain) admitted that he was “desperately weary at times,” and sometimes “depressed” and
discouraged, but that “I feel sure that it is only owing to the physical, nervous, and mental strain” of the war. Officers
also acknowledged the strain and exhaustion of the troops, especially after “good hard fighting,” they were under
“terrible strain.” See LAC, RG 9 III C10, Volume 4576, Folder 2, File 9, ‘Discharges’ and newspaper clipping from
The Standard, dated 30-4-17; LAC, RG 9 III C15, Volume 4669, Chaplains Reports, ‘Hospitals 1,’ and LAC, RG 9 III
C3, Volume 4214, Folder 1, File 10, Casualties, 2-3-17 to 1-1-18, CWRO, 387, ‘50th Battalion.’
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shock,336 even if there was no concussion or physical effect of the shelling. This was
another problem with psychiatric casualties, namely, that they could emerge seemingly
without physical derivation.337 Another soldier admitted that “during barrages I did see
shell shock victims,” and that there was no cover at Passchendaele; “there was nowhere to
run…there wasn’t a tree left in the area” to provide a modicum of protection.338 And
Thomas Salmon wrote in The Care and Treatment of Mental Diseases and War Neuroses
(1917) that during the war functional nervous diseases came to constitute “a major
medico-military problem,” especially as sustained artillery bombardments339 undermined
soldiers’ powers of resistance.
During the war medical authorities sought to understand the nature of shell shock
casualties to a much greater extent than they did war weariness. Medical authorities,
moreover, attempted to develop a classification and treatment plan to return soldiers to
duty as quickly as possible. Medical reports on war neurosis, for instance, attempted to
divide cases into those who experienced “prolonged” versus “exceptional” strain,
reinforcing the point that it could be cumulative stress or particularly acute trauma that
caused shell shock, or a combination of the two. In the view of some authorities, “the
Neurasthenia class includes some normal individuals whose breakdown is the result of
prolonged strain,” whereas the “shell shock cases are individuals with normal resistance
subjected to exceptional strain” during duty.340 In other cases, medical services
acknowledged that one particular event could exacerbate or bring shell shock symptoms
to the fore. One such soldier, for example, seemed to be “suffering from Hysteria, caused
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Bell, Canada in War-Paint, 161.
Medical professionals argued that soldiers could develop symptoms without being buried alive, or without being
exposed to shell fire. Even without a known physiological basis, soldiers could develop psychological issues that could
not be ignored. An MO noted that explosions could leave troops physically intact but with “dishevelled minds,” and
could be made ineffective “though there was no scratch upon him.” Some troops simply “cracked” due to stress over
time, as intense emotional shock could strip them of their self-control and equilibrium. And medical documents of the
50th Battalion noted that soldiers could be partially buried or have a shell burst very close to them “and yet be absolutely
unaffected by it from a medical point of view.” See Salmon, Mental Diseases and War Neuroses, 28-29; Moran, The
Anatomy of Courage, 21-25, and LAC, RG 9 III C3, Volume 4214, Folder 1, File 10, Casualties, 2-3-17 to 1-1-18,
CWRO, 387, ‘50th Battalion.’
338 Reid, Personal Memoirs of the First World War, 172.
339 Salmon, Mental Diseases and War Neuroses, 27.
340 LAC, RG 9 III B2, Volume 3752, Folder 3-1-4-2, Neurology, War Neuroses, ‘Treatment of Shell-Shock Cases at the
Front.’ The italics are mine.
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by general service conditions.” He had done capable duty in the trenches for 15 months,
but was then buried alive, certainly a traumatic event. The author of the soldier’s medical
case sheet concluded that “if [he] continued under the stress of active service conditions a
permanent mental condition will ensue.”341 And if the strains related to ‘active service
conditions’ could induce war weariness and psychiatric casualties, those “subjected to
some extraordinary exposure not incidental to all military operations”342 could suffer
even more.
Another factor in the onset of war weariness, and ultimately shell shock, was the
conflict all dedicated soldiers felt between their duty, and their self-preservation instinct:
the tension between the needs of the collective and those of the individual. The inability
to reconcile these two conflicting motivations could cause temporary and more permanent
psychiatric problems for individuals exposed to the trauma of combat. The social circles
of the soldier all reflected and reinforced the hierarchical nature of the military system,
and the troops were expected to contribute to group goals and conform to its rules and
values. Human beings exposed to traumatic stimuli and mortal danger, however, will
instinctively seek to protect themselves, and thus it was the role of comradeship, military
discipline, group cohesion, leadership, regimental pride, “social tradition,” and other
forces to counteract this biological fight or flight mechanism.343 This was one of the main
issues facing contemporary authorities, namely, how to convince individuals to face terror
and potential death or disfigurement when they had innate urges to ‘escape.’344 And even
steadfast and experienced volunteers were beset by this problem, to say nothing of
conscripts, untested, or reluctant soldiers. Pre-war tests and screenings to determine who

LAC, RG 9 III B2, volume 3618, 25-13-7 to 25-13-10, ‘Medical Case Sheet.’
LAC, RG 9 III C10, Volume 4536, Folder 6, File 2, ADMS 3 rd Canadian Division, ‘Extract from G.H.Q. Letter,’
dated 14/10/16.
343 One soldier wrote that without friends and comrades, “I’d have sprinted back to the coast and hopped a steamer to
Blighty long ago,” and that his chums did wonders “for a man’s resolve.” Caughill, ed., Letters to Janet, 109. W.H.R.
Rivers referred to this tension as “the conflicts between the instinctive tendencies of the individual and the forces of
social tradition,” and argued that “in the production of psycho-neurosis” there was “conflict arising out of…instincts,
and especially that of self-preservation, [which] takes an active if not the leading role” in this production. W.H.R.
Rivers, “Psychiatry and the War,” Science – New Series 49, 1268 (April 1919): 367-369.
344 In a discussion on attempting to prevent ‘encouraging’ the problem, Salmon wrote that this was “the unending
conflict between duty, honour and discipline, on the one hand, and homesickness, horror, and the urgings of the instinct
of self-preservation on the other.” Many feared that making neurosis ‘a way out’ for soldiers would be seized upon by
the men and an used as an exit or escape from their duties. Salmon, Mental Diseases and War Neuroses, 42.
341
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could endure the fire of battle were limited, and the veracity of the concept of
predisposition345 to breakdown is shaky at best. But experience in combat could be a
double-edged sword. Experience could allow the soldier to expect and anticipate dangers
at the front, as well as process powerful emotions inherent in battle. These experiences,
however, also wore down the individual over time and reinforced the idea of the
inevitability of death or disfigurement. And this sense of hopelessness or helplessness
was characteristic of war weariness.
As military authorities grappled with the reality of psychiatric casualties, there
was some debate over whether this was a new affliction, or if it was merely an updated
version of problems seen in the past. In the nineteenth century victims of industrial
accidents or railway crashes, for instance, seemed to exhibit some of the same symptoms
that now affected thousands of soldiers in the war. Moreover, early on there was a largely
physical understanding of shell shock, with an emphasis upon the bodily effects of shell
explosions, hence the term ‘shell shock.’ This was problematic, as it became clear that
psychiatric symptoms could emerge without physical origin; after experience and
reflection, it was acknowledged that its cause could be primarily mental, or shell
explosions themselves might be merely “the spark which releases deep-seated, psychical
forces due to the strains of warfare” and especially combat.346 By 1917, shell shock came
to represent “practically any nervous symptoms in soldiers exposed to shell fire that
cannot be explained by some obvious physical injury,”347 and factors outside shell fire
could also act as a contributing factor. According to one MO, the British Army and War
Office ultimately agreed on three different types of psychoneurosis of war: shell shock,
hysteria, and neurasthenia.348 The concept of war weariness was not well-developed
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It was suggested that certain troops were more predisposed to breakdown than others, including those with an
“unstable nervous organisation,” poor education, or poor surroundings [profession? upbringing? class?] to prepare the
man. There were concerns throughout the war about recruitment and “the types of men predisposed to these
disabilities,” and with “unfit recruits” and “general questions of prophylaxis.” Others who were apparently predisposed
included “organic nervous cases,” “feeble minded soldiers,” “border types,” those with criminal tendencies, alcoholics,
etc. LAC, RG 9 III B2, Volume 3752, Folder 3-1-4-2, ‘Functional Nervous Disorders’ and Volume 3751, 2-4-1, ‘Duties
of the Military Hospitals Commission.’
346 Rivers, “Psychiatry and the War,” 367.
347 Salmon, Mental Diseases and War Neuroses, 27.
348 Macphail, Medical Services, 276-277. Many shell shock cases were depicted as Neurasthenia, as soldiers broke
down after sustained periods at the front. This was often juxtaposed with Hysteria. Symptoms for hysteria included:
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during the war years, however, but it is a useful concept for understanding the impact of
combat on the individual, and as an important marker on the road to shell shock
debilitation. Hysteria was characterised by panic-stricken and erratic behaviour, and was
often applied to ORs and lower-class soldiers who were negatively impacted by the
cumulative trauma of war, often set off by exposure to intense or extraordinary situations.
Neurasthenia, on the other hand, was often reserved for officers and those from the upper
echelons of society; these cases were the result of long-term service at the front, and
resulted in more exhausted, apathetic, worn-down patients.349 And by the final years of
the war, British authorities had established a shell shock classification system based on
the prognosis and phase of treatment for soldiers,350 acknowledging that individuals
reacted differently to trauma and some recovered in short order, whereas others never
fully recovered. Medical authorities also made use of other expressions regarding the
myriad symptoms related to combat service and traumatic exposure. Some of the these
shell shock cases, for example, were subsumed into the larger category of ‘insanity,’351
suggesting a more permanent debilitation, pre-war mental health problems, and hereditary
predisposition.
War weariness as a concept was most fully developed after war, though some
contemporaries did use this expression. And aside from the shell shock designation,
authorities made use of other terms and even euphemisms to describe this phenomenon.
The complexity and confusion surrounding the nature of psychiatric casualties was one
reason for this ambiguity and reluctance. But there were also cultural explanations for not

erratic behaviour, seizures, irritability, lack of focus, depression, and others. Grescoe, The Book of War Letters, 169 and
LAC, RG 9 III B2, Volume 3618, 25-13-7 to 25-13-10, ‘Medical Report of an Invalid,’ 4 June 1917.
349 In MO McGill’s memoir it was noted that Neurasthenia was “the more commonly observed breakdown resulting
from the cumulative exposure to the stress of combat,” but was still a manifestation of shell shock. Norris, The World
War I Memoir of Captain Harold W. McGill, 98.
350 LAC, RG 9 III C10, Volume 4562, Folder 5, File 3, Work, ‘Resume of No. 3 Canadian Stationary Hospital,’ 1-5-17
to 10-7-18.
351 The Hospital Ship HMHS Araguaya, for instance, had 65 “mental” cases aboard, or around 8.5% of its total number
of cases. Of these cases, 16 were diagnosed with dementia praecox, 15 as delusional insanity, 10 with mental stupor, 6
confusional insanity, 6 mania cases, 4 melancholia, 3 mental deficiency, and 1 each of mental instability, hysteria, and
G.P.I., which suggests there was some difficulty in nomenclature and distinguishing between the nature and symptoms
of these psychiatric conditions. MO Andrew Macphail also referred to concussion/fright neurosis, hysteria,
neurasthenia, psychasthenia, reflex paralysis, and katatonic [sic] stupor. LAC, RG 9 III C10, Volume 4577, Folder 5,
File 6, ‘H.M.H.S. Araguaya’ and Macphail, Medical Services, 277-278.
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drawing attention to these problems, as well as a widespread fear that giving these
conditions a name would only legitimise them, and thus encourage its development in
others. The term exhaustion,352 for example, was commonly used to describe troops who
had been worn down by conflict, and were suffering the inevitable physical (and
psychological) reactions to sustained combat. In other instances, NYDN was applied,353
suggesting the authorities were unable or unwilling to acknowledge debilitation and the
fact that soldiers were being made militarily ineffective but without a physical, tangible
wound. The use of the term ‘nervous’ served to put the responsibility for breakdown
squarely on the shoulders of those suffering these conditions, rather than on the nature of
the war itself. Another expression used to emphasise the failings of the individual rather
than highlight the extreme circumstances in which most frontline troops found
themselves, was “temporarily unable to stand the strain” of combat.354 At least with this
example, the word ‘temporarily’ suggested that this soldier had been able to endure
trauma in the past, and with proper care, could do so again in the future. Other soldiers
found themselves “all in,” and unable to carry on;355 others suffered a “crack up” or
“cracked” under the pressure;356 and still others had a case of “nerves,” suffered from
“shattered nerves,” or found that their nerves had “let go,” were “in pieces,” or their
nerves “were going.”357

Without rest, exhaustion could make a normally robust soldier “break down” over time. A Canadian MO also wrote
of “nerve and exhausted” cases, a “worn out and exhausted officer” as well as “badly shocked and exhausted men” at
sick parade. Other soldiers were described as ‘tired’ and ‘worn out.’ See Bell, Canada in War-Paint, 184 and Norris,
The World War I Memoir of Captain Harold W. McGill, 156.
353 Those diagnosed as NYDN found it more difficult to be evacuated down the line than other, more traditional or
physical casualties. Moreover, there seemed to be some stigma attached to this designation, as though they were less
deserving of army resources, time, sympathy, and the like. LAC, RG 9 III C10, Volume 4541, Folder 2, File 4, ‘XCII
Corps, Medical Arrangements No. 9’ and ‘A.D.M.S., 1 st Canadian Division,’ 30 March 1918.
354 Dunn, The War the Infantry Knew, xxxv.
355 Bell, Canada in War-Paint, 182.
356 Canadian artilleryman Ernest Black noted that when laughter did not work as an outlet or ‘safety valve,’ “sometimes
there was a crack up” in the unit. Humour has been depicted by others as “an escape valve” as well for soldiers. Roy,
ed., The Journal of Private Fraser, 21 and Laffin, Soldiers’ Stories from France and Flanders, 2, 178. Black noted,
moreover, that in the Second World War this was called battle fatigue, but was known as shell shock in the First World
War. Also, even the strongest troops, those “full of guts” could break down from shell shock. And Lord Moran wrote
that some “cracked” due to stress over time. The conditions under which the soldiers fought “tested [even] the strongest
of constitutions.” Gaudet, ed., The World War I Journal and Poems of Pte. Frank Walker, xi.
357 Norris, The World War I Memoir of Captain Harold W. McGill, 98, 154; Reid, Personal Memoirs of the First World
War, 215; Graves, Goodbye to All That, 104 and Christie, The Memoir of John Becker, 203.
352
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The contributing factors to the onset of war weariness could not be removed
entirely, and thus prevention was perhaps the best approach to help minimise the worst
effects of psychiatric casualties. Care for the health, morale, and physical well-being of
soldiers helped with their endurance, giving them the best chance to stave off the worst
effects of long-term service. The mental and physical state of soldiers, especially infantry,
was important for success in combat, and training and “the condition of men are
important factor[s]” to be considered. Moreover, troops should be lightly equipped in any
attack, to avoid exhaustion, be well-fed prior to going ‘over the top,’ and be well-rested
so as to be “fresh and can [therefore] fight better.”358 ‘Collapse’ was also especially
troublesome in the cold months. Proper equipment and clothing, dry warm blankets, heat,
and hot drinks were all helpful, and “all efforts are to be directed toward combating
collapse during the cold season,”359 though it is not clear if they were referring to collapse
of energy, will, health, or something else entirely. Alcohol, moreover, also helped prevent
‘collapse,’ exhaustion, and other problems, at least to a point. Alcohol had the ability to
induce a feeling of warmth and comfort, provided a sense of euphoria at first,360 calmed
rattled nerves, and acted as a fortifying force. It was issued prior to attacks and other
engagements, was used as an incentive to recruit volunteers for raids, patrols, and other
missions, and often issued following combat to help soldiers cope with exhaustion and
trauma. And for shell-shocked soldiers combatting the enemy as well as their own terrors
and nightmares, booze was a welcome gift.361 Robert Graves in Goodbye to All That also
referred to the healing effects of alcohol, especially in officers, who with their greater
privileges had better access. Alcohol acted as a coping mechanism, but there were also
problems pertaining to dependency and addiction.362 Humour, laughter, and even weeping
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The Military Museums, W.A. Howard and Arthur J.E. Child Archives, TMM F00 81, John Cummer Fonds, Volume
1, Series 1-4, 9-3-4, Folder 9, ‘Training: Trench Warfare.’
359 LAC, RG 9 III C10, Volume 4554, Folder 2, File 2, ‘Dressing Stations, Organisation Of.’
360 W. Langdon Brown and J. Keogh Murphy, eds., The Practitioner’s Encyclopaedia of Medical Treatment (London:
Oxford University Press, 1915), 153.
361 Norris, The World War I Memoir of Captain Harold W. McGill, 246.
362 Graves also referred to a “two bottle” company commander, who relied too heavily on alcohol to cope with the
trauma and terror experienced. Graves, Goodbye to All That, 152. The use of alcohol as a coping mechanism can also
be found in fictional accounts of the war, such as Gail Bowen and Ron Marken, Dancing in Poppies (The Playwrights
Guild of Canada, 1992). The tendency to use alcohol to dull the (emotional) pain can also be found in Fred Doucette,
“Sick Soldiers: A Veteran with PTSD describes War’s Invisible Wounds,” The Walrus, 13, 2 (March 2016): 55-56. For
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also acted as coping mechanisms, by providing psychological relief, reducing tension, and
promoting adaptation.363
The preconditions for the onset of war weariness could never be eliminated
entirely, but the treatments and responses to psychiatric casualties were important to the
future well-being of the individual. There were both official and unofficial treatments; at
times, these cases were severe enough (and the soldiers militarily ineffective) to be sent
down the line to be cared for by other medical personnel, whereas other cases were
deemed moderate enough that treatments at or near the front was believed sufficient. For
care near the front lines, it was important that the soldier be kept busy and occupied, so as
not to dwell on their situation or be given much time for brooding. One MO speculated
that more soldiers did not lose their sanity “because they had little opportunity to indulge
in introspection.”364 Keeping the patients busy with exercise, games, or light employment
helped “divert the patients’ mind from dwelling on his own symptoms”365 and
deteriorating further. Other authorities insisted on treatment in close proximity to the
firing line, “where the spirit of army discipline is most felt” by the soldier.366 In these
treatment centres, army discipline, drill, and physical exercise were emphasised,367 so the
individual would be treated more as a soldier than an invalid, and be given rest in the
guise of military exercises or duties.
For more serious cases, or with soldiers who dealt with sympathetic MOs,
evacuation down the line to larger and more specialised medical facilities led to further
treatment. Special Hospitals for shell-shock cases allowed for the concentration of
specialists and equipment that could be tailored to these cases and problems.368 Aside

other information on alcohol and Canadian troops, see Tim Cook, “‘More a Medicine than a Beverage:’ ‘Demon Rum’
and the Canadian Trench Soldier of the First World War,” Canadian Military History 9, 1 (2000): 5-22.
363 Black, I Want One Volunteer, 83-84; Teed, ed., Uncle Cy’s War, 12, and Susan M. Labott and Randall B. Martin,
“The Stress-Moderating Effects of Weeping and Humour,” Journal of Human Stress, 13, 4 (Winter 1987): 159-164.
364 Norris, The World War I Memoir of Captain Harold W. McGill, 198.
365 LAC, RG 9 III B2, Volume 3752, 3-1-4-2, Neurology, War Neuroses, ‘Functional Nervous Disorders.’
366 Salmon, Mental Diseases and War Neuroses, 36.
367 Ibid, 39. It seemed only the most serious cases were evacuated out of the front lines. Those classified as NYDN,
with minor symptoms, or “overwrought mental conditions requiring a short period of treatment, will be retained in the
divisional area; it is more serious cases that are sent to the special hospital.” LAC, RG 9 III B2, Volume 3752, 3-1-4-2,
‘Treatment of Shell Shock Cases at the Front.’
368 For example the Granville Canadian Special Hospital at Ramsgate, in the UK. This hospital “gave the C.A.M.C. the
opportunity to play a pioneer part in the Imperial Army in establishing remedial treatment for…the many forms of
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from these hospitals, training schools were established to train officers and medical
personnel to deal with these cases, and neurological centres were established in the army
zones themselves. These were inspired by French practice and embraced the idea of
proximity of treatment.369 Behind the lines, however, treatments and responses to
psychiatric casualties comprised re-education of the soldier, including persuasion and
hypnotism, drill and physical exercise, gymnastics, massage, hydrotherapy, and
electrotherapy.370 Some ‘treatments,’ especially electro-shock therapy, bordered on
torture, which is not surprising given that some MOs and doctors believed that shell
shock was “a condition which is essentially childish and infantile in its nature,”371 clearly
not conducive to a sympathetic attitude. Treatments outlined in the CAMC Journal
emphasised the various techniques applied to an individual, including the application of
electric shocks, but also explored the reality of relapse and the complicated nature of
psychiatric casualties. An examination of one soldier indicated a “well-developed, wellnourished man,” with normal heart, lungs, and reflexes, and his x-rays and tests were
negative.372 This soldier, however, had become ‘shaky’ after a close call; following a stay
in hospital, he returned to his unit but relapsed and broke down mere weeks later. He was
ultimately sent to the Granville Canadian Special Hospital after both
psychiatric/psychological and physical symptoms began to emerge.373 Needless to say

nervous disorders which at first were included under the term ‘Shell Shock.’” Special Hospitals were also established in
Canada for more permanently debilitated cases, such as at Cobourg and Newmarket. Salmon, Mental Diseases and War
Neuroses, 34, 41; LAC, RG 9 III C10, Volume 4554, Folder 2, File 3, ‘Medical Arrangements, 25-6-17 to 20-12-17;’
LAC, RG 9 III B2, Volume 3602, 24-3-2, Medical History of the War, ‘The Care of the Casualty,’ and Volume 3751,
2-4-1, ‘Duties of the Military Hospitals Commission.’
369 LAC, RG 9 III B2, Volume 3752, 3-1-4-2, Neurology, War Neuroses, ‘Treatment of War Psychoses.’
370 Ibid, 38-40. See also LAC, RG 9 III B2, Volume 3752, 3-1-4-2, ‘Treatment of Shell Shock Cases at the Front’ and
Volume 3493, 11-1-15 to 11-1-21, ‘Report on Remedial Gymnastics, Physical Training, Massage, Hydro and Electro
Therapeutics in the C.A.M.C.’
371 Salmon, Mental Diseases and War Neuroses, 40.
372 LAC, RG 9 III B2, Volume 3602, Folder 24-3-1 (Volume 1), CAMC Journal, ‘An Unusual Psychoneurosis of War,’
by Digby Wheeler, Temporary Captain, CAMC.
373 Ibid. The soldier came to France in September 1916, and “carried on without any trouble until buried by high
explosive shell” on 27 April 1917. He was unconscious for roughly three hours, and then sent to a CCS by his MO after
“having requested to be allowed to carry on.” But he was told he was ‘shaky,’ and needed respite. At the base hospital
three days later he noticed he could not taste or smell. By May 1917 he was back at his unit, but “his M.O. would only
allow him to carry on at the kitchens,” knowing he needed a break from frontline stress. While at the kitchens, though,
he uncovered two rotting German corpses while digging a pit. By June 1917 he was sent again to the CCS for trench
fever. While at the hospital this time, however, “he developed gross symptoms of shell shock, such as tremor and
persistent occipital headaches.” He was then sent to Granville Special Hospital, where electric currents were applied to
his muscles. The fate of this soldier is unclear.
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this soldier had ceased to be an effective member of the military unit, had moved beyond
war weariness, and was unable to carry on at the front.
The ultimate goal, of course, was to treat the soldier and return him to his unit as
soon as possible. It was important, for manpower and morale considerations, to ensure
units were up to strength and soldiers were kept in the line save for the most serious
cases. Perhaps the most effective treatment for minor to moderate cases of shell shock,
however, was rotation out of the line, rest, and respite from the strains of war, as well as
the trauma and tensions associated with combat. Importantly, rest was also crucial to
stave off the worst effects of war weariness, and to prevent its further development. The
contemporary Practitioner’s Encyclopaedia of Medical Treatment advocated for ‘rest
cures,’ and argued that pain required rest, whether it be psychological or physiological in
origin, and that “pain may persist apart from material causes.”374 Worry and mental
tension could also manifest as pain, and victims naturally developed both physiological
and psychical defences.375 In other situations, the intervention of the medical or
commanding officer could make the difference between short-term and recoverable war
weariness, and long-term debilitation from shell shock and ineffectiveness. The MO of
the 31st Battalion, for example, distinguished between those who were too willing to
parade sick, and those with an “apparently genuine case of nerves.” This latter soldier was
allowed to “go back to the horse lines to do light duty” until the battalion was relieved at
the front.376 Historian Pat Brennan argued that
‘Light duty’ was a frequently employed treatment for so-called ‘deserving cases’
of battle stress/shell shock. Anything that removed the tension of combat, even
briefly, helped all but the worst cases. Being kept close to their comrades aided in
the steadying of such men, as did the fact that there was no stigma of malingering
attached to such light duty assignments close to the front.377

Brown, Medical Treatment, 66-67. Soldiers sometimes developed defence symptoms “against an intolerable
situation in the world.” Furthermore, there were generally three scenarios as it applied to rest cures. 1) Soldiers recover,
and then relapse when put once more into the old situation. 2) The soldier “may be dominated by the idea that as soon
he recovers he will have to go back to the intolerable situation, and remain un-influenced.” 3) The soldier sees things in
a new light and finds a solution to the problem.
375 Ibid.
376 Norris, The World War I Memoir of Captain Harold W. McGill, 102.
377 Ibid, Footnote 13.
374
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Rest, respite, and rotation out of the line, even for a short period, could do wonders for
the health, mental stability, and general well-being of most cases. The problem, of course,
was that not all would recover after a short time out of the line, and not all MOs, army
doctors, or commanders agreed who were ‘deserving cases.’ Certainly some soldiers were
killed or broke down permanently when they might have been salvaged had they been
taken out of the line sooner.
This sympathy and intervention on the part of military or medical authorities
could help prevent war-weary soldiers from becoming seriously shell-shocked, and
assisted with the soldiers suffering from shell shock from deteriorating further. Captain
McGill of the 31st Battalion saw many cases of “shattered nerves” during one particular
battle. The worst were sent to the field ambulance, but “the majority I allowed to lie down
in an adjoining dugout” and get some rest. Furthermore, some “partially-recovered”
soldiers and “nerve and exhaustion” cases were kept in the vicinity and made up a fatigue
party.378 It seems McGill here made a compromise, allowing the soldiers a rest from
normal duties, but without allowing them to be removed from their units entirely or sent
down the line for longer-term absence. Captain Dillon of the CAMC argued in September
1918 that powers of resistance and especially repression are “voluntary and maintained by
effort.” He wrote, however, that “long-continued strain, therefore, by exhausting the
reserves of mental energy is apt to bring about a breakdown,” which can also be caused
by “sudden and intense strain or shock of exceptional nature.”379 And both war weariness
and shell shock or nervous exhaustion could be helped by rest and light duty. Despite the
complexity and varying severity of these cases, in time some soldiers were sufficiently
recovered to return to duty. One Canadian MO even boasted that in contrast to previous
cases, “to-day the vast majority of those affected [by shell shock] are returned to the front

Ibid, 154-156. It is important to note that there were limits on the discretion of the MOs. One set of ‘Instructions’
issued in August of 1918, for example, indicated that “a medical officer will not grant an other rank more than 24 hours
exemption from duty,” even if this short rest allowed the soldier to carry on in the longer-term. LAC, RG 9 III B2,
Volume 3686, 30-0-0 (Volume 4), June 1918 – December 1918, General Correspondence, ‘Instructions for Medial
Officers,’ dated 21 August 1918.
379 LAC, RG 9 III C10, Volume 4575, Folder 1, File 5, Bulletin of the CAMC, Volume I, No. 6 (September 1918),
article ‘On the Nature of Shell Shock,’ by Captain Dillon, and File 6 ‘Categorisation.’
378
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as efficient soldiers in the course of a few weeks” of treatment.380 The problem, however,
was that the author did not provide much information on how these soldiers were treated
nor the rates of relapse after returning to the front. Yet despite the long-term nature of
many psychiatric casualties, some were indeed returned to a version of active duty. Some
were placed in units on the lines of communication, rather than sent back to combat
infantry duties, whereas some officers took on staff or training duties behind the lines.
Others managed to get relatively safe or ‘bomb-proof’ jobs behind the lines,381 despite
jeers of cowardice or malingering from those still at the front. And yet even after a full
year of treatment and time away from the front, some cases “may never improve.”382 It
was these soldiers who were permanently debilitated by shell shock and were no longer
capable of being effective soldiers, and sometimes even effective citizens.383
An examination of the symptoms and consequences of psychiatric casualties
suggest serious suffering and implications for the individual, and his military unit. Shell
shock was more serious than war weariness, although the latter was more pervasive and
masked the real decline faced by long-suffering soldiers. The symptoms of war neuroses
were various, affected everyone slightly differently, and were often based on the personal

There was also a well-entrenched belief that “only a very small proportion of men returning [to Canada] insane, can
be pronounced hopelessly so,” and that “the majority of them will recover and the remainder who turn out to be
incurable would be too small to justify large federal expenditure on buildings and other overhead expenses.” Other
reports admitted that though some cases recovered, some were chronic and permanent cases. LAC, RG 9 III D1,
Volume 4715, Folder 108, File 20, ‘Outside the Pale: Yet Another Canadian Hospital Bombed;’ LAC, RG 9 III B2,
Volume 3751, 2-4-1, ‘Relations with M.H.C.’ and ‘Duties of the Military Hospital Commission,’ and Roy, ed., The
Journal of Private Fraser, 15.
381 One soldier admitted in June 1918 that his effectiveness had decreased over time, and was eventually transferred to
the Ordnance Corps. He had requested the transfer over six months prior. He justified it by writing that “there were very
few of the old mob left [in his unit] due to casualties,” and “I had already put in enough time ‘up the line.’” Rogers, ed.,
Gunner Ferguson’s Diary, 152-153.
382 The statistics for the 65 “mental” cases aboard the hospital ship HMHS Araguaya are instructive. Of these, 18 were
diagnosed as Dementia Praecox, 15 with Delusional Insanity, 10 Mental Stupor, six Confusional Insanity, four
Melancholia, three Mental Deficiency, and one each of Mental Instability, Hysteria, and G.P.I. Of these 65 cases, 14
were convalescents and fit for release, 24 might be fit within six months’ time, 10 may be fit in a years’ (12 months’)
time, 12 may improve over an undisclosed or unknown amount of time, and five “may never improve.” And in some
cases where the “psychic element” is the main feature, “these cases do not improve with ordinary convalescent
treatment, and should be occupied by light duty as soon as possible.” LAC, RG 9 III C10, Volume 4577, Folder 5, File
6, ‘H.M.H.S. Araguaya’ and LAC, RG 9 III B2, Volume 3751, 2-3-6-2, ‘Documents for Troops Returning, Boards.’
383 Many of these soldiers lived out the rest of their lives in sanatoriums or hospitals, needing constant care and mere
shadows of their former selves. In the words of one MO, these were the “unfortunate men who had lost control of
themselves and could only live on as useless wrecks of humanity,” no longer able to soldier or serve their country. They
were those who, though they physically survived the war, were permanently debilitated by it nonetheless. LAC, RG 9
III D1, Volume 4715, Folder 108, File 20, ‘Outside the Pale: Yet Another Canadian Hospital Bombed.’
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experiences of the individual. One contemporary medical assessment noted that in the
symptoms of shell shock, “the soldier loses a function that either is necessary to continue
military service or prevents his successful adaptation to war” and combat.384 The soldier
converted psychological problems into physical symptoms, which were manifest in
numerous ways. One report by the War Work Committee of the National Committee for
Mental Hygiene in 1917 indicated that these symptoms of the disturbance of psychic
functions included delirium, confusion, amnesia, hallucinations, nightmares, anxiety
states; the disturbance of involuntary functions including heart disorders, low blood
pressure, vomiting, and diarrhea; and the disturbance of voluntary muscular functions
including paralysis, tics, tremors, convulsive movements, mutism, and deafness.385 Other
symptoms included sweating, rapid heartbeat, headaches, weakness, sleeplessness or
insomnia, loss of appetite, abdominal pain, vision problems, and others.386 Continued
terror could induce relapse, and “the ultimate fitness of such men as soldiers is a matter of
considerable doubt, owing to the probability of relapse under fire.”387
These symptoms and the suffering of the individual were bad enough, but war
weariness and shell shock also negatively affected the soldier’s military effectiveness and
ability to carry on with duty. The most serious cases were removed from their units and
sent down the line to hospitals and rest centres. In time, some returned to duty in some
capacity, others were sent to base hospitals for longer-term treatment and hospitalisation,
whereas the most serious cases were evacuated to England or even Canada.388 For those
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returned to duty, the chance for relapse was real,389 and could turn a short-term problem
into long-term debilitation. Addressing the very real problem of war weariness early on
could thus pay substantial dividends before it transmuted into shell shock debilitation. For
soldiers forced to stay at the front, or who convinced their CO or MO to allow them to
‘carry on,’ there were other consequences of war weariness and shell shock. Some were
made “helpless from shell shock,”390 or became paralysed by fear. These soldiers were
obviously militarily ineffective, as were those who could no longer endure shell fire. This
can be explained in part by the sense of helplessness and hopelessness – also
characteristic of war weariness – that being trapped in an artillery bombardment could
induce. One MO recounted that “a man reported in a state of nervous collapse and
confessed that he could not bear the shell fire…I advised that he be employed behind the
lines for a time,” giving the soldier a break.391 This erosion of combat effectiveness was
noted by other participating soldiers as well. One argued that officers became less useful
over time as Neurasthenia developed, and John Becker of the 75th Battalion admitted that
his nervousness and jumpiness compromised his soldiering abilities.392 One medical
report noted that a soldier became overly apathetic about his existence at the front, and
did not “seem to worry greatly over his future.” This was certainly problematic for
authorities, especially if the soldier became excessively cautious or reckless. This one
soldier also illustrated a “marked indifference,” and was “nervous.”393 This probably did
not inspire confidence in his comrades.
The impact of shell shock and other psychiatric casualties went beyond the
suffering of the individual, and also affected his military unit. These problems also went
beyond war weariness; the reluctance of soldiers was becoming the inability to carry on

Army reports acknowledged that some Hysteria cases or “other neuroses” can relapse while in convalescent
hospitals or after discharge. LAC, RG 9 III B2, Volume 3752, Folder 3-1-4-2, Neurology, War Neuroses, ‘Functional
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391 This sympathy and understanding of the hardships endured was evident elsewhere in McGill’s memoir as well. In
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with duty. For infantry, recklessness or undue caution could imperil the unit or
compromise its ability to seize battlefield objectives. Reckless behaviour could invite
retaliation from the enemy or get the soldier and his comrades killed. Caution or fear
could force soldiers to dig in or even withdraw, again hurting chances of carrying out
orders. The author of a report on ‘Medical Aspects of Air Service’ noted that “after many
[stressful sorties or] shows he becomes, to use his own expression, ‘dud.’” Soldiers driven
to this point lacked “resolution, loses confidence in himself, becomes stale, and if he is
not withdrawn for a rest usually comes to grief”394 or brings grief to his unit. And the very
nature of shell shock casualties “endanger[ed] the morale and discipline of troops in a
special way,”395 and therefore the army ignored or denigrated these casualties at its peril.
The inability or unwillingness of authorities to acknowledge war weariness and shell
shock problem certainly contributed to assaults on morale, discipline, and combat
motivation.
For the soldiers driven to, and then beyond the breaking point, yet forced to
remain at duty, serious health problems, permanent debilitation, and sometimes even
death were the result. One chaplain admitted that he was “desperately weary at times,”
but also “depressed” and “discouraged,” largely “owing to the physical, nervous, and
mental strain” induced by service.396 For some soldiers, especially those expected to stay
at the front and endure the terror until killed, wounded, granted leave, or rotated out of the
line, this depression and discouragement was simply too much too bear. Some soldiers
could no longer withstand the pain, and used suicide as a permanent solution.397 Other
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soldiers acted in such a way that their behaviour would all but guarantee their death (or
serious wounding) in combat. Though heroism and personal bravery were applauded,
these acts often ran counter to discipline and orders, and the loss of experienced and
veteran soldiers was difficult for both comrades and the unit to bear.
Statistics on the number of soldiers suffering from shell shock and other war
neuroses, of various kinds, are notoriously difficult to find. Each army had different ways
to calculate which casualties constituted shell shock, and war weariness was not tracked
at all. And even within national armies, at times these casualties were calculated in
different ways. MOs were busy with treating casualties and prioritised manpower and
morale; accurate record-keeping and follow-up treatments were secondary considerations.
Some soldiers were both physically and psychologically wounded, but were often lumped
in with more traditional, physical casualties. Furthermore, many casualty lists did not
have a separate category for psychiatric or psychological casualties, again lumping them
under the umbrella term ‘casualties.’ In other instances, casualty figures are
incomplete.398 The numbers are also skewed by the fact that some soldiers suffered
multiple breakdowns, or were diagnosed with shell shock, returned to duty, and then
suffered a relapse. Should this be counted as multiple cases of shell shock? Or is it better
to understand these cases as chronic?
Furthermore, many military and medical authorities were unwilling to admit how
many troops were afflicted with shell shock to varying degrees. And because there was no
clear consensus on what constituted shell shock, it was “relatively easy for the military
authorities in Britain and Germany to associate the condition with cowardice and
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malingering.”399 It was more honourable, for example, to be torn apart by shell fragments
than be made militarily ineffective by little-understood psychiatric problems. The army
authorities did not want to emphasise these problems and the difficulties this created. Yet
despite these limitations, some information on rates of shell shock can be provided.400 For
example, a contemporary report on Mental Diseases and War Neuroses in the British
Army stated that functional and nervous diseases represented one in seven discharges for
disability in the Army, or one in three if (physical) wounds were excluded.401 And
Macphail stated in The Official History of the Canadian Forces in the Great War 19141919: The Medical Services that 8,513 soldiers were diagnosed with “nervous diseases”
during the war,402 presumably in Canadian combat units alone, though this certainly
seems like an understatement of the problem. It should also be noted here that Macphail
was notoriously unsympathetic to these types of casualties, which also might help explain
his calculations.
Work done by historians and researchers in the years since the end of the war also
provide some insight into the extent of the shell shock problem, and how it differed from
war weariness. Historians Ian Beckett and Peter Leese in both wrote that there were
approximately 80,000 war neuroses (shell shock) cases in the BEF during the war,
representing 2% of all wounded.403 These cases also represented approximately 36% of
post-war disability pensions to veterans.404 Martin Gilbert asserted that by 1916 “genuine
cases of shell shock were also growing, reaching more than fifty thousand by the end of
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the war,” presumably referring to the British Army alone. By 1920, roughly 65,000 exsoldiers were still receiving pensions for neurasthenia, and 9,000 of these were still in
hospital. By March 1939, around 120,000 British veterans of the First World War were
receiving pensions (or had received their ‘final awards’) for war-related “primary
psychiatric disability.” These 120,000 veteran pensions represented 15% of all pensioned
disabilities.405 Other historians, however, refer to the inadequacy of casualty lists in
capturing the true extent of shell shock and the impact of combat on individuals. Peter
Hart wrote that in addition to the roughly 9.7 million soldiers killed through military
action in the war,
roughly 21 million were injured: some recovered relatively unaffected, but many
were scarred or maimed for life. Nor do these figures really take into account the
mentally traumatised, ranging from shell-shocked men who would never be sane
again to the millions suffering from what we would now recognise as posttraumatic stress disorder [PTSD].406
There were also soldiers who survived the war, but then perhaps months or years later,
experienced psychological problems due to their war service. And psychiatric casualties
also transcended national, linguistic, geographic, class, and rank lines. One historian
argued, for example, that in the German Army 613,047 soldiers, or 4.57% of all those
mobilised were treated for ‘nervous disorders.’407 Psychiatric casualties created a unique
problem for MOs, and put them in an unenviable position, having to balance the needs of
the individual patient with that of their employer, the army.
There was tension amongst MOs and other personnel in the CAMC related to their
service, conflicting priorities and value systems, and differences between civilian and
military medicine. It was army policy to be suspicious of certain types of casualties,
namely, non-physical and psychiatric casualties. In the foreword to a medical officer’s
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memoirs, one historian wrote that there were often “very fixed views about courage and
cowardice,” though there was some leeway for individual MOs to be sympathetic to shell
shock cases. There was a rudimentary understanding of psychiatric casualties at the time.
Moreover, the “prevailing military ethos of ‘courage unto death,’” as well as “anxiety
over any displays of fear in front of one’s peers” combined with the MO’s main duty of
ensuring the “maximum number of his battalion’s soldiers were available for duty every
day” militated against too sympathetic an understanding of these problems.408 And yet, it
was official army policy that officers, even MOs, were not to coddle the men, but were to
act in a paternalistic manner, expecting all soldiers to do their duty to the utmost. One
MO noted, for example, that during a long and exhausting march many soldiers wanted to
fall out or lie down, but the officers were expected to show no pity. Instead, they were to
“curse them, cajole and coax, threaten and promise, appeal to their pride and power of
endurance,”409 anything really to keep them going. And doubtless some wounds were
treated more sympathetically than others. Physical wounds suffered in combat or during
active service were always treated more sympathetically and generously than ‘invisible
wounds.’410 Throughout the war, there was always some suspicion that those claiming
shell shock were actually malingering, to escape further duty at the front. Those under
suspicion were kept on the continent, and not discharged or evacuated to England,411
pending further examination and diagnosis. Those without visible or serious wounds, and
where shell shock could not be proven, were usually sent back to the front in short order.
The emphasis on manpower and morale, the desire to discourage other shell shocked
soldiers from ‘going sick,’ and the concern for “needless” evacuation and misdiagnosis 412
help explain this unsympathetic view.413
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The authorities often distinguished between legitimate cases of shell shock, and
others. One MO in late 1916, for example, argued that it was necessary “for a disciplinary
stand-point to distinguish between genuine cases of ‘shell-shock’ and those of loss of
nerve power.”414 War weariness was even more difficult to diagnose. And even into 1917,
many authorities were requiring a very high burden of proof and clinging to a very
narrow, traditional, and physical understanding of shell shock, as a shell concussion or
other physical origin to explain these problems.415 In this sense, there was a false
dichotomy between legitimate wounds (mental or physical), suffered as a direct result of
combat or enemy fire, and illegitimate problems suggesting cowardice or malingering.
Many of the more traditional MOs subscribed to this latter view, suspicious that all
claiming shell shock were ‘slackers’ or ‘swinging the lead.’ And even if MOs did
acknowledge that the best soldiers, including volunteers and veterans, suffered from
“anxiety neurosis,” war weariness, and other problems after months or years of service,
many believed that their duty to the army trumped their Hippocratic Oath.416
And yet, military medical matters were complex and did not fit neatly into
reductive black and white understandings of health. Not all soldiers reacted the same way
to combat or stress, and family history, role in the forces, personal experience, length and
intensity of service, duties performed, and hardships endured all could factor into how
soldiers reacted to battle and service. Some soldiers broke down from shell shock after a
relatively short period of time at the front, and cases of psychiatric casualties were also
found in soldiers on the lines of communication behind the front.417 Some were able to
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recover in relatively short order after rest and time away from the sources of trauma.418
Other troops required weeks or months of recovery time before being made effective
again; some individuals never fully recuperated.
Some shell shock and psychiatric cases were more ambiguous and difficult to
classify, reinforcing the overlap between war weariness and shell shock. This reality,
combined with the somewhat confused and even contradictory response of the authorities,
placed further pressure on the MOs tasked with determining who was ‘fit’ to carry on
with duty, and who was given a chance to recover behind the lines. For example, NYDN
cases fell somewhere between healthy, committed soldiers and those debilitated by shell
shock. The army recognised that their military effectiveness and well-being had been
compromised, but whose problems were not yet serious enough to warrant evacuation
from the continent or discharge. MOs were to use this term in soldiers who became “noneffective” and lacked visible wounds, but were “presumed to have originated from the
effects of weapons in action.”419 Furthermore, in some cases the CO of the soldier’s unit
needed to confirm with the hospital that “the man had been subject to exceptional
exposure” to justify a transfer and time out of the line. Later in the war, the British high
command even prohibited the use of the term ‘shell shock’ altogether, or at the very least
seriously circumscribed its use.420 Army policies and the desire to limit those evacuated
from the front for psychiatric casualties compromised the ability of the medical services
to properly and promptly handle casualties. In February of 1917, for example, a hospital
staff member complained that “the hospital is getting clogged by the army regulations
requiring evidence from the front before sending shell shock N.Y.D. and gas cases to the
base”421 hospitals. In this case we see army rules and procedures, and emphasis on
manpower and morale considerations, take precedence over the needs of individual
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patients and long-term recovery. The desire to prevent seemingly ‘needless’ evacuation
was deemed more important than the fact that hospitals were becoming overwhelmed,
which compromised medical care. This was a reality that MOs had to conform to, at least
in principle.
And at times the orders to and expectations of MOs were contrary to civilian
practices, where most Canadian medical officers began their careers, as well as
ambiguous. In civilian medicine, the ultimate goal was the recovery and continued health
of individual patients, so they could once again become an effective member of society.
In military medicine, by contrast, the ultimate goal was to ensure the maximum number
of soldiers at the front; soldiers were mostly means to an end, and the needs of the army
were paramount. In terms of ambiguous or unclear orders, MOs were instructed to retain
“as many light cases as possible [in the army zone] until such a time as they were fit to
return to duty.”422 Of course, it was not always clear what constituted ‘light cases,’ and at
times it was better to remove a soldier from frontline service for a short while rather than
force him to remain at the front and risk a more serious breakdown. Preventative
measures and sympathetic treatment were beneficial, even if they ran counter to official
army policy.
Despite the personal views of the MOs and their commitment to the Hippocratic
Oath and civilian medical values and practices, they were nevertheless in a difficult
position. Seeing patients suffering and dying was bad enough. Having soldiers die under
their care, despite best efforts, must have shaken even the most hardened veteran doctors.
Declaring a soldier fit for further duty and sending him back to the front, moreover, could
be akin to a death sentence for that soldier. For those soldiers who were pushed beyond
the breaking point and could no longer endure at the front, desperation sometimes drove
them to evade duty or escape the trenches. Malingering, however, was considered a crime
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by the military authorities, and some shell shocked soldiers were no doubt executed as
malingerers, shirkers, and slackers – often for cowardice or desertion.423

Impact on Behaviour and Attitude
The stresses endured by soldiers serving at the front and on the lines of
communication were enough to affect how they viewed the world, and their behaviour as
well. The sights, smells, and sounds of death, coupled with the reality of suffering,
witnessing and participating in terrible things, and the physical and emotional exhaustion
all served to place an enormous burden on the individual. There was some comfort and
safety in numbers, but each soldier dealt with trauma in his own way and was expected to
do his duty and not undermine the unit. Support was offered in the form of chaplains,
MOs, alcohol, and other fortifying forces, but each soldier faced difficulties at the front
and were expected to endure until wounded, killed, or granted leave. After long and hard
service, especially in combat units, some soldiers became reckless or apathetic, others
fatalistic or overly cautions;424 some troops were driven by bloodlust and feelings of
revenge, whereas others were determined to seek a Blighty or give themselves a SIW.
Others ‘voted with their feet’ and sought to avoid further duty altogether. There were
many soldiers, however, who attempted to maintain their composure and stick it out at the
front despite their war weariness. Notions of duty, regimental spirit and pride,
comradeship, patriotism, fear,425 and ‘carrots and sticks’ all help explain how and why
soldiers tried to endure at the front, even if they were ultimately unable to do so. One
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infantry subaltern reflected that some soldiers sought to stay at the front and refused to be
evacuated until the task at hand was completed,426 even if they were on the verge of
breakdown and were quickly declining in health and ability. Many did not want to shirk
their duty or let their comrades down, which was admirable, but sometimes misguided.
Having an unfit soldier remain at the front could be counterproductive; a shell-shocked
man in the front lines could be disastrous for unit morale, and despite their commitment,
these soldiers might very well be less than effective militarily.
The hard fighting, heavy casualties, and extended periods at the front could also
induce a sense of helplessness or hopelessness amongst long-serving veterans. The longer
that one was ‘in country,’ the clearer it was that their chances of unscathed survival were
marginal at best. Loss of hope and feelings of helplessness were damaging to morale over
time, and certainly contributed to the onset of war weariness.427 This loss of hope and
desire to end the pain and trauma once and for all drove some desperate soldiers to
suicide and self-harm. If self-inflicted wounds and illnesses were a desperate act on the
part of troops to evade duty and escape the trenches, suicide was a way to avoid further
service and suffering permanently. The self-preservation instinct is strong, and thus few
sought death consciously. Some, however, behaved recklessly or did commit suicide.428
MOs noted deaths in their unit, including suicides and attempted suicides, as have other
officers.429 At times, the stresses and strains of the front lines, combined with bad news
from home – such as Dear John letters – proved too much for these worn soldiers to
endure. In many cases, if a soldier committed suicide at duty it would not be reported as
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such, and their next of kin would be informed that their loved one died “a soldier’s
death.”430 Lord Moran noted the seemingly spontaneous nature of some of these suicides;
he wrote that one soldier “did not appear ill” or suicidal, but then killed himself. Moran
admitted, however, that this man was “out of sorts,” sullen, dazed, morose.431 But in war
and combat especially, dazed, sullen, or morose feelings were all too common. And
Private Bert Cooke wrote of a comrade who “blew his brains out.” Apparently he was “a
fine fellow, and no one would have thought he would have done such a thing…but this
life is enough to make a fellow do anything.”432 What was it that pushed these soldiers
over the edge? And how can we account for those soldiers who were pushed to the edge,
but not over it?
Personal motivations for suicide during military service are difficult to determine.
Some soldiers were simply pushed beyond the breaking point, and saw no other way out.
One MO argued that soldiers committed suicide because they could no longer face the
war, but did not want to bring disgrace to themselves or their unit,433 for example by
deserting, surrendering, or otherwise acting in an undisciplined manner. In other cases,
the guilt and shame of acting in such an undisciplined way, or being accused of such
behaviour, contributed to the decision to end one’s life.434 Other suicides are perhaps
explained by an impulsive idea generated in a time of great distress combined with
readily available firearms. For others, the uncertainty and violence at the front was just
too much to endure. The lack of control over one’s own fate could be disheartening, and
some took the matter into their own hands;435 the act of suicide gave them a sense of
control over a highly volatile existence and allowed them to leave this world on their own
terms. It is certainly a sad state of affairs when suicide was deemed a better option than
continued service at the front.
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Malingering versus Breakdown, and the Self-Preservation Instinct
It was often difficult for MOs and commanders to determine whether soldiers
were genuinely unable to withstand further duty, or whether they were simply fed up with
the state of affairs and sought a way out. The differences between a war-weary soldier
and shell-shocked soldier could be subtle. Of course, this is too simplistic an
understanding of the problem, especially as some soldiers seemed willing to carry on, but
were unable to endure. Conversely, there were also troops who were physically and
psychologically healthy enough to remain at the front, but simply wanted, and probably
deserved, a rest. The desire for a Blighty wound was a clear indicator of war weariness, as
was the grumbling and complaining that was nearly ubiquitous in the forces. Grumbling
and grousing, moreover, was understood by many authorities as a healthy outlet for
discontent; by allowing critiques of the officers, for instance, this ensured that
dissatisfaction did not become a collective problem and boil over into mutiny.436 A
Blighty wound offered the soldier a brief reprieve from combat, as well as time away
from the front and perhaps also hospitalisation. Canadian artilleryman Ernest Black
described these wounds as “nothing to do any permanent damage but enough to get him
to hospital in England and a furlough before he came back to France” and further duty.437
It was certainly no secret that many long-serving soldiers dreamed of or even sought out
‘cushy’ or Blighty wounds438 as an honourable way to avoid further duty, at least until
partial recovery. A 2nd Battalion soldier recalled that “when you are really thoroughly fed
up with the whole thing there, you would say, I wish I could get a Blighty.”439 One MO
noted that for those serving – and suffering – in the trenches, “a cushy wound, a Blighty
business, seems the most desirable thing in the world.” Some soldiers after calculating
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their odds of survival, however, took the next step and actually sought out these
wounds.440
But for the soldiers who did not get their Blighty, and were forced to remain at the
front for the foreseeable future, other actions were taken to avoid further service. At
times, this was done with clear goals in mind; the soldier made a conscious decision to
minimise his participation in the war as much as possible. At other times, the soldier was
merely reacting to his body and mind, ensuring that he could survive to fight another day
by reducing his participation in the present. This was an important distinction to make,
one in which gave MOs and officers much trouble, but close contact with their
subordinates, clear channels of communication, and quality leadership practices certainly
helped in this regard.
The sick parade was one way for MOs to gauge the authenticity and severity of
the ailments presented by the troops. But this was often difficult, especially with the
fickle nature of psychiatric casualties. Furthermore, the unit’s worst malingerers and
“scrimshankers” attempted to fool the MO by trying to “look their very worst.” Captain
Ralph Bell noted that some soldiers showed up on sick parade after failing to shave, with
improper clothing, and acted in an exaggerated or pitiable way to emphasise their
problems.441 And at times, it worked, and they managed to get past the battalion MO.442
Of course, many saw such behaviour as shameful and embarrassing, which could also
bring disrepute on themselves and the unit. Indeed, some troops refused to go sick or
leave their comrades, despite the fact that they were increasingly incapacitated and
declining in utility. Major G.S. Strathy wrote that though some troops played up their
symptoms, many seemed to want to stick it out at the front and claimed they were fit
when they were not, “rather than be thought to be ‘swinging the lead’” at the front.443

Some soldiers lingered in areas known for heavy shelling in the hopes of getting “a Blighty one.” Moran, The
Anatomy of Courage, 114 and 121.
441 Bell, Canada in War-Paint, 54.
442 DUASC, Clearing: The Tale of the First Canadian Casualty Clearing Station, BEF, 1914-1919, by Thomas Brenton
Smith, MS-2-432 – SF 44-1, page 88.
443 Though he argued that neurasthenic, nervous, “lazy ones,” and cowards did go sick. LAC, RG 9 III B2, Volume
3751, 2-4-1, ‘Major G.S Strathy, War Diary,’ August 1914 – February 1918.
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It was a common viewpoint among MOs, even sympathetic ones, that only
‘genuine’ cases of shell shock deserved rest and medical attention. This also complicated
cases of war weariness, which affected soldiers who were no longer fit and enthusiastic,
but not yet debilitated by shell shock. Harold McGill of the 31st Battalion argued that the
term shell shock was “much-abused,” and often used by misguided MOs to “describe a
condition that was nothing but terror.” True cases of shell shock did occur, but “in my
experience [this] never occurred in the case of cowards.”444 McGill felt that those
suffering from shell shock were often the best, hardest-working, and most committed
soldiers of the unit, as
The victims were men of finest moral courage. This combined with a high sense
of duty and a lively imagination set the stage for the development of shell
shock…[as the soldier’s] whole physical nature revolted from the sights and
sounds of bombardment. This was much intensified if he was with troops holding
a static position and obliged to sit still and take punishment without the
opportunity of striking back…[in response to such stimuli] all the man’s natural
physical impulses promoted him to take shelter, and to run away if
necessary…[but his] spiritual courage, his faith to his duty and his discipline
forced him to remain…the result was a conflict under which the nervous system
collapsed and the soldier became a gibbering maniac.445
The belief that some soldiers used shell shock as an excuse to evade duty was also
espoused by other military authorities. One British MO acknowledged that when the term
itself was coined, some “weaklings” saw it as an opportunity to malinger or escape the
front,446 justified in their behaviour by official recognition of the impact of combat on the
individual. There were times, moreover, when shell-shocked soldiers were blamed for
their condition, even if it was authentic and caused by exposure to battle. Some soldiers,
for example, were said to have developed “functional disorders of the nervous system”
but “under conditions which would not affect an individual with a stable nervous system,”
thus putting the blame squarely on the soldier, rather than on an inadequate medical or
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rotation system, or the impact of the war itself.447 There was a fine line between
breakdown and fitness for further service; those who were able and willing to carry on at
the front one day could become debilitated by shell shock the next. There was also a fine
line between war weariness and shell shock ineffectiveness. This emphasised the
importance of MOs and commanders being familiar and in close contact with their
subordinates.
In addition to conscious malingering and evasion of duty, soldiers reacted to the
long-term exposure to combat and trauma in other ways, especially by succumbing to
natural fear reactions. Fear, of course, was a natural aspect of wartime service. The
human body and mind were placed in situations of extraordinary stress and mortal danger,
and soldiers were also expected to endure and participate in traumatic and terrifying
behaviours and circumstances. And despite the most rigorous and realistic training, one
could never adequately prepare for the horrors of war, and combat in particular. In
moments of extreme stress and terror, the natural response was to run and hide, anything
to prevent continued exposure to such sources of fear. Leaving the battlefield and
cowering in a shell hole were obviously frowned upon by military authorities; and indeed,
these behaviours were illegal, not to mention deemed ‘cowardly.’448 And yet no amount
of regimental pride, promises of rewards, appeals to tradition, masculinity, and authority,
sense of duty, good leadership, and threat of punishment could keep all soldiers in the
firing line indefinitely when fear rose to a certain level.
In all species the natural self-preservation instinct is paramount. This often
manifests itself as a fight or flight response,449 when in the face of danger the victim
needs to prepare to aggressively confront the sources of danger, or to flee this danger
altogether. The problem for infantry soldiers of the First World War, however, was that
especially during trench warfare the opportunities for direct retaliation and aggression

At times, moreover, with hysteria and other neuroses cases “there is a suspicion of malingering.” See LAC, RG 9 III
B2, Volume 3752, 3-1-4-2, Neurology, War Neuroses, ‘Functional Nervous Disorders’ and LAC, RG 9 III C10,
Volume 4575, Folder 1, File 7, ‘DMS Circular Letter No. 25.’
448 Some soldiers, however, were sympathetic to those who were “unable to stand more active service” anymore. See,
for example, Cate, ed., A Soldier’s Memoir of World War I, 54.
449 To Fight or Flight Grossman has added posture (or intimidation) and submission in response to aggression from
another member of the same species. Grossman, On Killing, 5-14.
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toward the enemy were limited, save during set-piece battles, patrols, and raids. Most of
the time soldiers were in the trenches or behind the lines and exposed to enemy fire, but
unable to properly retaliate. The inability to strike back at your aggressor as a cause of
shell shock and other psychiatric casualties has been suggested by contemporary MOs,450
and the chances to flee the battlefield without being apprehended or killed in the process
were few and far between. Discomfort, stress, fear, and being under near-constant shell
fire “from which every human impulse recoils…[and] every human instinct cries ‘go
back!’”451 was difficult to endure, day after day. And yet, there were few opportunities for
respite.
One soldier acknowledged the power of the self-preservation instinct, and the
“irresistible impulse to ‘take cover’” in these situations.452 This ‘irresistible impulse’ to
run and hide, however, obviously undermined the unit’s ability to carry out orders and
seize objectives.453 If all soldiers gave in to their natural instinct to run from danger, unit
cohesion would collapse. Lord Moran argued that fear was simply the “response of the
instinct of self-preservation to danger” encountered at the front. It was the soldier’s
resistance to fear and fortifying factors that mattered, though this resistance could be
lowered by wounds or illness, and intense emotional shock could strip soldiers of their
powers of self-control.454 For those who gave in to their self-preservation instinct and
went AWL or deserted, being captured by authorities meant courts martial, stigmatisation,
even death. Medical explanations such as shell shock often fell on deaf ears in these
situations, as MOs and commanders would have to agree to allow the soldier to leave the
front, even for a short rest. Those who were not granted this privilege were depicted as
insubordinate, cowardly, or even traitorous. Other authorities were dismissive of
psychiatric casualties, interpreting them as childish, feminine, or degenerate. One wrote
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that the symptoms of shell shock were merely “the result of the action of the natural
instinct of self-preservation,” and that this was “a primitive instinct expressed by the
emotion fear,”455 and would not be tolerated. It is thus no wonder that troops on the
precipice of breakdown grew desperate and resorted to SIWs and illness, desertion, and
other forms of evasion of duty.

Links to Legal Aspects, Discipline, Criminality
There were direct links between the health and medical reality of troops at the
front, and the legal and disciplinary aspects of service. War-weary soldiers might very
well neglect their personal health and the military policies designed to maintain it – a
sense of apathy and helplessness were characteristic of pronounced war weariness. Some
medical ailments, such as trench foot and VD, were understood as only occurring in units
with poor morale, weak discipline,456 and ineffective leadership, or under extreme
circumstances only. With the proper inspections, equipment and clothing, care for
subordinates, and adherence to rules and regulations, it was argued, there would be very
few cases of trench foot amongst units at the front. Good units and individuals with pride
and commitment simply did not allow these cases to emerge. The reality, of course, was
much more complex. Soldiers could also be punished and have their behaviour shaped by
medical problems. Troops who had contracted VD, for example, were punished for
failing to follow army regulations, but also needed to be controlled and perhaps confined
in certain areas.457 Medical issues afflicting soldiers could compromise their ability to
follow orders, stay in the line or formation, and ultimately seize military objectives. This
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impacted all soldiers in all arms and services, especially high stress positions such as
those in the air force458 and infantry.
There was a difficult balancing act to maintain. On the one hand, the medical
authorities needed to care for their patients and ensure sufficient health and strength to
continue fighting. At times, this meant time away from the sources of stress. On the other
hand, medical personnel were subject to and expected to uphold military discipline,459 and
were instructed to be more concerned with the collective rather than the individual. In
many cases the needs of the army were privileged over those of individual soldiers,
especially regarding matters of health. In the Canadian Hospital at Etchinghill, for
example, close confinement of individual soldiers could retard recovery, but was still
recommended and justified as “taken with a view to the best interests of military
discipline and also with a view to the best interests of those other ranks as patients in this
hospital.”460 In this case, the impression made on other patients and the need to uphold
military discipline were deemed more important than the recovery of the soldiers
themselves. It should also be remembered that this was a more communal society, and
many of the troops were used to subordination, paternalism, close control and discipline
(such as in the factory). It was argued that the very survival of Western Civilisation was
at stake, so the authorities could be forgiven for taking liberties with the soldiers.
Nevertheless, soldiers were often still punished, such as with courts martial, for “fail[ure]
to maintain equilibrium” when engaging the enemy, even if they had been medically
diagnosed with shell shock or neurasthenia.461

The high-stress environment of flying coupled with the negative impact on the human body led to “marked
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The desire for a Blighty wound462 amongst soldiers was certainly not criminal, but
going the next step and actually wounding oneself was. The administering of SIWs and
illnesses was likely not widespread, but it did happen and the army authorities were
concerned. Furthermore, the desire to attain a SIW and then hide evidence of it did
suggest mens rea, a guilty mind.463 These soldiers knew that what they were doing was
considered illegal and even cowardly, but they had had enough of the war and had grown
desperate to escape further duty. There were also special procedures to be followed in
cases of suspected SIWs, partly to ensure that further investigations could be made and
partly to ensure these cases were not evacuated with other ‘legitimate’ physical
wounds.464 It seems even these desperate soldiers with SIWs and illnesses had not
suffered enough, and the authorities sought to punish them further and deter others from
attempting such behaviour.
Active service conditions, hard fighting, heavy casualties, the terror of combat,
and the stresses of war eventually drove even the most committed, strongest, mostexperienced volunteers to and beyond the breaking point. A minority of soldiers
committed suicide465 or acted in such a way as to invite death. Some soldiers broke down

explain and justify why they “failed in their duty.” The author argued that MOs have fallen prey to this ruse, and
“without due consideration of the military issues at stake, have accepted such cases as being in the same category as
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determining whether soldiers were fit to stand trial, and thus be tried with and even executed for cowardice and other
crimes. Macphail, Medical Services, 277-278.
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or exposing themselves unnecessarily to enemy fire. Moran, The Anatomy of Courage, 114, 121. And one soldier
recalled that “I saw some of the men lie down in a trench there and hold their feet up to see if they could get wounded.”
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Reid, Personal Memoirs of the First World War, 216.
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and were debilitated by shell shock; others sought to evade duty, legally or otherwise. Of
the latter, troops removed themselves from duty with SIWs, feigned illness, or
deserted.466 Those who served until wounded and removed from the line could expect a
brief respite from duty, but only until sufficiently recovered to carry on at the front. Some
were wounded several times, but never seriously enough to keep them from going back to
the front for further action. As long as the soldier was not physically incapacitated by
wounds, disease, or illness, he was expected to return and remain at duty until killed, or
the end of hostilities.467 In one case, a clearly shell-shock soldier was apprehended for
desertion, and after repeat offenses was sentenced to death by firing squad.468 He survived
the war, however, as his sentences apparently were commuted or postponed each time; in
this case, even desertion and a death sentence could not prevent this soldier from being
returned to the front line.

Preventative Measures, Mitigating Factors, Warning Signs
Medical officers, commanders, chaplains, and other support personnel had an
important role to play in the prevention and detection of war weariness. It was important
to recognise the early signs of war weariness in the individual, before it transmuted into
larger problems like shell shock. It was thus crucial to identify ‘warning signs’ and other
indicators of breakdown.469 To identify the signs of war weariness, it was important also
to understand what eroded the health and morale of the soldiers, both in the short-term

were only exacerbated by service on the Western Front. Still others were pushed beyond the breaking point, and felt
that suicide was the best option for themselves and their unit. It was better to end it all and rid the unit of an
increasingly useless soldier, than to desert or go AWL and bring disgrace to the battalion. Suicide is different than war
weariness, but they both speak to the impact of combat on individuals, the role of medical problems (including
psychiatric casualties) in the armed forces, and evasion of duty. On the 31st Battalion’s voyage to England one soldier
committed suicide by jumping overboard the Carpathia. There were other references to suicide by jumping overboard
ships in the archival record as well. One such document made reference to “an insane patient.” See Norris, The Memoir
of Captain Harold W. McGill, xiv and LAC, RG 9 III B2, Volume 3618, 25-13-11 to 15-14-9, ‘Suicide, or Deaths from
Causes other than the Result of War Conditions’ and Moran, The Anatomy of Courage, 3-4 and 189.
466 DUASC, Clearing: The Tale of the First Canadian Casualty Clearing Station, BEF, 1914-1919, by Thomas Brenton
Smith, MS-2-432 – SF 44-1, page 88.
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469 And also other signals that the soldier was not faring well at duty. The cumulative stress, attacks on morale and
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and over longer periods. The transitions from war weariness to shell shock, from shortterm breakdown to more permanent debilitation, could not be prevented entirely, but with
care and consideration could be minimised and the worst effects mitigated.
There were different views on how best to prevent psychiatric casualties, and both
medical and military authorities had a role to play in this matter. An article published in
1918 by the Canadian Medical Association offered some ideas on how to prevent
psychiatric casualties, and to extend the effectiveness of the soldier. The author suggested
that discipline had a role to play in the prevention of these casualties, but “discipline
alone was not sufficient to prevent their occurrence;” discipline was no panacea. It was
also important to be forthright with the soldiers and explain to them the reality of combat
and especially reactions to it, such as fear. It was the duty of officers and leaders to assure
the troops that “fear was nothing to be ashamed of,”470 and was only a natural response to
terrifying situations. Fear and terror were in fact healthy reactions to this stimuli, and it
had to be impressed on all ranks that it was normal “in the presence of danger, and came
to all except the insane and the liar.” This frank and forthright attitude, and the acceptance
that they could be afraid and still be good soldiers, was somewhat of a departure from
traditional British understandings of duty, endurance, and ‘character.’ The reality of the
war on the Western Front forced this reappraisal.
Leadership also played an important role in the prevention of serious war
weariness, and the mitigation of its worst effects. Officers and leaders needed to play an
active role in the maintenance of the health and well-being of their subordinates, to care
for their welfare, and “take a personal interest in them.” This last point was essential, as
close contact with the troops allowed leaders to determine what each soldier needed;
some required a joke or humorous anecdote to relieve stress, some needed a quiet chat of
reassurance, and still others required a stern hand and paternalistic oversight. Regular
acquaintance and familiarity with the troops allowed authority figures to monitor the
soldiers and watch for “the slightest change in a man’s demeanor or habits [which] should

It was important to impress upon the soldiers that as long as everyone was ‘doing his bit’ they would be fine. This
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be reported immediately.”471 It was important to keep the soldier occupied, interested, and
distracted to “divert his mind from introspection” and dwelling on the negative aspects of
service. Ultimately, it was crucial to treat the soldiers as “if they were human beings like
themselves, and not as merely cogs of the machine” of war.472
Humanising the soldiers was an important aspect of endurance at the front. This
reminded them that they had had a life prior to enlistment, had family and friends who
loved them, and were more than just a regimental number. This was just one reason why
tangible connections to home were so vital to morale and health, even if close and regular
contact with home might actually increase stress. If leave to Canada was nearly
impossible,473 packages and letters from home could regularly reach the troops at the
front. Parcels were also often shared around the unit, building camaraderie and providing
some break from the monotonous food of the trenches. Moreover, special care packages
from charity and religious groups back in Canada (and the UK) also helped sustain the
troops. For those recovering in hospital, these comforts helped with morale and might
very well have assisted with recovery. In one case, convalescing soldiers received liquor,
cooking ingredients (herbs, corn flower, chicken broth), fruit (apples and oranges),
lemonade crystals, syrup, and other such foodstuffs.474 And for soldiers in the line, good
food, equipment, and supplies helped disease resistance and general welfare.475
Concern for the general health of the soldiers also helped mitigate the worst
effects of war weariness and assist endurance at the front. As the historian of the 1st
Canadian CCS argued, the medical services and bathing facilities did wonders for the
soldiers’ health and well-being.476 Bathing and de-lousing allowed the soldiers to get
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clean, to get new undergarments, and to have their clothes steamed to eliminate much of
the itching caused by lice, at least for a short while. The lice would soon be back, of
course, but these facilities reminded the men that they were human, and that the high
command did care for their well-being. Regular bathing was not always possible, but it
was something to look forward to. According to instructions issued to the CAMC, “at
least one bath per week is requisite,”477 but this was not always realistic, especially during
periods of more mobile warfare such as the Hundred Days. Care of the feet also helped
the soldiers remain at duty. The issuance of dry and clean socks,478 appropriate clothing
like solid footwear and gum boots, and supplies like whale oil and trench pumps, to the
extent that they worked, were also important. Idleness was poison for morale, so soldiers
took actions to improve their lot even if they were of questionable effectiveness. Soldiers
needed their feet to march, stand, and fight properly, so the importance of foot care could
not be overlooked.
Perhaps the most important factor in the prevention of serious health problems and
in mitigating the worst effects of war weariness was regular rest479 and rotation out of the
line. Time out of the line gave soldiers an opportunity to catch up on correspondence and
sleep.480 Troops out of the line might still be expected to undergo training and contribute
to labour parties, but it also meant increased safety if they were out of range of enemy
guns, though gas and aircraft could still reach them. For combat infantry, pilots, and other
high-stress services, rest and time away from combat allowed for the quieting of nerves
and the rejuvenation of health. Removing the soldiers from the cause of their stress,
allowing their natural response mechanisms to relax, and providing them with an
“absorbing environment free from flying [and other combat] associations” provided both
physical and emotional, mental, and psychological rest.481
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As the war dragged on, it became increasingly evident among perceptive officers
that there needed to be a better system of rest and rotation. Even hard-working and
committed volunteers could breakdown after the cumulative exposure to stress and
trauma. One officer wrote that “ever since Canadian troops have gone to France…there
has been no systematic rest for the troops.” This was problematic, as “many battalions
have been six, eight and even nine months on continuous duty in the trenches, or in
immediate support, with only a few days rest...no troops can efficiently perform such
continuous service.”482 This is important for two reasons. First of all, even when soldiers
were in immediate support, they were still exposed to stress and danger, and would be
called into action if the occasion arose. This meant little genuine respite from the strains
of war. Secondly, the reference to ‘systematic rest’ is telling, as a clear system of leave,
known by the troops and adhered to, likely helped stave off the worst effects of war
weariness. It also gave the soldiers something to look forward to and likely bolstered their
endurance, knowing that if they did their duty just a bit longer they were entitled to a
well-deserved and officially-sanctioned rest.483
In addition to rest and sleep, leave and increasing the physical – and perhaps also
psychological – distance between the soldier and the sources of stress played an important
role in staving off the worst effects of sustained combat. Simply being rotated between
front, support, and reserve positions was helpful. Going on leave also offered an
opportunity to ‘get away from it all,’ to return to civilised life, and to do things one was
unable to do in the trenches. Families in Britain could be visited, as could pubs, tourist
sites, theatres, shows, brothels, and prostitutes. Eating a meal that was not bully beef and
without shells falling was also a welcome relief. Many soldiers took the war and its
trauma with them on leave, undoubtedly, but it did have therapeutic potential. And yet, in
terms of minimising or neutralising the worst effects of war weariness, leave could be a
double-edged sword. It allowed for the recuperation and rejuvenation of the individual,
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but the return trip could also induce panic and reluctance,484 and contribute to the onset of
psychiatric casualties that were increasingly common. Nevertheless, lack of leave and rest
was a common complaint at the front,485 and leave did help many soldiers survive the war
and minimised the damage done by the twin dangers of war weariness and shell shock.
Rest and rotation out of the line were important for the long-term sustainably of the
troops, but leave was even more beneficial. One MO argued that even behind the lines
“there was no such thing as one moment’s complete security,” and thus the importance of
and “healing effect” of leave.486 And even if soldiers were unable to get extended leave to
escape France and Belgium, there were other ways to provide them with recreation and
time away from the front. Convalescent soldiers in hospital, for example, were sometimes
allowed to go on day trips and sightseeing excursions,487 often planned by members of the
Chaplain Services or other support personnel.488 Day trips and outings gave the soldiers
some fresh air, allowed them to see the sights, provided a welcome distraction, and gave
them something to look forward to.
In addition to rest and leave, food, water, and alcohol helped stave off the worst
effects of war weariness by contributing to the health, morale, and overall endurance of
the troops. Without proper food and adequate (clean) water, soldiers were more prone to
disease and decline; and the shortage of rations and delays in food deliveries to the
trenches reinforced the idea that the soldiers were mere cogs in the war machine, and their
officers cared nought for them. The lack of proper supplies and sustenance also
contributed to the grousing and grumbling of soldiers, and, combined with other
grievances, could boil over into collective indiscipline. Blame was often placed on the
officers in ‘bomb-proof’ jobs. For unit COs, this was unfair in some ways, as many cared
deeply for their subordinates and approached their task with a paternalistic attitude; and
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there was not much that could be done about traffic congestion, pilfering along the lines
of communication, and shortages. Some officers and COs also turned a blind eye to
small-scale theft, ‘scrounging,’ and looting of the soldiers to supplement meagre and
monotonous army rations.
Food provided the soldiers with calories, crucial for mental and physical activity.
The soldiers were expected to make do on the rations provided by the authorities, but
there were opportunities to get different and extra food as well. Packages from home,
bartering with and purchasing from locals, dining at estaminets, and taking advantage of
surplus or looted food also helped. Army rations included bully beef, biscuits, tea, jams
and preserves, and the increasingly rare fresh meat, bread, or produce which helped
sustain the soldiers, but had many detractors. The love/hate relationship that the soldiers
had with bully beef, for example, is emphasised in a poem of the same name.489 But
despite these problems, Canadian soldiers were fed sufficiently throughout the war. And
for soldiers recovering in hospitals or convalescent centres, it was even more important to
provide them with healthy, ideally fresh, hearty foods. This aided in the recovery process,
but also helped with morale. Major C.H. Reason of No. 3 Canadian Stationary Hospital
noted that “patients at the front are men who have been living hard and at times on food
which has lost much of its vitamine [sic] constituents,” and thus it was even more
important for hospitals to compensate for that in recovering troops. Fresh fruit (apples,
oranges, grapes) or lime juice, jams, fish, vegetables, bread, milk, and eggs were
recommended, whereas “tinned food should be avoided”.490
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Alcohol, including the official rum ration, was also welcomed by many troops for
its healing properties and its role in sustaining them. Alcohol such as spirits helped with
the morale of the soldiers, contributed to their health, and assisted with sleeping.491 It is
important to note that not all soldiers consumed alcohol; there were numerous teetotalers.
For the rest of the troops, alcohol was welcome in helping take the edge off, providing
‘liquid courage,’ and to help with the cold and damp. Private Southworth who went
overseas with the 139th Battalion wrote that at Vimy the soldiers were preparing to attack.
At 4:30 am “one of the officers came along the trench with the rum and I took a dandy
and by 5:30 I was all nerve” and ready to fight.492 Many soldiers commented on the
ability of alcohol to calm nerves; it played an important psychological role in the ability,
and perhaps also willingness, of soldiers to continue with duty at the front. Artilleryman
Ernest Black also referred to scotch as “that perfect medicine,” and claimed it cured him
of influenza.493
And yet all the alcohol and food could not prevent some soldiers from breaking
down and becoming susceptible to war weariness. It was thus crucial that officers and
COs were acquainted with their men and practiced good leadership. Close contact and
mutual trust were important, as was communication up and down the army hierarchy. The
authorities needed to be familiar with the contributing factors toward and symptoms of
psychiatric casualties, and be watchful for indicators that soldiers were not faring well.
Exposure to intense stimuli, as well as the cumulative experience of the stresses of war,
drove many troops to the very edge of breakdown; it was the duty of medical and military
authorities to minimise the numbers that were pushed beyond the edge. It was important
for commanders to identify the individual limits of ‘courage,’ and remove those soldiers
from combat before reserves ran dry. Exhaustion and the lack of genuine respite also
contributed to this draining of courage. To use Lord Moran’s analogy, every day the
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soldiers withdrew more and more from their accounts until “the credit in his bank of
courage had run out” and breakdown was imminent.494
It was thus essential that soldiers on the edge of breakdown were removed not
only from frontline service, but from the battle area itself. This was done to prevent the
transition from war weariness into shell shock, as “prolonged exposure to fear [and other
aspects of service] leads to stress, which accumulates and causes the breakdown of a
person’s normal performance.”495 More specifically, there were certain indicators of
impending breakdown that COs could look for in subordinates. For example, troops who
had in the past withstood artillery bombardments and other stressful situations but had
begun to be rattled and visibly shaken by these things might indicate they were being
pushed beyond the limits of endurance. Moreover, heavy drinking, recklessness, loss of
concentration, caution, and disproportionate fear over personal safety could also be
considered warning signs, especially if such things diverged from past behaviour.
Physically, there were also indicators of impending breakdown; trembling, irritability,
nightmares or insomnia, ticks and twitches all could indicate a physical response to
psychological and mental stress or trauma.496 The need to intervene on behalf of the
individual soldier before permanent debilitation ensured an important role for MOs,
commanders, chaplains, and other authorities. Good leadership practices, close contact,
trust, and familiarity with all ranks helped, as did a measure of sympathy and
understanding toward those who were “mentally affected owing to the hardships of war.”
It was important to identify and take action on those who had lost their “mental vigour
and strength,” or who were not in their “right mind”497 because of the strains of war, both
acute and cumulative. Some authorities acknowledged the conditions of the war and its
“physical and moral exactions” which placed an enormous burden on the soldiers. It was
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thus “absolutely necessary that the tension of trench life and army vigilance be relaxed on
every suitable occasion”498 with proper rest and respite, so as to prevent war weariness
and breakdown.

Morale, Combat Motivation and Effectiveness, Endurance, War
Weariness
The medical aspects of service and the health and well-being of the soldiers, both
physical and otherwise, had a profound influence on morale, combat motivation and
effectiveness, endurance, and ultimately, war weariness. The links between morale and
medicine were complex, and could be reinforcing. For example, a good military medical
system, with effective preventative measures, concern over sanitation, treatment,
evacuation, and care could reinforce and bolster morale. Prior to soldiers going into
combat it was reassuring that if they were hit, they would be treated by a competent and
caring medical staff. On the other hand, the ignorant, harsh, or unsympathetic attitude of
more traditionally-minded MOs could undermine morale, as even loyal volunteers
worried what would happen to them if they could no longer withstand shellfire or service,
or if they suffered a medical problem beyond their control.499 Service conditions
conspired against the soldiers and their ability to endure indefinitely. Nearly-constant
exposure to stress, fear, and trauma compromised both mind and body, weakened
purpose, and sapped the will.500 There were many occasions, moreover, where the
military requirements took priority over medical ones. An officer of the Canadian Special
Hospital at Witley wrote that “men were urgently wanted for the front,” and there was
pressure on the medical services to ‘heal’ the troops and return them to their units as soon
as possible. Furthermore, during periods of panic and military emergencies at the front,
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such as the German Spring Offensives (beginning March 1918), this pressure took on a
more urgent tone. An officer at Witley argued that:
it was a time of stress at the front, and the number of days a patient spent in
hospital was that number of days’ delay in training and taking his place in the
firing line. For this reason hospital days were carefully watched, and all attempts
made not to lose time…it had been felt that patients were wasting a great deal of
time while in hospital. The average stay in hospital of a patient at this time was
about five weeks. Many patients, of course stayed longer…they tended to lose
physical condition and morale.501
Sending troops back to the front prematurely encouraged relapse and further health
problems, but also assaulted morale. An excessive emphasis on training and military
discipline in hospitals and convalescent centres could also retard the healing process. And
finally, as morale was often whipped up to a fever pitch prior to attacks and operations,
there was often a negative letdown following these engagements. As one infantry
subaltern argued, the “morale of the infantry was bought at a great price.” These soldiers
had been “keyed up to endeavour far beyond their normal powers, marching and fighting
over great tracts of country throughout the last year, they suffered the inevitable reaction
when their task was done and they might rest.”502
There were also important links between the health and medical well-being of the
soldiers and their combat motivation and effectiveness. A soldier who was shot through
the legs and was unable to stand was clearly no longer effective as a soldier. There were
more ambiguous cases, however, where the men had their soldiering abilities
compromised, but were nevertheless kept in the line. This might include less serious
medical problems, but also war weariness. Those removed from the line for shell shock
and other war neuroses were a detriment to their unit, or who had sympathetic MOs or
commanders. For the rest of these cases, however, they were expected to carry on until
relieved in the line, killed, or (physically) wounded.
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The realities of combat and life on the Western Front undermined the health and
well-being of the soldiers on a daily basis. Life in the trenches could be dirty,
claustrophobic, and terrifying, but also afforded some measure of protection and
predictability. During the more open warfare of the final months of the war, on the other
hand, the sense of confinement might have been less, but there were other dangers to
contend with. Casualties related to VD or trench foot were directly and indirectly related
to life at the front; during the wet and cold winter months, for example, the “number of
men having to recover high and dry, out of the trenches, begins to grow.”503 Other
realities of combat also compromised the health of the soldiers. Overburdening the troops
with too much equipment, for example, could undermine the ability of soldiers to seize
battlefield objectives. Clothing and equipment were important parts of the soldier’s kit,
but if it was too heavy it disturbed the “equilibrium between equipment and mobility,” a
key factor in military success. Poor or damaged clothing could undermine fighting
efficiency, and going into battle exhausted could mean defeat by an enemy with inferior
“fighting qualities and equipment.”504 Medical authorities recommended that the load
carried should “seldom exceed” 55 pounds, and that a load above 66 pounds was
“oppressive.” And yet according to the Infantry Field Service Manual, the soldiers were
already required to carry approximately 59 pounds, and other equipment “generally
carried by the soldier” included their steel helmet (over two pounds), SBR (over three
pounds), and ground sheet (over two pounds). In winter they needed to carry even
more.505

Moreover, “ill-fitting or tight shoes, with uncleanliness of the feet, combine to disable the marching soldier.”
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Exhaustion, fatigue, the lack of respite, and the cumulative effect of the strains of
war served to reduce the effectiveness of the troops. This was especially problematic in
attacks, when all available strength was required to overcome enemy resistance. After
Arthur Currie visited the French sector at Verdun, he argued that attacks would be more
successful if they were made by “absolutely fresh troops who had been specially trained
for the work in hand.”506 Rest included both sufficient sleep, but also a lack of strenuous
physical activity prior to going ‘over the top.’ Exhaustion in battle could mean the
difference between success and failure, victory and defeat. To this end, it was crucial that
troops went into the attack as light as possible, and did not bring any superfluous
equipment. As the emphasis on firepower increased over time, there was unfortunately “a
growing tendency to overload N.C.O’s and men in the attack,” but there were ways to
lighten the load on infantry. It was possible, for instance, for troops to take less small
arms ammunition with them than previously instructed, because ammunition could be
taken from casualties; moreover, attacking troops should not be burdened with too many
entrenching tools, as these could be left largely to the follow-up waves and consolidation
troops.507
Exhaustion and other medical problems compromised the soldiers’ ability to carry
out orders and attain battlefield objectives in other ways as well. For war-weary soldiers
who had not yet become debilitated, and those wounded or ill but not removed from the
line,508 there were a host of problems to contend with. Some soldiers suffering from
exhaustion, for instance, were described as having “marked impairment of judgment,”

and “the evil effects are aggravated when men already fatigued both physically and mentally after duty in the trenches
are called upon to carry an excessive load for many miles frequently under adverse conditions as regards both road and
weather.” LAC, RG 9 III C1, Volume 3894, Folder 59, File 25, ‘6272/1 (Q.A.1), First Army, by Lt-Gen. R.C. Maxwell,
Quartermaster General, 27-2-17’ and ‘Memorandum on the Weight Carried in Relation to the Health of the Soldier,’ 27
January 1917.
506 Currie was the CO of the 1st Canadian Division at the time. LAC, RG 9 III C1, Volume 3871, Folder 115, File 8,
‘Notes on French Attacks, Northeast of Verdun in October and December 1916.’
507 It was important to lighten the load because they were already burdened with much equipment and weaponry. In
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508 The archival record contains a telling comment on a wounded soldier and his decreased abilities. This soldier “was
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work or trench duties. It is likely his physical abilities, including stamina, concentration, dexterity, and strength, were
compromised. LAC, RG 9 III B1, Volume 390, B-23-1, ‘Requests for Billeting.’
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which could imperil the rest of the unit.509 Hallucinations or falling asleep while on sentry
duty could also put comrades in danger, and falling asleep at one’s post was a courts
martial offense. And yet, this behaviour was understandable considering the troops were
“unavoidably exposed to conditions of extreme hardship, exposure and irregular diet”
which negatively affected their health and effectiveness.510 This was the reality faced by
all soldiers on the Western Front, but not all commanders acknowledged this reality or
were able to address these problems. The Corps commander Arthur Currie in October
1917, in preparation for the battles of Third Ypres, decided that “getting the troops up to
the line, with the minimum [of] fatigue” was indispensable. Moreover, “it was essential
that the troops detailed for the attack should be fresh,” and not fatigued.511 Talk was
cheap, but changes to army policy were not always easy to implement, especially for a
corps commander answerable to British superiors and political leaders in Ottawa. Worn
out individuals and units coupled with heavy casualties could negatively affect the
military situation by forcing them out of the line, or by being unable to participate in
subsequent operations. This placed more of the burden on other troops still in the line.512
A cycle of exhaustion and over-reliance on worn units resulted.
War weariness also undermined the endurance of soldiers, and hurt their ability to
carry on at the front. Proper care contributed to health and overall well-being,
strengthened resistance to illness, and helped sustain morale during difficult times. Rest
prior to and following operations, sufficient sleep and food, hygiene, sanitation, and
regular bathing, the quantity and quality of water, alcohol and estaminets, and proper
medical care all contributed to endurance.513 Lack of water could be detrimental to the
troops and their ability to carry on. Poor and insufficient food in the trenches was
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‘extreme hardship,’ see Macpherson et al., Medical Services – Hygiene of the War Volume I, 2.
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observed, as was the monotony of it outside the line. One soldier complained about the
water situation, noting that “we never had water to drink,” or it was often tainted with
gas, and they could also not drink the water collected in shell holes because it “was all
full of blood and piss and shit.” Water, he concluded, “was a terrible thing” in the line.514
And if the lack of sufficient food and water undermined performance and endurance, rum
acted partly as an antidote to these troubles. One sergeant remarked regarding rum that “I
often felt that that was one thing that kept them going,” despite all the problems on active
service. In one example, a cold, tired, and wet soldier was given a double shot of rum and
quickly went to sleep, even dozing through the firing of a fifteen inch howitzer in close
proximity.515 This speaks to the utter exhaustion plaguing the troops, but also the little
fortifying forces that helped with endurance and perseverance.
The reality of combat and general service on the Western Front did not always
allow the soldiers to be granted what they needed to carry on. At times, it was impractical
to remove individuals and especially entire units from the line, even if they deserved a
rest. Pushing both individuals to, and then at times beyond, the breaking point obviously
did not bode well for effective long-term service. But military necessity took precedence
over the health and well-being of the soldiers. One officer complained in October 1918
that “right in the midst of your big achievements, at a time when I thought you were all
needing and entitled to a rest…you have had to go at it harder than ever around Cambrai.”
This chaplain wrote, moreover, about the tenacity and endurance of the troops, thanking
them and writing that “God bless you all for the way you stick at it and carry
through…[during] the seriousness of the Spring situation” at the front.516 This short-term
thinking ensured that military requirements were at least partly addressed, but also
undermined the endurance of both individuals and entire units, encouraging more
permanent breakdown. And even for troops taking part in rest and regular rotation, simply
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enduring duty was taxing. There were “physical and moral exactions,” the “tension of
trench life” and service more generally, and it was often difficult for soldiers to endure
and stay at their posts while “under constant shell fire.”517 This was enough to drive
anyone mad over time, not to mention contributing to the development of war weariness.
Long-term service at the front wore down even the strongest and most committed troops.
And this was also the case for members of all branches of the armed forces. For noncombatants it was particularly taxing, as service at the front “has been found to be
extremely exhausting, even demanding the recall in some instances of men who were
physically incapacitated by the strain and burden of it” all.518 The health and medical
reality of the troops on the Western Front had a direct bearing on the endurance of the
soldiers, for both good and ill.
Though it is difficult to find direct references to the phenomenon of war weariness
in the archival record, there are mentions of the physical exhaustion that contributed to it
and the attendant problems related to the phenomenon. Private Robert Cushman wrote
that he was “fed up with the Army” and continued service at the front, employing a
common euphemism for war weariness. Moreover, he wrote that the military authorities
could “put me down as a malingerer or send me to a ‘Nut house,’”519 admitting that his
behaviour bordered on criminal or irrational, but that he was unable or unwilling to
continue service at the front, despite the consequences. Cushman had agency in this
situation, and attempted to take fate into his own hands, even if it meant court martial or
institutionalisation. Other soldiers, however, were not able to evade duty or escape further
service.520 Even when units were rotated out of the line, they were expected to continue
with labour and training, despite the pleas of COs who knew their men needed genuine
rest and respite.521 This lack of rest and respite increased the vulnerability of both units
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and individuals to war weariness over long periods of time. Army authorities
acknowledged the “weariness of war” and made references to “tired and worn out men,”
suggesting two distinct phenomena: physical exhaustion (‘tired’) and war weariness
(‘worn out’), or psychological exhaustion.522
Even with proper care, preventative measures, and effective treatment, the reality
of combat on the Western Front, coupled with general service conditions, wore down
even the best volunteers and experienced soldiers. The heavy casualties, the acute
exposure to trauma, and the long-term and cumulative impact of the stresses of war
contributed to the onset of both individual and collective war weariness. And though war
weariness and shell shock debilitation were different phenomena, they exist on a
spectrum. War-weary troops were often reluctant and well on their way toward serious
and more-permanent shell shock which rendered them useless as soldiers, whereas shellshocked soldiers could desire to carry on with service (be willing), but not physically or
psychologically capable of continuing. The medical structures and aspects of service had
a direct bearing on war weariness, and shaped how soldiers saw the war and their plight
in particular. The medical and legal systems could contribute to these problems, and both
these systems also had to deal with these issues once they developed. There were times,
moreover, when the legal and medical realities of service actually exacerbated the
problems of the soldiers, rather than helping alleviate them. For psychiatric problems like
war weariness, an analogy could be made to physical ailments. If a soldier strained a
muscle, for instance, it was likely understood by the medical and military authorities as a
waste of resources to address this problem while it was relatively minor and did not
prevent the soldier from carrying on with duty. If this strain led to a muscle tear or torn
ligaments and the inability of the individual to carry a rifle or march, however, then it
would be prudent for the army to address this problem as soon as possible. A soldier
behind the lines in hospital was a soldier who could not directly contribute to winning the
war. And just as war weariness did not necessarily preclude a soldier from pressing on, if

LAC, RG 9 III C15, Volume 4663, Publicity, ‘Chaplains Serve up in the Front Line,’ newspaper article and Ibid,
Volume 4675, Extracts from Chaplains’ Reports, ‘Work of Chaplains in France, R.C.’
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a soldier reached the point of breakdown, then this would have to be addressed by the
army authorities.523 War-weary soldiers, though unhappy and discontented, could still
continue at the front, whereas seriously shell-shocked soldiers were all but useless
militarily. This was the situation that regular Canadian troops found themselves in during
service on the Western Front, at Vimy Ridge and during Hundred Days campaign of the
final months of the war.
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The author would like to thank Dr. Vance for this idea and analogy, which captures the distinction between the
inability and unwillingness to continue, and how the authorities chose to address existing problems with limited
resources.
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Chapter 3 - War Weariness in the Canadian Corps,
April-August 1917
The introduction and the previous two chapters provide the foundation for our
analysis of war weariness amongst Canadian troops during two distinct time periods:
April-August 1917, and July 1918 to the signing of the Armistice in November 1918.
During the April to August 1917 time period, the most important combat operation was
the preparations, attack, and consolidation operations of the Battle of Arras, and in
particular Vimy Ridge. The fighting around Vimy is a good place to start our analysis,
and provides a useful opportunity to investigate the effects of combat on both the
individual, and the collective (the military unit).
The Battle of Vimy Ridge and other operations around Arras is a starting point for
our analysis of war weariness for a few reasons. First of all, the Vimy operations
constituted the first large-scale set-piece battle of the war for the Canadian Corps,
whereby all four Canadian divisions fought together in such close proximity with the
same overall objectives. Second, the fact that the Corps was still under the command of a
British General, Julian Byng,524 reflects the reality of fighting on the Western Front for a
multinational force that was the BEF.525 The Canadians, though having seen action earlier
in the war, were still undergoing the development of attack doctrines and absorbing
lessons distilled from previous operations. In this sense, they were firmly in the middle of
their ‘learning curve’ development, a process that would continue until the end of the war.
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Born 1862 as Julian Hedworth George Byng. A soldier, he earned his commission in 1883, and served in the Sudan
and South Africa. During the war he led the 3rd Cavalry Division at First Ypres, a Cavalry Corps by March 1916, the IX
Army Corps in Gallipoli, the Canadians by March 1916 and at Vimy, and then the III British Army at Cambrai until the
end of the war. Became 1st Viscount Byng of Vimy and Governor-General of Canada, 1921-1926. Died 1935. Magnus
Magnusson, ed., Chambers Biographical Dictionary (Edinburgh: W & R Chambers Ltd., 1990), 240 and Holger H.
Herwig and Neil M. Heyman, Biographical Dictionary of World War I (Westport: Greenwood Press, 1982), 103.
525 Vimy illustrates the problems of and advantages related to coalition warfare, and especially that the Canadians were
but one aspect of a large multinational force that was the British Army in the war. Despite the increasing
‘Canadianization’ of the CEF, and Ottawa’s increasing insistence on administrative control over its forces, the Corps
was always reliant upon British staff work, artillery, the RFC, and later RAF, and other British arms, services, and
support. This was evident at Vimy, and in nearly all Canadian operations.
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Vimy is also a useful starting point for our discussion of war weariness in the
Corps because, despite the battle being short,526 especially compared with the drawn-out
attritional struggles at the Somme and Verdun in 1916, it was an intense combat operation
nonetheless. The Battle of Vimy Ridge and First Scarpe lasted from 9 to 14 April 1917,
but also involved months of extensive preparations and follow-up, mopping-up, and
consolidation operations afterwards. In addition to the intensity of these operations, for
many soldiers at Vimy this constituted the first major sustained action, with attacks and
counterattacks, death and disfigurement, and close quarters action. Many of the
participating troops had been in trench warfare and participated in small-scale raids and
patrols, but the Battle of Vimy Ridge was different. And finally, this period is fruitful for
an examination of war weariness because by 1917 most other armies were showing
significant signs of ‘wear and tear,’ and beginning to breakdown both collectively and
individually. And indeed, some would in fact break in this period, both on the Western
Front and beyond. This period is thus useful for an examination of war weariness as it
allows a discussion of the Canadian Corps within the wider context of the war and how it
affected the other major combatant armies. Why the Canadians were able to carry on
without mutiny, widespread indiscipline, or a serious reduction in military effectiveness
will be examined below.
The operations at Vimy allow the historian to identify some of the more important
forces that contributed to, and helped mitigate, the worst effects of individual and
collective war weariness. Factors that contributed to its onset and negative manifestations
included heavy casualties,527 a sense of disappointment or incomplete victory, and the
wider military context in which these operations took place. Although the soldiers would
not be familiar with all the developments outside their immediate area of operations, they
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The Report of the Battles Nomenclature Committee of 1921 listed Vimy Ridge and First Scarpe as lasting between 9
and 14 April, both under the Battle of Arras 1917. There were also other operations associated with this battle,
including Second Scarpe, 23-24 April; Attack on la Coulotte, 23 April; Arleux operations, 28-29 April; and Third
Scarpe or the Capture of Fresnoy, 3-4 May 1917. Nicholson, Canadian Expeditionary Force, 555.
527 April of 1917 was the third worst month of the entire war for the Corps in terms of overall casualties (the two worst
were August and September 1918). These enormous casualties, and the inability of these operations to create a lasting
strategic breakthrough, was likely a contributing factor to the onset of war weariness and a major source of discontent
after the initial enthusiasm of this limited success wore off.
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did receive information through newspapers, official announcements, and rumours.528
And if the soldiers were unable to appreciate the ‘bigger picture’ at the time, hindsight
and subsequent historical analyses allows a deeper contextual understanding of the
period.529 At Vimy, the Corps had fought effectively and achieved its objectives, despite
heavy casualties and relative inexperience. Furthermore, the successes at Vimy
illustrated, quite dramatically, that the power of the defensive could be overcome with
existing and developing weapons systems and doctrines. There were also aspects of the
operations that served to bolster morale and mitigate the worst effects of war weariness.
The sense of limited victory and local success, coupled with an increasing sense of
Canadian uniqueness or superiority, likely kept the growing war weariness at a simmer in
the Canadian forces.

Lessons and Implications of Home Front and War Weariness
beyond the CEF
An important lesson to be learned from these experiences of war weariness was
the crucial link between the home front and the battle front. And as it was for the other
combatant nations, so it was for Germany. With millions of men under arms and the nearcomplete mobilisation of the economy and entire society to serve the war effort, problems
emerging in one theatre could directly impact another. Firsthand accounts530 and
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See, for example, Hesler, ed., Interlude: 1916-1919, 36.
The spring and summer of 1917 witnessed the failure of the French Chemin des Dames offensive, and the
subsequent mutinies in the French Army reinforced the sense of Allied despondency in this period. Moreover, hindsight
allows us to appreciate that the success at Vimy was of a limited nature and the outright failure of other operations at
Arras ensured that the ‘victory’ was pyrrhic and fleeting at best, and a bloody waste at worst. As the British Chief of the
Imperial General Staff (CIGS) Sir William Robertson noted, with the British spring attacks of 1917 “we gained a great
victory at Vimy,” but elsewhere the campaign was a disappointment. Field-Marshal Sir William Robertson, From
Private to Field-Marshal (London: Constable and Company Ltd., 1921), 308. And the authors of the history of the
Royal Canadian Regiment (RCR) stated that the careful preparation of the Corps “had paid its usual dividends,” and
that the victory at Vimy “shone the more brightly amid the general gloom of the Western Front.” Ken Bell and C.P.
Stacey, 100 Years: The Royal Canadian Regiment 1883-1983 (Don Mills: Collier Macmillan Canada Ltd., 1983), 64.
The failure of the attack elsewhere was due to the inability to bring up sufficient guns, or the proper time to establish
communications and register targets, lack of tanks, poor weather, and a lack of carefully-prepared plans for subsequent
days. Hart, The Great War, 337.
530 Though there are some issues with her account, the views of Princess Evelyn Blücher are illuminating. She noted the
anxiety over food supplies, the distribution of anti-government leaflets, increasing demoralisation, and the links
between the two fronts, as men on leave informed regular Germans of the truth about the military situation. Evelyn
Princess Blücher, An English Wife in Berlin: A Private Memoir of Events, Politics, and Daily Life in Germany
throughout the War and the Social Revolution of 1918 (New York: E.P. Dutton & Company, 1920).
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subsequent literature531 point to the increasing and detrimental connections between the
home and battle fronts, as war weariness and the undermining of commitment to the war
itself on the home front served to encourage this development on the battle front, and vice
versa. This dynamic appeared to be mutually reinforcing and got worse over time in
relation to the overall war situation, and the breakdown in control over soldiers and
information. This war weariness was coupled with the decline of morale and discipline at
the front, and the increase of strikes and eventually anti-government and anti-war protests
(revolutionary rhetoric) at home. Allied military authorities also noted the onset of
German war weariness on the battle front, identifying the increase in unwounded POWs,
the breakdown of officer control over subordinates, and evidence of individual
agency/protest to legitimate military authority. The disappointment with the failure of the
German Spring Offensives, equipment and supply shortages, the loss of faith in ultimate
victory and increasing political aspects532 of protest were other indications of an
increasing – and increasingly harmful – and widespread war weariness. War weariness
afflicted all the major combatants and national armies on the Western Front, certainly by
1918 if not earlier.533
The problems affecting other armies largely goes beyond the scope of this project,
but a brief analysis of war weariness in other formations helps illuminate the problems
facing Canadians. For the French Army, military action in the field affected morale and
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German disintegration in 1918 included the decline of motivation, the onset of war weariness, disillusionment, and
exhaustion which seriously compromised fighting effectiveness. Watson, Enduring the Great War.
532 Political aspects of protest included calls for a new government making peace at all costs, or even the overthrow of
the German Imperial government altogether. The inspiration, literature, and symbols of the Bolshevik Revolution in
Russia also came to play an increased role in uprisings as time went on.
533 In the Russian Army there was an enormous gap between officers and ORs, and the harsh conditions facing the
regular infantryman eroded confidence in the officer corps. These issues were also compounded by other deep-rooted
problems in the army, and wider society. The Belgian army and its soldiers experienced the negative long-term effects
of war and occupation, and the Italian and Austro-Hungarian armies also exhibited growing signs of war weariness by
the 1918. And though the American forces were likely not experiencing collective war weariness on the same scale as
its counterparts by 1918, there were indications of individual and small-scale war weariness due to sustained combat
and the lack of proper coping mechanisms discovered by the other long-serving combatants. As the US case
demonstrates, all major armies experienced some level of collective and widespread war weariness provided they had
fielded military units for a sustained period of time. Historian Philpott argued that despite perceptions of relative
strength “the reality was that all armies were on their last legs come 1918, with the exception of the slowly growing and
green American army.” See Fiona Reid and Christine Van Everbroeck, “Shell Shock and the Kloppe: War Neuroses
amongst British and Belgian Troops during and after the First World War,” Medicine, Conflict and Survival, 30, 4
(2014): 252-275; Herwig, The First World War, especially chapter 9 and Philpott, War of Attrition, 311.
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motivation, but orders, attitude, and expectations played an equally important role in
determining the perception of success or failure. Expectations of victory in the Chemin
des Dames offensive came to naught, and the large-scale collective indiscipline of mid1917 (the Nivelle mutinies) erupted as a result of this failure. Disciplinary problems were
“magnified by previous expectations of victory,”534 and just as a disproportionate rise in
morale can accompany successes on the battlefield when achievements surpass
expectations,535 the opposite can also result. For the French poilus, hopes for a substantial
breakthrough were dashed, they had been deceived by their own leaders, and expectations
clearly did not match reality. In fact, the “great optimism that had swept over so many
French soldiers helps to explain the disillusion that came next”536 in the form of combat
refusals and other forms of collective indiscipline. This disillusion and sense of futility
suggested war weariness, and were a main contributor to the mutinies that resulted.537
Without the antidote of at least local successes to neutralise growing discontent in the
ranks, it became evident “the ordinary French soldiers were becoming war weary,”538 and
facing the prospect of further suffering with no end in sight. The attacks led to heavy
casualties, and results did not match the rhetoric used prior to the offensive. And this
failure was doubly dreadful “because of the damaging hyperbole he [Nivelle] had used to
promote it.”539 Ultimately, the offensive was “psychologically disastrous,” and French
morale was “shattered” by spring 1917.540 This was a perfect state of affairs for the spread
of collective war weariness, which only further fuelled the morale and discipline
problems plaguing the French at this point.
With proper rest, leave, and rotation policies coupled with more effective tactics, a
crisis might have been averted. And yet the “offensive turned what had been occasional

534

Kellett, Combat Motivation, 262.
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536 Michael S. Neiberg, Fighting the Great War: A Global History (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2006), 242.
537 Gwynne Dyer, War: The New Edition (Toronto: Vintage Canada, 2005), 266.
538 Hart, The Great War, 342 and 339.
539 Ibid, 340-341. Hart also noted that the presence of tanks “raised the spirits of the long-suffering poilus” prior to the
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localised indiscipline among battle-weary troops…into a crisis for the French army,”541 a
development from individual and local war weariness into more general and collective
manifestations. Continued costly attacks without adequate redress of grievances, these
“fed up” men eventually refused to advance, commenced strikes and protests, while a
growing number of homesick and hungry soldiers initiated a mutiny.542 Shell shock led to
the increasing inability to carry on in combat, but there were also indicators of a
developing unwillingness and reluctance to endure continued war and combat, an
important distinction to make.543 Ultimately “defeat, failure, and even a prolonged
absence of obvious success can have a devastating impact on morale,” resulting in further
problems. Lack of success undermined combat motivation and willingness to endure at
the front, and hence the chances for military success; it called into question belief in the
cause, weakened faith in leaders or the army, lessened the sense of self-confidence and
respect, undermined discipline, eroded group bonds, and had detrimental tactical
repercussions.544 War weariness did not necessarily preclude soldiers from carrying on in
combat, but did make their service increasingly contingent and conditional, to mention
nothing of their attitude toward the war and their enthusiasm in its prosecution. It was the
inability of the French military authorities to address legitimate soldier grievances545 that
allowed the simmering war weariness to boil over into mutiny.546
Regarding the Nivelle mutinies, there were both official and unofficial responses
to war weariness, discontent, and disillusionment. With the problems afflicting the French
Army by mid-1917 it was clear that military morale was an important factor. And though

Philpott, War of Attrition, 290. Moreover, the Nivelle offensive showed “cracks…in French morale,” which led to
open protests and eventually mutiny. Norris, ed., The World War I Memoir of Captain Harold McGill, 287.
542 Hew Strachan, ed., World War I: A History (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1998), 197.
543 For the soldiers themselves, it could be difficult to distinguish between the inability and unwillingness to continue
with duty. One soldier wrote, for instance, that going up the line some casualties “and others [were] so badly shaken
and shell-shocked that they were either unfit or unwilling to proceed on the following night.” Roy, ed., The Journal of
Private Fraser, 313. See also Reid, Broken Men, 29-40 on shell shock and war weariness.
544 Kellett, Combat Motivation, 260-261.
545 The strikes, mutinies, and disorders facing the French Army and nation arose primarily from “the circumstances of
the war.” The grievances facing the troops included problems with the quality and quantity of food and drink, including
wine, important for morale; pay and allowances problems; issues with a lack of clothing, shelter, warmth and other
comforts; and especially a lack of rest and leave. See Ibid, 201.
546 Of course hindsight allow us to appreciate that the French did not collapse into complete disintegration and
revolution, which was partly explained by the timely and effective intervention on the part of France’s military leaders.
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morale is an amorphous and complex subject, often difficult to pin down,547 we can
narrow it down with definitions and by looking at the factors that contribute to (and
compromise) morale. Laurence and Matthews in The Oxford Handbook of Military
Psychology provide a specific, military understanding of morale, as “the emotional bond
that holds the group together and is a result of unit cohesion and esprit de corps.”548
Importantly, this links the individual to the group. One edited collection defined morale
as a “spiritual quality…desirable in soldiers,” and “a sublime, self-denying state of being
that transpires when groups such as mobs or armies imbibe a sense of purpose that
transcends the personal welfare of their members,”549 again stressing the links between
the individual and collective. Both individually and collectively, the prerequisites for
strong morale were sorely lacking in the French Army by the mid-1917. Army life in
general and combat specifically exposed the soldiers to the cumulative strains of war,
including sleep deprivation, exhaustion, fear of mutilation or death, survivor guilt, and
anxiety over friends and family. By 1917 infantry units also had their morale negatively
affected by insufficient motivation and training, the lack of comforts and supplies, and the
“lack of confidence in officers” or superiors.550 While the needs and respect afforded a
soldier continued to be neglected, could the French troops really be expected to endure at
the front, suffer, and ultimately die at the hands of a cold and callous high command with
little regard for human life and no attendant compensating military successes?

Indeed, morale is “easier to detect than define,” and the term is complex, fluid, and contextual. Boff, Winning and
Losing on the Western Front, 94. Moreover, “morale considered as a psychological condition was not tangible,
measurable or localizable.” Englander ‘Discipline and Morale in the British Army, 1917-1918’ in State, Society and
Mobilization ed. by Horne, 128.
548 One historian wrote that “in the broadest terms, morale is concerned with the way in which people react to the
conditions of their existence.” Baynes, Morale, 92. Janice H. Laurence and Michael D. Matthews, eds., The Oxford
Handbook of Military Psychology (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012), 3. A similar definition can be found in
Richardson, quoting Field Marshal Slim: “high morale means that every individual in a group will work – or fight –
and, if needed, will give his last ounce of effort in its services.” Major-General F.M. Richardson, Fighting Spirit: A
Study of Psychological Factors in War (London: Leo Cooper, 1978), 3.
549 Robert Cowley and Geoffrey Parker, eds., The Reader’s Companion to Military History (Boston: Houghton Mifflin
Company and The Society for Military History, 1996), 311. Strachan also defined morale in terms of the link between
the individual and the collective. Morale as “an action-based, group-centred concept that summarized the relative
combat-willingness of individuals and units.” [The italics are mine] Strachan, World War I, 191. James Ulio also
describes military morale as connecting the individual soldier with the collective group (the military unit). He defines
military morale as “that conditioned quality, in the individual soldier and the in the unit of command, which holds the
soldier, holds the unit, to the performance of duty despite every opposing force or influence.” James A. Ulio, “Military
Morale,” American Journal of Sociology 47, 3 (November 1941): 321-330.
550 Beckett, The Great War, 303.
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As soldier morale, enthusiasm, and uncritical acceptance of duty waned,
disciplinary problems increased in the French Army. In response to collective indiscipline
and insubordination, authorities relied upon a mixture of carrots and sticks551 to keep men
loyal and units cohesive. In this sense, the French command employed a two-tiered
approach, punishing the worst offenders or ‘ringleaders’ of the mutiny with the firing
squad (although many death sentences were commuted), while implementing longoverdue reforms on important matters such as tactics and leave policy. One of the first
actions taken by the newly-appointed Philippe Pétain was to issue Directive No. 1, to
restore order, discipline, and morale.552 The Directive ordered officers to keep track of
their men and the conditions under which they served; to appear in the trenches regularly;
to improve the food situation, including the provision of more fresh vegetables; and to
“regularize furloughs and to grant extended leaves after long periods of combat.”553 As
the nation was left increasingly vulnerable554 by dozens of striking or mutinying
divisions, the military leadership sought to induce men back into their units – and into the
firing line – by any means necessary. The most reasonable soldier grievances were
addressed, coupled with a firm hand towards the worst mutineers in an effort to reassert a
measure of top-down control. This mixture of positive inducements to behaviour and
punishments for a select minority ensured the semblance of military cohesion,555 the
maintenance of at least some divisions in the line, and the preservation of Allied unity.
This top-down intervention was crucial, and it seems the regular French soldiers simply
wanted to maintain their sense of humanity, be treated with respect, and for their officers

‘Carrots,’ or positive inducements to behaviour, included promises of leave and other ways to address soldier
grievances. The ‘sticks,’ disincentives, or punishments and the threat of punishment, included the use of courts martial
and capital punishment for the most egregious offenders of military law.
552 DUASC, Folder MS-2-432, SF 44-1, Clearing: The Tale of The First Canadian Casualty Clearing Station, B.E.F.,
1914-1919, by Thomas Brenton Smith, 218. Pétain combined heavy-handedness with concern over the men’s legitimate
grievances. Neiberg, Fighting the Great War, 247.
553 Herwig, The First World War, 321 and Neiberg, Fighting the Great War, 248. As Captain McGill also noted, “long
overdue reforms” quelled the situation. Norris, Memoir of Captain Harold W. McGill, 287.
554 The French Army was “paralyzed” in this time period. Adam Tooze, The Deluge: The Great War and the Remaking
of the Global Order (London: Penguin Books, 2015), 74.
555 Though the veracity of his account and his motivation needs to be considered, German General Erich Ludendorff
noted in his Memoirs that after the Nivelle Offensive he noticed a weakening of attacks and that many French units
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anyone’s guess. Ludendorff, My War Memories – Volume II, 424 and 428.
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to acknowledge and ultimately address their genuine and long-standing grievances.
Directive No. 1 also promised a change in tactics. There would be an end to unlimited,
attritional-style attacks, and the French command promised to postpone any major
offensive until the arrival of the vast American armies and mechanical implements to
overwhelm the Germans.556 Attacks that were ordered, and deemed necessary to uphold
the Coalition or to stabilise or consolidate the line, would be of only a limited nature, with
set objectives, be well-planned, and supported by heavy firepower.557 These tactical
adjustments proved a stimulus to morale and acted as a partial antidote to collective war
weariness; and successful limited attacks at Verdun and Malmaison helped restore esprit
de corps.558 Though limited attacks and changes in leave policy prevented further
outbreaks of collective indiscipline, the French Army continued to deteriorate over time.
Indeed by 1918, and certainly by the final months of the war, the troops were exhausted,
“tired of life at the front,” but many troops were “sustained by a desire for retribution”
which only increased as more areas of Belgium and especially France were liberated.559
And thus despite the continuing and collective war weariness of the French soldiery, the
desire for revenge allowed them to carry on and provided sufficient combat motivation
and willingness to stagger to the finish line.
An examination of the French mutinies provided lessons for other Allied forces,
and helps us comprehend the phenomenon of war weariness, its origins, impact, and
potential neutralising factors. First of all, this episode highlights that there is a perceptible
and important link between the home front and battle fronts, especially in an occupied
nation experiencing total war. These connections can help explain the expansion or
transmutation of war weariness as a largely local or individual phenomenon, to a more
collective and general one. Problems on the home front could ‘contaminate’ the fighting
front, and vice versa, and issues at home were often directly related to the war effort.560

In other words, to wait for the ‘Tanks and the Yanks.’ Herwig, The First World War, 321.
Neiberg, Fighting the Great War, 249 and Herwig, The First World War, 321. Moreover, Pétain’s motto apparently
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Second, leave was a key component of soldier life. Troops experiencing the hardships of
war required not only physical rest from combat, but also psychological respite from war
itself, and hence leave and the return to the interior was important, despite the obvious
(and potentially dangerous) connections between the home and battle fronts. Third, this
deterioration of soldiers and units, even in victorious armies, was all but inevitable after
years of total war and the enormous investment of lives and treasure. By 1918 the French
Army was but a pale shadow of its former self, only capable of limited operations and
holding the line. As the French approached total exhaustion, the lingering, collective war
weariness561 undermined the ability and willingness of soldiers to seize objectives and
contribute positively to the war effort. Luckily, France was part of a wider coalition that
defeated the Germans in the field and forced its surrender. Fourth, the French mutinies
illustrate the importance of maintaining a committed, healthy, and happy soldier as the
means to attaining victory in war. A key role is played by medical services, who are
partly responsible for matters of rest, convalescence, and the health and sanitary
requirements of those expected to fight and if necessary, die in the service of their
country. The supply and support services also played a significant role in their health and
well-being. Ensuring that proper food, water, alcohol, equipment, and other supplies
made it to the troops ensured they had the resources to carry out their duties. Bands,
concert parties, chaplains and padres, and similar services also helped bolster the troops’
spirits and helped them endure the sometimes admittedly terrible conditions of service.
Moreover, in order to feel respected and more than just a cog in the vast war machine,
proper and attentive leadership helped the soldiers carry on with duty. Pétain tried to
address this disconnect between the officers and ORs, and encouraged a “more open
command style” with his Directive No. 1.562 Leadership was vital, and the onus was on
the officers to know their men, address their grievances, look for signs of ‘wear and tear’
amongst subordinates, explain orders, and maintain cohesion and continuity. Moreover,
the rhetoric and orders of the high command, and the propaganda given to the troops, had

The French mutinies were but “one manifestation of the general war weariness that gripped Europe during 1917,”
suggesting the widespread nature of this phenomenon at this stage in the war. Philpott, War of Attrition, 291.
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to be grounded in reality and the experiences of the common soldier. The large gap
between the expectations and promises of victory and the subsequent disappointment of
the troops on the battlefield played an important role in precipitating the Nivelle mutinies.
And finally, war weariness, collective indiscipline, and discontent in the French
Army also illustrate the importance of an awareness of the changing circumstances and
fortunes of war. The act of liberating long-suffering civilians from occupation acted as a
boost to morale and combat willingness. The changing circumstances in the final months
of the war affected the motivation of those taking part in these final campaigns. The
changing conditions provided a new sense of urgency; and the prospect of victory and
battlefield success could bolster soldier endurance. The authorities needed to be cognizant
of these changing circumstances, as during times of high morale or during successful
military operations, a heavy-handed approach to discipline might be unwarranted, even
counterproductive. And finally, this provides insight into the interplay and connections
between the individual, collective, and the overall military situation, especially regarding
war weariness and its impact on military operations. It is worth reiterating here that war
weariness developed even in victorious armies, as was the case with the French. It did not
preclude individuals from carrying on in combat, though it did compromise military
effectiveness and commitment to the cause.563 French acute or long-term collective war
weariness and decline was problematic in the second half of the war, especially in the
spring of 1918 when the Germans were preparing their final offensives, but their erosion
occurred in tandem with other armies.
The British Army was eventually victorious in the First World War despite its
own experience of war weariness and its detrimental effect on soldiers. After years of
war, heavy casualties, and daily ‘wastage,’ by 1918 the BEF was composed “mainly of
youthful conscripts.”564 And though a soldier’s commitment and dedication were not
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necessarily suspect simply because they were conscripted, the Army had lost much of its
veteran and long-serving soldiers.565 The nature of the fighting, the wider war situation,
and the heavy casualties and conscript replacement help explain some of the disciplinary
problems affecting the British Army by 1917. Historian Gerard Oram pointed out that by
late 1917 there was much evidence of a deterioration of morale, but no corresponding
increase in death sentences.566 This is curious, but courts martial death sentences are but a
rough proxy of morale and discipline. Moreover, a ‘Report of British Armies in France,’
dated December of 1917, made explicit reference to the phenomenon of war weariness,
relatively rare for contemporary and especially official documents. The report concluded:
War-weariness there is, and an almost universal longing for peace but there is a
strong current of feeling that only one kind of peace is possible [a peace of
victory] and that the time is not yet come.567
This is important for a few reasons. First of all, the report made direct reference to the
phenomenon, acknowledging it as a widespread reality at the front. Second, it illustrates
that war weariness involved an end to the war, the ‘longing for peace,’ or at least an end
to an individual’s participation in the war. The men were fed up and frustrated with the
slow progress of the war; the next step was to take action to remedy or address this
situation. And finally, the report recognised that war weariness did not necessarily
preclude soldiers from pressing on in combat, especially at this juncture of the war when
the desire for victory and defeat of the enemy trumped the desire for an exit from the war.
In this sense it might be said that at this point the British Army exhibited signs of
individual war weariness, but had not progressed toward collective war weariness.
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The strength, will, and commitment of soldiers could be destroyed suddenly, such
as by undergoing heavy, prolonged shelling or by a bloody battle, like the Somme.568
More problematically, however, was that one could also be worn down in a cumulative
process after facing many stressful events and situations. As one historian put it, a
soldier’s will “is gradually used up by monotony, by exposure, by the loss of the support
of stauncher spirits on whom he has come to depend, by physical exhaustion, by a wrong
attitude to danger, to casualties, to war, to death itself.”569 There were both external
factors in the erosion of will and strength, such as exposure and heavy casualties, but also
internal, more human factors.
This wearing out of individuals was a problem faced by all armies undertaking
sustained combat operations. Some military authorities believed that an army’s
recruitment and training systems could watch for predisposition, or identify those most
liable to break down. Major-General F.M. Richardson argued that even veterans and
volunteers committed to the cause, and with good service records could erode to the point
of military ineffectiveness. These “seasoned solders, often an NCO, who has sustained
others, perhaps through several campaigns, but at the cost of drawing too heavily on his
own reserves,” was liable to break down. He concluded that these soldiers are “just worn
out,”570 a probable reference to war weariness. And as individual and unchecked war
weariness entrenched itself in the British Army by the latter half of the war, the
conditions were appropriate for the progression into more general and collective war
weariness, which had a direct impact on military effectiveness. This could involve a
wider collapse of military units. When the Germans launched Operation Michael on 21
March 1918 in a bid to end the war, there was indeed evidence of collapse, at least in
some units. And after years of hard fighting, enormous casualties, and insufficient gains
on the battlefield, this type of collapse was all but inevitable; moreover, a “major crisis in
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morale,” like the French mutinies or the collapse of the British Fifth Army, “tended to
occur in all armies…between two and a half and three years after real entry into the
war,”571 suggesting a cumulative and long-term process after prolonged exposure to war
and combat. Furthermore, the loss of some unit COs, and the death of ten infantry
lieutenant-colonels at this battle suggested “a collapse of morale at the lower level or a
failure to provide support for higher authority,” both of which were present in the Fifth
Army.572 This was a collapse akin to those experienced by the French Army in the spring
of 1917 (during the mutinies), the Russian breakdown after the Kerensky offensive, and
Italian collapse after Caporetto. There were also both individual and collective aspects of
this disintegration, as “many of the units, worn down by the attrition battles of 1917,”
were in a poor state for effective defence, and individuals “may simply have passed
beyond the point of what was bearable by flesh and blood.”573
Collective war weariness, however, did manifest itself in the British Army by
1917-18.574 Inconclusive fighting, fear and discomfort, death and mutilation “had taken
its toll of even the stoutest constitutions,” and when enough individual soldiers suffered in
such a way, collective war weariness was but a small step away.575 This was marked by
“collective defiance” among certain units, which was a clear threat to legitimate military
authority, and was liable to spread to others. There was a mutiny at the base at Étaples
and other “unruly incidents” at British base camps in France, some soldiers established
councils (on soviet lines), and political subversion led to the collapse of the 16th Division,
which all “seemed symptomatic of a loss of élan and a will to win,”576 both hallmarks of
war weariness. The ultimate fear for British authorities, however, was likely that this
defiance, disgruntlement, and war weariness would lead to collective, organised, and
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violent rejection of the war.577 And though the authorities never had to deal with this
consequence, there is no doubt the British Army experienced a crisis in morale and
discipline, especially with the collapse of the Fifth Army during Operation Michael.
And yet the British Army did not totally collapse, and was able to recover from its
military reverses and problems during the spring and summer of 1918. Indeed, the British
Army, in tandem with its various Entente partners and associated powers, were able to
rebound in strength and cohesion to defeat the Germans in the field, despite the fact that
war weariness and logistics were a serious problem by the Hundred Days.578 In fact, some
historians have argued that not only did it rebound, but that its morale actually surged
with the victories of the final months. One asserted that “however war-weary British
troops were during the Hundred Days, they had a morale advantage which only grew with
every successful attack.”579 And yet, if morale did surge in the final months of the war, it
was because the urgency of the campaign, evidence of German decline, and the prospect
of military success and ultimate victory acted as powerful antidotes to the collective war
weariness.
For the German Army in the final years of the war the connections between the
home and battle fronts were a key feature in the development of war weariness.580 As
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some historians581 have pointed out, the problems facing the Germans on the battle front
might have been endured were it not for the simultaneous deterioration on the home front.
Soldiers were used to withstanding hardships in the service of their nation, but the
inability of the government to care for its citizens at home put in peril the very people
they were trying to protect. This connection between the home and battle fronts, and
especially between material realities and commitment to the war effort, was explored by
historian Holger Herwig. He noted that there was an increasingly evident connection
between “hunger and peace,” as “hunger was gnawing at the nation’s social fibre, that
war weariness had gripped large segments of the population” and that the uneven
distribution of food was made worse by inefficient central control.582 This state of affairs
thus compromised the ability to make war (on the home front), as well as prosecute the
war effort (on the battle front). The troops were thus exposed to the problems of the home
front, whether that be through leave, propaganda,583 rumour, or in the reality of daily
shortage at the front. In a sense, then, the problems on the home front both reflected, and
reinforced, the sense of war weariness on the battle front.
The reality of the situation at home undermined the ability and willingness of
German soldiers to endure in other ways as well. With the problems at home becoming
ever more evident to soldiers in the line, this served as a constant distraction.584 As the
Entente forces advanced and the food situation grew steadily worse in Germany, soldiers
at the front was given no peace of mind, no reassurance that all was well and his family
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was being adequately cared for. This is important for a few reasons. First of all, the
deterioration taking place could not be masked by propaganda or censorship efforts,
ensuring that soldiers became aware of the reality sooner or later. This could, amongst
other things, result in a decline in faith or trust in authorities. A regular soldier, for
instance, might start to question the government’s war aims, or the war itself, wondering
why he should continue to suffer and die to uphold a regime that lied (or at least misled),
could not care for its civilians, and was unable to exploit battlefield success and transform
them into peace or victory. Second, this awareness of the situation at home speaks to the
limits of blind loyalty and obedience. As knowledge of the reality of the problems of the
home front became more widespread, regular troops could no longer ignore the plight of
their family back home. If an individual determined that their current participation in the
war helped prolong the conflict, they might conclude that their removal from the war through the act of surrender or desertion - might hasten the end of the war and thus help
alleviate the problems at home. Third, the links between the home and battle fronts
emphasize the requirement of political and military authorities in wartime to ensure the
proper focus on both guns and butter. There was a need to guarantee sufficient production
of both military requirements and food and consumer goods for the home front.
A final lesson to be distilled from German Army war weariness was that the
morale and discipline problems in the final months were widespread, and not easily
resolved. More important, however, was the fact that these problems affected previously
loyal soldiers and effective units, suggesting that war weariness was a growing and
prevalent phenomenon after years of brutal warfare. All individuals had their breaking
point, and by the summer and autumn of 1918 many German soldiers had been pushed to,
if not beyond, this breaking point. And contrary to the views of some subsequent
commentators, these disciplinary problems such as desertion and other evasion strategies
affected more than just ‘bad apples’ and troublemakers. In the words of the Crown Prince
Wilhelm (the eldest son of the Kaiser and commander of German forces in the war), these
stragglers and those “sick and tired of the war” represented a growing proportion of the
German infantry. He wrote that these men
…scarcely made an effort to hide their disinclination to rejoin their units. Nor
were they all rascals; there was many a face there which showed that the nerves
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had given way, that energy was gone, that the primitive and unchecked impulse of
self-preservation had got the mastery over the recognition of the necessity for
holding out or resisting.585
It thus seems the Crown Prince was referring to both shell-shocked soldiers and warweary veterans. His comments also illustrate the importance of medical services;
individuals, worn down by the cumulative effect of combat and exposure to trauma,
needed to be monitored for signs of wear. The onset of individual, and then collective war
weariness, illustrates the need for effective and equitable rest and leave policies. Respite
for both individuals and military units acted as a mitigating factor for the worst and most
pernicious effects of war weariness. The inability to tackle this growing collective war
weariness, coupled with battlefield failures, ensured that it manifested itself in
increasingly disruptive acts of indiscipline, ultimately undermining Germany’s ability to
win the war.
A victorious army required the fortitude of its own personnel, and the endurance
of the home front and its civilian population. And the strength and ability to endure the
cumulative stresses and strains of war on the home front was indispensable for its army
fighting in close proximity to its parent society. Moreover, the onset of war weariness
could have real-world implications for both the soldier and the unit in which they served.
It could compromise combat units to the point of ineffectiveness, and even lead to
battlefield reverses or defeat. Certain ideas and attitudes, such as anti-war perspectives or
defeatism, could spread and have an effect out of all proportion to the actual numbers
involved. Ultimately, all major armies on the Western Front were experiencing collective
war weariness by 1917. But the Canadians were largely spared this at the time, in part
because they did not field a massive army in Europe until much later than the other
nations,586 and hence delayed their disintegration by over a year.
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Vimy Ridge in Context
The attacks on Vimy Ridge by Canadian and British forces were part of a much
larger campaign, the Battle of Arras. These attacks were also loosely coordinated with the
French Chemin des Dames offensive, which began 16 April. The new French
commander, General Robert Nivelle, “sought a major offensive in 1917 to pressure the
Germans on two fronts,” with the British attack in the north near Arras, and the French
attack between Reims and Soissons, along the Chemin des Dames ridge.587 The problems,
however, were manifest. The Germans had already withdrawn much of their forces
beyond the Hindenburg Line, and had solid defensive positions and undertaken thorough
preparations in the area of attack. The offensive “proved to be a disaster,” and Nivelle
was replaced by Pétain, “who inherited an army with a massive morale problem.”588
Other developments also had a direct impact on the war. The return of Vladimir
Ilyich Ulyanov (Lenin) to Russia ensured the fall of the Provisional government and the
nation’s exit from the war,589 and worker strikes and demonstrations in Germany
indicated the erosion of the pro-war consensus there.590 In both Germany and Russia these
events reflected and reinforced the destabilizing and war weary mood present there by the
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early months of 1917. War weariness could be detected in the Russian and German
armies by 1917 as well.591 And on 13 June, the first heavy bomber raid on London was
launched. This, along with the ongoing zeppelin raids, reinforced the sense of total war in
Britain and likely contributed to the developing war weariness on its home front. In this
total war, the interplay between the civilian home front and the battle front(s) were
complex, and ultimately crucial to the outcome of the war. Both home and battle fronts
needed to maintain coherence, and be resilient in the face of strains associated with the
war effort. These events reinforced the sense of despondency found in both soldiers and
civilians of the major European armies by 1917, after having endured the stresses of war
from the beginning (August of 1914).
The high casualty rate suffered in active operations and trench warfare, and the
heavy casualties experienced by the major combatants on the Western Front also illustrate
the stresses and strains placed on individuals during war, and during combat more
specifically. But it also highlights the cumulative nature of war weariness and a loss in
collective morale. Heavy casualties had a multi-faceted impact: the loss of friends and
comrades hurt individuals, whereas the loss of leaders and important team-members
compromised the cohesion and military effectiveness of units. These losses also
undermined the power of the armed forces more generally, as morale and enlistment were
negatively affected by news of military disasters, units destroyed, and the death and
suffering of soldiers. And finally, the entire nation itself could be undermined by heavy
losses and consistent casualties, especially if civilians and workers came to question
whether it was all worth it. And 1917 was a bloody year indeed. The British on the
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Western Front suffered 120,070 casualties in April 1917; 76,040 in May; 75,123 in June;
84,695 in July; and 81,080 in August of 1917. This combined for a total of 437,008
casualties over this five-month period.592 The numbers for the French and Germans in this
period illustrate that high casualty rates plagued all major combatant armies on the
Western Front, regardless of offensive or defensive posture at any particular time.593 The
total strength of the Corps in this period also fluctuated, based largely on casualties, but
also on transfers and other administrative changes. The total strength of the Canadian
Corps at the end of each month reflects the offensive and defensive actions that affected
the casualties and thus overall strength of the Corps in that particular month.594 One
reality of the war was that understrength units tended to take heavier casualties than fullstrength ones, even if objectives were seized and held.

Training and Preparations for Vimy Ridge and Affiliated
Operations
Training and preparation for major offensives in the First World War did not
always pay off for the attacking forces. The power of the defensive, and the sheer number
of variables ensured complexity, confusion, and that things did not always go according
to plan. The weather could turn, supplies could fail to arrive, weapons systems could
become inoperable, and thousands of other variables could directly affect the outcome of
the battle, for good or ill. Much in war cannot be controlled, no plan ever survives contact
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with the enemy, and war is necessarily the realm of uncertainty.595 Nevertheless realistic,
thorough, and extensive training and preparations could certainly improve the chances of
success, as well as provide the attacking troops, especially ‘green’ ones, with an
understanding of what might be expected regarding the mechanics of combat and the
dynamics of human beings under hostile fire. And though no training course or teaching
syllabus could adequately prepare for the horror of the modern battlefield, work on tactics
and technology could be useful. These preparations inform our discussion of war
weariness in two related, yet seemingly contradictory ways. On the one hand, the
thorough preparations prior to the offensive contributed to the fatigue suffered by troops
undertaking these operations, encouraging the onset of war weariness at a local and
individual level. On the other hand, these preparations helped mitigate the worst
manifestations of war weariness and prevented its transformation into a more collective or
general expression. It must be emphasised that these preparations were not about
combatting war weariness – they were about increasing the chances of success and
ensuring victory. But they did have a direct, positive impact on the soldiers, which helped
with the embryonic war weariness.
As the section on the disciplinary and legal aspects of Canadian Corps made clear,
much training and preparation for combat was based on the “immediate and implicit
obedience to orders,”596 both in and out of action, on the parade ground and in the midst
of combat. This was designed to increase the likelihood that when soldiers were in
combat they would remember their training and follow orders without hesitation, not
allowing their biological fight or flight response to override their duty; the entire notion of
military obedience depended on it. Aside from instilling basic discipline, there was
specialist and tactical training in the lead-up to Vimy. The Corps Commander in this
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period, Julian Byng, ordered that units slated to take part in the upcoming attack were to
be relieved in the line prior to operations, to ensure adequate training and preparation. For
units still in the line, they were to take over frontage similar to that of the Vimy sector,
and “partially trained” officers and ORs were to receive a minimum of three weeks
additional training prior to the offensive.597 This individual training sought to instill in the
officers and men the confidence and skills required to succeed in combat.
This supplemental training included both individual and unit preparation for the
coming attack. Training schedules were organised at the divisional, brigade, battalion,
and down to the company and platoon level weeks and even months in advance. The CO
of the 1st Canadian Infantry Brigade (CIB), for example, wrote that after he assumed
command in February 1917, preparations for the attack on Vimy had already begun. The
Brigade was holding trenches to the left of the Ridge (with Brigade HQ at Aix Noulette),
and “during the month of March the Brigade was withdrawn for training in anticipation of
the attack”598 on Vimy. Moving units to the sector during the planning phases was also
important, as it allowed the different branches and services to acclimate to the region and
its various features. Aerial photos needed to be taken, barrage maps drawn up,
ammunition and supplies stockpiled, and the location of RAPs and headquarters
determined. All of these preparations took time, but were crucial. Infantry had to work in
harmony with the other infantry units, especially those on the flanks and who would leapfrog them in the attack; the infantry would also have to coordinate their attacks with
artillery, engineers, CAMC,599 and other services. Only through this thorough planning
and cooperation could an operation of this magnitude hope to succeed against a wellentrenched enemy dominating the high ground.
As attack doctrine, tactics, and technology evolved throughout the war, there was
an increasing emphasis upon all-arms cooperation, and the coordination of the different
branches of the armed forces. This allowed the Entente to play to their strengths, and
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dated 7 June 1918.
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ensured that each service would complement the others and contribute positively to the
overall goal of the operation. This developing attack doctrine and the competent use of
technology were important to the ultimate success at Vimy Ridge.600 And yet, despite all
the efforts at all-arms cooperation and use of all means at one’s disposal to increase
firepower, the First World War remained a largely infantry-artillery conflict. Field and
siege artillery, howitzers, and mortars accounted for the vast majority of casualties during
the war,601 despite the popular notions of the war as one of MGs, gas, tanks, and aircraft.
In a sense, then, the success of Vimy was based not so much on mastery of all-arms
cooperation, but on proficiency in artillery and infantry cooperation. For the Battle of
Arras, and Vimy in particular, there was an increased emphasis upon counter-battery and
suppressive fire.602 The former was designed to locate the presence of enemy artillery
batteries, and then systematically destroy them prior to or during the attack itself.603
Suppressive fire, on the other hand, was predicated on the idea of neutralizing the enemy
by forcing him to take cover during bombardments. An enemy taking cover in trenches,
or finding safety and refuge in deep bunkers/tunnels, was hindered in his ability to
operate MGs and defensive positions promptly. The outstanding work of the artillery (and
gas services) contributed positively to the ability of the infantry to seize their objectives,
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and ultimately to the success attained at Vimy. And after the Ridge was seized, the
artillery and gas services then turned their attention on German reinforcements and
counterattack staging areas as well as on enemy communications systems, to great effect.
The training of the Corps was but one aspect of the thorough preparations that took place
prior to the Vimy attack. As with any large operation, preparations were of a myriad sort,
covering medical, administrative, personnel, intelligence, and other aspects of a major
attack involving thousands of soldiers. For the Vimy operation, an extensive set of
tunnels604 was dug to shelter troops and provide jumping-off points for the infantry in
closer proximity to the enemy lines. Moreover, equipment had to be accumulated, orders
issued, ammunition stockpiled, and the launching of artillery and gas to wear down the
German defenders before the troops even went over the top.
An important aspect of preparation was ensuring that soldiers going in were wellprepared, and units well-trained and at or near full strength. The Canadian staff, infantry
and other units involved had roughly three full months to prepare for this operation.605
Some units had more time than others, but the experience of the 11th CIB seems typical.
For this unit, preparations for Vimy began in February, and “continued without
interruption”606 right up until the attack itself. This is also compared favourably to the
amount of time afforded Canadians for future operations, such as in later 1917 and into
1918. Sometimes the staff had only a few weeks to prepare complex operations, and at
times during the final months of the war they were only given a few days; this put added
stress on those forced to carry out these complex and dangerous operations. For the 2nd
Battalion, the months prior to Vimy were used to gain and acclimate reinforcements for
the unit, and there was a period of “comparative inactivity” to get the battalion up to
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strength and provide rest.607 This final point was crucial, as infantry units up to strength
generally took fewer casualties than worn, depleted, or understrength units. For the
PPCLI, this meant the promotion of officers through the ranks to compensate for
casualties, and the return of wounded men to the unit.608 Returning soldiers to the unit
from hospital or convalescent camp, provided they were able to carry on, was perhaps
preferable to incorporating entirely new troops into the group.
Plans for Vimy also included the preparation of defensive features, jumping-off
points, artillery battery platforms, and communications. And though Canadian troops
entering the sector were taking over from British troops, and before them French forces,
there was much work to be done for a large set-piece attack. Infantry of the 16th Battalion,
for example, contributed to large working parties prior to the offensive,609 ensuring that
there were sufficient personnel to construct important positions and physical structures
required for an attack of this nature. When units entered the frontline trenches or came to
a new section of the line for the first time, there was often much to be done to improve the
positions. Units engaged in working parties, digging new trenches, repairing older
sections of the line,610 and generally shoring up the positions in front of Vimy. Even when
the PPCLI were out of the line, its members took part in working parties. There was much
to be done in terms of labour and construction, and little was left to chance. Much labour
was conducted under the supervision of units of engineers. The engineering corps made
use of additional labour in the form of infantry working parties, pioneers, as well as their
own Labour Corps units. One important task was the establishment of adequate sources of
water and distribution channels611 for the troops and draught animals taking part in the
assault. Without sufficient water, any sustained effort would quickly break down, and
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good sources of water were important for both the health and morale of the troops.612 In
addition, there was also an emphasis upon communications613 networks, the ability of
different groups to send messages to one another, and the movement of supplies and other
important material across space. The labour and working parties were involved in burying
cables, and ensuring alternative means of communication such as visual, wireless sets,
pigeons, and preparing for runners and dispatch riders.614
Communications were crucial during all phases of the Battle of Vimy Ridge, from
preparation and planning through to the consolidation and mopping-up operations. One
key element of any battle plan was the artillery preparation – the development of fireplans and timetables; the working out of which field and siege guns, mortars, and
howitzers would fire and when, the different types of ammunition employed; the
identification and elimination of enemy batteries (counterbattery fire), with the assistance
of the RFC;615 and plans for wire-cutting,616 destructive, neutralizing, and creeping
barrages to assist the advance. Communications were crucial to the preparatory
bombardment phase,617 as forward artillery observers needed to be in direct contact with
the batteries they were directing fire for. Delayed information in the form of handwritten
notes might be hours out of date, and thus erroneous. Moreover, efforts were made to
prevent the Germans from having a clear picture of the developments and preparations on
the Allied side of the line. To this end, patrols and outposts were established to thwart
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enemy efforts to ascertain assembly locations, to discourage German working parties, as
well as to allow for the artillery observers to be as far forward as possible. 618
The artillery plan for Vimy, furthermore, was designed to protect the element of
surprise. To this end, the preparatory artillery and MG barrage would not increase prior to
zero hour and the launching of the infantry attack proper.619 In the past, an increase in fire
had alerted the Germans that an attack was imminent, and the planners at Vimy wanted to
avoid tipping the enemy off.620 The successful artillery plan was also predicated on the
notion of near-perfect timing; the guns would have to fire according to a carefully
calculated timetable, and the infantry would have to advance in synchronicity with the
creeping barrage and its various ‘lifts.’621 The plan also relied on the stockpiling of
supplies and ammunition for months prior to April 1917, and sought to degrade German
morale622 and defensive capabilities over time. It also needed to protect the infantry in its
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attack, and to work in conjunction with MGs, tanks, aircraft,623 gas, and smoke.624 After
the identification of German artillery batteries, Allied guns were concentrated, there was a
preparatory bombardment of several days, attempts to cut wire, and the effective use of
gas and artillery killed enemy horses and forced German commanders to move their
reserves back.625 This artillery and gas bombardment also wore down the health and
morale of the German troops forced to endure these attacks. As a communique of 18
April 1917 by the Corps General Staff attested, German POWs captured at Vimy reported
a “great falling off in the morale of the 1st Guard Reserve Division.” There were,
moreover, references to a ‘laxity of discipline’ in the German forces.626
Raids and patrols launched prior Vimy also served an important role in the
preparation phase, for a few reasons. First of all, these patrols and especially raids
allowed for the acquisition of knowledge unattainable in other ways. Observation from
the air was limited, and inclement weather could ground aircraft and stymie aerial
observation efforts.627 Ground-based patrols, however, could monitor German activity,
making note of enemy movements, defensive positions, and barbed wire.628 When the
PPCLI moved into the sector they almost immediately undertook aggressive patrols and
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trench raiding; good intelligence on enemy defences would be crucial for the upcoming
attack.629 The regimental historians of the 2nd and 16th Canadian Battalions also recalled
sorties and raids launched in the weeks leading up to Vimy.630 Second, aside from
knowledge gained from observation, patrols and raids were to capture German POWs to
gain important intelligence which could assist in the forthcoming assault. Prisoners might,
for instance, be persuaded to divulge important information to their captors related to
potential artillery targets, such as communication trenches, company and battalion
headquarters, assembly and rest areas.631 Moreover, prisoners might contain written
intelligence or documents that could be useful to Allied staffs and intelligence officers.
And losing soldiers to enemy raids might undermine the morale of defending troops still
in the line. Third, these raids and patrols were useful in testing German defensive
capabilities, the strength of their positions, and the response time of local units to threats
on their front.
And finally, raids allowed for lessons and refinements to new tactical ideas and
methods of organisation. An officer of the 31st Battalion wrote in his memoir that tactical
organisational changes in this period included the incorporation of “so-called specialists”
such as machine gunners and rifle grenadiers into infantry platoons;632 they would no
longer remain a wholly separate branch of service. The idea was to make use of fire and
movement tactics, to bring as much firepower to bear on the enemy without sacrificing
the power of manoeuvre and flexibility. These new organisational principles of the
platoon were designed to allow for the close cooperation between riflemen, Lewis
gunners, bombers, and rifle grenadiers.633 The different arms and services would work in
conjunction with one another, seeking to achieve common goals with complementary
technology and tactics.
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In addition to organisational, tactical, and technological changes, preparations
took other forms as well. In order to increase the chances of battlefield success and to
give participating troops as much information as possible about the terrain and landscape,
scale models were built. Captain Walter Moorhouse of the 4th Canadian Mounted Rifles
(CMRs) remembered that in preparation for Vimy, plaster models of the battlefield were
constructed, and every officer and OR studied them.634 In addition, soldiers were guided
over taped courses in which routes and pathways were outlined on terrain similar to that
of the upcoming attack.635 One regimental historian described this battle practice as
“arduous training” for the Vimy operation, which also included thorough explanations as
to what was expected of each unit and individual. Just as important events require
practices and controlled run-throughs, members of the PPCLI remembered that
reconnaissance, training, and “meticulous rehearsal”636 contributed materially to the
success at Vimy. And though it was risky to do so, maps of the sector with unit
dispositions, tentative objectives, and other important features, as well as aerial photos,
were distributed to the lower echelons of the military hierarchy by mid-February.637 This
allowed even more time for the dissemination of important information and the proper
preparation and planning of the complex operation that was the attack on Vimy Ridge.
The preparations went beyond the material, however. For any large-scale military
operation, it was important for the troops to have the right frame of mind going into
action, and to believe that their participation would positively contribute to objectives. To
this end, the leadership had a duty to impress upon all ranks the reality of the situation,
and be honest about what they would encounter, without intimidating them. In a sense,
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the psychological preparation was as important as the material preparation.638 This
psychological preparation oftentimes took the form of expressions of confidence in the
soldiers and their ability to overcome the obstacles in their way. Prior to the attack the
GOC 6th Brigade visited each of his Battalions (the 28th, 29th, and 31st) for some final
words of encouragement and reassurance.639 This personal, paternalistic touch was
intended to be inspiring and comforting for the troops preparing for the assault. And the
men were also given a hot meal and some rest leading up to the attack, which helped as
well. In this type of preparation, the role of chaplains and padres was indispensable.
Captain Frank Buck of the Canadian Chaplain Service, for instance, recalled prayers and
hymns prior to the attack acting as a sort of spiritual and psychological preparation,
steeling the men for the coming storm.640 Conversely, however, too much reflection or
rumination prior to a large-scale attack could also be detrimental. One veteran recalled
that before Vimy he and nearly everyone else were “mainly thinking of whether I might
be killed or wounded,”641 which could be demoralizing at the worst possible moment.
Ideally, the high command and officer corps would seek to inculcate a positive attitude
amongst the troops, and a “spirit of confident expectation” during preparation.642 The
soldiers needed confidence in the attack plan, their leaders, the system of resupply and
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medical evacuation, in their weapons, and, ultimately, in themselves and their ability to
seize the objectives.
The final aspect of preparation was the stockpiling of supplies, and the
distribution of equipment to those taking part in the assault.643 The accumulation of
important equipment and supplies needed for a set-piece attack, on a fortified position
like Vimy, began months in advance. The CASC and infantry quartermasters worked in
conjunction with their British counterparts to ensure that supplies were ordered,
transportation arranged, and the paperwork was in order. Planners and staff had to ensure
adequate supplies of ammunition (in dumps), water, and military stores, and for the
establishment of supply refilling points.644 Plans and routes for bringing forward supplies
during the attack were also arranged, and an emphasis placed on ensuring that extra
rations were provided for the troops.645 A dearth of supplies, food, or clean water could
undermine even the strongest and most steadfast of soldiers, imperilling an otherwise
well-prepared attack.
And immediately before the attack was launched on the morning of 9 April, troops
awaiting the order to proceed were busy with last-minute checks and preparations, and
were to assemble in silence. For the infantry, rifles would have to be cleaned and loaded,
with plenty of ammunition and bayonets fixed for the attack.646 The thorough training,
preparations, and instructions issued for the attack on Vimy illustrate the enormous
complexity of the operation.647 These preparations also served to help stave off the worst
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Beadon, The Royal Army Service Corps, 132.
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assaulting troops, tram lines, dumps, water, medical aspects, battle stops, POWs, salvage and burials, craters in no
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effects of embryonic war weariness. Plans and thorough preparations were not designed
to counter war weariness, but they had this unintended effect nonetheless.648

The Battle of Vimy Ridge, Arras, and other Operations
Justification for the attack on Vimy began with the fact that it was an important
position, in an important sector of the Western Front. The Ridge was key to the French
city of Arras and the Douai Plain, and it was also an important feature of German
defensive positions in the theatre.649 After all the preparations, training, and preparatory
bombardment, the attack on Vimy Ridge itself began at 5:30 am on the morning of 9
April, 1917. In terms of dispositions, the Canadian infantry were organised with the 4th
Canadian Division on the left (or northwest end) of the line, and then the 3rd and 2nd
Divisions in the centre of the line, and the 1st Canadian Division on the right (or
southeast) end of the line.650 Nearby British units also helped bolster the attack and
provided much needed support and firepower.651 But the main attack would be in the
centre of the line, conducted by the Canadians there.
To better understand these dispositions, the 1st Division will be examined more
closely. At Vimy, the 1st Division attacked with infantry of two leading brigades, the 3rd
and 2nd Brigades, with the 1st in reserve. Each brigade in turn attacked with three
battalions, and one in reserve. The 2nd CIB sent in the 5th, 7th, and 10th Battalions, with the
8th in reserve, and the 3rd Brigade slated the 15th, 14th, and 16th Battalions for the attack,
with the 13th in reserve. After the first objective was reached (the ‘Black Line’), the next
two objectives were assaulted with the reserve brigade, the 1st Brigade, and the 1st, 3rd,

man’s land, reliefs, transport, maps, preparation and planning of RAPs, collecting posts, advanced and main dressing
stations, evacuation routes and plans, battle and straggler stops, and collecting posts. LAC, RG 9 III C1, Volume 3845,
Folder 49, File 4, Vimy Operations, “X” Division (1 st Canadian), ‘Instructions.’
648 In the final months of the war, on the other hand, the Canadians would not be granted such comprehensive
preparations, which contributed the onset and development of war weariness in that period.
649 Prior to April 1917 there were three separate battles for the Ridge, and in 1915 the French alone lost nearly 150,000
troops in a “futile attempt to retake” the position. Neiberg, Fighting the Great War, 234-237. British C-in-C Douglas
Haig also saw value in Vimy, and assigned the job of seizing the Ridge to Henry Horne’s First British Army.
650 Cook, Shock Troops, 95.
651 To the south/right of the Canadians were the British 51st, 34th, 9th, and 4th Divisions, just north of the town of Arras
itself. Other British units were placed south and east of the Arras railway, and south of the Scarpe River. For a map and
unit dispositions at Vimy Ridge and Arras, see Neiberg, Military Atlas of World War I, 83.

190

and 4th Battalions.652 By the end of the attack, all brigades of the 1st Division were used in
the assault and consolidation operations at Vimy, though not all at once or at the same
time. In another area, a brigade of the 2nd Division used its battalions a bit differently,
with two sent into the attack, one kept in reserve, and one battalion used as “moppers up”
and for carrying parties.653
The story of the successful Canadian attack on Vimy Ridge has been told by
different historians, participants and others in the years since April 1917,654 so there is
little sense in covering this well-trod ground here. To better understand the problems
facing the troops at Vimy, however, a closer examination of some difficult aspects will be
examined. Two geographic and defensive features of the Ridge, ‘The Pimple’ and Hill
145, provided the attackers with extra problems beyond those typical of First World War
attacks. These positions directly contributed to the problematic assaults on soldier morale,
combat motivation, and endurance, but thorough training, all-arms cooperation, and
effective supply management helped overcome these issues. These two positions offered
the stoutest German resistance to the attack, and both had the potential to compromise the
attack at Vimy. These positions were ultimately overcome, but at high cost.
At the most northerly section of the Canadian line, the terrain rose even above the
heights of Vimy to a geographic point colloquially referred to as ‘The Pimple.’ This was
in the sector tasked to the 4th Division, and lay between Souchez and Givenchy-enGohelle. This position dominated the surrounding areas, and with excellent vantage
points the German defenders could rain fire down on the attackers. The 4th Division,
moreover, was the most recent addition to the Corps, and though was composed of some
seasoned units, many of its troops were experiencing sustained combat for the first time.
To make matters worse, the weather of early 1917 was not conducive to complicated
military operations. The cloud cover and precipitation meant little to no visibility for

LAC, RG 9 III C1, Volume 3844, Folder 48, File 7, ‘Vimy Scheme;’ Nicholson, Canadian Expeditionary Force,
544-545, Appendix “B;” Chartrand, The Canadian Corps in World War I, 14 and Cook, Shock Troops, 95.
653 LAC, RG 9 III C1, Volume 3844, Folder 48, File 7, ‘Vimy Scheme.’
654 Some good works on Vimy Ridge, and with various perspectives, include: Ted Barris, Victory at Vimy: Canada
Comes of Age April 9-12, 1917 (Toronto: Thomas Allen Publishers, 2008); Tim Cook, Vimy: The Battle and the Legend
(Toronto: Allen Lane Canada, 2017) and Geoff Hayes et al., eds., Vimy Ridge: A Canadian Reassessment (Waterloo:
Wilfrid Laurier University Press, 2007).
652

191

aircraft, and there were accounts of both rain and snow during the attack itself.655 A
General Staff officer stated that the “very trying weather has imposed a severe strain on
our troops and has considerably retarded progress.”656 Military combat is stressful and
difficult in the most ideal conditions, and inclement weather only added to the complexity
and strain of this operation. The 10th CIB was originally tasked with seizing ‘The
Pimple,’ but the 11th Brigade was forced to take over from the 10th. One problem was that
the soldiers of the 11th were less familiar with this sector of the line, and because of the
urgency of the situation and the need for haste – the position was causing problems for
units in other parts of the line and impeding progress – there were no written orders
issued, only verbal.657 Nevertheless, despite difficulties and the intense strain imposed on
the troops of multiple brigades, the position was seized and consolidated.
The feature of the Ridge known as Hill 145 also imposed substantial strain on the
attacking troops. Units of the 11th CIB were tasked with the capture of Hill 145, as well as
the “labyrinth of trenches” which converged on this position. In the end the CO of the 11th
Brigade, Brigadier-General Victor Odlum, was forced to use all the battalions under his
command in the attack. Ultimately the 102nd Battalion “went forward with characteristic
dash”658 and eventually seized the position. This comment on the attitude and morale of
the soldiers, of their ‘characteristic dash,’ allows us to consider the veracity of comments
on combat.659 The men of the 102nd Battalion were often, if not always, flush with morale
and enthusiastic to go forward in battle or ‘over the top.’ The truth, however, is often
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more nuanced and complicated than that; in operations at Vimy, for instance, the
casualties, problems, and frustration related to the inability to seize objectives may have
undermined the morale and compromised the attitude of attacking troops, forced to fight
an intense battle, in a disadvantageous position, especially after the benefit of surprise
was lost. However in this situation, the men of the 102nd Battalion did indeed seize ‘The
Pimple,’ though it took longer than anticipated660 and may not have reflected the rosy
interpretation offered by Odlum and his staff. This also highlights the importance of
hindsight and historical analysis, especially in fleshing out ideas and trends that may not
have been discernable to contemporary participants and observers. War weariness is
certainly one of those ideas that was not fully understood at the time, but historians can
now gain a better understanding of it with careful research and reflection.
The capture of the strong defensive positions on Vimy did not herald the end of
the battle for Canadian and British troops involved, however. After these objectives were
seized, the participants were required to ensure the safety of the battlefield by ‘mopping
up’ the area and neutralising any remaining pockets of resistance. Prisoners were
collected, defensive positions cleared, and the area made safe for additional troops. This
phase was also responsible for clearing out dangerous areas, and dealing with hazardous
devices left behind by withdrawing German forces. The 2nd CIB, for instance, established
a special party of infantry to investigate former German dugouts, especially for delayedaction mines and booby traps.661 To make use of these shelters and defensive positions,
they would have to be made safe for occupation first. Moreover as German doctrine
dictated, immediate counterattacks were launched against the recently-lost positions at
Vimy, and the Canadians would have to fight off these responses as well. Much work,
however, needed to be done to prepare for these counterattacks. The capture of the Ridge
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was crucial to the overall operation, but the consolidation phase was just as, if not more,
important than the actual capture of the Ridge. Destroyed defensive positions would have
to be repaired, new trenches and communications networks established, fire-steps
reversed, and other activities designed to make the newly-won positions impervious or at
least defensible to countermeasures and attacks in the future. Units of the 1st Division
took part in consolidation, and beginning on 13 April sent patrols to extend the line and
gather intelligence. In addition, the units that had actually fought at Vimy were relieved in
the line and subsequently went into support and reserve.662 These exhausted soldiers
certainly deserved a rest and respite from combat, especially if war weariness was to be
checked. In this period immediately following the capture of Vimy one of the main goals
was to advance and consolidate the gains made at much bloody cost. This “skillful patrol”
fighting was important in this regard, as the Corps had to ensure hostile enemy units
could not exploit defensive weaknesses. Consolidation entailed digging new trenches,
repairing roads, bringing up guns, and advancing buried cable and communications.663
And as an integral aspect of First World War defenses, copious amounts of barbed wire664
were also positioned in front of the newly-capture Ridge.
As part of the larger Battle of Arras, the Corps assisted in further operations on the
flanks of Vimy and in other sectors. To help with these attacks, Canadians brought up
guns and stockpiled ammunition, contributed working parties, and even launched their
own attacks on the British flanks on 23 April, and then again on 28 April. During the
attack on 23 April,665 however, instead of facing a beaten and demoralized enemy, the
Canadians found themselves facing “determined resistance” by the German forces and
“severe fighting” ensued.666 This British attack made little headway against “stubborn
resistance,” and therefore the success of the Canadian units was “the more remarkable”
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because of this.667 Again on 28 April Canadians attacked and made an “important
advance…at light cost, across ground that presented great difficulties to the attacking
forces and corresponding advantages for the defence.” Local successes like this, in the
wake of a victory like Vimy, against heavy odds, and in contrast to other non-Canadian
units, served to reinforce the sense of Canadian difference, and ultimately, sense of
superiority. These successes also acted as a mitigating factor for the onset of war
weariness. If gains were made and tangible results achieved, and the thorough
preparations and training for attacks seemed to pay off, war weariness might be kept at
bay, at least for a time and provided rest followed these operations. In many ways the
Canadians were fortunate at Vimy, though this luck would not last.
There were, however, operational aspects that assaulted the morale and motivation
of the soldiers of the Corps, and thus contributed to war weariness. During the Canadian
attack on Fresnoy, for example, its seizure was short-lived. 668 Losing key positions,
especially in combination with the death and wounding of good and effective soldiers in
the capture of these positions, could be demoralizing, to say the least. In these situations,
the casualties suffered and stresses imposed on the surviving soldiers all seemed for
naught – this was the nature of indecisive fighting on the Western Front.669 Perhaps it is
not surprising that the battle around Fresnoy resulted in the loss of the position. A
Canadian Corps communique of 13 May 1917 made reference to “some of the bitterest
hand-to-hand fighting which has yet occurred.”670 This type of close-quarter fighting
whipped up the emotions of participants, and the sheer violence involved was not easy to
endure. Adrenaline and exhilaration only went so far in neutralising the negative effects
of violence and trauma. And even for veterans and those who had previously been in
combat, this was a new type of fighting, which required them to kill, neutralize, or
capture their opponents at close-range. Moreover, the use of close-range weapons had a
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deeper impact on attacking (and defending) troops; the need to drive the bayonet home, to
shoot someone point blank, or to throw Mills bombs a few metres ensured this was a
more intimate way of killing.671 Looking into the eyes of your victim and witnessing their
last breath was certainly traumatic, regardless of the loyalty, experience, comradeship,
sense of duty, training, or any other factor associated with army service. Sooner or later
soldiers broke down as a result. And the greater the distance between attacker and victim,
the easier it was to kill – and to live with this killing. Range provided both emotional
(psychological) and empathic distance,672 and served as a kind of protection against
trauma and negative consequences. Moreover, soldiers in battle can intellectually
understand horror and what they are participating in, but emotionally, the distance
allowed them to deny this to a great extent. At closer ranges, initial feelings of euphoria
for having done your duty and contributed to group objectives quickly give way to guilt
and remorse; having to kill at close-range served to increase the trauma on the attacking
soldier. And in closer and especially hand-to-hand combat range, it was difficult to deny
the humanity of your enemy, greatly increasing the chances of psychological trauma. 673
Though this psychological trauma is more often associated with shell shock and war
neurosis, it was also a contributing factor toward war weariness, as soldiers who had not
yet broken down from combat sought to avoid this all but inevitable fate. The health and
well-being of the troops had a direct impact on their ability and willingness to endure.
In the end, German counterattacks eventually seized Fresnoy and drove the British
and Canadians from the position. Some German POWs informed their captors that they
were to re-capture lost positions at Fresnoy “at all costs, and were warned that they would
not be relived until they had done so.” This acted as a powerful motivator, and it is thus
no wonder that the Germans were desperate and determined to effect an Allied
withdrawal. The possession of the trenches and positions went back and forth, but in the
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end the Germans retained control of Fresnoy. Both sides suffered heavy casualties, but
the Germans also seemed “greatly demoralized”674 by the end of the battle. This is
important, as in an attritional and largely static struggle that was the war on the Western
Front, even victorious and successful armies could become demoralized and have war
weariness affect them, both individually and collectively.
Following the capture of Vimy and the First Battle of the Scarpe, the Corps was
involved in operations designed to assist British attacks elsewhere, but more importantly
to support French attacks to the southeast, and keep the pressure on the enemy.675 The 1st
Canadian Division, for example, participated in operations at Willerval-Arleux and at
Fresnoy to straighten out the line after Vimy and to consolidate the area.676 Trenches and
lines needed were extended, flanks secured, and defensible positions attained. The actions
and operations of the 1st CIB are instructive. The Brigade went into the Vimy attack on 9
April, and after its successful operation was relieved in the line. Following this, it was
ordered “back into the line again on several tours of duty,” and were at the Battle of
Fresnoy. After this attack there followed a period of “ordinary trench duty interspersed
with periods of relief and rest”677 until 15 August, when the attack on Hill 70 began. The
Army attempted to minimise casualties and maintain the striking power and cohesion of
units by rotating infantry units between the front line, support, and reserve trenches. The
10th Brigade was in the line for eight days, reserve for eight days, in support for eight
days, and then back into the line for another tour of over a week.678 Yet even while units
were in ‘ordinary trench duty’ or in supposedly ‘quiet’ sectors, they were still exposed to
the strains of war, and continued to suffer daily casualties.679 This the army called
‘wastage,’ and it served to slowly bleed units to death. This also negatively impacted the
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health and morale of individuals – there never seemed to be any genuine respite from the
mortal dangers of duty,680 and even careful and veteran soldiers could be killed by a stray
shell or sniper, gas or air attack. The allotment of replacements certainly helped units
sustain losses, but these troops were inexperienced, and perhaps unfamiliar with the
traditions of the battalion. In the ranks new troops could compromise unit cohesion, and
comradeship might also suffer with the loss of trusted leaders and friends; some veterans
and ‘old hands’ simply did not trust new troops.681 Moreover, by 1917 enlistment
numbers were drying up, to say nothing of the declining medical standards for infantry
combat service.682
And yet despite manpower issues the Corps did not remain idle during the spring
and summer of 1917. Aside from the operations at Vimy, the Corps began preparations
for Lens and Hill 70. The Battle of Hill 70, 15-25 August,683 saw a preparatory phase
between May and July, whereby the Corps began to threaten the German hold on the city
of Lens. By June 1917, Canadian infantry were trying to maintain continuous and
harassing pressure on the enemy, to prevent the enemy from thinning his line in this
sector and sending reserves elsewhere; coordinated attacks with other forces were
designed to put maximum pressure on the enemy. The Canadians were tightening their
grip on Lens, or “rather the shattered remains of the city,” after all the destruction caused
by artillery.684 Other preparations included attacks southwest and west of the city (for
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instance on 28 June), followed by a “period of comparative quiet” used for the
improvement of roads and communications, patrols, and the use of MGs and snipers in an
effort to “let slip no opportunity to inflict casualties on the enemy.”685 The nature of
trench warfare and adherence to an attritional strategy ensured this. The lull in the
fighting and preparatory phase was also used for counter-battery work, wire-cutting, and
destructive artillery and gas bombardments on dumps, roads, and communications
infrastructure. This thorough preparation suggested that the Corps and its staff officers
had learned a great deal about how to deal with German defences, especially from the
recent Vimy operations.
Despite the dissemination of lessons in both a top-down and bottom-up manner,
the fight for Hill 70 was a bloody,686 confused, and exhausting affair. There were, of
course, many difficulties encountered by attacking troops. In July and especially August
1917, the infantry and other arms of the 6th Brigade were involved in “very desperate
fighting”687 both prior to, and during, the attack on Hill 70. Some of its constituent units
were able to seize their objectives, despite heavy casualties which, over time, eroded their
fighting power. In an attack on a single strongpoint, for example, three officers were
killed trying to take the position.688 The loss of leaders and officers was especially
difficult for small units to deal with; they provided leadership and a sense of continuity,
helped maintain unit traditions, and were the linchpin of cohesion. Soldiers often looked
up to these leaders, and sought guidance and strength from them. The loss of a
particularly well-liked officer or charismatic personality might very well demoralize an
infantry unit when it needed strength and solidarity the most.689 The lack of sufficient
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communications networks, moreover, meant that it was exceedingly difficult to bring up
the required amount of ammunition and supplies to sustain the attack.
Perhaps it was some consolation for the attacking troops that “very heavy
casualties were inflicted on the enemy during this fighting.”690 It was perceived that this
would compensate for the heavy casualties and loss of trusted leaders and close friends in
combat. This comment also indicates that even successful and ultimately victorious
armies suffered appalling loss of life and other casualties, and the enormous difficulties in
overcoming entrenched and prepared defences, especially against a committed and alert
enemy. Moreover, after the war of movement and flanking attacks broke down in 1914,
many attacks were designed to inflict casualties on the enemy, as well as erode their will
to fight, even if they were officially designated as breakthrough attacks. By late 1917,
though the Germans had suffered hundreds of thousands of casualties already, the Entente
was still a long way from defeating the enemy’s armies in the field. The question seemed
to be, which side would break first?
The operations of the 27th Battalion also illustrate the enormous difficulties facing
attacking troops, and the stresses of combat which, over time, eroded the will to fight and
endure. The 27th suffered casualties691 even before the assault began, which reduced the
numbers in each attacking party, and therefore diminished the striking power of these
units. Early casualties also had the potential to negatively affect the morale of the troops;
things seemed to be going awry even before the operation began, and this was not a good
portent for things to come. The 27th had a tough task, and faced German defences and
concrete-fortified houses, stoutly defended by MGs, snipers, and bombing parties. Hard
fighting and heavy casualties were the order of the day, and due to persistent and strong
counterattacks, the 27th Battalion was ultimately forced to withdraw from Cinnabar
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Trench.692 And in an attempt to put a positive spin on the operation, the author of the
Battalion Narrative wrote that
The spirit and drive shown by all ranks during this operation which included the
hardest and most difficult fighting ever encountered by this Battalion was
conclusive evidence of the confidence of the men in themselves and their
Officers…[and that] the cheerfulness and untiring energy
of carrying parties allowed the infantry to carry on and repel counterattacks.693 This
confidence in the officers, however, might very well have been shaken after realising that
not all objectives could be seized, and certain attacks ended in failure. When the 27th was
withdrawn from the line it had suffered 306 casualties, including fourteen officers, a
substantial percentage of the nominal strength of a battalion. The unit also captured fortyone German POWs.694 But were these captures worth the hundreds of casualties to
experienced veterans? This is a question that many soldiers perhaps dwelled on as the
units were withdrawn to lick their wounds, and begin the process of reconstituting the
battalion from the left out of battle (LOB) group. And despite the manpower advantage of
the Entente, an attritional strategy would need to inflict far more casualties on the
Germans than suffered by the attacking forces.695 This could not be guaranteed.
In tandem with the problems of the 27th, each company of the 28th Battalion had
its own difficulties in the attack on Hill 70. These problems, both acute and cumulative,
contributed to the onset of war weariness as well. “A” Company, for instance, discovered
that mist, dust, and smoke obscured the battlefield and increased the problems for
attacking troops.696 The training, preparation, and issuance of maps prior to the attack
were for naught if the troops were unable to see the terrain they were to be attacking over.
Shell craters, outdated maps, and the destruction of landmarks all exacerbated this
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problem. These environmental factors also contributed to the enormous confusion on the
battlefield, and this and uncertainty could be a disorienting and stressful. This, combined
with a sense of helplessness to remedy the situation, were contributing factors toward war
weariness. For “B” Company of the 28th Battalion, the problems facing the unit served to
compromise the ability –and perhaps willingness – of the troops to seize objectives. On
this front, for instance, the lack of Mills bombs, small arms ammunition, and equipment
imperilled the advance. And as the author of one report stated clearly, “…a retirement
took place shortly afterwards, owing to failure of supplies.” This comment directly linked
the failure of logistics with failure on the battlefield, but this is also perhaps reductive, as
combat is complex and can be explained by both material and non-material factors.
Nevertheless, not having the proper equipment and in sufficient numbers could drive a
wedge between the planners of attacks, and those actually ordered to carry them out.
Supply problems were often well beyond the control of staff officers and COs, but for the
‘poor bloody infantry’ at the sharp end, this might be tantamount to abandonment. Heavy
casualties and a lack of sufficient reinforcements could also stymie even the best planned
attack. Ultimately, “B” Company was forced to retire and fall back, which no doubt
undermined the already-fragile morale of the unit.
The experiences of “C” Company were much the same: heavy casualties and
sustained attacks on morale, combat motivation, and endurance. “C” Company was
ordered to move up and join another unit to assist in tackling a particularly difficult
position, but there was a failure in seizing objectives. Owing to heavy shelling and the
absence of cover, one officer explained that “it was unnecessary at that time to take the
risk of moving the company through very heavy shell fire,”697 despite orders to do so.
This suggests that the problems encountered on the battlefield and the mortal danger
facing the troops induced a sense of reluctance or unwillingness to follow orders to the
letter. This may have been prudent, but the high command expected bold attacks and the
adherence to plans, regardless of the circumstances on the ground. This also suggested a
measure of agency exercised by officers, who decided that the casualties in this case were
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simply not worth the potential gains. The Lens and Hill 70 operations were designed to
keep pressure on the Germans, inflict casualties on them, and ultimately seize all
objectives in the assault. Attacks on 21 August were planned to seize, consolidate, and
hold Green Crassier and the city of Lens. The problem, however, was that the German
defenders were keen on withstanding the attacks and were not giving up Lens.
Counterattacks, moreover, forced the retirement of some Canadian units. And yet,
“nevertheless, our progress continues and at very moderate cost to ourselves the circle is
being drawn ever tighter and tighter around Lens,” though the understanding of ‘very
moderate cost’ might have been disputed by the infantry actually take part in these costly
attacks. In the week of 23-30 August, for instance, the Corps suffered a total of 2,962
casualties, including 68 officers and 2,894 ORs.698 These casualties, with little
appreciable gain, could reinforce a sense of futility amongst the infantry, no doubt
contributing to the war weariness simmering below the surface of both individuals and
military units.
In addition to the Battles of Vimy Ridge and Hill 70/Lens undertaken by the
Corps between April and August of 1917, Canadian units were also engaged in smallerscale raids, patrols, and other actions. These sought to prepare troops for further combat,
to test out new weapons systems, equipment, and refine tactics; to assess and gain
intelligence on German defences; to support flanking units; and to keep the enemy off
balance and inflict casualties at every opportunity. The problem, of course, was that these
raids and patrols, even if executed perfectly, still resulted in casualties for the Canadians.
Between 28 June and 5 July, for example, consolidation operations, raids, patrols,
sniping, and trench mortar (TM) activity resulted in forty-two officer and 1,029 OR
casualties.699 Raids on German lines opposite the Canadian front were also designed to
inculcate the offensive spirit, and to contribute positively to the development of morale.
Successful raids could reinforce a sense of confidence, assurance, and trust, whereas
unsuccessful raids could result in a sense of demoralization; the key question being, were
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these casualties worth it? Could the High Command justify these casualties for limited
military intelligence and intangible gains on a relatively narrow front? On the evening of
22/23 July, a large raid was launched with the intention of destroying enemy dugouts and
capturing POWs. A report on the raid indicated that “our casualties were very light, being
little greater than the number of prisoners captured,” suggesting that on balance, these
casualties were in fact worthwhile. But unless the experience or intelligence gained
proved decisive, there was no way these types of costly attacks could win the war by
themselves. This kind of cold calculation contributed to the onset of war weariness after
years of attritional warfare on the Western Front.
If raids were specially designed actions launched through No Man’s Land and into
the enemy lines with clear purposes and objectives, patrols were more regular operations
to monitor and, if need be, defend certain sections of the front. In this period, there were
times when patrols were sent out every night, to observe No Man’s Land and to gather
intelligence.700 In the immediate aftermath of Vimy, these patrols were often launched in
conjunction with consolidation operations, designed to ensure German counterattacks and
hostile parties were kept at bay. Patrols also served to keep the enemy off-balance on the
opposite side of the line. By May 1917 these patrols were having a direct impact on
enemy activity. Patrols in connection to the Arleux and Fresnoy operations, for example,
fired on German communications networks in the evening, and kept a close watch on
enemy guns and defensive positions. And patrols launched into No Man’s Land itself
meant that “the enemy appeared to be very nervous and threw several bombs in front of
his own posts.”701 Because of these aggressive patrols, Canadian outposts could be
pushed forward and connected up with trenches to assist with the defence of the area.
The experience of the 11th CIB in June 1917 illustrates the daily stresses facing
the soldiers. In order to maintain the initiative and prevent German working parties from
operating too freely, units were involved daily in artillery, TM, and MG firing. And
though there is some historical evidence suggesting daily firing took on a more theatrical,
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unenthusiastic, or perfunctory element in certain sectors and at certain times,702 these
hostile actions did contribute to frequent casualties and daily wastage. Snipers and
distance weapons, such as rifle-grenades, ensured that there was little respite for a soldier
during a tour in the frontline trenches, even during supposedly quiet periods or in quiet
sectors of the line.703 Boredom and monotony, routine and work, combined with periods
of mortal danger and trauma, characterised soldier life during trench warfare. And it was
this lack of genuine rest for regular soldiers that wore so heavily on the troops, and
contributed to cumulative stress experienced by all combatants during the war. These
patrols had multiple functions; they could act in both a reconnaissance and offensive role.
Patrols were at times tasked, for example, with preparing and cutting gaps in enemy wire,
often a prelude to subsequent infantry operations. The 11th Brigade in the week ending 13
June conducted several raids and minor operations, capturing seventy-two German POWs
and three MGs, and destroying other enemy mortars and MGs in the process. In addition,
Canadian raiding parties also bombed or destroyed sixty enemy dugouts, at times with
mobile charges. Perhaps most important, according to German prisoners artillery and
attacks cost them roughly 460 casualties in this period alone.704 Inflicting casualties and
destroying weapons and equipment were worthwhile, but whether the information gained
during these raids was worth the casualties is another question. This reality also reflected
the limitations of Entente strategy, the problems inherent in trench warfare, the power of
the defensive, and the fighting prowess of the German Army.
Both acute and cumulative stresses contributed to the onset and eventual
manifestation of war weariness on both an individual and collective level, especially after
years of attritional and indecisive warfare. Private Fraser of the 31st Battalion, for
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instance, wrote on 9 April that the experience at Vimy “proved a trying ordeal and called
up all the stamina and perseverance which the body and mind could muster.”705 Infantry
unit accounts, in the form of war diaries and regimental histories, provide the historian
with an understanding of how these groups experienced and overcame the difficulties
inherent in combat. Colonel Murray, for instance, outlined some of the difficulties facing
the soldiers of the 2nd Battalion, which, over time, undermined the morale, endurance,
combat motivation, and military effectiveness of this unit. These included the fact that
heavy casualties and unforeseen difficulties could slow, and even imperil, the entire
attack. Problems during the advance led to much anxiety on the part of the troops, and the
loss of respected leaders and officers could be devastating and demoralizing.706 When
certain individuals came to be seen as symbols of the regimental spirit, these losses
weighed particularly on others in the battalion. Murray admitted regarding the loss of one
particularly well-liked member of the team that “the unit without ‘Tubbie’ was simply not
the 2nd Battalion.”707 These losses undermined unit cohesion, contributed to
demoralisation, and put added pressure on the surviving soldiers of the unit. And over
time, the loss of these indispensable personnel was a direct contributing factor to the
onset of war weariness.
The experience of the PPCLI also provides some insight into the difficulties
inherent in offensive operations at this phase of the war. Even with thorough preparation
and precautions taken to preserve secrecy, there were concerns that the Germans would
be prepared for the attacking troops. There were worries that “leakage of information
through documents falling into the hands of the enemy or of enemy agents”708 would
reveal the objectives, start date, or plans of attack. In the end, these concerns were largely
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groundless, but highlight the difficulties in organising such a complex operation, the
uncertainties, and the myriad things that could go wrong right up until zero hour, to say
nothing of the problems that could materialise after the attack was launched.
Nevertheless, according to unit records the assault was “a model of” a limited set-piece
attack, that succeeded due to thorough reconnaissance, training, and “meticulous
rehearsal.” Moreover, the new flexibility in tactics, and especially fire and movement,709
allowed the companies of the PPCLI to carry the day. And yet, even in a successful attack
like that of the Princess Pats, casualties were inevitable. By the time the unit was
withdrawn it had suffered 222 casualties, including eighty-three killed. In 1917 each
battalion had a nominal strength of roughly 1,000 troops, and thus hundreds of casualties
could have an impact on the performance of the unit out of all proportion to the actual
numbers involved. The casualty list for 9/10 April, inclusive, also listed those who had
died of wounds (six), were missing (ten), or other types of casualties. One wounded
soldier George Blanchard, for example, was listed as invalided with Shell Shock.710 This
suggests that even in successful attacks, war neuroses and psychiatric casualties still
occurred. Sometimes these numbers were staggering, too. The cumulative pressure placed
on individuals, and the strains imposed on military units over time led to the onset of war
weariness, but also the more debilitating and potentially permanent shell shock.
The experiences of the 2nd and 3rd Brigades also provide some insight into the
reality of fighting at Vimy. The 3rd Brigade, in the southern section of the line and
attacking toward Thélus, suffered casualties to its infantry battalions (14th–16th
Battalions), MG companies, and TM batteries.711 Despite these and the difficulties
encountered, the Brigade and its constituent units were able to seize their objectives of the
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Black and Red Lines,712 and capture enemy positions and dugouts. Upon the capture of
these, however, some important observations were made. The enemy, apparently, had
been “well fed and cared for, and seem[ed] to have plenty of food, cigars, trench
cookers,”713 and other conveniences that made life in the trenches more bearable. This
was often also in stark contrast to British trenches and positions. Reports and assurances
that the Germans were suffering badly and lacking in morale might have been
exaggerated, or perhaps applied only to certain units or sections of the line. Many of the
dugouts captured, moreover, were of excellent design and construction, were deep and
formidable; some even had electric lights. But instead of negatively affecting morale,
reports indicated that “our troops are in good spirits…the enthusiasm and vim displayed
were excellent.”714 Understandably, this ‘enthusiasm’ might not have persisted had the
attack not been so successful and swift. In later phases of the war heavy casualties and
hard fighting, with little attendant military success, acted as a demoralizing force, greatly
contributing to war weariness and other problems. In the words of the historian of the 16th
Battalion, the Germans made use of clever tactics, such as the use of gas and artillery
barrages and feigned counterattacks, to undermine the ability and willingness of the
attackers to attain their objectives. These tactics and ruses were a “policy well calculated
to undermine fighting morale.” And yet, despite the opposition and heavy casualties
suffered by the 16th, this “neither impaired Battalion morale nor depressed the spirits of
the men;” the soldiers of the unit came to believe that “the gains [at Vimy] had justified
the losses.”715 But dissent, doubt, war weariness, and worse set in when this rational
calculus failed and the soldiers started to believe that the fighting and heavy casualties
were no longer worth it. At this point, the military reliability of both individual soldiers
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and entire units were called into question. Though there is a lack of substantive evidence
for this at Vimy, it played a larger role in later operations, most notably at Third Ypres
and during the final campaign of the war.
The 2nd Brigade at Vimy also suffered heavy casualties, but had some
compensation as well. The Brigade suffered heavy casualties in only two days (8-10
April) of initial fighting, with 1,109 casualties. And after the early fighting at the Ridge,
the Brigade suffered a further 218 casualties in the operations between 10 and 20 April.
Brigade strength was 3,479 soldiers during the attack, meaning roughly 38% of the unit
became a casualty.716 These losses were (apparently) compensated for, however, by the
captures made, including 779 POWs seized, five guns, eighteen MGs, nine minenwerfers,
975 rifles, three listening sets, and copious amounts of engineering material seized by the
infantry. These were also tangible reminders of a successful attack, which could act as a
buoy to morale and help offset the worst aspects of war weariness. It was compensating
aspects, the capture of war material and objectives, and the casualties and suffering
inflicted on the enemy,717 which made these attacks seem worthwhile to the troops
actually tasked with the assaults. The loss of a trusted leader or comrade could perhaps be
made more bearable, and provided some consolation, if the objectives were seized and the
enemy undermined, physically or psychologically. Of course everyone dealt with grief
differently, but it would have been even worse if these casualties were suffered without
the military successes. But did these local actions really contribute to the ultimate defeat
of the German Army? Both propaganda and military policy dictated that Allied soldiers
were informed the enemy was suffering from the attritional nature of the fighting, and the
German Army itself was certainly but a pale shadow of its former strength. The Allied
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adoption of a defensive posture after the Third Battle of Ypres and the failure of the
Cambrai attack718 belied this view, however, and the fact that the German Army made
substantial progress during the Kaiserschlacht offensives made it difficult to reconcile the
reality on the ground with the rhetoric of the High Command. Losing a close friend to
‘the cause’ was difficult; but losing a close friend to a cause that seemed no nearer
completion was more difficult still.719
The death of a close friend, or the heavy casualties suffered during operations as a
matter of course, might have elicited a different response from soldiers, however. Instead
of demoralization in response to the death of comrades, one might also respond in a way
that actually encouraged subsequent aggressive behaviour. Numerous firsthand accounts
included remarks related to wrath, and the desire to avenge fallen mates as a motivating
factor and an impetus for behaviour.720 This phenomenon was noted by serving infantry,
as well as in other services and amongst other combat arms, such as the air services.721
Though blood-lust and a desire for revenge might act as a motivator factor for
combatants, it could also compromise decision-making and encourage reckless,
undisciplined, even suicidal behaviour. This behaviour might very well reflect the warweary soldier who was pushed to the edge, and decided that these actions were preferable
to a continued existence under the status quo.722 Boldness, aggression, and confidence can
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certainly be positive attributes in combat, but reckless or individualist behaviour could
also undermine leadership and discipline, and increase the danger on comrades through
irresponsible behaviour that invited retaliation or put them in vulnerable positions.
Furthermore, some were able to endure the stresses and strains of combat by coming to
enjoy the action.723
Compensating factors, and other aspects that helped stave off the worst effects of
war weariness, were also found at Vimy. Seeing the attack pay off, and the important
gains made, acted partially as a mitigating force which allowed infantry to endure the
conditions of frontline service a little longer.724 By the end of the Battle, the Corps had
consolidated their gains and sent out patrols, defeated at least three German
counterattacks, captured three battalion COs, fifteen other officers, and over 2,000 NCOs
and other ranks.725 The reality of the victory and the physical spoils of war726 perhaps
compensated for the heavy casualties sustained by the attacking troops. Despite the
bloodshed, the attack was a great success and proved that limited, set-piece attacks could
prevail over an entrenched enemy.

Medical Aspects and Arrangements, April-August 1917
The medical realities of the war, including the near-constant threats to life and
limb, created numerous problems for armies. The true nature of warfare and especially
combat on the Western Front, and how the authorities dealt with certain types of
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casualties had the potential to undermine morale, reinforce war weariness, and directly
contribute to the onset of shell shock. The medical arrangements and evacuation
procedures during operations, however, helped with the morale of the troops taking part;
knowing that one would be cared for if wounded acted as a bolstering force, instilling a
sense of confidence in the medical system.727 And prompt medical attention could reduce
suffering and save lives.728 For COs, manpower was paramount, ensuring that military
medicine was an integral aspect of any battle plan. The reality of combat in this period,
including shell shock, can help inform our discussion of war weariness because, although
they were different phenomena, they existed on a continuum and there was some overlap
between these two ways of understanding the impact of combat on the individual. Much
historical writing on shell shock has focussed on its contributing factors, responses, and
ways to mitigate this problem, and these same approaches can also be applied to war
weariness.
One of the first tasks prior to any battle or impending operation was to select sites
for collection and medical treatment areas. During the preparation phase sites would be
identified, and equipment brought up. RAPs, advanced and dressing stations, divisional
walking wounded collecting stations, and rest stations would all have to be established
and stocked, in addition to larger facilities such as casualty clearing stations, medical
stores depots, and laboratories all before evacuations reached the railhead behind the
lines. Ambulance trains would take more seriously wounded to more permanent facilities
behind the line, and eventually to base hospitals on the coast. For the Arleux operations,
casualties were funnelled to the advanced and main dressing stations, and separated by
mobility and severity, with walking wounded sent to one location, and stretcher cases to
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A prompt and efficient military medical system helped with the morale of troops, especially when it came to
treatment of comrades. As one historian argued, the “abandonment of comrades does not enhance dedication to duty.”
Robert J.T. Joy, “Medicine, Military,” in Reader’s Companion to Military History ed. by Cowley and Parker, 294.
728 LAC, RG 9 III C3, Volume 4125, Folder 5, File 4, ‘Report on Operations,’ Hill 70, 29 th Battalion.
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another.729 Evacuation routes730 were also identified in an attempt to avoid confusion and
congestion after zero hour. Following the launch of the Vimy attack, further aid posts
were established and dressing stations moved up as the infantry attacked, advanced, and
ultimately consolidated positions.731 The medical system needed to have flexibility and
mobility, and respond to changes in the wider military situation.
Thorough preparations, however, could not prevent problems arising, or the overwork and exhaustion of medical personnel. In anticipation of a battle leave and passes
were often cancelled, ensuring that with staff ‘all hands were on deck’ for the upcoming
arrack.732 During large operations, which resulted in heavier casualties concentrated into a
relatively short time period, medical personnel became fatigued both physically and
mentally, both of which could negatively affect performance and decision-making. And
with the stakes so high, a bad decision or mistake could be fatal. Officers of the 2nd
Division wrote that at Vimy this frontline and “forward work is the most trying from a
physical as well as mental standpoint,”733 which could compromise the health and
effectiveness of individuals, and affect the wider military situation. A battalion lacking in
healthy soldiers might very well fail to take its objectives, even if it had the willingness to
do so. And even after a unit seized its objectives and was looking forward to relief,
further medical duties remained. For the 1st Division at Vimy, it was clear that:
If a unit is relieved [in the line], it is still responsible for the evacuation of its own
wounded from the Front Line and should leave behind the Regimental Medical
Officer and sufficient personnel to carry out this duty.734
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Stretcher cases were collected at the ADS, placed on trench tramways, and conveyed to the main dressing station
further to the rear. Walking wounded cases, after being processed, were collected and then “conveyed in horsed
[ambulance] wagons” to the main dressing station. LAC, RG 9 III C1, Volume 3847, Folder 54, File 5, ArleuxAcheville Operation, ‘Miscellaneous.’ For information on the use of trench tramways, see Steven Trent Smith, “Narrow
Path to Victory,” Military History, 34, 2 (July 2017): 54-61.
730 LAC, RG 9 III C1, Volume 3845, Folder 49, File 4, Vimy Operations, “X” Division (1 st Canadians), ‘Instructions.’
731 Murray, History of the 2nd Canadian Battalion, 164 and LAC, RG 9 III D1, Volume 4715, Folder 107, File 20, No.
10 Canadian Field Ambulance, Historical Records, Synopsis of Operations, Mt. Sorrell to Mons.
732 This was to ensure that all medical personnel were available for duty, as well as to deal with any emergencies and
expected heavy casualties. LAC, RG 9 III C10, Volume 4562, Folder 3, File 2, No. 3 Canadian Stationary Hospital,
‘Daily Orders No. 98,’ 9 April 1917.
733 See a report on the role of chaplains and padres in medical treatment and evacuation work. LAC, RG 9 III C15,
Volume 4664, ‘Summary of Work done by Chaplains During Battle of Vimy Ridge: Second Canadian Division.’
734 LAC, RG 9 III C1, Volume 3845, Folder 49, File 4, Vimy Operations, X Division (1 st Canadian). And furthermore
“there was but little time for rest in the strenuous few weeks after April 9th” 1917. See LAC, RG 9 III D1, Volume
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Stretcher bearers and other staff were often assisted by infantry, especially during
engagements with heavy casualties. This ensured that even after the achievement of
objectives, there was much work to be done which only increased the strain placed on
infantry and others. This reality also reinforced the sense that there really was no genuine
respite on the Western Front, for soldiers to recuperate properly.
Yet despite thorough planning of medical arrangements and evacuation,
confusion, and congestion did occur at Vimy. Partly, this was inevitable, considering the
casualties required to overcome entrenched defensive positions, and the power of the
defensive, generally, in the war.735 Another problem was that during the preparatory
bombardment as well as during the attack itself, destruction compromised the ability of
medical units to reach and evacuate casualties. Roads became churned up by bombs and
shell explosions, and shell fire itself compounded the problems facing medical
workers.736 With the sheer number of personnel in the immediate vicinity, coupled with
the destruction of roadways and other communications, congestion and delays were the
result. This increased the time required to evacuate casualties, but also ensured difficultly
in bringing up rations and medical supplies through mud, shell holes, and “crowded and
fiercely shelled roads.”737 Without sufficient supplies, the potential for casualties only
increased. Congestion was partly overcome by the use of light railways and trench
tramways, but, according to the records of the No. 10 Canadian Field Ambulance, “it was
extremely hard to avoid congestion of wounded.”738 Any added problems to the medical
services could result in further casualties.

4715, Folder 107, File 20, No. 10 Canadian Field Ambulance, Historical Records, Synopsis of Operations, Mt. Sorrell
to Mons.
735 For tactics and technology to overcome defensive positions and attain success in the War, see Rawling, Surviving
Trench Warfare: Technology and the Canadian Corps, 1914-1918; Griffith, Battle Tactics of the Western Front: The
British Army’s Art of Attack 1916-18; Griffith, ed., British Fighting Methods in the Great War; Gudmundsson,
Stormtroop Tactics: Innovation in the German Army; Bidwell and Graham, Fire-Power: The British Army Weapons
and Theories of War 1904-1945; Travers, How the War Was Won: Factors that Led to Victory in World War One; and
Clarke, World War I Battlefield Artillery Tactics.
736 LAC, RG 9 III D1, Volume 4714, Folder 106, File 4, ‘Operations Vimy Ridge: Report on the Collection and
Evacuation of Wounded,’ 9 April 1917.
737 LAC, RG 9 III D1, Volume 4715, Folder 107, File 20, No. 10 Canadian Field Ambulance, Historical Records,
‘Synopsis of Operations, Mt. Sorrell to Mons.’
738 Armies more generally also made use of light railways and tramways. Ibid; Brown, British Logistics on the Western
Front, 162; Smith, “Narrow Path to Victory,” and Hesler, ed., Interlude: 1916-1919, 25.
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Medical personnel at Vimy also faced other issues based on the reality of combat.
For example, medical personnel lacked adequate stretcher bearers. This was compounded
by the fact that German POWs used as bearers only made one-way trips;739 at the end of
their journey they were escorted to POW cages (or concentration areas). This shortage of
medical personnel during attack and follow-up operations ensured that those MOs,
orderlies, medics, and bearers who did remain were driven to the point of exhaustion.
Some medical units worked for twenty-four hours straight, before given a “short and
[much] needed rest.”740 Exhaustion can lead to mistakes, and mistakes on the operating
table could be fatal. Amongst medical personnel, the work of a stretcher bearer was
exhausting,741 dangerous, and often thankless. Carrying a soldier over shell holes and
through mud was fatiguing at the best of times, but under shell fire this job was even
more dangerous and arduous. Medical personnel, moreover, as non-combatants were
unable to retaliate against the enemy, the source of the mortal danger they confronted.742
The ability to shoot back at the enemy served as “a psychological release if nothing else,”
and bearers were also unable to duck for cover when under fire.743 The inability to

LAC, RG 9 III D1, Volume 4714, Folder 106, File 4, ‘Operations Vimy Ridge: Report on the Collection and
Evacuation of Wounded,’ 9 April 1917.
740 LAC, RG 9 III D1, Volume 4715, Folder 107, File 20, No. 10 Canadian Field Ambulance, Historical Records,
‘Synopsis of Operations, Mt. Sorrell to Mons.’ The medical facilities themselves also became overwhelmed with
wounded, especially during sustained and intense operations. At Vimy, accommodation at the main dressing station was
“taxed to the utmost,” which caused further delays and problems.
741 Ibid. At Vimy Ridge even with six-man stretcher bearer teams “frequent reliefs were necessary.”
742 This was also the case with other non-combatants, such as those from the Service Corps. The historian of the British
RASC wrote of the “specially strenuous nature” on logistics, transport, and supply troops. Moreover, “the fact that there
could be no respite made that task a heavy mental and bodily strain – mental, because whatever punishment it received
from the enemy it had no opportunity to retaliate, but had to deliver its loads to the troops – physical, because of the
long hours over difficult ground added to what every mounted man knows, that with animals to be cared for, the work is
but half done when he re-enters his billet or bivouac.” Colonel R.H. Beadon, The Royal Army Service Corps: A History
of Transport and Supply in the British Army – Volume II (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1931), 129. And
some argued that non-combatants suffered the highest level of psychological breakdown, because they had little outlet
for aggressive behaviour. The opportunity to strike back and kill the enemy was linked to better ability in “coping with
fear on the battlefield.” Striking back also allowed for the release of adrenalin and glycogen. And if a “combatant could
not act, he was more susceptible to fear,” and thus breakdown over time. Joanna Bourke, Fear: A Cultural History
(Emeryville: Shoemaker & Hoard, 2006), 206-210. And the ASC personnel were “within a few hundred yards of enemy
trenches,” but generally these units “do not have the same chances of military ‘glamour’ on the battlefields, theirs is a
story of endurance and determination.” Graeme Crew, The Royal Army Service Corps (London: Leo Cooper Ltd.,
1970), 129.
743 When carrying a stretcher and under fire these bearers “literally had to stand and take it.” Gaudet, ed., The World
War I Journal and Poems of Pte. Frank Walker, xv.
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properly strike back, or the feelings of helplessness which this engendered, were
important contributing factors to the onset of war weariness.
The physical features of this sector of the front, the weather, and even the time of
day also become problematic for medical personnel at Vimy. For No. 10 Canadian Field
Ambulance, inclement weather, “the ancient enemy,” compounded the problems they
faced. Mud and precipitation hindered evacuation efforts, and medical personnel found
themselves battling enemy fire, as well as snow and rain.744 The arrival of night brought
its own problems,745 and the danger of slipping into the mud or drowning in water-filled
shell holes was a real one. The medical arrangements for the Battle of Hill 70 in August
1917 seemed to adopt some of the lessons learned during Vimy. The medical actions and
responses at Hill 70 were largely successful, in part because of the rapid and effective
evacuation and treatment of casualties. Adaptations for weather, sufficient transport
facilities, and “the provision of alternate routes” in the face of congestion all contributed
to successful evacuation.746 The medical arrangements for this battle, however, were
unable to anticipate and accommodate the presence of civilians in the area.747 These
civilians and refugees not only complicated the operations of the Corps, but by requiring
varying degrees of medical attention and supplies they also contributed to the over-taxing
of medical resources and personnel.
The casualties inflicted on the attacking forces had a direct impact on the military
units taking part in these operations through the summer of 1917. Some officers, such as
chaplains, were given respite and rest periods after sustained operations. In one case, G.H.
Andrews was returned to Canada “in accordance with the policy…for recuperation after
an arduous term of service.”748 Of course chaplains and other non-combatants were often
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LAC, RG 9 III D1, Volume 4715, Folder 107, File 20, No. 10 Canadian Field Ambulance, Historical Records,
‘Synopsis of Operations, Mt. Sorrell to Mons.’ During the Battle of Hill 70, moreover, reports indicated that poor
weather usually added extra “hardship” on the troops and medical personnel. LAC, RG 9 III D1, Volume 4714, Folder
106, File 5, ‘Report on the Evacuation of Wounded in the Canadian Corps: Operations for the Capture of Hill 70.’
745 LAC, RG 9 III D1, Volume 4715, Folder 107, File 20, No. 10 Canadian Field Ambulance, Historical Records,
‘Synopsis of Operations, Mt. Sorrell to Mons.’
746 LAC, RG 9 III D1, Volume 4714, Folder 106, File 5, ‘Report on the Evacuation of Wounded in the Canadian Corps:
Operations for the Capture of Hill 70.’
747 Ibid.
748 LAC, RG 9 III C15, Volume 4615, C-A-7, Andrews, G.H., ‘Cablegram from the Overseas Minister to the Minister
of Militia and Defence, dated 23 April, 1917.’

216

granted special privileges or secured more leeway than regular infantryman, but the date
of this cablegram indicating this policy of recuperation was 23 April 1917, just weeks
after the capture of Vimy and its attendant arduous fighting. The loss of trusted officers
and support personnel was difficult for military units, but infantry battalions also had to
deal with the loss of their riflemen. For instance at Vimy, one Captain was wounded
(presumably prior to the assault), but “pluckily insisted on going in with his company for
the attack.”749 On the surface, this seemed like a laudable decision, but it may also have
caused some problems, too. His behaviour might also have acted as a deterrent on
subordinate troops’ decision to go sick or to seek medical attention for wounds or other
casualties.750 And finally, the captain’s decision to go forward with his men might also
have negatively affected his unit if his performance, decision-making, or stamina were
compromised. Weakened soldiers had their abilities undermined by medical problems,
and instead of rest and treatment, carrying on in the line could prolong or exacerbate
health issues.
Regardless of the medical arrangements and evacuation procedures in place, a
certain proportion of casualties had to be evacuated from the battle zone, sent back to
Britain,751 or even be invalided back to Canada. Those returned to Canada were the most
serious cases, deemed unable to return to the front for at least six months. Returning them
to Canada allowed for a longer respite back home, and helped ease the burden on medical
facilities and personnel in the UK. In July of 1917, for instance, H.M.H.S. Letitia
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LAC, RG 9 III D1, Volume 4688, Folder 42, File 20, 6th Canadian Infantry Brigade, April 1917, Unit Narrative.
There is evidence, for instance, of soldiers deciding to stay in the firing line despite the fact that they were wounded,
physically or otherwise, or other troops who sought to nurse a wound in secret lest they be deemed a coward,
malingerer, or seen as suffering a SIW. When it came to psychiatric casualties, the biggest concern was the chance for
relapse if a soldier stayed in the line beyond the breaking point. In one case, a shell shocked soldier was sent to the CCS
by his MO “after having requested to be allowed to carry on” at the front. This soldier was apparently ‘shaky,’ often a
clear indicator of advanced or acute shell shock. Less than a fortnight later (27 April to 5 May), however, he was back
at his unit, “but his M.O. would only allow him to carry on at the kitchens,” ensuring he was only on light duty behind
the lines. The MO knew that this soldier required respite, but also knew that the unit required all the soldiers it could
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one’). See also the legal and medical chapters above for more information on Blighty wounds.
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transported soldiers back to Canada suffering from hysteria, epilepsy, “marked
neurasthenia, and similar troubles” of this nature.752 Unlike physical wounds, however,
the treatment period for psychiatric casualties could be quite unpredictable. Some
required only a few days and removal from the front lines to recover their self-control and
equilibrium; other cases required weeks or months, whereas some individuals were
invalided for the balance of their lives. Others committed suicide,753 or self-medicated
with alcohol. In a report from Moore Barracks Canadian Hospital (Shorncliffe) the officer
in command lamented that “there are some cases suffering from mental disease who are
now invalided back to Canada and subsequently recover their mental balance.” He
continued, writing that “this recovery sometimes takes place within a short time,” and
thus recommended keeping these types of cases in hospital for a time and if they failed to
recover, they could then be returned to Canada “without the stigma of having been insane
attached to them.”754 As was the case with war weariness, at times these casualties only
needed rest, respite from service, and an understanding and responsive medical system.
During the operations at Vimy the No. 3 Canadian Stationary Hospital (in April 1917
alone) received 468 shell shock cases “when there was marked activity on that front.” The
average monthly total, however, was 335 cases per month,755 an increase of nearly 40%.
The casualties suffered at Vimy and other engagements between April and August
1917 illustrate that this loss of close comrades and well-liked leaders could be devastating
to the unit, whether that be the company, battalion, or even brigade. In less than a fortyeight hour period, for example, the 31st Battalion of Alberta suffered one officer and
fifteen ORs killed, as well as three officers and sixty-one other ranks wounded, and four
ORs missing in action (MIA).756 Depending on the severity of the wounded casualties,
some of these soldiers might very well return to their unit after a stay in hospital and

LAC, RG 9 III B2, Volume 3618, 25-13-7 to 25-13-10, ‘The O.C. Troops, H.M.H.S. “Letitia,”’ 25 July 1917.
See, for instance, Julian Humphries, “How were Suicide Cases dealt with in the Frontline Trenches during the First
World War?,” BBC History Magazine, Volume 15, No. 08 (August 2014): 97.
754 LAC, RG 9 III B2, Volume 3618, 25-13-7 to 25-13-10, ‘Moore Barracks Canadian Hospital Shorncliffe, 25 July
1917, Officer I/C Hospital to A.D.M.S. Canadians Folkestone.’
755 LAC, RG 9 III B2, Volume 3752, Folder 3-1-4-2, Neurology, War Neuroses, File ‘Treatment of Shell Shock Cases
at the Front.’
756 Chartrand, The Canadian Corps in World War I, 15 and Norris, The Memoir of Captain Harold W. McGill, 281.
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convalescent centre; the dead, and in all likelihood the missing, were lost to the Battalion
for good. And though replacements could help bring the unit back up to nominal
strength,757 the individuals lost could simply not be replaced. In wartime and other
traumatic situations, strong bonds can form between those forced to endure these
hardships. The loss of these trusted comrades could in turn be devastating for the
survivors in the event of heavy casualties. In addition, new soldiers sent to any unit would
perhaps lack the intimate knowledge of the history and traditions of the unit. It was this
regimental spirit and unit cohesion that created such a potent striking force in action.
Other units also experienced similar losses to that of the 31st Battalion at Vimy Ridge.758
By 1917, it was nearly impossible to reconcile these casualty rates with the pool of
reinforcements available – something would have to give.
Medical officer experiences provide insight into the different types of casualties
suffered, and their impact on both individuals and units. Exhaustion, both physical and
otherwise, for instance, could render soldiers militarily ineffective, even detrimental to
the goals of the group. As Captain Harold McGill, MO of the 31st Battalion explained, a
set of orders for 8 May 1917 for the battalion to move up into the line and begin
operations was cancelled. And in his view “this was fortunate, for the men were in no sort
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The problem, of course, was that by 1917 voluntary recruitment in Canada had all but dried up. The passing of the
MSA (conscription) helped fill the ranks again, but the training, experience, and dedication of these replacement
soldiers were called into question from the very beginning, perhaps unfairly. Many of these MSA soldiers served
admirably, but there likely remained a gulf between ‘green’ troops and the ‘old sweats.’ Will Bird, for example, did not
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himself and his comrades. Bird, Ghosts Have Warm Hands, 110.
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of physical condition to undertake further active operations without a rest.”759 McGill
here also touched on a point that was crucial, if controversial, during the dangerous and
often-monotonous experience that was life on the Western Front, namely, that a short rest
could act as a powerful rejuvenating force for the soldiers. This rest and respite helped
mitigate the worst effects of both war weariness and shell shock. Unfortunately, this vital
aspect of recovery and recuperation was often in short supply.
The nature of combat on the Western Front, however, ensured that despite rest
policies, war weariness and psychiatric casualties still occurred in alarming numbers.
These were based on active service conditions as well as the rigid nature of the army
system. And even the War Office acknowledged these casualties, stating in the context of
the classification system that some soldiers were discharged “owing to nervous
breakdown resulting from service in the present war,” and could be hired by companies at
home without fear of being called up for service.760 It was accepted that they would never
soldier again. A report on ‘Mental Cases’ in military hospitals also acknowledged that
soldiers could suffer “from a disability due to his being a soldier.”761 Moreover, a patient
report at Moore Barracks Canadian Hospital in July 1917 indicated that “there were no
symptoms of definite mental disease other than those of a hysterical nature, such as are
induced by the strain of service conditions acting on a youth.”762 This illustrates the belief
on the part of some authorities that certain types of soldiers had a predisposition763 to
breakdown, while still acknowledging these problems could be initiated or exacerbated by
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the ‘strain of service.’ And though these sorts of candid appraisals of the impact of
combat on the individual were relatively rare, by the end of the war the authorities were
unable to deny the very serious, and sometimes permanent, negative impact of war
service on these soldiers. This was evidenced, in part, by the post-war debate and
discourse that resulted in the British War Office Committee of Enquiry into Shell-Shock,
launched in 1922.764
The victories at Vimy Ridge and Hill 70 were certainly impressive, and tangible
gains were made against stubborn and entrenched opposition. Casualties were inflicted on
the enemy, and prisoners and war material were captured by the attacking troops. The
issue, however, was whether these losses were deemed worth the gains attained.765
Moreover, what constituted a successful offensive for the high command might have
looked very different for the soldiers at the sharp end. The statistics tabulated for
Canadian casualties in this period indicate that Vimy, especially, was a costly victory,
with 3,598 killed and 6,664 wounded, for a total of 10,262 casualties766 for this operation
alone. And in April of 1917 the Corps suffered 14,301 casualties in operations on the
Lens-Vimy front.767 In addition to the overall number of casualties suffered, the severity
of these casualties also set the Vimy battle apart. In battles and engagements of the First
World War, the ratio of walking wounded to stretcher-bearer casualties was generally 3:1.
But at Vimy, both groups were roughly equal;768 this was a bloody battle, with lots of
severely wounded, and military or territorial gains were attained at very high cost. The

764

At this the British government formally recognised shell shock as a condition of the war. Beckett, The Great War,
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key question was whether these gains, impressive though they were, were actually worth
the very heavy cost in lives lost, maimed, or psychologically destroyed. Some soldiers
certainly felt that the casualties and the loss of friends was worth it, and these sentiments
were often expressed by soldiers themselves, in letters home, for instance. And though
there are issues regarding self-censorship and the desire to paint a rosy picture for those
back home, these sentiments often came across as genuine, if naïve. James Jackson
Woods of the 3rd Entrenching Battalion, for example, wrote in a letter dated 15 February
1917, that
I tell you I miss Earl. It was hard to say good-bye. But I think that we will be able
to get to-gether again soon….But I know that we would rather be here and do our
bit and take what ever comes…[rather than have people tell] our parents that we
were afraid to [do] our duty. For what is worth living for is worth fighting for.769
The fact that Woods was not infantry, and the timing of the letter predated the large
battles of 1917, including Vimy and Passchendaele, might account for his continued
commitment to the cause and his sanguine attitude. Woods might also have just been a
generally cheery and optimistic person by disposition, or perhaps had yet to become
disillusioned as to the true nature of Western Front service. One can also read a sense of
commitment and stoicism in Woods: we will endure and do our duty, come what may.
Victor Wheeler of the 50th Battalion, though he never actually stated it was not worth it,
lamented the loss of his comrades and the negative effects it had on the survivors. Aside
from deaths reinforcing a sense of hatred and longing for revenge, the loss of a friend
meant “a close and valued companionship of more than two war-years had snapped, and
my throat was choked with sobs.” A comrade, having lost his brother, “wept bitterly, a
lament burning deep within him…there had been an inseparable bond between them”770
which could not be repaired or replaced. Any comment on the contribution this made to
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The spelling and other errors of this letter are kept just as they are, in order to preserve the authenticity of this
correspondence. Letter from Private J.J. Woods, to Mrs. Johns, from ‘Somewhere in France,’ dated 15 February 1917.
Found on the Canadian Letters and Images Project, http://www.canadianletters.ca/content/document-11028.
770 And after leaving the Vimy sector, Wheeler remarked that the men were “utterly fatigued but proud of a job well
done, sad at the loss of so many of our comrades but thankful for our own delivery.” Any comment on the contribution
this made to overall victory was noticeably absent, however. Wheeler, The 50th Battalion in No Man’s Land, 99-103.
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overall victory was noticeably absent, however. Grief might also conjure up certain
emotions and cloud rational thought.
The Corps General Staff, however, felt that the gains at Vimy were worth the cost.
A unit narrative of April 1917 indicated that at Vimy the casualties suffered were “not
disproportionate to the success achieved,” and since 9 April the Corps had captured some
4,500 German POWs.771 Other staff documents from later in April also conformed to this
view. In one, the author expressed that “our own losses were light in proportion to the
results achieved,” which included the capture of 1,000s of German POWs, including 87
officers, and 63 guns, 124 MGs, and 104 TMs.772 At Hill 70, one report indicated that the
results were worth the casualties sustained, and the losses were “light,” and “within
moderate bounds.” In exchange for these casualties, the divisions at Hill 70 had inflicted
heavy losses on the enemy, capturing 1,378 POWs, along with MGs and trench
mortars.773 And though the Germans had sustained heavy casualties, they had mandatory
military service in place, and a much larger manpower pool in which to draw from. The
Canadians, on the other hand, were already scraping the bottom of the barrel in terms of
volunteer infantry reinforcements, and could therefore not afford such costly casualties.
The British were also concerned with manpower problems by this phase of the war; the
balance of 1917 and 1918 would be trying times indeed.

Lessons Learned, Results, Conclusions, and Interpretations
The operations of the Corps between April and August 1917 illustrate the factors
that contributed to success on the battlefield, as well as those that compromised chances
for success, and ultimately, contributed to failure. The reality of failure and a sense of
futility could certainly encourage the onset of war weariness, though this reaction to
combat was not confined to unsuccessful armies and individuals. Conversely, war
weariness manifested itself in the Corps in the final months of the war when there were

LAC, RG 9 III D1, Volume 4677, Folder 7, File 4, April 1917, Canadian Corps (General Staff), ‘Unit Narrative.’
Ibid, ‘Communique’ 18 April 1917, report ‘The Capture of Vimy Ridge,’ and Intelligence Summaries, ‘Intelligence
Report,’ 27 April 1917.
773 LAC, RG 9 III D1, Volume 4677, Folder 8, File 2, August 1917, ‘Summary of Operations, including Hill 70, Report
on, and Summary of.’
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tangible markers of success. Though no two military engagements were the same, some
common elements can be distilled, especially as to factors contributing to the overall
success of operations. Discipline was one such factor that helped individuals overcome
difficulties,774 and acted as a form of control from without, ensuring that soldiers
remained obedient and did their duty. Discipline could be capricious, uneven, and did not
always work properly, but with a disciplinary system in place and every soldier doing his
part this paid dividends during the traumatic experience that was combat. Discipline
helped keep the troops in the line, despite powerful forces encouraging distance between
the individual and sources of trauma. The problem with the focus of the authorities on
discipline was that they often equated this with military effectiveness or battlefield
prowess, which was mistaken. One set of orders issues to the 2nd Canadian Division, for
instance, indicated that
a good fighting division is always a good division in camps and billets, and this is
shown by the clean turn-out of the individual soldier, the smart saluting, and the
general good behaviour, all of which are evidence of the pride that every man
takes in the good name of his division.775
However, just because a unit looked smart on parade and saluted superiors promptly, this
did not guarantee a good fighting unit in battle. Effectiveness in training and drill, and
good appearance on the parade ground did not necessarily translate into combat success.
Conversely, just because a unit seemed to be lacking in formal discipline and deference to
authority did not indicate poor fighting prowess.776 It was crucial for all ranks to be made
aware of these policies, orders, and procedures. NCOs, in particular, needed to act as a
mediator between subordinates and officers,777 and this had the added benefit of
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Men kept advancing at Vimy despite the fact that their comrades were falling all around them, with McGill
remarking that “that was the kind of discipline that made the taking of Vimy Ridge possible.” Norris, Memoir of
Captain Harold McGill, 268.
775 LAC, RG 9 III C9, Volume 4530, Folder 3, ‘To all Commanders 2 nd Canadian Division,’ 15 November 1917.
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increasing the familiarity of ORs with their superiors, and encouraged trust and unit
cohesion.
Discipline contributed to battlefield success, but good morale was also a key
contributing factor to victory. An important aspect of morale was the troops’ confidence
in their leaders, equipment, their supply lines and medical system, and the attack plan
they were ordered to carry out. One way that officers of the Corps expressed concern for
their subordinates was to ensure sufficient food,778 water, and rum. These acted as
fortifying forces, and contributed both to the health and morale of the troops. A well-fed
soldier was better able to concentrate, exert energy, and withstand illness and hardship.
Proper caloric intake also helped prevent somnolence and lethargy, which could be fatal.
Though it was difficult to ensure adequate sources and supplies of water,779 in quantity
and quality, extra effort prior Vimy helped ensure sufficient water for the troops. And
before going ‘over the top’ it was imperative that the soldiers had a hot meal, and went
into battle with extra rations, lest they be wounded or stranded in No Man’s Land.
Adrenaline, excitement, and physical exertion expended lots of calories, and the dearth of
food could halt an attack in its tracks. And after the assault was launched, and during the
consolidation phase, it was vital that food and water were brought forward in sufficient
quantities.780 Exhaustion and hunger could imperil an advance, just as a lack of
ammunition or reinforcements could. Rum and alcohol, but also other drugs like caffeine
and nicotine, helped the soldiers calm themselves prior to going ‘over the top,’ helped
them endure the trauma of combat itself, and assisted in their recovery and grieving
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processes.781 The importance of rum prior to Vimy was nicely captured in the words of
historian David Bercuson:
Down the line came the panacea to top all panacea, the rum issue…an
unbelievably generous one, about triple the ordinary…now, gone were gloom and
apathy. A wave of quick and confident elation followed the magic-medicine down
the line.782
Rum was crucial on the day of attacks, but also on subsequent days of operations to give
the soldiers extra help in enduring combat and dealing with the various stresses and
emotions related to it.783
The morale of the troops, and the confidence they had in leadership was also
predicated on the idea of being well-equipped for combat, and having the right equipment
and clothing to accomplish the task at hand. For the PPCLI, success at Vimy (and Arleux
and Fresnoy) was partly based on providing the proper equipment, tools, and supplies to
carry out orders. An adequate supply of Mills bombs, sandbags, candles and matches
(helpful in dugouts) were important for the attack and consolidation phases. Moreover,
issuing chocolate and chewing gum also helped, if only to raise troops’ spirits.784 And just
as water and food needed to be brought forward during the attack to reach the advancing
troops, so too did equipment and tools need to reach them during the consolidation phase.
To this end, special carrying parties and follow-up troops needed to bring up ammunition,
and entrenching tools and wire to help the infantry dig in and repulse counterattacks.785
These operations provided lessons for the Corps during the war itself – to allow
refinement of tactics. During combat, confusion and chaos often reigned, and even

A soldier wrote that after a rough day “never did rum taste so good!” Roy, ed., The Journal of Private Fraser, 309.
Bercuson, The Patricias, 98.
783 LAC, RG 9 III C1, Volume 3851, Folder 64, File 3, ‘Instructions for the Offensive Hill 70,’ July 1917. For the
importance of rum, see Tim Cook, ‘“More a Medicine than a Beverage:’ ‘Demon Rum’ and the Canadian Trench
Soldier of the First World War,” Canadian Military History 9, 1 (2000): 5-22; LAC, RG 41 III B1, Volume 7, Interview
with Col. H.S. Cooper of the 3rd Battalion, page 15, and Pugsley, On the Fringe of Hell, 66.
784 PPCLI Archives, 34 (8)-8, General Operations, 1st Canadian Division, Vimy and LAC, RG 9 III C1, Volume 3846
Folder 52, File 1, ‘1st Division Report on Vimy Operations, Willerval-Arleux and Fresnoy Operations.’ Moreover, a key
role in this process was played by the Chaplain Service. At Vimy, they established canteens and coffee stalls near the
front and on the lines of evacuation. Here the troops received hot drinks (coffee or cocoa), as well as some food and
stationary for letter-writing. The chaplains also wrote letters for wounded, helped at the main dressing station, prepared
bodies for burial, organised the evacuation of wounded, worked with burial parties, and many other thankless, but vital,
tasks. LAC, RG 9 III C15, Volume 4664, Battle of Vimy Ridge, 2 nd Canadian Division.
785 LAC, RG 9 III C3, Volume 3846, Folder 55, File 1, Arleux-Acheville Operation, 5th British Division, Extracts from
13th Infantry Brigade (Imperial), ‘War Diary.’
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dedicated, loyal soldiers could get lost and disoriented. Shell explosions could deafen,
landmarks and other physical markers destroyed, gas could temporarily blind, and fog and
smoke could obscure the battlefield. On top of battle confusion and ‘fog of uncertainty,’
enormous pressures were placed on the individual during these times, and the strains of
combat could override a sense of duty and discipline, rational thought and common sense,
and activate the body’s natural fight or flight response. Shirkers, malingerers, and
deserters needed to be apprehended and punished, of course, but regular troops who had
lost their way or needed a brief respite or rest from battle should be treated with more
understanding – sometimes soldiers just needed a hot beverage and a firm, but
encouraging word. At Hill 70, trench police established battle stops to deal with
“stragglers,” as well as a ‘Battle Stragglers Collecting Post.’ The latter was established at
9:00am on zero minus one, to apprehend stragglers, deserters, and those going AWL
during the preparation and forming-up phase.786 Similar arrangements were made at
Vimy, where the ‘Battle Police’ reported to the Assistant Provost Marshall (APM), and
the posts themselves were manned and patrolled by mounted troops.787
Another important lesson gleaned from the operations of April-August 1917 was
that exhaustion, and war weariness more generally, could imperil an advance; conversely,
the need for ‘fresh’ troops was paramount, especially when undertaking offensive
operations against an entrenched defender. Ways to address the fatigue and exhaustion of
the troops was to ensure that battlefield objectives were realistic, that preparation was as
complete as possible, that sufficient reserves close by, and that rest and rotation policies
were in place to limit the number of soldiers exposed to the trauma and mortal danger of
combat for extended periods. One report on the operations at Hill 70, for example,
emphasised that the final objective selected should be
a suitable tactical feature for resisting counterattacks. Its distance should not be so
great that the troops detailed to take it are exhausted upon arrival – they should

LAC, RG 9 III C1, Volume 3851, Folder 64, File 3, ‘Instructions for the Offensive Hill 70 – July 1917’ and Folder
64, File 4, ‘Administrative Arrangements.’ The Military Police (MP) also had duties regarding tracking down offenders,
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that soldiers went ‘over the top’ when they were ordered to, and also rounded up stragglers. Bourke, Fear, 220.
787 LAC, RG 9 III C3, Volume 4163, Folder 10, File 1, Operations Vimy, 23-12-16 – 26-2-17, ‘8th Brigade.’
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reach it [the final objective] as fresh as possible and be capable of meeting beating
off counter attacks.788
This report highlighted the importance of avoiding exhaustion, and the need for the
careful planning of operations, and the thorough and up-to-date knowledge of German
defensive tactics and positions.
The study of other armies, their operations, experiences, and problems, both
Allied and enemy, also served to provide the Corps with some lessons to be applied to
their own upcoming and future operations. During the bloody and protracted French and
German battle at Verdun, for instance, Arthur Currie, then in command of the 1st
Division, travelled to the sector to study the operations there. His report highlighted the
importance of reconnaissance, training, and preparation for attacks, including platoon and
company training incorporating the latest weapons and using the leap-frog (instead of
attacking in waves), mutual support, and bite-and-hold tactics.789 More importantly,
however, was the need to ensure that the troops had high morale, were well-rested and
prepared for future operations. Indeed, after Vimy the troops required much recuperation.
One soldier wrote on 16 April 1917 that he had been in the line for 9 days, and “it was
Hell.” He survived to be taken out of the line “for a few days rest, and, believe me, we
need it.”790 To prepare for future operations, when out of the line the troops should be “reequipped, re-clothed, fed particularly well,” provided with entertainment and
“consequently returned to the line absolutely fresh and highly trained.”791 These were

The italics are mine. LAC, RH 9 III C1, Volume 3850, Folder 62, File 1, ‘Report on the Capture of Hill 70.’
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790 McClare, ed., The Letters of a Young Canadian Soldier during World War I, 107. Another soldier remarked on 8
April that “believe me, [we had had] enough for one day.” By 14 April he admitted that “we were very tired.” McGrath,
The World War I Diary of William Hannaford Ball, 89, 91.
791 Currie wrote that the French troops at Verdun were specially-trained ‘storm’ troops “on a large scale and their
morale and esprit-de-corps were consequently very high.” LAC, RG 9 III C1, Volume 3871, Folder 115, File 8, ‘Notes
on French Attacks, North-East of Verdun in October and December 1916.’ Part of maintaining the health and military
effectiveness of the troops was also ensuring that their morale was solid. Lessons from Vimy were also applied to
subsequent operations. Prior to the 7th Brigade raid on the evening of 8/9 June, for instance, the unit was taken out of
the line for training. These preparations took place in the mornings, but “during the afternoon and evening sports and
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analysis and adoption of new tactics, and these lessons were applied to the planning of the Arras and Lens/Hill 70
attacks. Beckett, The Great War, 229.
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lessons that his 1st Division, and ultimately the entire Corps, could benefit from. Currie
seemed to recognise this fact, and argued that Canadians would be more successful “if
these attacks were made by absolutely fresh troops who had been specially trained for the
work in hand,” rather than thrown in piecemeal or without proper training.792 Though it
was not always possible to implement these policies or ensure troops were ‘fresh,’ this
knowledge helped the Corps leadership understand the factors and forces that undermined
chances of battlefield success.
Attacking soldiers, aside from being well-trained and ‘fresh,’ needed to be
properly equipped for battle. This included sufficient clothing, equipment, weapons, and
supplies. During all phases of battle, including preparation, attack, consolidation and
mopping-up, special weapons and equipment were required for the troops to fulfill their
duty. The attack phase at Vimy required a copious supply of Mills bombs for the infantry
to successfully assault and capture positions. The infantry riflemen, as part of the new
platoon organisation, moreover, were to cooperate and complement the work of Lewis
gunners, bombers, rifle grenadiers, and TM crews.793 And during the consolidation and
mopping-up phase of the attack, respectively, sandbags and entrenching equipment, as
well as “P” (phosphorus) bombs for clearing dugouts, were also helpful. Other lessons
suggested the need for concealment of assembly and thorough preparations, including
previous intelligence assessment and observation, which were deemed “absolutely
essential.” Furthermore, close cooperation with flanking units, and communications with
the military hierarchy were crucial. Another lesson was that stick grenades were easier to
throw than the British Mills bombs, giving the Germans an apparent advantage. And
finally, it was argued that though rifle grenades were essential, better range for the
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weapons and more training for grenadiers would be helpful.794 For the soldiers actually
undertaking these operations, clear evidence that the high command and staff officers
were doing all in their power to improve the chances of success was important in keeping
war weariness to a simmer, rather than boiling over into indiscipline and outright refusal.
The capture of Vimy Ridge and the subsequent operations of the spring and
summer of 1917, impressive though they were, could not and did not win the war for the
Entente. There was still much fighting that needed to be done to defeat the enemy, but, on
balance, the evidence for widespread war weariness in the Canadian Corps at this period
is largely lacking. The fact that these operations were successful, combined with the
thorough preparations, respite periods afterwards, and time between these engagements
ensured that war weariness remained at a simmer. These campaigns were generally short,
and well-spaced out (after Vimy, the next big operation at Hill 70 was more than three
months later). The same could not be said for the final months of the war, where there
was little ‘down time’ and operations occurred in close succession, ensuring that war
weariness began to boil over into a more serious and collective problem. It is also
important to note that by the spring and summer of 1918 – when the first signs of
‘cracking’ begin to appear amongst the Canadians – the Corps had been in the field
roughly as long as their counterparts on the Western Front had been when they
experienced similar problems in 1917.795 There were indicators of individual and
localised war weariness at Vimy, but it was not until later in the war that cumulative
strain on long-serving soldiers began to have a more significant impact, as experienced
during the Hundred Days. And because the Canadian forces mostly avoided the worst
effects of war weariness between April and August 1917, the authorities were less
prepared for this phenomenon when it did begin to impact individuals and units in 1918.
After Vimy, the attritional struggle with Germany would have to continue, and the Allied
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offensives needed to drive the German Army from occupied France and Belgium, to say
nothing of the need to subdue Germany itself. It was only by convincing the Germans,
and the other Central Powers, of their own imminent defeat in the war that would finally
force the enemy military and political authorities to sue for peace. To that end, the
Canadians, in tandem with the other Allied armies and nations, would need to destroy the
Germans’ ability, and will, to continue the fight. The operations at Third Ypres, and the
continued campaigns into 1918, were designed to attain this objective, however long and
bloody that process might be.
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Chapter 4 - War Weariness in the Canadian Forces,
July-November 1918
The final period of the war, the five months (July-November) prior to the signing
of the Armistice in November of 1918, is useful for our examination of war weariness.
This helps us understand the origins and contributing factors toward, but also the
characteristics and manifestations of, war weariness on both an individual and collective
level. In this period there were many aspects, events, and dynamics that induced feelings
of war weariness so near the end of the war. After years of combat, and war more
generally, the soldiers had been pushed to, and at times beyond, the breaking point.
Furthermore, as an attritional, industrial, and total war, the societies and civilians of each
combatant nation were also reaching the limits of their endurance due to the stresses and
strains associated with the war effort. The Hundred Days presented individual soldiers,
but also their military units, with unique challenges. The nature of the fighting in the
summer and autumn of 1918 helps explain the enormous stresses imposed on the soldiers,
and the difficulty in maintaining momentum in attacks. This period was characterised by
sustained combat, with little time for preparation for upcoming operations. Aside from the
need for physical preparation, there was also little time for emotional and psychological
preparations, arguably just as important as stockpiling ammunition and ensuring
sufficient food and water. The war-winning strategy of Allied Commander-in-Chief
Ferdinand Foch called for nearly constant pressure on the enemy, ensuring they had no
respite and could not regain the initiative or prepare proper defensive positions. The
problem with this, of course, was that it afforded less respite for the attacking troops as
well. The hasty preparations and insufficient time for planning was problematic, to be
sure, but the lack of time following operations and in anticipation for upcoming
engagements was also challenging. In 1916/1917, units would be removed from the line
for extensive periods of rest, training, acclimatization of replacements, and other duties
after extended or particularly strenuous operations or tours of duty at the front. Thus after
the Somme or the Third Battle of Ypres, Canadian units that participated were withdrawn
from the line, sent back to lick their wounds and regain their confidence, strength, and
morale. During the Hundred Days, however, there was little time after operations to
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recover, rest, make good on losses, revise doctrine and tactics, replace equipment, and
integrate reinforcements. This lack of respite, and forcing soldiers to remain in combat
without sufficient mitigating factors and outlets, was an important contributing factor
towards the onset of war weariness.
An important part of the period following combat operations was to receive, train,
and integrate replacements. Without this influx and steady stream of reinforcements, and
without surviving members of the unit to help reconstitute shattered battalions, these
formations would quickly cease being effective military units, and would ultimately be
destroyed. The Hundred Days constituted some of the heaviest fighting for the Corps and
wider British Army, and included some of the bloodiest months, in terms of casualties,
for the entire war. And as voluntarism had long since dried up in Canada, the Corps was
reliant upon conscripted and inexperienced Military Service Act (MSA) soldiers, and on
the very veterans that had suffered so much, for so long. The influx of conscripted troops
brought its own problems with morale and unit cohesion, but also put added pressure on
the veterans of the unit. Continuing to use worn soldiers, however dedicated they were,
eroded their ability to endure the strains of war.
We are now able to appreciate that the Hundred Days ensured the defeat of the
German forces on the Western Front. To the soldiers engaged in these operations at the
time, however, it was not clear that the war would be successfully concluded in 1918, if at
all. Others were sanguine that 1919 would be the year of victory, even if it would require
much heavy fighting and thousands of further casualties. As German power declined and
its army was unable to halt successive Allied attacks, the writing may have been on the
wall for Canadian and British participants – and yet, these soldiers were still engaged in a
war that was mostly won, but not yet over. The acknowledgement of this war as neverending trauma was definitely a contributing factor toward the onset of war weariness. The
reflective soldier knew that his chances of unscathed survival diminished with each
passing day in the field, and it seemed only a matter of time before he was wounded or
killed. It was nearly sacrosanct amongst the troops that one could not avoid a shell or
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bullet “when your number’s up.”796 The inability to reconcile this belief in all but
inevitable death or disfigurement797 with the need to carry on in combat, directly
contributed to the development of war weariness.
The period from July to November 1918 presented the attacking troops with other
problems as well. As the defeat of the Germany accelerated after the Entente victory at
the Second Battle of the Marne, more and more POWs fell into Allied hands. Both
contemporaries and historians attest to this reality,798 as Germans were overrun, forced to
surrender, or decided upon it for self-preservation. The capture of all these prisoners
meant that there were fewer (veteran) enemy troops in the line, and likely encouraged the
surrender of further Germans as well. It also sent a positive message to the Entente forces,
supporting the belief that the war might very well come to an end. But these captures also
had negative consequences. The great upsurge in POWs meant an increase in stress on the
Entente, a strain on resources, especially food supplies, and there was always the fear of,
and potential for, treachery on the part of enemy soldiers, especially during capture and
escort. The period also presented the attackers with other problems such as booby traps
and scorched-earth tactics; the increased presence of civilians and refugees; and issues
pertaining to supply and logistical delays.
This period provides a useful case study on the contributing factors toward, and
implications of, war weariness on both an individual and collective level, as well as how
the legal/disciplinary and medical systems impacted the troops. Between August and
October 1918 the Corps was engaged in several Vimy-sized battles, starting with the
Battle of Amiens, beginning 8 August, and then through the Battles of Arras/DrocourtQuéant Line in late August and early September, and the Battles of the Canal du Nord
and Cambrai in late September and into October. In these bloody engagements, all four
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divisions of the Corps were involved, at one time or another, and enormous gains were
made. These gains were attained at enormous cost in lives, however, and it was this
reality that wore down even the most dedicated, experienced troops, even volunteers.
In terms of mitigating factors to the development of war weariness, the belief that
victory was imminent,799 advances (operational or tactical), or at least the perception of
success on the battlefield acted as a powerful motivating force and helped worn-out
troops stave off the worst effects of war weariness, at least for a time. German surrenders,
desertion, withdrawals, and the inability to stem the Entente advance were also tangible
reminders that the troops might finally be marching to victory, however slowly and costly
it might be. This was in contrast with earlier in the war, where gains had mostly been
costly, minimal, and temporary. The military emergency that had been the German Spring
Offensives had also been defeated, and the Allies were once again on the march through
German-occupied Europe. The Entente had survived these enemy attacks, and the
initiative had turned decisively in their favour. American forces were finally arriving in
Europe in formidable numbers, France and Italy had remained in the war; and though
they were largely incapable of extended offensive operations, they still held down
thousands of German and Habsburg forces and manned hundreds of kilometres of front.
By September and October 1918, Germany’s allies fell one by one, leaving Germany
increasingly vulnerable. And finally, the economic, financial, and industrial might of the
Allies was now making a perceptible difference on the battlefield, with technology
making a real impact on combat. The sheer volume of guns and shells, their increasing
strength and sophistication, and raw numbers of tanks also began to be felt by both
Entente troops, and the enemy. The actual performance of the tanks left much to be
desired, but in terms of psychological impact, they were invaluable. The same could also
be said for the Allied use of gas warfare; refined doctrine, advanced delivery systems, and
the willingness to use this weapon all paid dividends for the Allies in the final months of
the war.800

A soldier wrote in mid-September there was “a general feeling of victory in the air.” Caughill, Letters to Janet, 127.
The widespread use of gas, however, was a double-edged sword. Liberal use of poison and lachrymal gas could
cause enemy casualties and force withdrawals, but also Allied casualties with the mere shifting of the wind. The
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And yet there were also numerous factors that contributed to the onset of war
weariness, and thus compromised the soldiers’ ability and willingness to endure at the
front. Aside from heavy casualties, the loss of good soldiers, especially officers, trusted
comrades, and veterans was difficult for the individual, and the unit to deal with. The
number of soldiers lost could be replaced in relatively short order, but personalities, trust,
cohesion, and comradeship could not be. It was difficult to deal with the loss of close
friends, especially after mid-October when German defeat appeared all but inevitable, if
not imminent. Logistical problems and supply issues, moreover, negatively affected both
the health and morale of the troops. And as the front was advancing, in some cases
several miles each day, this put added pressure on the already overburdened Service
Corps. The road and railway system could only handle so much traffic. Hindsight informs
us that Germany did not need to be invaded to effect the defeat of its army in 1918, but
for the weary infantryman in early November this was not known, and the German
frontier was a long way off. As any reflective soldier might have asked at this juncture,
was it worth it? Could I survive this phase of the war? Will my death materially
contribute to the defeat of the enemy? Such questions were both symptomatic of, and
reinforced, the deepening war weariness by the final months of the war.

Problems Pertaining to Open and Mobile Warfare, and Other
Issues in the Hundred Days
With the resumption of more open warfare in the final months of the war, the
soldiers were relieved they would be out of the dangerous, confining, dirty trenches. Open
warfare exacerbated some of the problems inherent in trench warfare, but also caused
entirely new problems. With open warfare, an attacking unit’s flanks were extremely
vulnerable; the more a unit advanced, the more exposed its flanks and the further it was
from its own lines and supplies. Shortages and supply problems were the inevitable result

extensive use of gas also ensured that attacking troops would need to advance with their SBRs attached; this meant a
decline in visibility, difficulties breathing and communicating, and served to exhaust the already over-burdened
soldiers. Furthermore, some gas (like Mustard) could linger in water and shell holes for weeks, causing problems and
casualties long after it was delivered.
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of all this (comparatively) rapid movement, and the liberal use of shells and gas only
increased transportation problems. With destruction of the landscape, it was difficult for
planners and attacking troops to identify landmarks and other physical features of the
terrain. As one soldier noted, “maps were completely useless at times, because of the
countryside being so chewed up.”801 Roads and other features were sometimes nonexistent – how could the troops find their way in this lunar landscape? And with this new
type of warfare, it was not always clear when or where an attacking force should dig in.802
With relatively static trench warfare aerial observation and photos, raids and patrols,
underground tunnelling and mining, and extensive analysis of enemy positions, maps, and
terrain made it easier for planners to decide where an attack should stop, preferably on a
natural defensive feature that could be defended, adequately supplied, and reinforced.
This was especially true as immediate and aggressive counterattacks were an integral
aspect of German defensive doctrine.803
Major Arthur Bick, an artillery officer of the 1st Division, also recognised these
problems. He noted that the extensive use of HE shells created craters and holes on the
battlefield, which impeded infantry and armour, and delayed movement.804 The torn-up
roads and destroyed communications infrastructure directly contributed to congestion and

801

Reid, ed., Personal Memoirs of the First World War, 221.
Arthur, ed., Forgotten Voices of the Great War, 289. There were some bad habits picked up by the men while in
trench warfare and it was sometimes difficult for the infantry to adapt to the new type of open and (more) mobile
warfare. One document referred to the “tendency [of attacking troops] to take up positions on reverse slopes where
there was little field of fire.” Moreover, another ‘bad habit’ was the tendency on the part of troops in the line to
withdraw before relieving troops were actually in position to replace them. LAC, RG 9 III C3, Volume 4189, Folder 8,
File 4, Notes on Operations, 28-3-18 to 18-10-18, ‘Notes on Recent German Attacks.’
803 Currie wrote that in the fighting beyond the Canal du Nord the Germans “have fought us here very, very hard,” and
that “these counter-attacks were the most violent in character, heavily driven home and made in large numbers.”
Another soldier noted at Cambrai the Germans resisted in a “severe and stubborn way,” with numerous counterattacks.
And “the key feature of the German defense became the timely counterattack to destroy the attacker at the moment
when he was most off balance.” Humphries, ed., The Selected Papers of Sir Arthur Currie, 121; Renison, “A Canadian
Epic of One Hundred Days,” in Canada at War, 395 and Gudmundsson, Stormtroop Tactics, 94.
804 Bick, ed., The Diary of an Artillery Officer, 78, 102, 105, 119, 123, 149. At this phase of the war, despite the
manufacture of thousands of new guns each year, many old artillery pieces were still in operation. With the pace of
operations it was difficult to remove guns from the line for repair and recalibration; this meant the rifling inside the gun
barrels became increasingly smooth and worn down over time, affecting the range and accuracy of the shells fired. This
could destroy roads and other vital pieces of infrastructure and communications. See also pages 79, 102, 118, 131-133.
The increase in the wear and tear of the guns meant nearly constant repairs and adjustments to maintain accuracy and
effectiveness. LAC, RG 9 III C12, Volume 4588, No. 81 Canadian Ordnance Mobile Workshop, Folder 3-4.
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supply problems,805 as well as to confusion, which further undermined the combat
effectiveness of the affected units. The Germans also contributed to this destruction of
infrastructure, in an attempt to frustrate and delay the Entente advances. These delaying
actions also provided the enemy with time to regroup and fall back to well-established
defensive positions, such as the Hindenburg Line (Siegfriedstellung).806 The Germans
also covered their retreat to the Canal du Nord with artillery, gas, MGs, and rearguard
actions, taking the time to blow up most of the bridges across the Canal. In addition, they
flooded key areas807 in front of the advance by manipulating the dykes and drainage
system. This was a defensive tactic used multiple times in the final months, with varying
degrees of effectiveness. At the Canal de la Sensée, for example, German defenders broke
the dyke bank of the canal, which forced delays on the attacking troops as supplies were
brought up and engineers were required to repair and build bridges.808
References to German scorched-earth tactics emerge in contemporary firsthand
accounts. The physical destruction of important historical or cultural buildings was noted
by the Entente since August 1914,809 and used extensively in propaganda efforts. But as
the Allies closed in and Germany’s allies fell into defeat this destruction took on an added
urgency in the final months. An officer of the PPCLI noted that Cambrai had been
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Ensuring effective communications between the front lines, HQ, and command posts further to the rear was
especially difficult. As one soldier recalled, telephone and other communications cables would have to be buried, but
were subject to “frequent breaks and [therefore required] continual supervision.” The inability to communicate properly
between leadership and attacking forces, as well as between different units, could be disastrous. Reid, Personal
Memoirs of the First World War, 213, 221, 218-219. Other soldiers noted very heavy traffic and congestion at the Battle
of Amiens. One remarked, moreover, that all they had to eat in this period was their iron rations “and what we could
pick up.” Others noted that medical supplies never ran out, but they “sometimes ran short of rations,” which
compromised the health, morale, and effectiveness of the soldiers.
806 The Hindenburg Line, as it was known to the Allies, contained the German front system east of Monchy-le-Preux,
the Fresney-Rouvroy Line, and the Drocourt-Quéant (DQ) Line, which contained the Vis-en-Artois Switch, amongst
other defensive positions. The Hindenburg Line was “a very strongly prepared defensive system held in great depth by
the enemy.” Bick, Diary of an Artillery Officer, 108 and 117-119. And in Currie’s Interim Report on the Operations of
the Canadian Corps during the Year 1918 his description of the German defences illustrated formidable positions
indeed. He wrote of “a succession of ridges, rivers, and canals, which formed natural lines of defence of very great
strength…often mutually supporting, [which] had been abundantly fortified…[and] represented years of intensive and
systematic labour. Barbed wire entanglements…machine gun positions innumerable, and large tunnels had been
provided for the protection of the garrison.” There were also four main systems of defence, including: the “old German
front system east of Monchy-le-Preux,” the Fresnes-Rouvroy Line, the DQ Line, and the Canal du Nord Line.
Humphries, ed., Papers of Sir Arthur Currie, 261-262.
807 Bick, Diary of an Artillery Officer, 128, 131, and 136.
808 Ibid, 172 and 178. The Germans also flooded terrain near Mont Houy and Valenciennes to slow the Allied advance.
809 John Horne and Allan Kramer, German Atrocities, 1914: A History of Denial (New Haven: Yale University Press,
2001).
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partially destroyed prior to evacuation, and that many houses had been looted with the
removal of metal, blankets, furniture, pictures, and the like. At Douai, the Germans
shelled the town “to pieces,” destroyed bridges, looted homes, set booby traps and
explosives,810 and blew canal locks to flood “a large portion of the country[side].”811 This
destruction only exacerbated the logistical difficulties facing the attacking troops. As the
Germans retreated across France and Belgium they shelled roads, compromised the water
supply, mined roads, and set explosives to hinder the advance.812 And the city of
Valenciennes only fell after a bitter struggle in which every bridge and canal was
destroyed, and every road mined by the withdrawing enemy.813 The destruction of
bridges, roads, railway crossings, and canals had a dramatic impact on the
communications infrastructure of the region, slowing the advance and adding to the strain
already placed on the attackers. As the troops moved further beyond the supply depots
and railheads, “considerable strain was placed on available lorry resources” and other of
transport.814 Without proper supplies, the troops could not be expected to maintain the
same level of combat motivation and effectiveness.
Though the German Army was declining rapidly in cohesion and combat
effectiveness, there were still disciplined units able to put up stout resistance. As artillery
officer Bick noted, the Allies were facing “stubborn” resistance, and many of the
defenders were fighting with a marked desperation and sense of urgency. The rearguard
units and machine gunners were especially deadly, causing casualties, slowing troops,
creating uncertainty, inducing caution. The defenders did not give ground easily;
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The archival/historical record noted the German tendency to make use of booby traps, ruses, and explosives in this
time period. Prior to their withdrawal, defenders often set up traps, explosives, mines, and these were often attached to
likely souvenirs. Some explosives were fitted with long-delay action fuses, to kill or maim soldiers long after the
Germans had departed. The Germans also made widespread use of mines, and set up traps in cupboards, beds, dugouts,
cellars, and old trenches. See LAC, RG 9 III C10, Volume 4551, Folder 1, File 14, ‘Instructions Re. German Mines and
Booby Traps,’ 24 August 1918.
811 Christie, ed., Letters of Agar Adamson, 344-347.
812 Renison, “A Canadian Epic of One Hundred Days,” in Canada at War, 388.
813 Ibid, 411. Moreover, archival records of the 9th CIB noted that the Germans blew craters in roads, set fire to a row of
houses in the city, and the area in front of the Escaut Canal was flooded. LAC, RG 9 III C3, Volume 4189, Folder 8,
File 1, Operations, Valenciennes, 21-10-18 to 9-11-18, October 1918, 9th Brigade, ‘Field Messages’ and ‘Narrative of
Operations,’ 43rd Battalion 21-24 October.
814 LAC, RG 9 III C1, Volume 3946, Folder 64, File 4, ‘Artillery Notes on Attack by Canadian Corps: August 8 th
1918,’ and Folder 66, File 1, ‘Interim Report Covering the Operations of the Canadian Corps during the year 1918’ (by
Lt.-Gen. Sir A.W. Currie).
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transport infrastructure was blown up, crops were destroyed, and villages set ablaze prior
to evacuation.815 Some accounts of wanton German destruction might be apocryphal or
exaggerated, nevertheless there was indeed much destruction and delay in the path of the
Allied advance. This destruction complicated attack plans and compromised the supply
situation, but also put added pressure and stress on the attacking troops themselves. For
the ‘poor bloody infantry,’ the war had always been one of physical labour and
demanding duties. Route marches over long distances was just an accepted aspect of
soldiering. During the Hundred Days, however, distances and demands grew
substantially. Private A.E. Smith of the 116th Battalion wrote to his mother from France
on 11 August 1918 stating that his current billet was, just days ago, six kilometres behind
the German line. He explained that “it is a long route march to the front line and it is
getting longer every day,”816 only adding to the strain. Many soldiers were glad to finally
be making progress, but these exertions wore down even the strongest troops over time.
The demands placed on the soldiers were also exacerbated by inclement weather
and other problems associated with open warfare. Although the trenches were not luxury
accommodations by any stretch of the imagination, there were funk holes, covered
sections, dugouts, and underground tunnels and chambers where soldiers could escape the
terrible conditions, at least temporarily. The foetid smell and vermin were perhaps a small
price to pay for periods of relative safety. During the Hundred Days, however, these
shelters were left behind as the troops continued to advance. One soldier remarked that in
the final months “the weather was our worse enemy,”817 suggesting that for some at least,
the weather was just as hated as the Germans. And just as the enemy could cause
casualties and undermine the strength of units, so too could the weather and atmospheric
conditions. As the advance continued beyond the old trench lines out into the open, many

Bick wrote that the Germans were pillaging and “burning towns, villages and crops as they retire.” It seems that
while retiring they destroyed “trivial things – sacking a chateaux, burning furniture etc.” but also systematically blew up
crossings, highways, bridges and the like. Bick, Diary of an Artillery Officer, 149, 163, 165, and 173.
816 Climo, Lively Letters from World War One, 285 and 288, taken from The Cobourg World, Friday 20 September,
1918, Page 1:4, ‘Letters From Men at the Front (In France),’ Letter dated 11 August 1918. The editor of this collection
stated that “hardly any letters from soldiers have been published in October due to the men at the front being too busy
chasing after the retiring Germans” to write much.
817 Reid, Personal Memoirs of the First World War, 214. Currie also wrote that adverse weather was one of the main
difficulties faced by the advancing troops in this period. Humphries, Papers of Sir Arthur Currie, 301-302.
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soldiers were forced to sleep out in open fields, exposed to the conditions.818 Another
soldier noted that the weather, the cold tea and food, and the lack of blankets undermined
their health, morale, and combat motivation. Living in cold and wet trenches, under
constant shell fire, “from which every human impulse recoils…every human instinct
cries, ‘Go Back!’”819 did not bode well for the future ability and willingness of soldiers to
carry on. But carry on they did.
Another contributor to war weariness in the Hundred Days was the fact that by
late October 1918, the war was simply not yet over. The decline of the opposition, the
problems on the German home front, and the fall of its allies all but ensured the ultimate
defeat of Germany. And yet, the war continued throughout October and into November,
with heavy casualties being inflicted on both sides all the while. This reality certainly
contributed to the fed-up attitude increasingly evident amongst the soldiers. Most
remained committed and loyal, to be sure, yet others worried that they would be killed or
maimed before the war finally ended. This was a fear exhibited by troops throughout the
war, but in these final months it took on heightened importance. For many in the line, “it
had become evident that Germany could not win;” they had lost the war, “but the Allies
had not yet won it,” ensuring that these troops continued to face mortal danger daily.820
Thousands would be killed in the final months before the Armistice took effect. Though it
is often difficult to cut through the hyperbole and hindsight found in soldier memoirs
written after the conclusion of hostilities, there was a sense among some Canadian troops
that they were being pushed too hard by their own officers. This perception was made
worse by evidence of imminent German collapse which only increased in the autumn of
1918. A soldier of the 49th Battalion remarked that his comrades were “mad about it [the
order to take Mons], we didn’t want it…they were all grumbling to beat hell, and they
knew the war was coming to an end…what the hell do we have to go any further for?”821
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Indicators of decline were everywhere, and local German successes like effective
rearguard actions and counterattacks could not mask wider defeat. One Canadian wrote
that losses in the final weeks were difficult to bear, especially those “who were sacrificed
when the victory was in sight.”822 The term ‘sacrifice’ suggests, at the very least,
disappointment at the (perceived) callousness on the part of Allied leadership. Will Bird
of the 42nd Battalion recounted that after his sergeant-major informed the troops that
Mons was to be taken, “every man argued bitterly and it was difficult to get them ready”
for the attack. Soldiers from another platoon even suggested they attack their own HQ.
Bird remarked, somewhat pithily, that “the officers were worse enemies than any
German.”823 It was important that the signing of the Armistice occurred when it did, as
these attitudes and the war weariness they represented could not remain at a simmer for
long. And once these sentiments boiled over there would be enormous implications for
the morale, discipline, commitment, and combat motivation of the soldiers at the front.
The Corps commander in the Hundred Days, Sir Arthur Currie, also wrote of the
hard fighting, and the fact that many enemy soldiers fought on to the bitter end. In late
August 1918 the German Army was “far from defeated,” he wrote, and “was staging an
orderly withdrawal, desperately trying to stabilise the front along a new defensive
line.”824 Many enemy units remained in the field, and the liberal use of gas, stout
rearguard actions, and deadly MG teams ensured that heavy casualties were inflicted on
the Entente forces whenever they advanced. Both individual soldiers and the military
units were approaching exhaustion, and yet the fighting continued. And even in
November, just days before the end of hostilities, Currie wrote of “stiff fighting,” the
“enemy fighting very stubbornly,” and casualties incurred on the attackers.825 It was this

2, page 10; Ibid, Volume 10, Interview with C. Howard of the 20th Battalion, page 23, and Chase, “Unwilling to
Continue, Ordered to Advance,” 112, 116.
822 Renison, “A Canadian Epic of One Hundred Days,” in Canada at War, 411.
823 Bird, Ghosts Have Warm Hands, 147-148. Bird also wrote that “no one wanted to run into any trouble” or get killed
so near the end of the war.
824 Humphries, ed., Selected Papers of Sir Arthur Currie, 108 and 126.
825 On 26 October, Currie wrote that “the Germans fought us exceedingly hard all the way…” and “you must not
assume that we have been out of the line and resting.” On 1 November Currie wrote to Kemp: “since August 8 th the
Corps, as you know, has been continuously engaged.” Currie also referred to the “continuity of the operations” and
“very hard and continuous fighting.” During the Canal du Nord Battle Currie explained the negative impact that these
operations were having on the military effectiveness of his troops. He wrote that “the tremendous exertions and
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reality that contributed to the growing war weariness amongst Canadian troops, and wore
down even the most stoic and committed veterans.
After years of war and especially combat, Canadian soldiers were experiencing
the negative repercussions of this long-term service. Not all soldiers were long-serving
veterans, of course, but nor were they all young, ‘fresh,’ and healthy. Substantial
experience at the front, and years spent in uniform, were positive in the sense of
providing personal understandings of the reality at the front, and tips for survival in this
environment. Service also brought comradeship, confidence, and a sense of purpose. The
cumulative effect on individuals, however, could be negative as well, as they were worn
down by trauma, physical exertion, health problems associated with high-stress living,
and the lack of genuine respite. As Ernest Black explained, most troops taking part in the
Amiens attack in August “had been in a [big] push before,”826 such as the Somme, Vimy,
and Third Ypres. The pace of the Hundred Days, however, was all part of the plan to
conclude the war as quickly as possible. The Germans suffered because of this, but so too
did the Entente soldiers forced to carry out these plans.
The CO of the PPCLI also wrote about the problems facing individuals. He
lamented the loss of friends and fellow officers in costly attacks, where at Arras “one
whole company was wiped out.” These were not just faces and statistics, these were
human beings with fears and desires, needs and experiences. In a letter to his wife dated
27 August 1918, Adamson admitted that “I fear our next casualty list will be a severe one
as, from all accounts, the fighting has been most intense,” and that it was Foch’s idea to
“put a Division in the line and let it push for all it is worth for 10 days and then take it
out.”827 Adamson knew the negative effects of combat took their toll on all troops,
regardless of their experience, duties, demeanor, or health. By September 1918, the pace

considerable casualties consequent upon the four days of almost continuous fighting had made heavy inroads on the
freshness and efficiency of all arms.” And after five days of fighting at the Canal, he remarked that “to continue to
throw tired troops against such opposition, without giving them an opportunity to refit and recuperate, was obviously
inviting a serious failure.” And finally, during the pursuit phase prior to reaching Valenciennes “the 1 st Canadian
Division had now been in the line for two weeks without having an opportunity to rest and refit since the hard-fought
battle of the Canal du Nord.” Ibid, 299, 127, 131, 280-281, 293-295.
826 Black, I Want One Volunteer, 164.
827 Christie, ed., Letters of Agar Adamson, 340-341, Letter to his wife Mabel, dated 27 August 1918.
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and intensity of the fighting had negatively impacted both individuals and the units they
served in. Regarding the latter, some units “were all kept very much on the go and I am
more than ever convinced that the present open fighting is a young man’s job,”828
suggesting that this type of fighting was more taxing than trench warfare. Another soldier
of the 26th Battalion wrote in September that despite his unit being “depleted and
exhausted,” they were expected to attack again.829 The heavy fighting of the period also
reinforced the notion, present throughout the war, that breakdown in combat, due to the
cumulative effects of the strains of warfare, was all but inevitable for long-serving
veterans. In a letter of 3 September, Adamson wrote that “Charles thinks he will crack,
but wants to stick it for a couple of months…Donald Gray is very anxious to take
command, becoming second in command to Charles till he cracks.”830 This suggests
breakdown was expected, but also that Charles sought to remain at the front in a show of
dedication and duty, but also based on notions of masculinity and social expectations.
The Hundred Days presented the Canadians with other unique challenges, namely,
the presence of substantial numbers of civilians, refugees, and other non-combatants in
the war zone. This increased the pressure placed on soldiers, and meant more work for
them as well. Civilians in the area complicated attack plans, and induced a sense of
caution on the part of planners. For example, forces needed to be careful with artillery
barrages, and according to one artillery officer, “shooting promiscuously is not allowed”
due to the presence of civilians.831 Attempting to maintain the moral high ground in
relation to the enemy meant altering attack plans to take these civilians into account. And
as the Corps continued, they encountered ever more civilians and refugees on their lines
of advance. One officer noted that by November roughly a third of the soldiers’ rations
were being shared with locals.832 The presence of civilians, however, might also have
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contributed to the morale of the troops, as they relished the role of liberator and finally
saw tangible evidence of the positive impact they were making.
Another difficulty facing the advancing troops was the water situation. This was
connected to transportation and logistical problems, as well as to German destruction and
scorched-earth policies. One 2nd Division report of 25 August 1918 indicated that “wells
in recaptured area are reported contaminated with Arsenic…all water must be tested
before drinking.”833 It is unclear whether the retreating enemy purposely poisoned wells
or this was an unintended consequence of combat in the area, though the results were the
same. Another report indicated that in the forward area “it is unlikely that many of these
wells will be available for some little time,” ensuring that these shortages could not be
mitigated by local sources. In some cases, despite the best efforts of support and service
troops, it was “impossible to obtain water tank lorries to convey water forward under
divisional arrangements,” which meant the troops would be reliant upon a limited number
of supply tanks and chlorinating tablets.834 These problems served to undermine both the
health and morale835 of the participating troops, and were a direct contributing factor
toward war weariness in the final months of the war.
Ultimately it was the nature of the fighting during the Hundred Days that eroded
the strength and will of the long-serving veterans still fighting and dying on the Western
Front by the summer and autumn of 1918. The hardships and discomfort, hard fighting
and heavy casualties, the “violent nature of the fighting in 1918, the rapid…movement
from place to place, and the fact that the troops were almost constantly in action”836 wore
down even the strongest, most committed veteran soldiers. It was fortuitous that the
fighting ceased when it did in November 1918, but in August there was still much heavy
fighting, and suffering, to remain.

LAC, RG 9 III C10, Volume 4553, Folder 5, File 8, ‘Ref. No. 3-4/4869,’ A.D.M.S., 2nd Canadian Division.
Purposeful poisoning of wells was also a claim made by some historians. See, for example, Brown, British Logistics on
the Western Front, 161.
834 Ibid, ‘Water Supply, Reports On,’ 2-8-16 to 20-11-18, No. 6 CDN Field Ambulance, C.A.M.C.
835 Because water was in short supply or even unobtainable, at times support services like the YMCA, Salvation Army
Huts, or Chaplain Services were unable to provide the troops with sufficient coffee, cocoa, or tea. This likely acted as
an assault on their morale. LAC, RG 9 III C15, Volume 4664, Report ADCS France, and ‘Reports – France.’
836 LAC, RG 9 III C15, Volume 4667, Chaplains Reports 12, and Volume 4674, Lt.-Col. W.T. Workman, including a
‘Report: The Canadian Catholic Chaplains Overseas.’
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July-November 1918 and the Hundred Days Campaign in Context
The period from July to November 1918 was the busiest of the entire war for the
Canadians in terms of actions and engagements. There were more days in action and in
preparing for operations than in any previous phase of the war. The Corps fought large
set-piece battles, and participated in urban warfare, follow-up, mopping up, and pursuit
operations, and by October nearly-constant advancing. During July 1918, the Corps was
mostly out of the line and preparing, training, and practicing for the upcoming offensive
in August. Following this respite, the Corps was nearly always in the line until the signing
of the Armistice on 11 November, and Canadian troops participated in three large-scale
battles, and a number of minor operations. The first major action of the campaign took
place in early August. Between 8 and 11 August the Corps played an integral role in the
Battle of Amiens.837 Following the successful conclusion of these operations, the Corps
moved to a different sector of the front to take part in the Second Battles of Arras,
between 26 August and 3 September.838 And, according to Canada’s Official History, the
third major battle in which the Corps was engaged was the Battles of the Hindenburg
Line, including the Canal du Nord, capture of Bourlon Wood (27 September-1 October),
and the capture of Cambrai (8-9 October).839 Following the capture of Cambrai, pursuit

Canadian troops, or at least detached units or sub-units, also participated in “actions round Damery” (15-17 August)
and the Second Battles of the Somme, 1918, including Albert (21-23 August) and Second Bapaume (31 August-3
September). G.W.L. Nicholson, Canadian Expeditionary Force, 1914-1919: Official History of the Canadian Army in
the First World War – With an Introduction by Mark Osborne Humphries (Montreal & Kingston: McGill-Queen’s
University Press, 2015), Appendix “F,” 554-556.
838 During the Battle of Arras aspects of the Corps were also at the Scarpe, or capture of Monchy-le-Preux (26-30
August) and the Drocourt-Queant Canal (2-3 September). Ibid. Currie also noted that the attack to break the FresnesRoubroy Line began before dawn on 26 August. And the attack on the DQ Line (and DQ Switch) began at 5:00am on 2
September. Humphries, ed., Selected Papers of Sir Arthur Currie, 110-114. The Corps attacked on 26 August east of
Arras, with troops on the right bank of the Scarpe. And by 2 September, they had broken through the DQ Line. LAC,
RG 9 III D1, Volume 4677, Folder 9, File 4, August 1918, ‘Operation Orders’ and Volume 4680, Folder 18, File 18, 4 th
Division, September 1918, ‘Operations DQ Line, Report on.’
839 The Battles of the Hindenburg Line included actions at Havrincourt (12 September), Epehy (18 September), St.
Quentin Canal (29 September-2 October), and Beaurevoir Line (3-5 October). Nicholson, Canadian Expeditionary
Force, 555. The attack on the Canal du Nord began on 27 September, one of the riskiest and most dangerous operations
of the entire war. Humphries, Selected Papers of Sir Arthur Currie, 118. See also Wheeler, The 50th Battalion in No
Man’s Land, 261 and 284 and LAC, RG 9 III C3, Volume 4231, Folder 23, File 1, Operations, Canal and Bourlon
Wood, 20-8-18 to 28-9-18. The Cambrai battle began at 4:30am on 8 October. Allied forces in this period also captured
the Hindenburg Line north from Marcoing to Lens, and then captured Cambrai, Lille, and Douai. Rolt-Wheeler and
Drinker, History of the Great War, 125, 127. An officer of the Corps wrote that the 3 rd Division was “fighting
837
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operations commenced, with the Corps chasing the enemy toward their frontier and
attempting to keep contact with the retreating Germans. The enemy made a stand at the
city of Valenciennes, however, and between 1 and 2 November the Corps fought and
captured the city (as well as Mont Houy).840 This was the final set-piece battle prior to the
end of the war. After this there was still fighting, but was on a lesser scale.
Especially compared with the operations of the past, this constituted a very heavy
period of sustained fighting for the Canadian Corps. The pace of fighting ensured a lack
of time for preparation, and insufficient time to recuperate following operations. Both
soldiers and units required time to take certain actions and recover properly. But it was
this lack of respite, combined with the continued use of long-serving soldiers, which
directly contributed to the onset and development of war weariness in the final months of
the war. The collapse of the German Army in the field and the subsequent signing of the
Armistice was fortuitous, as continued combat of this nature would have led to further
morale, disciplinary, and commitment problems, not to mention further medical issues.
During this final phase of the war political,841 military, and other developments
had a direct bearing on the operations on the Western Front, and on the perception of the
troops engaged. The perception of battlefield success and tangible aspects of progress, for
example, might have staved off the worst effects of war weariness on both an individual

continuously for twelve days from the crossing of the Canal du Nord on September 27, until it entered Cambrai on the
9th of October,” suggesting very little respite from the fighting for these units. Cambrai was fully captured by 10
October. Lt.-Gen. E.L.M. Burns, General Mud: Memoirs of Two World Wars (Toronto/Vancouver: Clarke, Irwin &
Company Limited, 1970), 76.
840 After the capture of Cambrai, Canadians were involved in the Battle of Ypres, 1918 (28 September-2 October),
Pursuit to the Selle (9-12 October), Battle of Courtrai (14-19 October), Battle of the Selle (17-25 October),
Valenciennes and Mont Houy, Battle of the Sambre (4 November), Passage of the Grand Honnelle (5-7 November),
and capture of Mons (11 November). The operations at Valenciennes and surrounding areas only began on 1
November, after the capture of Denain, on 19 October. On 2 November, troops of the British First Army seized
Valenciennes, the last major battle of the war. Nicholson, Canadian Expeditionary Force, 556; Horne and Austin, eds.,
Source Records of the Great War: Volume VI 1918, xxxvi and 390; and LAC, RG 9 III C3, Volume 4214, Folder 2, File
3, Operations Valenciennes, November 1918, 47th Battalion, ‘Narrative of Operations’ and report of 13-11-18 by J.M.
Ross, CO 10th C.I.B; Wheeler, 50th Battalion in No Man’s Land, 274-277, 297 and LAC, RG 9 III D1, Volume 4677,
Folder 9, File 6, October 1918, ‘Address from L’Abbe O. Podvin, Cure Doyen of Denain, at the Church of St. Martin,
re. the Deliverance of Denain, by the Canadian Corps, 27th Oct. 1918.’
841 The commitment of the US to the war, and the growing number of troop ships arriving in Britain, provided the Allies
with hope that the enemy could be defeated. The enormous industrial, economic, financial, and demographic strength of
the US provided a psychological and morale boost; the fact that US forces were inexperienced, insufficiently trained,
and lacked modern weapons was almost beside the point. US divisions were stronger than their counterparts, and the
technological superiority of the Entente helped mask the qualitative deficiencies with the quantitative.
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and collective level, at least for the Allied forces. For the Germans, however, military and
political developments were a harbinger of worse things to come.842 By 25 September
Bulgaria sought an armistice with the Entente,843 and Turkey concluded an armistice on
30 October.844 Continued Entente military victories and advances, combined with
increasing and sometimes intractable problems on the home front, ensured that war
weariness began to have serious consequences which could no longer be denied, hidden,
or properly dealt with. Political changes in Germany and military reverses 845 indicated
this decline and heralded the ultimate defeat of its army. War weariness was not exclusive
to individuals, and affected large groups of people as well. Indeed, after years of warfare,
and by the final months whole societies including civilian workers and of course armed
forces were suffering the negative effects of war weariness. Canadian soldier Coningsby
Dawson wrote that troops looked to the US for firmness and resolve in the face of
German calls for leniency, “for the reason that she [the US] is not war-weary, and
because millions of her men who are in khaki have yet to prove their manhood to
themselves.”846
The strength of the Canadian Corps at the end of each month between July and
December 1918 also reflects the heavy casualties suffered in the final months of the war,
and the disruption this involved. The charts in Appendix I clearly illustrate the steady
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Regime change in Russia, and the murder of the Tsar and the Romanov family (16 July 1918) began the destruction
of the old order. This had a deleterious effect on the other monarchies of the continent, not least of which were
Germany and Austria-Hungary. The peoples of Europe were inspired that they could throw off the shackles of imperial
government, however radical and violent the process. By 15 September, Vienna called for an international peace
conference, in an attempt to salvage something from the disintegration caused by the war. Inspired by the words and
ideas of US President Woodrow Wilson and Bolshevik leader V.I. Lenin, Czechoslovakia declared independence on 21
October. Barring a military and political miracle, the final defeat of the Habsburgs was only a matter of time. This also
had a negative effect on Germany and the other remaining Central Powers.
843 This came less than a fortnight after the Allies attacked the Bulgarian Army at Salonika, on 14-15 September. This
illustrated the will of the people and the recognition on the part of Bulgaria’s leaders that the war could no longer be
prosecuted effectively, especially with the dissipation of the pro-war consensus.
844 To protect and expand its Empire, and to accelerate the defeat of the Turks, the British launched attacks across the
Middle East and elsewhere. For example, a small British force occupied Baku on 4 August, the last major operation in
Palestine, which began 19 September, and Damascus fell to British (and allied Arab) forces on 1 October.
845 By 18 July the French forces had counterattacked at the Marne, driving the Germans back. US forces launched an
offensive at St. Mihiel on 12 September, followed closely by a combined Franco-American offensive at MeuseArgonne on 26 September. The British also recaptured Bapaume on 29 August, and On 24 October Italian forces
launched the Battle of Vittorio Veneto, which ensured the final defeat of the Habsburg Army. The final Allied offensive
on the Western Front began 4 November, and by 8 November Maubeuge was re-taken by British forces.
846 Dawson, Living Bayonets, 215-216.
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decline in the overall number of available soldiers, especially in terms of ORs. And the
Corps was also increasingly reliant upon long-serving veterans and recently-trained,
inexperienced MSA men.847 The substantial loss of life and disruptions this caused the
Canadian forces were also experienced by other armies. And though British artillery
production reached its zenith in 1918,848 increased technology could not fully compensate
for manpower and morale problems. Increasing the overall numbers and sophistication of
weapons systems was helpful, but increasing firepower was only beneficial if there were
still sufficient troops to operate this technology, which often required specialist training.
The final months, especially August to October, were especially bloody periods for the
British Army on the Western Front, and only July and November saw their casualties dip
below 35,000.849 In August 1918 they suffered 122,272 casualties; in September 114,831;
and for October were 121,046. As expressed in a chart, the number of casualties evidently
spiked during the heaviest fighting of the period. And the number of casualties and losses
to the French and German armies in this period were equally sobering.850 For Germany

The MSA did not provide the CEF with as many troops as it could have. In some ways, its impact was a case of ‘too
little, too late.’ According to the figures provided by the Departments of Justice and Militia and Defence, there had been
401,882 Class 1 registrations, but of this figure 221,949 were granted exemptions. Of these 179,933 remaining, 24,139
were unapprehended defaulters, and 26,225 were available for military service, but not called up. This left 129,569
available for military service, who reported for duty. Of this number, 8,445 were allowed to enlist in the British forces,
such as the RFC/RAF. This left a balance of 121,124 taken on strength in the CEF. Of these, 16,108 were struck off
strength as medically unfit or otherwise exempted. This left 105,016 available for service in CEF units. A further 8,637
were discharged for miscellaneous reasons, leaving a total of 96,379 on strength with the Canadian forces on 11
November 1918. Of this number, however, only 47,509 proceeded overseas, and of this group only 24,132 were
actually taken on strength with units in France/Belgium. Nicholson, Canadian Expeditionary Force, 551, Appendix
“E,” citing Report of the Director of the Military Service Branch to the Honourable The Minister of Justice on the
Operation of the Military Service Act, 1917, dated 1 March 1919, Canada Sessional Papers No. 246, and Memorandum
Respecting Work of the Department of Militia and Defence No. 5 and No. 6.
848 British industry turned out 10,680 new guns in 1918, the most to date. Moreover, 4,873 guns were repaired and
returned to service, again the highest number during the war years. British industrial output had accelerated throughout
the war, which was also reflected in the decline in the number of guns manufactured in the US for the UK in 1918
(213), which was lower than 1916 and 1917. Dale Clarke, World War I Battlefield Artillery Tactics (Oxford: Osprey
Publishing Ltd., 2014), 25, 60.
849 Casualties to the British Army on the Western Front for July 1918 amounted to 32,562. For November, the number
was 20,925. Churchill, The World Crisis, 845, citing British War Office, The Military Effort, 253.
850 In the French Army, Between July and November of 1918 (the ‘Campagne Offensive de 1918’) 110,000 soldiers
were killed on the field of battle, or became prisoners. A further 35,000 died in military hospitals in the war zone,
presumably from wounds and illness sustained in combat; roughly 18,000 died in hospitals in the interior; and 368,000
were evacuated from the front to the interior. These numbers also appear to exclude officers. Ibid, 846-847, citing
Journal Officiel, Documents parlementaires, Session Extraordinaire 1920, Annexe 633, Séance du 29 Mars, 1920,
proposition de resolution Marin and Statistics of the Reicharchiv. German casualties opposite the combined FrancoBelgian-British fronts (in the West) between July and November were substantial. In this five month period 78,196
soldiers died on the battlefield alone, 347,867 were missing and taken prisoner, and a further 359,670 were wounded
847
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especially, these losses, combined with the dwindling prospect for ultimate victory,
contributed to their collective war weariness in the final year of the conflict.

Training and Preparations
In the weeks leading up to the offensive at Amiens, the Canadians were engaged
in training, practicing, and preparing for the upcoming attack. Training included that for
open and more mobile warfare generally,851 and for more specific operations. Prior to the
attack on Valenciennes, for example, the 58th Battalion needed to reconnoitre the area,
coordinate with neighbouring units, and plan for the attack itself.852 Training was also
designed to help units recuperate from previous operations, and to assimilate
replacements. As the editor of one soldier journal made clear,
Even though the [19th] Battalion had just come through an intense period of
fighting, it had to keep up a regimen of training to help integrate reinforcements
and to allow newly promoted NCOs to exercise their authority. By keeping the
men busy [moreover], it helped to distract them from the trauma they had just
endured.853
Training thus continued throughout the Hundred Days, and when units were taken out of
the line they were to maintain strict discipline and continue drilling. The 116th Battalion
was given instructions to carry on “training as there was a temporary lull in the advance”
at one point in this period.854 These ‘lulls’ were few and far between, and thus authorities
wanted to ensure that these times were not wasted. Training ensured that lessons from
recent operations would be studied, and perhaps integrated into doctrine, but also that
there was little respite for the soldiers actually taking part in operations. This contributed
to the emerging war weariness.
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The Military Museums, W.A. Howard Library and J.E. Child Archives, TMM FOO 81, John Cummer Fonds, Series
4-6, 90304, Folder 3, Notebook: Open Warfare.
852 Cooperation with other units was often based on the use of liaison officers, who were to make contact with and
coordinate with units on the flank, and to keep their CO apprised of the situation elsewhere. LAC, RG 9 III C3, Volume
4163, Folder 12, File 3, Operations Canal du Nord (Bourlon Wood), ‘Narrative of Events.’
LAC, RG 9 III C3, Volume 4189, Folder 8, File 1, Operations Valenciennes, 21-10-18 to 9-11-18, ‘58th Battalion.’
853 Cane, ed., The Haunting Journal of Deward Barnes, 250.
854 LAC, RG 9 III C3, Volume 4189, Folder 8, File 1, Operations Valenciennes, 21-10-18 to 9-11-18, 116th (Ontario
County) Canadian Infantry Bn., ‘Narrative of Operations from October 21 st to October 24th, 1918.’
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Training occurred throughout the period, though was concentrated just prior to the
launching of the offensive; Canadians during the campaign itself were too busy with
operations to carry on much training behind the lines. When out of the line, training
involved much exertion, physical exercise, and always army discipline. But this was still
time out of the line, where soldiers could partially recuperate after fighting. This respite
was only short-lived, however, but could do wonders for health, morale, and endurance.
Any relief from the strains of war helped keep war weariness at bay, which is why the
pace and intensity of the campaign led to such deterioration – there was precious little
time for such relief. Training and preparation was thus designed, in part, to help the
troops recover before being thrown back into the maelstrom. For those taken out of the
line, it was important to take advantage of “rest conditions”855 before returning to the
front. Support personnel were busy bringing up supplies and stockpiling ammunition,
whereas infantry and other arms prepared for their roles in the attack. Training for
combat, however, was much different than the real thing. Once the campaign was
underway and during periods of heavy fighting, there needed to be time and opportunity
for recuperation.856 And as the campaign continued, one soldier noted confusion as they
were given only a “few hours’ notice” for the attack at Arras, and thus little time to rest
after Amiens.857 Lack of rest and genuine respite was detrimental to individuals, but could
also compromise the wider military situation itself.
The heavy casualties of the period meant time was also required to integrate
replacements into units. These were soldiers transferred to the infantry, or called up under
the MSA. Moreover, prior to Amiens Currie ordered a thorough re-organisation of the
Corps, and these troops would have to be trained in their new roles and acclimate to their
new surroundings, roles, and units. And as manpower shortages became dire in 1918, fit
(Category “A1”) soldiers in the support services and non-combatant branches, such as the

LAC, RG 9 III C15, Volume 4653, Historical 1, ‘Precis, July 1918.’ Artilleryman Ernest Black wrote that during the
Hundred Days ‘Rest’ meant “a change of activity and we spent the time practicing open warfare.” See Black, I Want
One Volunteer, 80 and LAC, RG 9 III C3, Volume 4189, Folder 8, File 1, ‘Operations Valenciennes, 58 th Battalion.’
856 H.M. Urquhart, The History of the 16th Battalion (The Canadian Scottish) Canadian Expeditionary Force in the
Great War, 1914-1919 (Toronto: The Macmillan Company of Canada Limited, 1932), 301.
857 Cane, ed., Journal of Deward Barnes, 236, 240.
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CASC, were ‘combed out’ and sent to infantry units.858 These troops, along with recentlyadded MSA men, needed to be inculcated into the life of infantry. This took time, and
also entailed inspections and drilling.859
Before moving into the line, units were required to prepare positions. This
included repairing trenches and wire, creating defensive positions, establishing jumpingoff points, and ensuring proper communications infrastructure. Units moving into the line
required time and effort to choose appropriate assembly areas for concentrating troops, to
examine the ground to identify problem areas and potential routes of advance, and
establish positions.860 As the advances continued, units were frequently entering new
sections of line where much work was required. During the battles at the Canal du Nord
and Bourlon Wood, for example, the 4th CMRs needed to establish an observation post
when entering a new sector.861 This in turn put added responsibilities on the infantry, who
often supplemented engineering and Labour Corps personnel with additional working
parties. And prior to any major attack time, effort, and personnel were required to
reconnoitre the area and launch reconnaissance patrols.862 Prior to Arras the 2nd Battalion
sent out parties to reconnoitre approach routes, assembly areas, as well as a possible HQ
and dressing station location.863 In October 1918, moreover, orders for the next day’s
action only reached the 52nd Battalion “late at night,” leaving little time for proper
preparation. Nevertheless, the CO, intelligence officer, and others sent out patrols,864
crucial to the chances of success. Another Canadian soldier wrote that “an attack made
without enough time for reconnaissance and preparation will usually fail.”865 It was,
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860 Urquhart, History of the 16th Battalion, 288, 301.
861 LAC, RG 9 III C3, Volume 4163, Folder 12, File 3, ‘Narrative of Events.’
862 This was crucial in the planning phase, and it was the duty of commanders and staff officers to determine the best
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important features of the area.
863 Murray, History of the 2nd Canadian Battalion, 278. This was also the case for the 16th Battalion, who required time
to reconnoitre approaches to the front to determine assembly areas. Urquhart, History of the 16th Battalion, 288.
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however, not always possible to heed this advice, putting extra strain on those forced to
carry out attacks.
Patrols and reconnaissance parties were designed to research the immediate area
and gather intelligence, which assisted planners and helped staff officers devise
appropriate plans. Preparations for the Canal du Nord in September 1918, for example,
were as extensive as the time allowed. The intelligence gathering included information on
the dimensions of the canal itself,866 as well as the local terrain and potential obstacles.
And after this information was ascertained, it needed to be analysed, and disseminated to
planners and decision-makers. To this end, conferences and meetings were held for
company COs and others who would lead their troops into battle.867 At these gatherings
orders were issued, maps distributed, discussions held, and other pre-attack plans decided
upon. Adequate preparations could pay dividends in the attack itself, though sufficient
time was often in short supply by the final months of the war.
Perhaps the most important aspect of preparations prior to, and during, the
operations of the Hundred Days was that there simply was not enough time for all of it.
The complexity of the operations and the sheer number of troops and variables involved
warranted more time for preparation. Yet because of Foch’s strategy of applying constant
pressure all across the Western Front, there was insufficient time for full preparations for
operations of this magnitude. The desire of the Entente leadership to defeat the Germans
before the onset of winter, or before the latter could regroup and recover, pushed the
participating soldiers to the very limits of their endurance.868 These rushed, incomplete, or
insufficient preparations caused myriad problems in this period. An officer with the 1st
Canadian Divisional Artillery (CDA), for example, noted in his diary that barrage maps
were sometimes late in arriving. These were crucial for the artillery to properly prepare its
barrages and lifts, but the pace of operations and the fluid nature of the situation
“necessitates very hasty work by the 1st CDA staff,” especially when orders and maps

LAC, RG 9 III C3, Volume 4206, Folder 7, File 8, ‘Operations Canal du Nord (Bourlon Wood), 19-9-18.’
Ibid, Volume 4189, Folder 8, File 1, ‘52nd Battalion, 21-24 October 1918.’
868 Humphries, ed., Selected Papers of Sir Arthur Currie, 108.
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were issued at the last minute.869 For the 2nd Battalion, preparations in this period were
often made “in haste,”870 causing further problems in the attack itself. This also
negatively affected the 20th Battalion, where the “lack of time for proper preparation” led
to delays and confusion.871 These problems could prove fatal to those undertaking
operations, and could compromise entire attack plans.
This lack of proper preparation time, especially for “battle wearied troops” was
problematic, to say the least.872 And because of heavy casualties, the lack of properlytrained replacements, and the pace of operations, under-strength and exhausted units
tended to suffer heavier losses in battle, which could compromise the local military
situation. And as was true with military units, so too was the case for individuals. As
Currie put it, “to continue to throw tired troops against such opposition, without giving
them an opportunity to refit and recuperate, was obviously inviting a serious failure,”873
and thus should be avoided at all costs. That attacks were so successful in this period is
quite remarkable, and suggests the increasing technological sophistication of the Allies,
but also the deterioration and especially war weariness plaguing the enemy in the final
months. And to put the pace of operations into perspective, the Corps staff officers and
planners had months to prepare for the attack at Vimy, and several weeks to plan for the
attacks at Hill 70, and Third Ypres in 1917. But for the attack on the DQ Line, on the
other hand, and “unlike previous battles,” Currie and his staff were given mere days to
plan for this complex operation.874 As one officer wrote in his diary on 2 September 1918,
the Vimy operation “took months of preparation,” but “four days ago I knew nothing of
this affair and the job is at the least of equal magnitude.”875 All the set-piece battles of the
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Hundred Days were complex, involving thousands of troops, different arms and services,
numerous units from multiple divisions and brigades, and for some operations, a careful
emphasis upon secrecy and deception. At Amiens some participating troops found that
there was insufficient time for proper preparations because of this need for secrecy.876
Many troops, including NCOs and some officers, were ignorant as to the location and
objectives of the upcoming attack, leaving little time for reconnaissance and other
important tasks. The Corps commander again weighed in on this matter, lamenting that
they were unable to carry out meticulous and careful preparations as they were
accustomed to. In a letter to Brigadier-General F.W. Hill on 15 August 1918, Currie
wrote that:
What worried me more than the actual operation itself was getting the troops and
guns into position without arousing any suspicion on the part of the Boche. All
movement for many miles behind our lines had to be carried out at night…the
move also was so hurried, and the necessity of secret so urgent, that many things
which are normally done in preparation for an attack had to be left undone.877
It was hoped that these things ‘left undone’ did not imperil the attack. Hasty preparations
and the nature of the fighting of the Hundred Days only added to the stresses and strains
imposed on the soldiers, fighting and dying, on the Western Front. Orders issued from the
high command asked the troops to push the enemy, and themselves, to the very limits of
their endurance. And it was this reality, coupled with the refusal of German forces to
quietly submit to the Entente, that exacerbated the growing war weariness found
everywhere by 1918.
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The Operations of the Hundred Days, Contemporary Views, and
Firsthand Accounts
The operations of the Canadian Corps in August 1918, in conjunction with other
Allied forces, included the two big set-piece battles at Amiens, and then at Arras.878 The
Battle of Amiens (beginning 8 August) was the first major action of the Hundred Days
campaign, and punched a large hole in the German defences on the Western Front. After
this breakthrough the attacking forces pushed the enemy back over eight miles the first
day, and then another five miles on 9 August.879 And by 10 August British and French
forces were completing a pincer movement, closing in on Montdidier and the capture of
roughly 25,000 POWs.880 The Amiens battle officially ended on 11 August, and was
trailed closely by follow-up and consolidation actions, designed to exploit the gains, beat
off counterattacks, and prepare the way for further operations. At the Battle of Arras,
which included operations at the Scarpe River (26-30 August)881 and the DQ Line (2-3
September), there were further gains. This area was dominated by German defensive
systems, not least of which was the Hindenburg (or Siegfried) Line. The Canadians,
playing an outsized role in these final months, “made the first break” in these positions.882
They were now tasked with breaking the Hindenburg Line, as well as its “tributaries,”
including the Fresnes-Rouvroy Line, Vis-en-Artois Line, Buissy Switch, and DQ Line
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These full-scale and more traditional set-piece attacks were also joined by pursuit operations, urban warfare, and
actions against German defensive positions, designed to isolate Germany, destroy the cohesion and fighting
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itself;883 these were all astride the Arras-Cambrai road, and protected Cambrai,
Valenciennes, and Mons.884 In the words of the PPCLI CO, the Corps was “exhausted”
after these engagements,885 and it was still only early September.
The main engagements in September included those around the Hindenburg Line
and affiliated defensive positions, and the daring attack across the Canal du Nord, which
began 27 September.886 In October the Corps completed its attack across and beyond the
formidable Canal, broke through the Marquion Line,887 and captured Bourlon Wood. In
conjunction with British forces they then advanced on Cambrai. At Bourlon/Bourlon
Wood, the attacking forces encountered many difficulties, including traffic congestion on
roads and bridges, which by delaying the arrival of ammunition and supplies888
compromised the ability to attain battlefield objectives. And as the advance continued all
along the line, the enemy was forced to evacuate Lens (3 October), and by 9 October the
city of Cambrai fell to the 3rd Canadian Division and British forces; meanwhile, the 2nd
Division crossed the Scheldt Canal.889 Allied momentum continued after the fall of
Cambrai, as the Germans were being pushed back all across the Western Front. Le Cateau
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and Iwuy were captured on 11 October, Lille and Douai taken on 17 October, and the
liberation of Denain was completed by the 4th Canadian Division on 19 October.890
As the campaign continued into November, the Corps continued its advance
through France and Belgium, driving the enemy back towards the German frontier. This
was done in coordination with British units, as well as the French, American, and Belgian
armies. The main Canadian operations between 1 and 11 November were at
Valenciennes/Mont Houy, and Mons. But as winter was fast approaching, the Entente
leadership was dedicated to ending the war as quickly as possible. Allowing the enemy to
withdraw in good order and establish further defensive positions would ensure at least
another campaign in 1919. This would destroy the Entente’s momentum and initiative,
increase the reliance on inexperienced troops, and give the Germans time to regroup. The
high command sought to avoid this fate at all costs, even to the point of driving their own
soldiers to the breaking point. Cases of war weariness and shell shock continued right up
to the signing of the Armistice on 11 November.
At Valenciennes and the Mont Houy operations there were still difficulties to
overcome, even as the German Army – and nation – crumbled in these final weeks of the
war. Hindsight allows us to appreciate this, but for the regular soldier at the front, there
was no end in sight.891 The attacking infantry were supported by the artillery and other
services, but the former were expected to conduct mopping up operations as soon as
possible,892 which could put undue stress on these individuals. Moreover, conducting
operations before consolidating gains and moving artillery and supplies forward could
end in disaster. Fortunately, the Canadians involved were able to overcome resistance in
the area, even as the 12th Brigade faced “considerable opposition…and the troops were
unable to progress beyond” a certain point.893 Valenciennes was eventually captured by
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troops of the 11th and 12th Brigades, but not before suffering casualties so near the end of
the war. According to operational reports, casualties were “comparatively light,”
amounting to 500 all ranks from the 47th Battalion, of the roughly 1,200 involved (around
42%).894 Casualties might have been ‘light’ in comparison to the bloody, drawn-out
attritional struggles of the past, but was little comfort for the grieving families back home
and their unit comrades. These gains were important, of course, but in the words of one
contemporary, “never did men more sorely miss their fellows than the Canadians [and]
their comrades who were sacrificed when the victory was in sight.”895
The Canadians captured hundreds of POWs, and contributed to the destruction of
the Germans’ “resistance and morale” at this late phase of the war. And yet, Valenciennes
was still a hard-fought battle, in the face of “severest opposition,”896 in which soldiers had
to deal with obstacles that placed enormous strain on them and their units. To give an
indication of the devastation, Valenciennes only fell after every bridge was destroyed, and
every road mined and set with explosives.897 In preparation for the attack, the enemy cut
retaining walls and constructed dams to raise the water levels of the Canal de L’Escaut
over six feet. These proved an obstacle at the best of times, but the enemy had also blown
bridges, wired the approaches to the canal, and destroyed culverts, roads, railway
crossings, and buildings.898 In the end, Canadian and British units in the vicinity captured
the city and forced the withdrawal of the remaining Germans back toward the Belgian
city of Mons. Progress was finally being made, which could cheer the men, but the cost
was still heavy, which assaulted morale. The advance continued, and by the evening of 10
November, Canadian units had entered Mons; by the next morning, some had pushed
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beyond the city itself.899 In these operations, there were casualties900 right up until the
signing of the Armistice. Indeed, Private George Price of the 28th Battalion was perhaps
the last Canadian to be killed in action on the Western Front, just minutes before 11:00am
and the suspension of hostilities.901 He was supposedly killed by a sniper, but those still
fighting had other problems to deal with as well. The PPCLI, for instance, had been
“desperately crippled” by previous actions around Cambrai, and thus spent “the next
month…devoted to training and bringing it back to something near the strength of a
fighting battalion” that could undertake operations. And yet, these units were still
expected to undertake operations, to maintain pressure on the enemy, to defeat German
rearguards, and to clear villages. As the PPCLI advanced and overcame enemy resistance,
the 4th Company even helped seize Mons.902 It is thus no surprise there were indicators of
war weariness, even on the precipice of victory.
Though the Hundred Days had been a bloody and protracted affair, the Canadians
and their allies accomplished what they set out to do. Ultimately, the Central Powers were
defeated on the field of battle, and were forced to sue for peace in the face of these
coordinated and unrelenting attacks. The fighting in the final months had cost the Corps
thousands of casualties, and also contributed in large measure to the development of war
weariness in this period. And the war weariness would have been even worse if the Corps
had not been so successful on the battlefield. Nevertheless, the accomplishments all along
the Western Front cannot be denied or denigrated. By the end of September the
Canadians had a very strenuous, but also very successful two months of combat. In this
short period there were four major operations in a span of seven weeks, in which each
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Division took part in three, including at the Canal du Nord. Simply surviving these
intense and bloody battles, despite the lack of proper rest and respite for the troops
involved, was impressive enough. The captures in this period were also impressive. By
the end of September the Corps had captured 27,000 POWs, 170 miles (along the front)
had been recaptured, 69 villages liberated, 500 guns captured, and had supposedly
encountered 49 German divisions in the field.903 Currie calculated that between 8 August
and 11 November, the Corps were responsible for the capture of 31,537 POWs,904 623
heavy and field guns, 2,842 MGs, 335 heavy and light TMs, and over 500 square miles of
territory. 228 cities, towns, and villages had also been liberated, including Cambrai,
Denain, Valenciennes, and Mons.905 Currie was proud of these accomplishments, and the
Corps’ tenacity during this period, especially at Amiens, Arras, and Cambrai. He wrote
that just because the newspapers were not discussing the exploits after the capture of
Cambrai, “you must not assume that we have been out of the line and resting,” as they
still had to ‘roll up’ the flanks and march on Valenciennes, and beyond.906 Between
August and November, this was “three months of the hardest fighting experienced by the
Canadian Corps,” where they suffered heavy casualties in a “period of relentless
fighting.”907 Official reports were also supplemented by later historical writing and
analysis that reinforced the view of the presence of war weariness by 1918.908
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Unit accounts including regimental histories and war diaries (WDs), are a valuable
tool for understanding how the participants experienced the fighting in the final months,
as well as the problems encountered. Colonel W.W. Murray, for instance, referred to
congested roads and the need to advance without the expected tank support at Amiens,
lamented the brevity of rest periods, German rearguard actions and defensive measures.
Despite these issues, the 2nd Battalion was successful due to preparation and the
integration of reinforcements, training, and the use of tactics such as leap-frogging and
advancing in ‘diamond’ formation.909 Ultimately, the 2nd at Amiens captured seven
officers and 428 ORs, four guns, 20 MGs, and stores of engineering material, though of
course suffered casualties as well.910 Moreover, of the factors undermining chances of
success, perhaps the most important were the “fairly heavy casualties” suffered. Speed
and especially surprise, however, allowed the attacking forces to overcome enemy
resistance, artificial smoke and fog, and tanks, helped in this regard as well.911 These
‘heavy casualties’ only increased in importance over time, particularly as units found
themselves engaged in action day after day. Neither individual soldiers nor units could
maintain this pace and casualty rate for long. E.L.M. Burns noted that the 3rd Division
was “fighting continuously for twelve days from the crossing of the Canal du Nord on
September 27, until it entered Cambrai on the 9th of October.”912 The nature of these
operations was hard on both men and machines, and war weariness and breakdown were
the inevitable result after a certain amount of time.
The fighting, exhaustion, and lack of respite in the final months served to
compromise the endurance and fighting effectiveness of both the individual and unit, and
began to negatively affect operations. One medical WD referred to “ten days and nights

spreading militancy on the home front and how 1918 saw “more strikes in Canada than in the rest of the war years
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without a rest, [and] rarely getting sleep” either. This was problematic, and troops got fed
up with such a life. One wrote that “you got awfully tired of 18 days under shell fire and
mud and machine gun fire and no hot meals…we lived on bully beef and hard
biscuits…[and] there was no glamour in it at all.”913 Exhaustion had a direct and negative
impact on soldierly abilities at this phase of the war. As October turned to November, the
pace of operations and difficulty in maintaining momentum were compounded by poor
weather. For the 2nd CMRs, “rain and cold wet nights” had the effect of “greatly impeding
the movements of our troops,” and contributed to trench foot cases.914 And for units of the
9th Brigade, attacks at Amiens were pushed forward “until an impasse was reached owing
to the nature of the ground” and the defenders.915 The terrain and weather acted as
obstacles to the advance, just as the enemy did.
Unit histories and WDs provide a relatively narrow outlook, but other accounts
took a broader view of the situation and contextual reality. From a larger perspective, it
was clear that the Corps and its constituent units were engaged nearly the entire period of
the Hundred Days. Lt.-Col. W.T. Workman, writing on behalf of the Catholic Chaplains
overseas, referred to the “violent nature of fighting in 1918, the rapid movement from
place to place, and the fact that the troops were almost continually in action,”916 which
acted as a contributing factor to the onset of war weariness and health problems. And
though the units of the Corps were advancing and capturing vast quantities of equipment,
weapons, and POWs, they were suffering heavy casualties with every attack.917 During
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the Valenciennes operations, other problems included the substantial number of civilians
and refugees in the area. Being greeted as liberators boosted spirits, but also meant limits
placed on military operational flexibility and freedom, as well as the sharing of rations
and water. Moreover, the Germans continued to practice scorched-earth tactics; under
such circumstances it was difficult to advance, and especially to maintain contact with
other units in these conditions.918 Accounts of those in staff positions, part of the High
Command, or at HQ,919 including Currie, also provide insight into the difficulties
encountered by attacking troops, and some of the various factors that helped overcome
these difficulties, and ultimately contributed to victory. Currie wrote that after the loss of
surprise the fighting on 9 August, the second day of the Amiens operation, “fresh
[German] troops” offered stiff resistance to the attackers. This highlighted the importance
of having rested soldiers for each phase of the attack, and the maintenance of surprise.
Despite the difficulties encountered, however, the German Army was “impressed” with
Allied superiority and the “great determination of our troops.”920 This was an impressive
victory indeed, as evidenced by the congratulatory messages and visits921 after the
conclusion of the battle.
Agar Adamson of the PPCLI lamented the heavy casualties inflicted on his troops
and fellow officers. In many cases these were not only colleagues, they were friends and
companions too. He referred to the fighting as “most intense” in a letter to his wife, in
part because of Foch’s plan to maintain pressure on the faltering Germans all along the
front. Adamson also referred to breaking down (or “cracking”) after long service at the
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front as all but inevitable.922 These combat veterans were aware of the reality at the front,
and acknowledged that all soldiers had their breaking point. The intensity of fighting was
also noted by the commander of the British First Army, Henry Horne. In a report of 4
October, he praised the “determined fighting of the Canadian Corps during the last five
days,” which saw them cross the Canal du Nord and capture Bourlon Wood. The Corps
also had to destroy numerous determined counterattacks, with troops from 12 German
divisions engaged.923
One artilleryman who participated in the Battle for Mont Houy and the capture of
Valenciennes was Andrew McNaughton, Canada’s Counter-Battery Staff Officer. Of the
problems encountered in the final months, he referenced the German propensity to
counterattack any Allied gains as soon as possible. This was part of their defensive
doctrine, and gave no respite to attacking troops. This also suggested the importance of
having ‘fresh’ reserves close at hand for consolidation and follow-up operations. He
noted, moreover, that proper planning and preparations were still required, as suddenly
improvised attacks were liable to failure, especially important given the pace of
operations during the period.924 McNaughton also expressed concern for the presence of
civilians, how it was important to be careful in the deployment of gas and artillery.925
McNaughton also provided an indication as to the importance of the successful
attack at Valenciennes. This was the Corps’ final set-piece assault, its last “major prearranged attack” of the war. Valenciennes can therefore be seen as incorporating many of
the lessons learned over the previously bloody years of combat on the Western Front. The
Corps managed to break the German lines, a “key position stoutly and desperately
defended,” suggesting the improvement of the Canadians, but also the decline of the
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Germans.926 Canadian casualties were deemed ‘light’ compared with those of the enemy
and considering the important gains made, totalling 60 killed and 300 wounded. And
finally, this was an important battle because of the enormous amount of artillery pieces
and weight of shells involved. At Mont Houy 88,090 artillery rounds were fired,
amounting to 2,149 tons. In contrast, at the Battle of Waterloo (1815) there were roughly
9,000 rounds fired, of 37 tons; during the entire Second Boer War, 279,000 rounds of
2,800 tons were fired, and the German fleet at Jutland (1916) fired a total of 1,942 tons.
This firepower was impressive, constituting “the most intense barrage in history
[supporting] a single infantry brigade.”927 It is thus not surprising there were so many
demoralized prisoners in the wake of such fire. This reliance on artillery and technology
might also have helped mitigate the worst effects of war weariness amongst the troops in
this operation, as Canadian soldiers spent less time in combat. But the thunderous artillery
shook the ground and rattled the nerves of even the most experienced veterans.
Another feature of the period was the enormous distances covered, and the sheer
pace of operations. One veteran referred to it as “the almost continuous offensive
operations which took the Canadian Corps from in front of Amiens on August 8 to Mons
on the 11th of November”928 and the end of the war. Currie wrote that after Amiens and
Arras, “something had to break,” but was thankful that it was not the Canadians as a
whole (though there were certainly individuals who broke down). In this final campaign,
the Corps was advancing and pushing hard, suffering casualties but also pushing the
Germans inexorably back. In a letter of mid-October, Currie wrote that “we are still in the
line, three [divisions] in and one out, so you see there is no rest for the wicked.”929 James
Adams of the 26th Battalion wrote that though he was new to the front, “many of the lads
here through the Amiens business have had about enough and are under a great deal of
strain.” Yet despite these problems “we continue to win battle after battle but are given no
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trenches and sunken roads, out in the open, and in demolished houses. Over 800 enemy dead were collected, and over
1,000 unwounded POWs captured.
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rest,” and are “victims of our own success I guess.”930 The reality of this open and more
mobile warfare proved a challenge for all involved. Aside from the “demands of the
varying conditions” and types of terrain, the heavy casualties, the difficulties in bringing
up adequate supplies, the lack of opportunity for rest, respite, relief, and recuperation
undermined the health and morale of the soldiers involved.931 These military successes
were thus bought at a rather heavy cost.
Members of the medical services and Chaplain Service provide unique insight into
the health, morale, and overall well-being of the troops at this time. One British MO
wrote that when the Germans were undertaking defensive destruction and scorched-earth
tactics, they often made shelters unusable in less than sanitary ways.932 And for the
members of the No. 10 Canadian Field Ambulance, the preparations, operations, and
follow-up aspects of Amiens between 2 and 20 August were characterised by congestion
and crowded roads, where progress was “slow and wearisome;” rapid advances served to
complicate medical arrangements933 and delay the arrival of equipment and supplies. And
after the loss of surprise, enemy resistance increased over time and “held to his strong
points with stubborn determination.” And yet, despite this “more difficult phase of the
fighting,” the men went forward with the “same spirit and eagerness that characterized the
first day of action” at Amiens.934 The Entente forces were able to overcome these
difficulties, but this last point on their ‘spirit and eagerness’ speaks to a larger problem in
the realm of military history, namely, the difficulty in analysing these intangible
descriptors, such ‘dash,’ ‘bravery,’ and ‘devotion.’935 What exactly do these terms mean?
Did this suggest they had good morale, effective discipline, the use of rum and other
fortifying forces? Does it mean they triumphed in combat despite difficulties? There are
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difficulties in quantifying and understanding behaviour and motivations in the chaos of
combat and the ‘fog of uncertainty,’ in the words of Clausewitz. But this problem is also
based on the penchant to attribute success and victory on the battlefield to the ‘character’
of the individuals involved. This only seems to complicate the task of the historian and
muddle the waters of analysis.
Many stresses confronted the attacking soldiers in this period. As part of their
scorched-earth tactics, for example, the Germans purposely flooded large sectors of
ground prior to retiring.936 The advancing troops also had to deal with large numbers of
civilians and refugees, many of whom were in an “emaciated condition” after years of
hardship. The liberation of formerly-occupied areas “was recompensed by the suffering
and misery of the days spent in the trenches,” where death, disease, and disfigurement
lurked around every corner. The fighting in the Hundred Days was difficult and
undermined health and morale, but chaplains and the YMCA played a key role in
providing the men with coffee, cigarettes, biscuits, and other material comforts. The
Chaplain Service and those attached to infantry and other units played an important role
in the health, morale, physical, emotional, and spiritual well-being of the soldiers at the
front and on the lines of communication. One chaplain wrote on 8 August that he visited
medical facilities and wounded troops to offer coffee and smokes, and organised a coffee
stall at the ADS.937 The importance and benefits of these actions cannot be measured or
quantified, but they were invaluable. In letters from the front, Coningsby Dawson made
reference to booby traps, often attached to explosives and mines, and the scorched earth
tactics of the Germans. This included the destruction of buildings and property, the
levelling of cities, and even “civilian populations…being carried away captive”938 by the
enemy. F.A. McKenzie, who fought at Amiens, Arras, and the D-Q Line, made reference
to encountering booby traps, obstacles and tank traps. He noted, moreover, that despite
declining German morale, enemy machine gunners put up stout resistance, battalion
losses were “cruelly heavy,” and the defenders were at times able to withdraw in good
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order.939 Nevertheless, at Amiens alone the Entente forces penetrated to a depth of 12
miles on the first day, and within a fortnight 30 villages had been liberated, over 10,000
German POWs captured, along with hundreds of guns.940
Yet despite these gains and successes on the battlefield, they came at a rather
heavy cost. There were casualties suffered by attacking troops and support personnel – as
well as to the defenders – but also unprecedented demands were placed on the surviving
soldiers. It was up to these long-serving veterans, in addition to recently-arrived
conscripted troops, to ensure attacks continued and that the enemy was given no respite to
regroup. Will Bird of the 42nd Battalion wrote at Amiens “I felt I would collapse if I did
not get anything to eat,” which suggested how busy the soldiers were and the supply
problems inherent in this warfare. Bird admitted he was simply exhausted from lack of
sleep and physical exertion, and that he was extremely thirsty during this period as
well.941 These problems, combined with the pace of the fighting, ensured that the health
and morale942 of soldiers could become compromised, and these factors all contributed to
the growing war weariness amongst both individuals and units. These problems wore
down even the strongest and most dedicated troops, and one wrote in a letter about the
continuous fighting and moving, and the extended periods without proper rest and
recuperation. His unit went ‘over the top’ three times in one week, and then again three
times in eight days.943 This pace could certainly not be maintained for long, and
contributed to war weariness and psychiatric casualties. Victor Wheeler of the 50th
Battalion also wrote about the pace and intensity of operations, and the negative effects
this had on himself and comrades. Long marches and combat led to “great physical and
mental strain” in this period. And before the Battle of Amiens, his unit arrived in
jumping-off positions “already exhausted, [and] we lay down on our haunches like weary
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oxen on the soaking-wet ground to get a few hours rest before zero hour” the next
morning.944 Wheeler also acknowledged heavy casualties, especially to officers; that his
battalion faced “long, hard” days at Amiens, where units advanced for three straight days;
and that his unit, “worn down by the heat and the lack of drinking water…lost a lot of
men.”945 This lack of water could have serious detrimental effects on both individuals,
units, and their ability to seize battlefield objectives. At times, desperation for water led
troops to drink from contaminated (with poison gas) water sources.946 Desperation
contributed to health problems, and discontent on the part of participating soldiers.
One contemporary noted that the Battle of Cambrai, after the hard-fought victories
at Amiens, Arras, and the Canal du Nord, was the “most intense and fierce battle” of
1918, in part because the enemy was “desperate,” and fought in a “severe and stubborn”
way. They relied heavily on rearguard units, MGs, and gas as manpower problems rose
dramatically. The Germans also continued to launch counterattacks in an attempt to
dislodge the Allied forces. The Canadian and British troops finally captured Cambrai on 9
October, and observers noted that “even victorious war is an awful thing.”947 The Army
high command, the press and politicians, the propaganda and public could all discuss
glory, personal heroism, sacrifice, and defence of the Empire, but for the soldiers actually
taking part in these operations, it was likely a different sort of feeling after these bloody
battles. This rhetoric, moreover, was largely unwelcome amongst the troops, and made
certain commanders appear callous or out-of-touch with reality.948
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Casualties, Medical Aspects, and Medical Arrangements for JulyNovember 1918
The medical arrangements illustrate the developments made in military medicine
during the war, but also the perennial problems affecting soldiers and those responsible
for their care. The thousands of wounded, gassed, and ill admitted to medical facilities949
demonstrate that despite the decline of German fighting power, heavy casualties were still
inflicted on the attacking forces, including 1,000s of killed or MIA. These casualties also
reflect that in many ways the power of the defensive950 still had the advantage over
offensive forces, even during this period of open and more mobile warfare; every time
there were engagements beyond normal trench warfare, there was also a corresponding
increase in casualties.951 This is perhaps counterintuitive given the general perception of
terrible trench conditions and artillery bombardments. But the reality was that trenches
provided a modicum of protection, and trench warfare had a twisted logic and
predictability about it. Tunnels and communication trenches provided some measure of
protection for those bringing supplies up the line, and removing casualties. Open warfare,
on the other hand, exposed troops to danger from above, below, and all sides.
The medical classification system ensured that manpower requirements were
addressed above all else. By the final months of the war, the emphasis on preserving and
maximising manpower for the coming campaign, and to compensate for heavy casualties,
took on a new level of importance and urgency. On 12 August 1918 the classification of
soldiers in CASC units was updated,952 presumably to ensure that any troops fit for
frontline service were transferred to infantry units. The idea was that these individuals
were of more use in combat units, and their experience and expertise along the lines of
communication could be more easily replaced. This attempt to free up all able-bodied
troops for combat duties also occurred right after the closing of the Amiens battle, where
heavy casualties were suffered. Infantry units needed to be brought up to strength, and the
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combing out of rear echelons for any remaining “A” men could help supplement those
arriving from reserve units, hospitals, and the newly-arrived MSA troops.953 But even
when infantry and other combat units were up to strength, they still suffered heavy
casualties. Due to the nature of operations thousands of casualties were regularly admitted
to medical facilities from the front and lines of communication. Front-line evacuations
constituted a higher percentage of these casualties,954 and numbers spiked during periods
of combat; even successful operations were costly, and wore down the strength of both
individuals and units. At the Arras operations, medical personnel and the combat services
encountered many difficulties. During inclement weather, for example, roads could
become nearly impossible to traverse with the rain and mud, it was difficult to avoid
congestion, and the reliance on evacuation by hand slowed and complicated matters. Yet
despite these obstacles, “these [medical] men did exceptionally good work today under
very heavy shell fire”955 and exposure to other mortal danger. This evacuation system
generally worked quite well,956 especially given the enormous challenges facing medical
personnel and the number of casualties suffered. The system did well under the
circumstances, but not all troops were treated equally and on the whole the needs of the
collective, especially manpower and morale, trumped those of the individual. This was
the case when soldiers were sent back to the front prematurely, or before their treatment
had been completed.957 With war-weary and psychiatric cases, this increased the chances
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of relapse and permanent breakdown/debilitation. Medical personnel did what they could
under difficult conditions, attempting to balance conflicting motives and priorities.
During the final months of the war medical personnel suffered from the same
problems afflicting combat soldiers, but also had other burdens unique to their duties. For
the 1st Canadian CCS, congestion complicated medical arrangements at Arras, and the
pace of operations and heavy casualties taxed the MOs and their staffs to the very limit.958
Moreover, soldiers were given precious little time out of the line for rest. The lack of
respite from service and sources of stress put enormous strain on those participating, and
wore down soldiers both mentally and physically. The open warfare of the period, and the
sheer pace of operations, also put more responsibility on medical personnel regarding
their sanitary duties; daily advances complicated matters, and meant new obstacles to
overcome, new sources of water to test, new dangers to confront.959
The experiences of medical personnel allow for a look at the inner workings of the
military medical system, and the problems and casualties suffered. At Amiens and related
operations, for instance, the 31st Battalion MO noted the heavy casualties suffered. He
acknowledged that “we had been in the line exactly a month and were all unspeakably
dirty and lousy,” a problem that for some amounted to “not only an annoyance and
discomfort but a positive torture.”960 Another CAMC member argued that the secrecy and
the “swiftness of the attack” at Amiens, as well as the “depth of penetration,” taxed the
medical services and personnel. There were also enormous casualties suffered in the few
days of battle there, including 7,643 wounded on 8 August alone, in addition to 5,076 and
4,783 wounded on 9 and 10 August respectively.961 During Arras and the fighting around
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the Hindenburg Line, the Corps suffered substantial casualties as well, totalling 664
officer and 13,686 ORs wounded alone between 26 August and 7 September.962
The pace of fighting caused considerable casualties to the attackers during this
period, but casualties were also incurred from regular duty and simply living at the front.
By the Hundred Days, troops were still being removed from the line for VD,963 despite
the best efforts at prevention, education, and discipline. The lack of clean water and fresh
produce964 also caused health problems, and German scorched-earth tactics and
destruction of water sources combined with supply difficulties only exacerbated this
issue. Soldiers were still incapacitated and thus removed from the line for ailments like
trench foot, trench fever, accidental and SIWs and illness.965 Perhaps most importantly,
by the summer of 1918 the global pandemic known as Spanish Influenza was wreaking
havoc amongst the troops.966 And as was the case during trench warfare, casualties were
sustained by infantry (and other) units at the front, even in supposedly ‘quiet’ sectors, and
during ‘quiet’ periods between operations – daily wastage. 967 Service and support troops
on the lines of communication also suffered casualties, from stray shells and explosives,
gas, snipers, and other distance weapons. There were also accidents, such as lorry
collisions or falling off horses or wagons. This wastage was a daily and interminable
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drain on the forces, constantly undermining strength and removing soldiers from duty, at
least temporarily. They also had the potential to negatively affect morale, reinforcing the
reality that death and danger surrounded these troops, even when they were not going
‘over the top.’ Eventually, many soldiers adopted a fatalistic attitude, indicative of war
weariness, in response to the reality that death or wounding was all but inevitable.
During this period every infantry unit engaged in operations suffered casualties,
whether it was battle wounds from enemy fire, or due to illness/disease. Casualties were
especially troublesome as the pace of operations afforded each unit little time to make
good their losses; the integration and training of replacements took time, and the lack of
respite following operations increased the burden on those who were not rotated out of
the line or sent to medical facilities as a casualty. Deward Barnes of the 19th (Central
Ontario) Battalion noted that they suffered 158 casualties, including eleven officers, on 8
August alone.968 Heavy losses, especially to officers, had the potential to adversely affect
the military effectiveness of the battalion going forward. There was promotion within the
ranks, especially of NCOs, but there was no replacing the steady hand of trusted and
experienced officers. The nominal strength of an infantry battalion was around 1,000 all
ranks, so casualties of 158 constituted a good proportion of total strength. Some suffered
even heavier losses than the 19th Battalion, at times approaching or surpassing 50% of
forces employed. And the 19th still had to continue fighting after these losses at Amiens,
they were not exempt from further combat.969 The 20th Battalion also suffered heavily on
the first day at Amiens, including thirty-two killed and seventy-seven wounded.970 On the
first day at Amiens the Corps largely achieved surprise, but on the following days the
enemy was able to bring up substantial reinforcements and launch counterattacks, slowing
the attack considerably. The German defenders were able to regain balance and put up
much stouter resistance starting on 9 August. The 50th Battalion at Amiens alone suffered
fourteen officers killed or wounded, as well as 231 ORs killed, wounded, gassed, or MIA;
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The 2nd CMRs lost four officers killed and five wounded, and seventy-eight ORs killed
and 135 wounded between 8-10 August.971 Between 8 and 20 August, at Amiens and
subsequent consolidation operations, the Corps suffered 11,822 casualties, part of the
reason why August 1918 was the single bloodiest month of the war for the Canadians.972
The casualties continued throughout the Hundred Days, ensuring that the pressure
and strain was maintained on those who did survive these engagements. During the next
major operation at Arras, the DQ Line and Hindenburg Line, casualties continued to
accrue. The 19th Battalion suffered heavy losses on 17 August, especially to officers, with
a nearly 50% casualty rate. For the unit as a whole this was obviously unsustainable,
especially as the campaign stretched out beyond weeks and into months. At the end of the
day, “only three officers came out who were not wounded,” compromising the ability to
seize battlefield objectives on subsequent days.973 In attacks on the DQ Line in early
September, the 50th Battalion suffered nearly 300 casualties before 8:30 am, undermining
the next phase of operations throughout the day.974 In other cases, casualties were
suffered even before the attack itself was launched, as artillery barrages and gas attacks
caught soldiers in assembly areas and collecting points preparing to go ‘over the top.’975
At the fighting around the Scarpe and the Fresnes-Rouvroy Line (Battle of Arras), the 19th
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Battalion lost 295 soldiers, and the 20th Battalion 437 in just three days.976 Of course
territorial gains were being made, but the cost was great.
The next major battles at the Canal du Nord, Bourlon Wood, and Cambrai again
saw substantial casualties in driving the Germans back. In these operations, the defenders
seemed to become more desperate over time, realising that every attack brought the
enemy one step inexorably closer to German territory. At the Canal du Nord, Victor
Wheeler of the 50th Battalion saw every single officer of “D” Company become a
casualty, and it was tough to bear the loss of “gallant, irreplaceable men.”977 And near
Cambrai, the 2nd CMRs also suffered heavy losses, which compromised their ability to
seize objectives in subsequent operations. The unit suffered some forty casualties prior to
even reaching assembly positions, meaning fewer soldiers for the attack itself. Heavy
uncut wire caused further problems, and “owing to heavy casualties, [the troops] were
unable to advance” to their objectives. Battalion strength at the outset of operations
amounted to 29 officers and 575 ORs, and they suffered fifteen officer and 266 OR
casualties.978 This meant that 52% of all officers became casualties, and roughly 46% of
ORs, totalling 47% of the entire unit. The 20th Battalion suffered eleven officer and 319
OR casualties at Cambrai on 10 and 11 October alone.979 Heavy casualties were inflicted
on the attackers because as the Germans continued to deteriorate and the supply situation
proved critical, the enemy relied heavily upon rearguard actions, MGs, and the copious
use of gas980 to slow the Allied attackers.
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Even after the final set-piece attack at Valenciennes, casualties continued right up
until the Armistice came into effect at 11:00am on 11 November.981 By this phase of the
war, casualties had taken their toll on participating units. The PPCLI on 10 November, for
example, could muster “only 450 strong including both bands and transport,”982
illustrating the costly and desperate nature of the fighting. This was a particularly bitter
pill to swallow, especially as the war appeared to be won, but not yet over. Indeed,
Currie’s order to take Mons on 10 November caused resentment at the time, and
considerable controversy in the years following.983 Casualties continued until the final
hour, but orders were orders, and Currie had received instructions to advance on Mons
from the highest levels. Advance the Canadians did, and by 11 November units of the
Corps had captured Mons, and pushed beyond the city itself. By the time the Armistice
came into effect, the Corps had already suffered 437 killed and 1,275 wounded in the less
than two weeks’ fighting of November.984 And since the beginning of August, the Corps
lost 11,259 killed and 36,906 wounded, which amounted to more than 25% of all
Canadian battle casualties in the entire war.985 This illustrates just how intense and costly
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the Writing of the World Wars (Vancouver and Toronto: UBC Press, 2006), 56-61; Daniel D. Dancocks, Spearhead to
Victory: Canada and the Great War (Edmonton: Hurtig Publishers, 1987), Appendix One, 241-245; Humphries, ed.,
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these final operations were, even if it is difficult for the modern reader to comprehend the
scale of the bloodshed.986
These casualties were problematic for at least three reasons. First of all, the fact
that the Corps continued to suffer heavy casualties at this phase of the war, even when the
enemy was disintegrating and the German nation was on the verge of revolution, was
perhaps disheartening for those undertaking these operations. And though there was relief
that the tide of war had finally swung decisively against the enemy, even successful and
victorious combat was costly. The German Army was able to inflict casualties on the
Canadian forces despite the Allied preponderance in military forces, technology such as
tanks and aircraft, and industrial and economic strength. Secondly, casualties undermined
the health and strength of individual soldiers, but also eroded the fighting effectiveness of
their units. Missing important leaders and key personnel was difficult to deal with during
the best of circumstances, including in combat operations and afterwards. Additionally,
understrength units tended to take heavier casualties in attacks, forming a cyclical pattern
that could only be broken with a large influx of new troops, or with the halting of
operations, rest and recuperation. The MSA ultimately put less than 25,000 new troops
into the field (with units in France and Belgium), ensuring that combat units relied
increasingly upon veteran soldiers, those previously in support roles, and those returning
from hospitals and convalescent centres. And because of the nature of fighting, and
especially the plans of the Allied high command to keep up pressure on the faltering
Germans all across the line, there would be no substantial break in operations. And
finally, casualties and the daily draining of military strength reinforced the notion that
death and disfigurement were inevitable, they were only a matter of time for every single
soldier at the front. This state of affairs placed an enormous burden on the individual,
regardless of their experience or level of commitment. These coping mechanisms were
also no panacea to the problem. War weariness, and shell shock were the inevitable result
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of all this. The loss of comrades and close friends only exacerbated this reality, especially
so near the end of the war.
Though it was difficult to determine which casualties were ‘genuine’ cases of
shell shock (a term the authorities used) and those related to exhaustion and gradual
erosion of fighting strength, including war weariness, there is no doubt these cases
continued right up until the cessation of hostilities. Indeed, the mere acknowledgment on
the part of army authorities that the stresses of war and the violence of combat could
create psychiatric casualties was progress of sorts. PPCLI daily orders for 27 September –
the opening day of the Canal du Nord – for example, referred to soldiers invalided out of
the line as “mental” cases, and were not listed as sick or wounded.987 This appeared to be
a frank recognition of a different type of casualty in modern, industrial war, that made
soldiers militarily ineffective but without a visible wound. Confusion over what
constituted shell shock, its manifestations and diagnoses, however, continued into 1918
and beyond. CAMC Captain F. Dillon wrote in September 1918 that there was still a
“diversity of opinion” regarding shell shock, but that it was a “class of cases amongst the
most difficult within the scope of medicine” to diagnose and treat. Some MOs, however,
refused to accept that the reality of war could produce such casualties in otherwise
healthy and committed soldiers; there was reluctance based on both “egoistic and
patriotic” motives to accept that psychiatric casualties were a normal part of modern
warfare. Dillon lamented that
no attempt seems to have been made to form any conception of a constantly
recurring clinical condition which might be said to represent the disorder resulting
from the stresses and strains of warfare.988
For more punitive or traditionally-minded doctors, their emphasis was elsewhere,
predisposition of soldiers to ‘mental’ problems. Many MOs and army doctors continued
to interpret shell shock in a narrowly physical sense, as the result of shell explosions or

PPCLI Archives, 34 (3) – 6, Battalion Orders, Daily Orders Part II, 1 January – 31 December 1918, ‘Daily Orders,’
27-9-18.
988 LAC, RG 9 III C10, Volume 4575, Folder 1, File 5, ‘Bulletin of the CAMC,’ Vol. I, No. 6 (September 1918), by
Captain F. Dillon, ‘On the Nature of Shell Shock.’
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brain concussion that disrupted the nervous system, rather than as a natural result of longterm and/or acute exposure to the trauma and terror associated with combat and frontline
service. This had a tangible impact on the soldiers, ranging from accusations of cowardice
to the rejection of post-war pensions for disability.
Though the sources of trauma and the contributors toward war weariness and
psychiatric casualties could not be removed entirely, 989 there were things that the
authorities could do to minimise suffering, and reduce chances of debilitation. Relief from
duty was essential, as was emotional and mental respite. Fatigue and exhaustion not only
contributed to casualties, but also undermined combat effectiveness and the ability to
carry on with duty.990 Commanding, medical officers, and the support services also
played an important role in identifying those driven to the breaking point, providing an
opportunity for intervention on their behalf. Chaplains could help ease the suffering of the
dying and wounded, and provide “cheering words to men on the edge of nervous
collaps[e],”991 comforting and reassuring those suffering from the results of the war. And
indeed, many did suffer during the war, whether at the front, on the lines of
communication, or on the home front. Anything the army could do to extend the ‘shelf
life’ of the troops was welcomed.
Most soldiers suffered during the war, though this suffering and the inevitable
casualties that accompanied combat were understood by authorities as a means to an end.
The troops endured hardships and trauma, the loss of friends and relatives, disease and
disfigurement, but it was all in the name of attaining victory.992 In order to ensure

Long marches and combat itself led to “great physical and emotional strain” on the troops. And because of the pace
and intensity of fighting, these pressures were all but interminable. One soldier noted that when they were pinned down
or under an artillery bombardment, their “nerves [were] stretched taut.” It was only a matter of time before these nerves
‘broke’ entirely. Wheeler, The 50th Battalion in No Man’s Land, 230 and 256.
990 By August 1918 previous actions and lack of proper sleep and rest could compromise future operations, especially
during the combined arms attacks of the Hundred Days. Moreover, “the exhaustion of the crews of the tanks is very
great after a heavy day’s fighting and if they are called upon again the next day, disappointment to infantry may result,”
which could imperil the entire assault. Another document referred to “the desirability of getting troops to the
concentration area with as little fatigue as possible,” so they would not expend precious energy prior to the attack itself.
LAC, RG 9 III C3, Volume 4163, Folder 11, File 4, ‘Operations Amiens, 5-8-18 to 16-8-18’ and Volume 4189, Folder
6, File 5, ‘Lessons Learnt from Recent Operations, 42 nd Battalion, R.H.C.,’ 25-30 September 1918.
991 LAC, RG 9 III C15, Volume 4653, Precis, ‘September 1918.’
992 Indeed, the historical record suggests that in many cases soldiers were sent back to the front despite their chances of
relapse, or before they were fully recovered, all in the name of military duty and the need to beat the enemy. In this
sense the soldiers really were a means to an end, and the collective needs of the army and nation trumped the needs of
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compliance and to impose the best terms possible on the defeated enemy, the Allies
needed to illustrate their offensive prowess and military superiority, and push as far into
German-occupied territory as possible. Hence the orders issued to take Mons, so near the
end of the war. And in the end, Currie was unable, or perhaps unwilling, to disobey orders
even with the cessation of hostilities on the near horizon.993 Currie sought to balance the
needs of his superiors, with those of his subordinates, thus his established emphasis on
shells over human lives. There was a widespread belief, however, especially in the postwar period that these casualties were unnecessary, and that those troops fell in vain.
The loss of trusted and experienced leaders hit the troops hard, as was the case
with the 20th Battalion in the tough and bloody fighting at this phase of the war. At Arras,
the unit was pinned down on the far side of the Sensée River, and “nearly all the officers
and section commanders were killed or wounded,”994 leaving the survivors largely
leaderless. And at the Canal du Nord, Currie wrote the enemy have fought us “very, very
hard,” and that “these [German] counter-attacks were the most violent in character,
heavily driven home and made in large numbers.” Heavy casualties were suffered by the
attacking forces, especially officers, and “some of our battalions have none.”995
Promotion through the ranks often took place in response to officer casualties, but it
would take time for newly-promoted troops to grasp the intricacies of unit command and
new responsibilities. The 52nd Battalion at Amiens also experienced a similar problem.
The (surviving) unit CO wrote of heavy losses, and that “my battalion was left with very

the individual soldier/patient, even in terms of health and recovery. LAC, RG 9 III B2, Volume 3618, 25-13-6, Gas
Poisoning, December 1915 – May 28 1918, File ‘The Use of Oxygen in Gassed Cases.’
993 The 2nd Canadian Division reported that between 7 and 11 November it suffered 365 casualties, and the 3 rd Division
suffered 116 casualties on 10-11 November. Another source indicated there were eight Canadians killed in the capture
of Mons, whereas a report on casualties for 11-12 November indicated there were no reported casualties for the 1 st
Division, two wounded in the 2nd Division, 66 casualties in the 3rd Division, and eight for the 4th Division. According to
Nicholson, “considering the resistance put up by the German machine-gunners, the capture of the city had been
achieved with very few casualties,” but this unlikely acted as much of a palliative to the friends, comrades, and family
of the fallen in the final days of the war. See Nicholson, Canadian Expeditionary Force, 482; Renison, “A Canadian
Epic of One Hundred Days,” in Canada at War, 423, and LAC, RG 9 III C1, Volume 3874, Folder 122, File 1, ‘Reports
and Returns, Daily Casualty Summary from Canadian Corps,’ 31-8-18 to 31-1-19. Moreover, “official post-war
calculation of Canadians killed, wounded and missing, including from gas, show a total of 18 officers and 262 ORs for
the final two days of operations.” And, “careful research made at General Currie’s request revealed that on 11
November itself there were one fatal and 15 non-fatal casualties.”
994 Corrigall, The History of the Twentieth Canadian Battalion, 219 and 241.
995 Humphries, ed., The Selected Papers of Sir Arthur Currie, 121.
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few officers of experience, having had 16 officer casualties during the past few days as
well as 20 sergeants.”996 They suffered officer casualties but also lost important NCOs
like sergeants, who were vital links between officers and enlisted men. The CO of the
52nd Battalion also lamented the loss of ‘experienced’ officers; their knowledge and
steadying hand could not simply be replaced by bringing in another from the base depot.
Losses to runners and other communications personnel and equipment could likewise
handicap a unit in operations. The fighting in the Hundred Days, however, required even
more reliance on runners than during static trench warfare. But it was exceedingly
difficult to maintain proper communications and links between the front and HQ when
roughly 90% of runners became casualties.997
Substantial problems arising from the pace of operations directly impacted the
medical care and evacuation of the period. Traffic jams, congestion, and the lack of
serviceable roads contributed to these problems.998 Delays in the treatment and clearing of
wounded meant the chances of saving these troops was “undoubtedly diminished” during
and after operations. Moreover, it was important that COs gave their subordinates fair
warning regarding the goals and duration of advances, “in order that the men may take the
necessary steps to conserve sufficient energy, physical and mental, to cope with the
situation” at the front.999 After all, exhausted units and individuals tended to perform less
well in their duties than their well-rested and ‘fresh’ counterparts. In this period, though,
‘fresh’ units and individuals were in rather short supply.
Despite the best efforts of the CAMC, casualties continued to accrue during the
heavy fighting of the final months of the war. Even during successful offensive
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operations, the number of dead, wounded, sick, and gassed increased over time.1000
Casualties were inevitable, but became even more problematic if they constituted a large
percentage of the attacking force or unit as a whole. To provide but one example, the 2nd
CMRs in October and November had a battalion strength of 22 officers, and 561 ORs
(583 all ranks). Their casualties in this period of just over two weeks amounted to five
officers, and 82 ORs, including 29 killed.1001 This meant roughly 23% of all officers and
15% of ORs became casualties during this short period.1002 And though during normal
trench warfare these losses would not have been insurmountable, because of the pace of
operations in the Hundred Days these units would be expected to launch multiple large
set-piece attacks in a relatively short time frame. And because of those killed in
operations, there was no chance of getting these veteran soldiers back in the unit after
hospitalization and convalescence – they would have to be replaced with troops less
experienced, and perhaps unfamiliar with the traditions and history of the unit. This no
doubt had an impact on the morale and cohesion of the unit itself. It was not uncommon,
furthermore, for attacking units to lose over 50% of their strength in a single operation.
The 43rd Battalion at Arras suffered this fate. The objectives for the unit were eventually
taken, “but the losses had been over 50%” and each company only had one officer
remaining. These casualties took their toll, and “A” and “C” Companies only mustered 38
ORs between them, whereas “D” Company only had 13 ORs, and 1 Lewis Gunner
surviving.1003 These losses were unsustainable over time, even with the rump of the unit
left behind in the LOB group to reconstitute the unit.
The heavy fighting also negatively affected the health and well-being of the
participating individuals. In the 2nd Battalion, exhausted soldiers drank water from shell

See, for example, LAC, RG 9 III C10, Volume 4564, Folder 2, File 1, ‘Casualties: Monthly Returns, Sick and
Wounded, 1-1-17 to 1-2-19.’
1001 When these casualties were suffered the unit also captured nine officers and 172 ORs as POWs. LAC, RG 9 III C3,
Volume 4163, Folder 12, File 9, ‘Operational Summaries, 2 nd CMRs, 26-10-18 to 13-11-18, Summary of Operations 26
October – 13 November.’
1002 It should also be kept in mind that of the battalion’s total strength, a certain percentage would be kept out of combat
as part of the LOB group. This makes the casualties of troops engaged that much higher.
1003 LAC, RG 9 III C3, Volume 4189, Folder 7, File 1, ‘Operations Arras, August 1918, 9 th Brigade, 43rd Battalion
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holes at Amiens, and got violently ill as a result.1004 It seems these troops grew so
desperate that they sated their thirst with polluted water, despite warnings and their best
judgment to the contrary. Exhaustion thus drove soldiers to take risks that ended up
harming their health. It was also acknowledged by the medical services that exhaustion
could compromise the health, ability, and endurance of those affected. One MO, for
example, after a passage on H.M.T. Victoria “arrived thoroughly broken down” due to
mental strain, lack of sleep, and the fact that he had “worked incessantly” throughout the
voyage.1005 And of course there were different aspects to exhaustion and war weariness,
namely, both physical and psychological exhaustion. Shell shocked soldiers could be fine
physically, but psychologically unable to carry on with duty. Conversely, one soldier
argued there was a disconnect between the mind and body, as “the body is a traitor to the
spirit – it can become very tired.”1006 Thus even if one had the desire or will to carry on in
combat or duty, they might be physically unable or incapable to do so. This speaks to a
larger point about the distinctions between war weariness and shell shock debilitation,
that the former largely represented an unwillingness and reluctance to carry on in combat,
whereas the latter suggested an inability to continue at the front or with normal duty. The
“stomach-sinking tension of nerves,”1007 as described by Will Bird, might not prevent a
soldier from doing his duty in battle, but without proper rest, outlets or ‘safety valves,’
and mitigating factors, this unwillingness could transform into inability.
These attacks pushed the troops to the very limits of their endurance, which had
detrimental consequences in the coming campaign.1008 On 31 August Currie wrote that
the 4th British Division was unable to gain its objectives, or even carry out its ordered
attack, “owing to the physical condition of the men and to their lack of numbers.”1009
Heavy casualties, exhaustion, and the health problems of the soldiers thus had real
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military implications. One MO went “ten days and nights without a rest, rarely getting
sleep.” And in one particular attack, a captain of the Fort Garry Horse admitted that
“there might have been more prisoners [captured] but we were too tired to run after
them,”1010 thus allowing their escape to fight another day. Ultimately, however, the
soldiers were able to overcome these difficulties and triumph in the war, despite their
exhaustion, war weariness, casualties, and health problems during the final months. The
survivors of the fighting in October 1918 were also praised by authorities and officials for
their “bravery and endurance,” their confidence and “powers of resistance,”1011 though
this poses a problem for modern researchers attempting to understand these intangibles.

Results, Lessons Learned, Conclusions, and Interpretations
For the size and strength of the Canadian Corps, the captures and results attained
in the final months of the war were impressive indeed. These captures acted as a tangible
reminder that the Entente were successful in this period, and illustrated German decline;
this acted as a powerful antidote to the war weariness present in all armies at the time.
The Canadians, along with their Dominion allies and alongside the British, French, and to
a lesser extent Belgian and American armies, made a direct and material contribution to
the destruction of German fighting capacity, will to continue, and therefore the cessation
of hostilities with the Armistice. Regarding results attained, the Corps captured thousands
of POWs, copious amounts of military equipment1012 and weapons, and liberated
numerous cities, towns, villages, occupied territory and countryside. On 8 August alone,
the Corps pushed the German defenders back anywhere from eight to ten miles,1013 and
there were similar advances on the Australian front to the north. Though the gains on the

LAC, RG 9 III B2, Volume 3601, 24-3-0 (Volume 4), ‘Medical War Diary, July 1917 to August 1918.’ See also
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‘Lessons Learnt from Recent Operations,’ 42nd Battalion, R.H.C. 25-30 September 1918.
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9 August were more modest, Canadians “made advances of up to four miles,” despite the
fact that “resistance had been stronger than expected, and was becoming still stronger”
over time.1014 The Canadians were also responsible for the destruction and capture of
hundreds of German MGs, artillery pieces, TMs, and other equipment during the attack.
To provide but one example the 2nd CMRs, in just two days, captured 342 POWs, fifteen
MGs, one TM, and one anti-tank (AT) rifle; the prisoners captured also exceeded the
unit’s own casualties, which was not always the case.1015
After the consolidation operations following Amiens, the Corps launched attacks
near Arras. These were quite successful, though did come at a heavy cost. The capture of
POWs, however, had a direct effect on the ability of the enemy to withstand further
Entente attacks, as prisoners were removed from combat and thus unable to return to the
fight. In late August the Corps was credited with capturing nearly 2,000 enemy soldiers,
and the decision of the German high command to counterattack resulted in the capture of
a further “approximately 6000 unwounded prisoners between 1 and 4 September”
alone.1016 The Canal du Nord, Bourlon Wood, and Cambrai operations further contributed
to the destruction of German fighting strength, and netted several thousand more POWs.
The 4th CMRs at the Canal du Nord, for instance, liberated civilians in the area, seized
four guns, a TM and AT rifle, twelve MGs and sixty-one POWs. And the 9th Brigade
captured nearly 1,000 POWs, though it was difficult to determine exactly as most were
used as stretcher-bearers and did not always remain in any given unit’s area of
operations.1017 And according to the CO of the British First Army, the actions of the
Corps were crucial, as they crossed the Canal, captured Bourlon Wood, and engaged 12
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German divisions,1018 providing opportunity for forces elsewhere to advance against a
depleted and distracted enemy. The captures in the final set-piece attack of the war, at
Mont Houy and Valenciennes and on through to the capture of Mons, were equally
impressive.1019 The Canadians and their allies had refined their attack doctrine and
improved substantially in offensive operations, but these captures also reflected German
decline over time.1020
Though the Hundred Days campaign resulted in the cessation of hostilities and the
destruction of the German Army and its willingness to continue the war, there were still
lessons to be learnt for other armies and forces. Lessons were not always taken to heart,
and sometimes the wrong lessons were learned. Following the conclusion of the war the
Canadian forces quickly demobilized and returned to their pre-war state as a small, underequipped, and relatively unprepared fighting force in the interwar period; many of the
lessons regarding fire and movement, secrecy and surprise, and all-arms tactics were also
forgotten. But while the war was still being fought, lessons could be applied to
subsequent operations. The medical services at Arras incorporated lessons from the
previous operation at Amiens, to help with the treatment and evacuation of soldiers. The
CAMC prepared for heavy casualties, understanding that momentum slowed after the first
day of attack, as congestion, the need to bring up artillery, and increasing enemy
resistance over time all factored in.1021

LAC, RG 9 III C10, Volume 4547, Folder 1, File 4 (3rd), ‘Canadian Corps Routine Orders’ 3rd Canadian Field
Ambulance, 23-7-18 to 21-1-19.
1019 The 47th Battalion at Valenciennes and Mont Houy captured between 800 and approximately 1,500 German POWs,
of different units, and roughly 800 Germans were killed in the attack as well. They also captured “several” field guns,
MGs, and TMs. The 44th Battalion in four days’ fighting captured three field guns, 20 medium and heavy minenwerfers,
83 MGs, and over 600 POWs. And on a single day of fighting the 46th Battalion captured seven field guns, six TMs, 45
MGs, four AT guns, a large quantity of rifles, ammunition, and equipment, as well as 800 POWs. LAC, RG 9 III C3,
Volume 4214, Folder 2, File 3, ‘Operations Valenciennes,’ November 1918, 47th Battalion, including ‘Narrative of
Operations,’ and report of 13-11-18 by J.M. Ross, CO 10th CIB; Ibid, 44th Battalion, ‘Report on Operations,’ 29
October – 1 November, and Ibid, 46th Battalion, ‘Report on Operations,’ November 1st.
1020 At this phase of the war the capture of enemy prisoners, especially unwounded ones, was likely indicative of
German war weariness, the fall of morale, loss of faith in ultimate victory, and acknowledgment of the hopelessness of
the situation. Some Germans refused to surrender and fought to the bitter end, to be sure, but the enormous number of
POWs falling into Allied hands suggested a widespread recognition of defeat and disintegration. In all, the Canadians
seized in excess of 30,000 POWs, over 600 guns, nearly 3,000 MGs, and over 300 mortars, in addition to capturing
over 500 square miles of territory, including the liberation of 228 cities, towns, and villages.
1021 DUASC, MS – 2 – 432, SF 44-1, Clearing: The Tale of The First Canadian Casualty Clearing Station, British
Expeditionary Force, 1914-1919, by Thomas Brenton Smith, page 173-177.
1018

288

This time period also made it evident that exhaustion could be detrimental, even
fatal, to any attack. Thus rest, rotation, and respite were crucial for both soldiers and their
units. Without proper rest and time away from the stresses and strains of war, war
weariness, shell shock, and other psychiatric casualties were all too likely. Units could
achieve their battlefield objectives without sufficient rest beforehand,1022 but this was
likely rare and the pace of operations in the Hundred Days made this unwise. The Allied
high command and unit COs needed to take the reality of exhaustion and the erosion of
endurance seriously, as war weariness and shell shock could harm the individual soldier,
his unit,1023 and, ultimately, the wider military situation itself. These types of problems
could induce recklessness, undue caution, apathy, terror, and any number of emotions and
issues related to the impact of combat on the individual and collective.
And indeed, the intensity of fighting took its toll on those involved. Bloody and
protracted engagements occurred earlier in the war, such as at the Somme and Third
Ypres, but never before had these operations taken place in such a short time period.
Successive attacks in the same area or employing the same units was a feature of the final
months, and simply put, there was a price to pay for this fighting. Not only in the
casualties inflicted, but also in the disciplinary problems it engendered and the moral
issues it created. The final Canadian to be officially executed for wartime crimes, Private
Norman Ling of Toronto, suffered this fate early in the campaign; he faced the firing
squad on 12 August, 1918.1024 The military authorities were keen on ensuring that the
proper ‘message’ was sent to those still in the line, and there was a clear deterrent aspect.
There were fears that disciplinary problems would overwhelm the situation, and thus a
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firm hand was required – desertion or cowardice would not be tolerated, despite the
particulars of any given case. Soldiers were punished for failing to do their duty, often in
disregard to the reasons for this failure.
This period was also problematic for authorities because the fighting brought the
troops within hand-to-hand combat range of the enemy. In many cases, this was the first
time they had been within such close contact with the enemy, save for trench raids and
patrols. And with this close contact, there were abundant opportunities for bloodlust,
revenge, and rage killings, especially as some enemy units, such as machine gunners,
refused to give in and fought to the bitter end. There is both anecdotal and official
evidence of the killing of German POWs and those attempting to surrender in the heat of
battle. At times, this killing was presented matter-of-factly in letters and memoirs, such as
those of Agar Adamson.1025 Other soldiers, however, felt guilty about contravening
international laws, agreements, and the norms of war. Some justified it by arguing that it
was of military necessity, part of orders received from superiors, or was done for the
safety of them and comrades.1026 This abrogation of the moral high ground was the result
of intense combat, but also reflected that at times no amount of discipline, training,
orders, expectations, or regimental culture could prevent human emotions from
overwhelming the individual. This was just one reason why connections to home and
family life, partly in the form of letters,1027 were so important for the soldiers at the front.
Constant reinforcements of their humanity perhaps helped prevent further
dehumanization of the enemy across No Man’s Land.

At Vimy Adamson wrote that “A German Major refused to be sent with prisoners to the rear, except in charge of a
Major. He will trouble us no more,” suggesting that his captors shot this uncooperative German prisoner as a matter of
course. Christie, ed., Letters of Agar Adamson, 274.
1026 Wheeler recounted at Amiens that the 54th Battalion had received orders to take no prisoners, and to “show no
mercy” to the enemy. In another section, he wrote that beyond Denain German MG crews were “given no quarter,” and
that those who refused to surrender were “despatched without mercy.” In a telling statement, he wrote that “it was
impossible to avoid taking so many alive,” suggesting that they did not want to take many alive. Wheeler, The 50th
Battalion in No Man’s Land, 244 and 279. Barnes noted in his journal that he witnessed and even participated in the
shooting of prisoners. He wrote, for example, that when they reached the German lines not all were captured, as “we
shot them down like dogs.” In another case, POWs were killed on their way to prisoner cages in the rear. And in a final
example, Barnes wrote that his comrade “Bell wanted to say for sure that he killed a German and so he shot a prisoner
point-blank.” Cane, ed., Journal of Deward Barnes, 226-231.
1027 Postal arrangements were thus crucial to the soldiers. During the open warfare of the period it was important that
letters and packages from home be delivered to the soldiers, even being brought up with military supplies if need be.
LAC, RG 9 III C10, Volume 4575, Folder 1, File 8, ‘Postal Arrangements during Operations,’ 2 September 1918.
1025

290

For the historian, there were also lessons to be gleaned from this time period. The
Canadian forces during the war were composed mostly of volunteer citizen-soldiers,
rather than professionals. And though months and years at the front tended to create
hardened veterans familiar with the strains of warfare, these were still humans with
natural (biological) reactions to trauma and terror. It is thus not surprising that despite
comradeship and pride in unit, discipline and effective leadership, and both ‘carrots and
sticks’ to keep soldiers at duty, some were unable to stand the strain and sought an escape
from the horror of combat, death, and dying. Many soldiers over time became war weary
and cautious, or fatalistic and apathetic, reducing their participation in combat to a bare
minimum; others suffered shell shock debilitation or panic, and did all they could to avoid
the sources of their fear and uncertainty. This is just one reason why instances of AWL
and desertion continued throughout the Hundred Days,1028 despite the tangible signs of
military success and corresponding indications of German disintegration. And desperate
soldiers would do nearly anything to escape their plight at the front, or evade duty,
including surrendering, adopting reckless behaviour that invited death or wounding, and
the administering of a SIW or illness. For these soldiers, almost any fate was preferable to
the inevitable result of the trenches and combat. Ultimately, just like human society and
life in general, combat and warfare more generally were (and remain) complex and
confusing, and resist clean, easy analysis.
Other unpredictable elements such as inclement weather or enemy responses1029
could make things difficult, or even compromise attacks altogether. Heavy rain turned the
battlefield into a bloody morass, and a well-timed and executed counterattack could
dislodge troops from recently-captured positions. Problems with the “inevitable confusion
and obscurity of close fighting” were also common in this period.1030 This emphasised the
need for substantial reserves close at hand, contingency plans and flexibility, as well as
robust communications. Perhaps most importantly, however, was the need to ensure that
soldiers were kept well-rested, and physically and mentally prepared for any

LAC, RG 9 III B2, Volume 3597, 24-1-4C, ‘Returns, Strengths, Casualties.’
Corrigall, The History of the Twentieth Canadian Battalion, 245.
1030 LAC, RG 9 III C1, Volume 3913, Folder 43, File 3, ‘Notes and Comments on Bourlon Wood Operation.’
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contingencies. Disorganisation was inevitable in combat, but it was important to minimise
the chances for confusion and exhaustion, lest they undermine efforts to seize objectives
and the ability to do one’s duty.1031 And yet despite all these difficulties, the Corps and its
allies were able to triumph and eventually bring about the cessation of hostilities.
The Canadian experience in Hundred Days was presented by veterans and unit
historians in a largely positive light. Regimental histories acknowledged the costly nature
of the fighting, especially with their honour rolls and lists of the fallen, but also
interpreted the Canadian role as effective, making a direct contribution to victory.
Moreover, many histories have a decidedly nationalist tone, emphasising Canada’s
contributions, sometimes at the expense of other formations and the very real and
important role played by other forces. It would be anti-historical and misguided, for
instance, to acknowledge the role played by the Corps while at the same time failing to
stress the role of Canadians within the wider British Army. The Corps was part of the
British Army, and the British Army was but one of the major armies on the Western Front
in 1918, fighting alongside its French, Belgian, and American allies. Nevertheless, these
histories and numerous secondary accounts emphasised that the war, especially Vimy
Ridge, Third Ypres, and the Hundred Days were an important event for Canada. A history
of the 1st Canadian CCS highlighted that Canadians “took a prominent part” in the attacks
on Amiens, Arras, the DQ Switch, Canal du Nord, Cambrai, and other battles.1032 A
biographer of Currie also made reference to the “outstanding” achievements of the Corps
in the Hundred Days, noting good fighting qualities and efficient military
organisation.1033 And even into the 21st Century, laudatory accounts stressing Canada’s
important contributions continue to emerge. In a history of the 1st Division, for example,
the Hundred Days was presented as a “rapid succession of set-piece attacks” and “a
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continuous coordinated advance.”1034 This was a view echoed by other historians, one of
whom wrote that this was “the most sustained series of offensives in the entire war,” and
that the Canadians were “practically never out of the line,”1035 yet never wavered.
Though this might be a reductive reading of the historical record there is truth to
this, and cotemporary army reports and official documents also conform to this view,
while recognising the problems and the casualties incurred. One report for November
1918 referred to the “heavy and continuous fighting for three months.” This report also
pointed to the numerous cities and towns captured by the Canadians, and the liberated
civilians freed from German bondage. In this way, the Canadians were depicted as
conquering heroes, despite the fact that there continued to be charges of looting, theft, and
other untoward behaviour in the formerly occupied areas. Ultimately, the actions of the
Canadian forces during the war were interpreted by many back home as earning a place
for Canada at the negotiating table. It would be simplistic and anachronistic to say that
Canadian independence and sovereignty were born on the slopes of Vimy Ridge or in the
battles of the Hundred Days, especially as the repatriation of the constitution did not
occur until 1982, and the Statute of Westminster was years away (1931). It was popularly
understood that Canada’s role in the war justified its presence at the Versailles Peace
Conference as a junior, but independent, ally of Great Britain.
Luckily for the soldiers of the Corps, the Allies were able to force the surrender of
the enemy before 1919. There were many factors that help explain why the war turned out
the way it did, and why it happened when it did, but suffice it to say here that the
Canadians played an important role in the fight to victory. The Hundred Days campaign
was, in fact, the culmination of a steep learning curve, where lessons from previous
operations were incorporated into attack plans, and where an all-arms doctrine emerged to
overcome the enemy defences. It first took a rather heavy toll in both blood and treasure
to determine that careful planning, and limited set-piece attacks increased the chances of
battlefield success. Effective attacks also served to reinforce the reputation of the Corps
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as elite, marching shoulder to shoulder with its allies.1036 And by 1918 the Entente
boasted overwhelming technological advantages over the Central Powers; their economic,
industrial, and financial strength also gave them enormous powers that their enemies
simply could not match. It cannot be denied, however, that Germany and its allies had
agency, and also played a role in their own defeat. The German offensives of March to
June 1918, for instance, served to inflict heavy casualties on the attackers, exhausted firstrate stormtroop units, put heavy strain on existing resources, expanded supply lines, and
of course hurt morale after promises of victory.
The final months of the war can also be understood in terms of morale, discipline,
combat motivation, and endurance. War weariness, related to these concepts and yet
separate from them, is also an effective way of understanding the experience of the
soldiers in the Hundred Days, and to a lesser extent the rest of the war too. It is my
contention that Canadian soldiers triumphed in this period despite the presence and
impact of war weariness on both an individual and collective level. The historical record,
firsthand accounts, and other evidence emphasises that other armies experienced even
more serious and deep-rooted war weariness compared with the Canadians.1037 Strong
morale was one way to stave off and minimise war weariness and mitigate against its
worst aspects. When Foch became Commander-in-Chief of the Allied Armies in the
spring of 1918, there was hope that a combined strategy would be able to finally and
effectively drive the enemy back. There was a sense that despite the heavy casualties and
resistance, progress was being made, and hope was evident. As one contemporary put it
“these are anxious days for Germany and encouraging ones for us…Foch is hurling his
opponent against the ropes…[and] the knock-out blow will follow later.”1038 After the
successful attack at Amiens, some even began to think that the war might come to an end
in the next few months. One British soldier stated “by Jove, the war’s coming to an
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end,”1039 which served to uplift them. Many were also heartened to leave the old Somme
battlefields behind and enter open country again, with one remembering that leaving the
old war-scarred land “was marvellous.”1040 D.J. Corrigall of the 20th Battalion noted that a
“spirit of optimism was in the air” after the success at Amiens.1041 As the Hundred Days
continued, tangible signs of success continued to emerge. Morale was also bolstered after
the men learned that Turkey, one of Germany’s allies, had sued for peace.1042
Morale was also be strengthened and preserved by both physical and non-physical
aspects. Of the former, hearty and timely food, clean water, alcohol, cigarettes, letters and
parcels from home, good clothing and equipment, physical comforts provided by
chaplains,1043 the YMCA, and other support services all contributed to the health, wellbeing, and ability of soldiers to withstand the strains of war. After months and then years
of war, it was often the little material comforts that mattered, and helped sustain the
troops just a bit longer. Of the non-physical factors that helped bolster morale, luck,
chance, superstition, religious belief, and fatalism all played a role. Some troops held firm
to their religious beliefs despite the horrors of war, which helped them endure the trauma
and terror of the front. Others used superstition, talismans or lucky charms in an attempt
to ward off danger – at times, it seemed that one survived based on mere chance.1044
These things made no real difference in reality, but were important if soldiers believed
they helped, and thus took psychological and emotional comfort in them. Importantly,
however, soldiers putting too much stock into the idea of chance could become
disheartened too. Losing a friend to a stray shell far behind the lines after surviving a tour
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of duty in the trenches, for instance, might be very difficult to accept. The apparent
randomness could unnerve even the strongest and most dedicated. And the idea that you
could be killed despite all your experiences and best efforts to stay safe could certainly be
demoralising. Success and commitment on the battlefield could also be explained, in part,
through other non-physical aspects such as “fighting spirt,” faith in leadership, the plans
of attack, abilities and equipment, confidence, “determination…dash and gallantry,” the
“high spirits” of the troops, “enthusiasm” and any number of other intangibles that are
difficult to explain, let alone quantify.1045
Just as there were myriad factors and forces that could bolster morale and
positively shape the soldier’s mind toward duty and belief in ultimate victory, there were
even more that undermined and eroded morale. As historians it is important to assess both
sides, and decide whether strengthening or weakening aspects were in the ascendency. A
single incident could assault morale, or it could be eroded over time though poor
leadership, bad equipment or clothing,1046 inadequate food, and lack of rest and respite.
As Currie wrote regarding the Canal du Nord, the “tremendous exertions and
considerable casualties consequent upon the four days of almost continuous fighting had
made heavy inroads on the freshness and efficiency of all arms” involved, and it was
doubtful whether further success could be attained as a result.1047 And a poem entitled

A report of late 1917 stated that “the greatest factor of success…was the fighting spirit of the men, tempered by
discipline, developed by training and enhanced by the confidence in themselves and their officers created by a year of
unbroken success.” Raids and training also helped build morale. LAC, RG 9 III C1, Volume 3859, Folder 85, File 8,
‘Reasons for Success in Recent Operations by Canadians on Second Army Front,’ and Ibid, HQ General Staff,
‘Preliminary Notes on Recent Operations on the Front of the Second Army;’ LAC RG 9 III C15, Volume 4664, Report,
‘23 June – 17 February’ and ‘Chaplains with Canadian Corps during September 1918;’ LAC, RG 9 III C3, Volume
4163, Folder 11, File 4, Operations Amiens, 5-8-18 to 16-8-18, document of 16 August 1918 and Ibid, Folder 8, File 1,
Operations Valenciennes, 21-10-18 to 9-11-18, October 1918, ‘9th Brigade, 116th Battalion;’ and Volume 4214, Folder
2, File 3, Operations Valenciennes, November 1918, 47th Battalion, including ‘Narrative of Operations,’ and report of
13-11-18 by J.M. Ross, CO 10th CIB.
1046 The lack of proper clothing, especially during the cold winter months, could attack the morale of the troops. In 1918
the lack of great coats and cardigans created “a serious problem,” and this lack of warm clothing “entails great
discomforture” [sic] amongst the men. Moreover, General Routine Order No. 33 of August 1918 stated that men should
try to maintain their clothing and equipment themselves, and that “clothing should be continued in wear until actually
worn out” before requesting replacements. They were also instructed to allow regimental or divisional tailors attempt to
repair them before requesting new clothing or equipment. See LAC, RG 9 III C10, Volume 4564, Folder 2, File 11,
‘Clothing Correspondence, Generally’ and Ibid, ‘General Routine Order No. 33,’ 16 August 1918.
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Armistice Day by T. McKenzie of Saskatchewan, contained the following lines, expressed
relief that the war had finally ended, but that it had been a hard road:
If you ever recall the sights we have seen
You’ll always remember in hell we have been.
For in Flanders fields at break of day
The dead and dying around did lay…1048
The death of comrades and effective leaders certainly had the ability to hurt the morale
and emotional well-being of those in the unit, but casualties also had the added effect of
putting an extra burden on the survivors. There was ‘survivor’s guilt,’ but there were
other burdens to shoulder as well. Exhaustion was a reality for all soldiers, regardless of
their branch of service. And during the Hundred Days there was even less time and
opportunity for rest than during trench warfare. The military authorities came to
acknowledge the detrimental effects of exhaustion on the abilities of the soldiers,1049 and
that soldiers needed to go into battle ‘fresh’ and well-rested. Exhaustion also contained
both physical and non-physical aspects, and thus rest from combat and respite from the
sources of stress were both essential.
Perhaps the largest assault on morale was that for much of the war, despite what
the propagandists and politicians said, there was no end in sight – except perhaps death.
One soldier wrote that by 1918 he and his mates were “almost reconciled to the belief that
the war would go on forever.” James Adams of the 26th Battalion wrote after the Arras
battles that any “exhilaration” he once felt gave way to “the awful realisation that this is
not a one time test and will go on and on with no definite end.”1050 In addition to this, for
many soldiers there was not much to look forward to. Leave was welcome by all, but
happened all too rarely, especially for the rank and file. Time out of the line and rotation
into reserve areas was also welcomed, yet time behind the front lines often did not mean
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actual rest and the ability to properly and fully recover. Infantry units out of the line were
still expected to undertake training and contribute to work parties. One soldier wrote in
mid-August that not knowing when the war would end, or how far they still had to go was
rather tough on the troops;1051 this sense of uncertainty preyed on the men, and eroded
their staying power over time. And as the final campaign continued and it became clearer
that the war might be ended in the next weeks, no one wanted to be killed so near the end.
As one artillery officer noted, every soldier still exposed to enemy fire “must have
wondered whether he was going to survive, or whether some shell ‘with his name on it’
would wipe him off the rolls in the last hours of the long war.”1052 This served to
undermine the enthusiasm and confidence of those still in the line, and for some troops,
induced a sense of caution that ran counter to Allied strategy at this phase of the war.
One way in which the authorities sought to keep the troops in the line was the use
of army discipline. Military discipline had three general characteristics: punishment, the
threat of punishment (deterrence), and as a system of personnel management. Upon
enlistment in the forces soldiers were aware of the numerous rules, regulations, and army
laws they were subject to. These were often published in daily and routine orders, to
remind the soldiers and to draw their attention to specific issues. In October of 1918, for
example, orders were issued to units in the forward areas about looting and removing
furniture to furnish dugouts, huts, and other billets. The high command instructed COs
that “formations and units will adopt strict measures to prevent such occurrences, which
not only constitute a grave disobedience of orders, but also tend to bring into disrepute the
fair name of the British Army.”1053 An increase in incidents, or the high command’s
awareness of such incidents, likely prompted these orders to be issued with such urgency.
Part of discipline was to instil unquestioning obedience. The idea was that if
soldiers naturally obeyed orders while out of the line, they were more likely to
automatically do so while at the front and under dangerous conditions in the line. The
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entire functioning of the armed forces depended on this obedience to legal and legitimate
orders. This was one reason why the army seemed to care so much about appearance and
behaviour, even far from the front. One report of October 1918, for instance, lamented the
“slackness in saluting” shown by troops, their posture, and body language.1054 These
behaviours apparently suggested a lack of respect for officers, the uniform, and the army,
and might undermine the very hierarchy that was so crucial for executing tasks, carrying
out orders, and maintaining continuity of leadership. This also explain the emphasis upon
cleanliness, discipline, and ‘smartness’ in appearance. One soldier in August of 1918 was
punished for having a “dirty rifle on parade.”1055 It was difficult for combat soldiers to
keep their weapons and equipment clean, but even for those on the lines of
communication it could seem frivolous to expect such cleanliness during active service
conditions, especially considering the pace of the Hundred Days. It seems, moreover, that
for the authorities any breach of discipline or disobedience, whether big or small, at the
front or behind the lines, could be interpreted as contrary discipline and perhaps the first
step toward the breakdown of the army hierarchy, order, and control. It was even more
difficult to get the soldiers to obey orders in the heat of battle, so it was important to
inculcate automatic and unquestioning obedience out of the line. In order to uphold
discipline and punish offending soldiers, military police (MPs) and provost agents were
used. By late August 1918, the Corps had 216 MPs in France alone.1056
Yet despite all the rules and regulations, and the personnel to enforce them, there
were still breaches of discipline and crimes committed in the Hundred Days. This is
important, if only because some historians have asserted that breaches of discipline
spiked during periods of inactivity, or when things looked rather bleak. The final months
of the war were anything but a period of inactivity, and though no one knew when (or
even if) the war would end, there was some cautious hope based on military successes in
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this period. Desertion and AWL, voluntary surrenders, SIWs, and acts of collective
indiscipline (‘strikes’ or mutinies) were examples of soldier discontent and attempts to
escape the front. There were, moreover, attempts to minimise individual participation or
evade further duty rather than escape the situation entirely. Hard fighting and heavy
casualties were a reality during the Hundred Days, but an extended period of inactivity it
certainly was not. This suggests that breaches of discipline were just part of the soldier
life, and that these crimes/acts of indiscipline were a way for soldiers to augment their
meagre rations (in the form of theft and looting), for example, or a way to let off some
steam, acting as an important safety valve. Grumbling, grousing, and complaining were a
natural part of being a soldier; verbal complaints did not necessarily lead to illegal actions
or military crimes, and there were different types of dissent and discontent.
If the final months of the war put more pressure on the soldiers taking part in these
operations, it also provided them with increased opportunities for indiscipline, especially
to loot, thieve, and acquire ‘souvenirs.’ Charles Harrison wrote that as the troops arrived
in Arras, “discipline has disappeared,” and looting for food commenced. Challenges to
military authority were evident, especially as there were fights between soldiers and MP
in the city.1057 One soldier candidly admitted that he and his pals “blew the padlock off” a
brewery in Arras, and before they knew it the “fellows were bathing in white wine.”1058
But then some MPs showed up, and “of course there was a fracas” between the two
groups. Looting was also frowned upon as the victims were often civilians, rather than
enemy soldiers; Allied forces were there to end the occupation, not aggravate its effects.
Captain G.A. Ramsay of the CAMC also noted the effects of looting, which had a
“baleful” effect on discipline in the area.1059 From the army point of view, the toleration
of discipline in one area might very well have encouraged it elsewhere. Others made
reference to corpses being looted, though it is rarer to see personal admissions of
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participating in this. 1060 Many other troops, however, readily admitted to ‘relieving’
German POWs of watches, badges, and other highly-coveted souvenir items.1061
Indiscipline in this period also included insubordination and the refusal of orders.
Will Bird (42nd Battalion) wrote of disobeying direct orders, standing up to a new officer,
and even threatening him with bodily harm if an unpopular order was not rescinded.1062
Under the Army Act alone, Bird and his comrades could have been charged with several
crimes or breaches of discipline. Section 8 (1), for example, covered ‘offering violence to
his superior officer,’ or ‘striking his superior officer,’ whereas 8 (2b) was ‘using
insubordinate or threatening language to his superior officer.’ Section 9 pertained to
‘disobedience of an order or lawful command,’ and section 11 was ‘refusing to obey a
general order.’ Disobedience and refusing orders are found in other firsthand accounts as
well. Sometimes this took the form of halting an attack and going to ground rather than
continuing, or even withdrawing without orders to do so. At times, this behaviour was
based more on biological determinants and self-preservation, rather than on wilful
disobedience or cowardice. Army discipline was designed to overcome these instincts and
natural responses, though. John Becker of the 75th Battalion wrote of going to ground
during an artillery barrage and attack. He admitted that “I was genuinely ashamed of
myself for flattening…as I was familiar enough with shelling to know by the sound if
[sic] would not be close.” He further wrote that “I realized then that my nerves were
going and that I wouldn’t be much good in action if I kept at it many weeks longer,”1063
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ignored.” Bird, Ghosts Have Warm Hands, 110, 117, 129, 135-136.
1063 Christie, The Memoir of John Harold Becker, 203.

301

illustrating the wear and tear on even committed volunteer veterans. Many soldiers
wanted to stick it out at duty, but were becoming increasingly unable to do so.
There were also some troops who candidly admitted they would welcome a
Blighty wound that would allow them to leave the trenches honourably, legally and
legitimately, but without having to do something drastic. In numerous memoirs, letters,
journals, and other accounts, many expressed the hope for a Blighty without having to
resort to more extreme measures like desertion or SIWs,1064 which were dangerous and
could bring disrepute on the individual and unit. When soldiers did finally get their
Blighty and were removed from combat, a sense of relief, and envy from their comrades,
was palpable.1065 One officer noted that “we often killed time by debating the question of
how badly we would be willing to be hit to get a Blighty,” and thus removed from
combat, at least temporarily.1066 This talk did not necessarily suggest demoralisation or
defeatism, but a decrease in commitment to the war effort could spread amongst young,
inexperienced, or impressionable troops. Perhaps more importantly, however, for some
desperate soldiers, this talk could turn to action after months and years of trauma and
tension. Some might have decided that they would throw caution to the wind and act in an
overly aggressive manner, reclaiming their agency and asserting their independence.
Reckless behaviour could bring further danger to the unit, and also ran counter to
military control and discipline. In the words of one veteran, from that point forward it was
either the ‘Victoria Cross or a wooden cross,’ suggesting an award for bravery, or death.
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Other troops, however, might have decided that instead of waiting to get a Blighty in
combat naturally, they would help the process along and put themselves in harm’s
way.1067 Others took the next step, administering a SIW or illness to ensure they no longer
remained effective as a soldier, whereas some went AWL or sought to escape duty
permanently through desertion or surrender.1068 And finally, the killing of prisoners also
represented a breakdown of army authority and discipline, could be counterproductive,
and put comrades in harm’s way in the form of retaliation for such behaviour.1069 And
yet, despite orders to the contrary and the negative aspects related to this illegal conduct,
killing prisoners continued throughout the war. As one infantry subaltern wrote, the
“circumstances of infantry fighting in the war were not such as to engender a chivalrous
attitude towards the enemy.” And furthermore, in this war there was “violence done by
angry men, whose experience had filled their hearts with cold fury and disgust,”1070
clearly not conducive to sympathy and mercy when emotions ran high and the cold steel
of the bayonet found vulnerable targets.
Disciplinary issues were evident on both sides of the line1071 in the final months of
the war. Discipline was an important way to understand soldier behaviour and the attitude
of authorities because it was often used as a proxy to measure the morale and military
effectiveness of a given unit. A battalion with high desertion and trench foot rates, for

One soldier who sought a ‘cushy’ put his hand above the parapet to attract German fire. Another soldier, “fed up
and far from home,” put his hand over the top, hoping to get hit. Ibid and Gabriel, Madness and Psychiatry, 53.
1068 For SIWs and illnesses as a means to escape the horrors of the trenches and active service conditions, see Gabriel,
Madness and Psychiatry, 57. One historian also wrote that “given enough exposure to combat,” soldiers eventually
realised and accepted that death and mutilation was inevitable, and based more on luck than skill. These soldiers came
to accept that “it is going to happen to me, and only my not being there is going to prevent it.” Christopher H. Hamner,
Enduring Battle: American Soldiers in Three Wars, 1776 – 1945 (Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, 2011), 219.
Many contemporary authorities, as well as historians today, have used SIWs statistics, surrender, and desertion rates as
a measure of a unit’s morale and discipline. See, for example, Philpott, War of Attrition, 119.
1069 The killing of POWs represented the breakdown of army authority as prisoners were to be kept alive for intelligence
purposes, as well as to ensure good treatment for British and other Entente prisoners held by the enemy. Killing POWs
could also be counterproductive as good intelligence could be lost, and rumours and knowledge that Canadians did not
take prisoners might encourage future Germans never to surrender, or even revenge killings and other atrocities. For the
killing of POWs, see Bird, Ghosts Have Warm Hands, 98, 106, 111, 120, 140.
1070 Douie, Recollections of a Subaltern of Infantry, 184-185.
1071 German generals made note of these disciplinary problems, partly to help explain the inability to stop the Allied
advance in the summer and autumn of 1918. Ludendorff noted, for example, poor morale, “skulkers” in units, and
demoralised soldiers. The German authorities also had to deal with 10,000s of deserters and those wilfully surrendering.
And Ludendorff also wrote of the establishment of German worker and soldier councils, indicating an influx of political
agitation and war weariness. Ludendorff, My War Memories Volume II, 542, 585, 587.
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example, was often understood as lacking in morale and the appropriate application of
top-down and self-discipline. Stronger leadership and a better appreciation of duty could
bring these rates down, so the argument went. Moreover, discipline was also seen as a
prerequisite for effective action in combat. At the Canal du Nord Currie explained that
success was based to a large measure on “iron discipline” and tactical expertise.1072 But
what, exactly, did this mean? Did it suggest the unquestioning obedience to orders,
regardless of consequences, even if it resulted in heavy casualties? Or did it suggest
strength in the face of opposition, and self-mastery over one’s panic and self-preservation
instinct? These disciplinary problems also had a direct effect on the fighting itself. When
authority broke down, and indiscipline rose, it could result in killing prisoners. At
Valenciennes, rumours and stories of brutal German occupation overwhelmed some
soldier’s sense of morality and discipline. One officer admitted that the German
occupation of Denain (and other cities) “so stimulated their desire to revenge the wrongs
done [to] these wretched people, that the miserable enemy could expect and certainly
received no quarter” in combat.1073 The capture of enemy forces was preferable, in many
ways, to the continued fighting between the two sides that served to elevate casualty rates.
Combat motivation is often understood as being composed of ‘carrots and sticks,’
or positive ways to encourage certain behaviour, through promises and rewards, and
threats of punishments or punishment itself should the soldier not fulfill his duty. This is a
useful analogy which helps explain soldier behaviour. There were both positive and
negative motivators, with the former encouraging good outcomes through duty and
combat, and the latter examining the fear of specific outcomes (for oneself, their unit, or
others entirely) should certain behaviour not be adhered to, and negative aspects that
shaped behaviour as well. In terms of positive inducements to behaviour, the apparent
righteousness and justice of the cause was motivation enough for some. After the signing
of the Armistice, Currie’s ‘Special Order of the Day’ thanked the troops for their
dedication and service. He referred to the soldiers, “conscious of the righteousness of

LAC, RG 9 III D1, Volume 4747, Folder 178, File 2, ‘Special Order of the Day,’ Canal du Nord.
LAC, RG 9 III C3, Volume 4214, Folder 2, File 3, Operations Valenciennes, November 1918, 47 th Battalion,
‘Narrative of Operations,’ and report dated 13-11-18 by J.M. Ross, CO 10th CIB.
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your cause,” who “have fought many battles and endured cruel hardships” throughout. 1074
According to Currie, in the end their suffering had been worth it. There were also
religious and moral overtones to inducements to fighting, stressing the need to rid the
world of its current danger, including militarism and the belief in ‘might over right.’ In
this regard, chaplains at the front and pastors in Canada had an important role to play in
motivating the soldiers to fight, and if need be, die for the cause. Some troops were
motivated by these high ideals and sense of holy obligation, as evident in the Latin
phrase: Melius est mori quant vivendi perdere causas.1075 One French Army chaplain also
told his troops that “friends, you are fighting for God’s cause…He has a splendid reward
for those who might fall.” Others stressed the great moral issues at stake, the war aims,
the “righteousness and justice of our cause,” and the opportunities for “the recognition
and renewal of our personal and national obligations to Almighty God in whose cause the
Allied sword has been unsheathed.”1076 Yet other chaplains appealed to the manhood or
masculinity of their flock, for example in stating that “there will be no feeble effort” or
weaklings among members of the Bible Society,1077 and that these soldiers should have
courage and follow in the example of Christ. Some chaplains made a direct comparison
between the suffering of Christ and that of the soldiers during the war.1078
In addition to the Allies’ war aims and the cause for which they were fighting,
during the final months the Canadians encountered numerous examples and reminders as
to why they were fighting. The liberation of cities, towns, and villages, along with
thousands of inhabitants, were tangible reminders that this war was about the lives of
human beings,1079 who by all accounts had suffered during occupation; there were many

PPCLI Archives, Sub-Series 16, Artificial Collections, Regimental History, First World War, File 16 (1.3) – 1,
Currie’s ‘Special Order of the Day,’ 15 November 1918.
1075 Which roughly translates as ‘Rather die than lose what makes life worth living.’ LAC, RG 9 III C15, Volume 4664,
Extracts, ‘Captain Adrien Beausoleil,’ section entitled ‘How Morale can be Built Up.’
1076 Ibid, and ‘Precis of Reports (monthly), August 1918.’
1077 LAC, RG 9 III C15, Volume 4663, Publicity, newspaper clippings.
1078 Vance devotes an entire chapter in Death So Noble to the connections between Christianity and the war (Chapter 2:
Christ in Flanders).
1079 It seemed that many soldiers appreciated the warm reception they got from the locals upon liberation. This acted as
a tangible reminder as to what they were fighting for. Subsequent interactions with civilians, for example helping with
the cultivation of the land, were also a reminder as to who they were helping. LAC, RG 9 III C3, Volume 4189, Folder
8, File 1, Operations Valenciennes, 21-20-18 to 9-11-18, October 1918, 9th Brigade, ‘Field Messages’ and ‘Narrative of
Operations,’ 116th Battalion and LAC, RG 9 III C3, Volume 4214, Folder 1, File 1, ‘Agriculture.’
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civilians and refugees in these areas. Liberation acted as a morale boost for troops, and
Victor Wheeler of the 50th Battalion wrote that “we felt a deep gratification in our mission
to liberate a conquered people and free enslaved spirits.”1080 The liberation of Denain, for
example, brought the reality of the suffering in occupied areas home to the soldiers. In an
address on the city’s liberation, its abbot spoke of German actions and “the odious crime
of a colossal empire.” He explained that the citizens were “weary of suffering,” of the
pillaging, having their rights trampled, their dignity outraged, the theft and looting,
families broken apart, and all the other injustices.1081 Letters of thanks from civilians,
being feted as liberators, visits from dignitaries, and messages of congratulations from
Currie, PM Borden, the Prince of Wales and others might very well have sustained the
soldiers at this late phase of the war.1082 These messages and visits were also an official
recognition of the part played by the soldiers in this final campaign.
Evidence of success on the battlefield and of impending victory in the wider war
also helped sustain some of the troops who had been worn down over months and years
of war. This also played an important role in keeping war weariness at a simmer. Currie
himself wrote that prior to the opening of the Battle of Arras in late August, the troops
were already “flushed with the great victory they had just won” at Amiens.1083 Success on
the battlefield beget confidence and a growing belief that the war might be victoriously
concluded before every last soldier currently in the ranks was killed or maimed. And
though Germany was certainly the senior and most important member of the Central
Powers, the fall of Turkey and then Austria-Hungary,1084 and the prospect of ultimate
victory, provided added motivation. And aside from wanting to complete the task at hand
and see the war through to its (successful) conclusion, many soldiers were also motivated

Wheeler, The 50th Battalion in No Man’s Land, 258.
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regarding ‘The Deliverance of Denain, by the Canadian Corps,’ 27 October 1918.’
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by the desire to ensure the sacrifices of their comrades, who had fallen on the field of
battle in the thousands, had not been in vain. To guarantee this, however, the Allies would
have to emerge victorious over their foe. This, of course, meant pressing on despite the
growing war weariness in all quarters. On the eve of Amiens, Currie instructed his troops
to “remember with solemn pride our gallant dead,” and to live up to their heroic example.
He reminded his subordinates to remember the Corps’ past achievements, and with an
“unmistakable belief in the justice of our cause” and a faith in God, to “fight for freedom,
for righteousness, for humanity.” And as a final word of encouragement, Currie
admonished his troops that with “high purpose and enduring determination let us ‘carry
on’ until the last fight is over and the final victory won” in this war.1085 During the
Hundred Days itself Currie reminded his officers to continue with training and discipline,
“united in a burning desire for victory of right over might”1086 which justified their
involvement in this bloody war.
Sometimes this ‘burning desire’ boiled over into acts of indiscipline as moral
outrage, a sense of wrath or revenge, or other less-than-honourable motivators animated
the soldiers in the final months. Some troops were motivated, frankly put, less by high
ideals of duty, hearth and home, service, and Christian sacrifice than by more mundane
things like souvenir acquisition and opportunities for plunder. For others, souvenirs were
merely a bonus, just rewards in a bloody affair that caused untold suffering. The historian
of the 2nd Battalion noted the propensity of troops to take souvenirs from the enemy, and
getting drunk on captured booze.1087 In other cases, food and drink were looted from
overrun stores and civilian establishments to augment monotonous, and at times
insufficient, army rations. For some, with looting and the collecting of souvenirs there
was an element of superstition to it.1088 Soldiers used superstitions, talismans, and other
‘lucky charms’ as a psychological defence mechanism to the horrors of war, and so
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anything that allowed the men to carry on at the front, without bringing undue dishonour
to the army, was generally accepted.
The moral outrage experienced by many Allied troops in the final months of the
war also acted as a powerful motivator. During trench warfare, the ability to appreciate
the destructiveness of the war and the deliberate destructive behaviour of the enemy was
rather limited. During the open warfare of the Hundred Days, however, the atrocities
committed and the destruction wrought were evident for all to see, at least in any given
area. The liberation of inhabited regions and the meeting of refugees and civilians in
countless number brought the Canadians face-to-face with the victims of German
aggression. These experiences were also exacerbated by years of rumours and stories as
to the frightful behaviour of ‘the Hun.’ Some of these atrocity stories were apocryphal,
highly exaggerated, or simply fabrications conjured up by propagandists and politicians.
And yet, many atrocity stories were based in reality, as documented by John Horne and
Alan Kramer in German Atrocities, 1914: A History of Denial. Canadian soldiers in the
final months did encounter much evidence of suffering, violence, and destruction caused
directly or indirectly by the German invasion, occupation, and defensive measures. One
soldier, for example, made reference to houses looted and interiors smashed during
advances.1089 Currie wrote on 9 October that as the troops of the 3rd Division entered
Cambrai they encountered surviving enemy troops, “many of whom I believe were left
behind by the Germans to start fires,” explaining that “new fires have been breaking out
in different parts of the city all day.” The Canadians also had to send out groups to “look
for booby traps,” left behind to kill or maim curious advancing soldiers.1090 Other troops
noted the fires of Cambrai, apparently set in the “spirit of wanton destructiveness.”1091
This must have invoked the ire of the advancing troops, already frustrated and worn down
by the pace of the Hundred Days.
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German occupation and behaviour in the war, the treatment of French and Belgian
civilians, as well as captured Allied POWs, further convinced many attacking troops not
only of the justice of their cause, but also engendered feelings of wrath, revenge, hatred,
and even bloodlust. It became apparent to some that not only should these areas be
liberated of the enemy menace, any captured Germans or those met on the field of battle
should be punished for their wrongdoings. This punishment sometimes took the shape of
war crimes and behaviour that ran counter to military discipline and international norms
of warfare. And yet, as these powerful emotions were stirred up in the liberators, officers
and COs found themselves unable, and at times unwilling, to rein in their troops.
Accounts of wartime service referred to hatred of the Germans, and the ongoing process
of de-humanisation throughout the war. Others made reference to the sinking of the
H.M.H.S. Llandovery Castle,1092 and how this tragedy was invoked just prior to the
opening of the Battle of Amiens to ‘get the blood up.’1093 Historian Tim Cook explained
the connection between the Battle of Amiens and Llandovery Castle thusly:
For the Canadians, the operations [at Amiens] was informally known as
Llandovery Castle, in homage to the hospital ship of that name that was sunk at
the end of June by a German U-boat. Eighty-eight of the ninety-four Canadians on
board died, including fourteen nurses. Even worse, the U-boat had machinegunned and rammed a number of lifeboats. This was viewed as the height of
barbarity, and as Canadians moved into the line on the night of August 7, many
felt that revenge was in in order. Brigadier George Tuxford…gave orders that the
‘battle cry on the 8th of August should be Llandovery Castle, and that cry should
be the last to ring in the ears of the Hun as the bayonet was driven home.’1094
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The calls for revenge and the reference to ‘the Hun’ further encouraged the dehumanisation of the enemy, making it easier to forego taking prisoners and acting in a
benevolent way upon contact with the enemy.
The news and literature reaching the soldiers at the front, including information
from home (despite censorship and a muzzled and mostly-loyal press), reinforced this
sense of German sinister behaviour. It is thus no surprise that soldiers on the eve of battle
were motivated by a sense of revenge or hatred. Officers often exploited these feelings to
encourage commitment and aggression on the battlefield. This sense of moral outrage was
the result of the sinking of Llandovery Castle, but also other actions like the bombing of
military hospitals behind the lines. One soldier at a reinforcement camp wrote that the
sinking “makes me all the more busting to get there [to the front]” because the Germans
do not “deserve to walk this good earth.”1095 Army publications and newspapers back in
Canada, indeed throughout the Empire, were whipping up martial and anti-German
sentiment, just as war weariness was becoming a serious problem on both the military and
(civilian) home fronts. To provide but one example, on 4 July 1918 The Canadian Daily
Record, printed for the troops in Europe, published an article entitled ‘The Dominion
Aroused: Feeling Intense over Sinking of Canadian Hospital Ship – Outrage Steels the
Nation’s Will.’ In this article references were made to “intense feelings of sorrow and
horror,” based on the “latest Hun sea outrage,” which was “deliberate in its cruelty,” but
just “the most recent exhibition of German infamy.”1096 And in order to capitalise on this
tragedy, the article suggested that “the consensus of opinion…is that by the outrage
Canada’s will to defeat the unspeakable Hun will be further steeled and the national effort
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increased.”1097 In other words, this was no time to give into war weariness, despair, or
defeatism; this event could act as a powerful motivator.
In addition to the newspaper articles and stories from home, Canadians also
personally encountered the victims of German aggression. This acted as a powerful
motivator for many at this phase of the war. One soldier wrote that his anger rose to the
fore after his unit encountered some recently-liberated British prisoners. These formerPOWs were “walking skeletons…[with] rags tied around their feet in lieu of boots, their
clothing crawling with vermin.”1098 And after coming across a POW camp and talking
with some of the troops there, it was determined the inmates had been treated poorly;
there was not enough food, and no heat.1099 Upon attestation, soldiers were aware that it
was possible to fall into enemy hands; this was a fate they accepted, even if it was not one
they hoped to have to endure. And as German resources became stretched to the breaking
point, it is not surprising that food and fuel for enemy prisoners suffered as a result.
The poor treatment of civilians and refugees encountered during the advance also
acted as a motivating force, and stimulated certain emotions in the troops. In a letter from
the front published in The Cobourg World in late November 1918, an officer wrote of his
experience in liberating a French village. The stories he heard chilled his blood, and he
hoped that “Heine’s men” would have to atone for their transgressions, “fourfold.” The
German occupiers had routinely stolen food from the villagers, had destroyed a lady’s
glassware, wrecked furniture “intentionally,” and drove away cattle.1100 Encountering
tired and hungry refugees driven from their homes angered the soldiers,1101 and reinforced
the view that Germans probably did not deserve mercy. Other contemporaries wrote of
enemy atrocities including the shelling of inhabited areas, the rape of women, and the
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kidnapping of civilians for forced labour.1102 All of this came to be known by the soldiers
through indirect channels, and through direct experience in liberating formerly-occupied
areas. Agar Adamson also reflected this view of hatred and anger at the Germans. In a
letter to his wife Mabel he mentioned “the devastated parts of Belgium and France,”
where the people had suffered greatly.1103 He wrote that “I have not the slightest spark of
feeling, but that of hate for any German,”1104 a rather candid admission. And even Currie
admitted in a 1 November letter to Sir Edward Kemp, the Minister of the OMFC, that
We have taken quite a number of prisoners…and furthermore, since our men have
released the French civilians in the areas they have traversed, and have talked with
these civilians concerning their treatment by the Germans, their feelings towards
the enemy have become much more bitter so that this morning I can well imagine
there were not quite as many prisoners taken as usual.1105
A soldier of the 50th Battalion also expressed hatred and even bloodthirstiness as a result
of the ill-treatment of locals. After arriving in a French village, he learned that local
women were forced into prostitution, and other villagers were tired, hungry, and in
rags.1106 It is often difficult to separate the exaggerated and apocryphal from the genuine
stories of the locals, but for many troops, these stories had a direct emotional impact on
them. And after the capture of Cambrai, this same soldier wrote of the “vicious enmity we
felt for the Hun,” but feelings of pity were also developing. He wrote of the devastation
they encountered, that “destruction and misery were everywhere,” and his unit spent an
evening in a “typically ravished village.” And finally, he admitted that “our thirst for
blood of les Allemands was being assuaged with every passing day” in this period.1107 A
report on the Valenciennes operations indicated similar behaviour, as the desire for
revenge led to questionable actions and atrocities. J.M. Ross of the 10th CIB wrote that
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the capture of Valenciennes was completed on 2 November, “to the great rejoicing of the
wretched inhabitants who had been in practical slavery for four years.” His troops had
learned from the locals of the brutal occupation, such as at Denain, Valenciennes, and
other cities, which “stimulated their desire to revenge the wrongs done [to] these
wretched people,” and thus the Germans were given no quarter.1108
The desire for revenge and to free occupied France and Belgium from the German
yoke inspired and motivated the soldiers in this period, but also helped sustain them and
allowed them to endure the stresses and strains of war. This was especially important
after long months and years of war, and combat, which served to erode the morale, health,
and commitment of even the most dedicated volunteer soldiers – they were war weary.
Moreover, this period saw increasing war weariness on both an individual and collective
level, and on the home front. The endurance of the troops in the final months of the war
can be explained in part by both physical and non-physical factors that helped prevent the
worst effects of war weariness and shell shock debilitation. War weariness and shell
shock did, of course, incapacitate and undermine the performance of many, but it would
have been even worse had it not been for these sustaining influences. Medical care,
treatment, and the reassurances that this brought were an important element in the
endurance of the soldiers near the end of the war. The medical services did not always
function properly or were able to effect prompt evacuation, but the chances for survival
after being wounded were greater than in previous conflicts. And despite the difficulties
inherent in open and more mobile warfare, the medical services had grown and learned
much from the previous years of combat. The CAMC and its British counterpart (the
RAMC) had expanded substantially in terms of size, resources, personnel, treatment
capabilities, administrative reach, and transport capacity. For the wounded and ill,
medical services sustained the soldiers, worn down and suffering ill-health from repeated
stressors. The CAMC, in addition to the YMCA and Chaplain Service all played an
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important role in the health, morale, well-being, and material comfort of the troops.1109
Chaplains were placed at HQ, at bases, with combat units, along the lines of
communication, with railway and labour units, and their duties included “ministering to
the spiritual, moral and social welfare of the troops.”1110 Chaplains in conjunction with
the YMCA and other charities also oversaw the entertainment of troops, such as cinemas
and concerts, as well as provided stationary, hot beverages, food, parcels from Canada,
and other material comforts that helped them endure the often brutal nature of the war.
The availability, cleanliness, quantity, and quality of water was also an important factor in
the health and endurance of the soldiers, especially while on the move and encountering
new sources of water, which may or may not have been contaminated.1111
Proper care for the soldiers, and their equipment and animals, went a long way in
sustaining the troops in the final months. This care gave the troops the best chance at the
front, and also illustrated the paternalism and care of the officers for their subordinates.
The supplies and equipment required at the front depended upon the transport services of
the CASC, as well as on the Veterinary Corps. Horses and mules needed proper care,
forage, and water, in addition to sufficient riders and caregivers (like groomers);
veterinarians helped keep these animals healthy and ready for duty. It is not too much to
argue that the entire war machine depended on these animals and their services. And
especially during the Hundred Days when the soldiers were nearly always on the move,
and “from the point of view of maintaining the mobility of the Corps as a fighting
formation, it is most undesirable to reduce the veterinary establishment except under the
most urgent necessity.”1112 When manpower shortages and infantry casualties forced the
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authorities to comb out rear echelon and support units, the case was made that these
veterinary services should be exempt.
In terms of non-material aspects of endurance, many benefitted from the religious
and spiritual support of chaplains. Aside from holding religious services and providing
religious rituals, such as the sacraments, chaplains played an important role in steadying
the soldiers prior to attack. Pep talks, informal chats, and prayers before combat helped
calm the soldiers, some of whom would meet their maker in the next 24 hours. Moreover,
issuing the Last Rites, and promises of a proper Christian burial served to reassure and
comfort believers who were mortally wounded. Chaplains oversaw burial services, gave
talks to men, in private or in small groups, and even wrote to next of kin when soldiers
were KIA. Not all soldiers were Christian, or even religious, of course, but for those who
were the chaplains had an important role to play in ensuring the soldiers were aware of
their duties, and were to be supported in all matters spiritual. In addition, soldiers also
benefitted from rest, relief, respite from trauma, rotation out of the line, and relaxation.
During the Hundred Days one soldier wrote that “after the strain of the preceding days,
the sunshine and relaxation were a welcome and pleasant relief,”1113 and rejuvenated the
troops. Time out of the line allowed them to reacquaint themselves with their humanity,
as well as relaxed their mental, psychological, and biological stress responses to mortal
danger, terror, and trauma. The authorities were responsible for the “comfort and
convenience of the men” while out of the line,1114 even if it was not always possible to
provide them with all they needed to remain healthy and committed. The reference to
‘sunshine,’ however, raises an important point on how circumstances beyond anyone’s
control could both contribute to, and undermine, a soldier’s perception and morale.
Morale, discipline, combat motivation, and endurance are all concepts linked to
the phenomenon of war weariness. The nature, pace, and intensity of the fighting in the
Hundred Days made this the most fertile period of the entire war for the onset,

Section for Corps’ and Ibid, ‘G.O.C. Canadian Corps, 6118/1 (Q.B.2),’ report dated 3 July 1918. See also Cecil French,
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1114 LAC, RG 9 III B1, Volume 392, C-18-1, ‘Canteens and Messes Regarding the Sale of Beer.’
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development, and detrimental impact of war weariness for both individuals, and the
collective (the military unit). Heavy casualties and the continuing use of long-serving
veterans only exacerbated this problem. Moreover, the sense of uncertainty, belief in the
inevitability of death or disfigurement, and a sense of helplessness or hopeless also
compounded the issue. References to the phenomenon of war weariness, and the use of
the term itself, can be found in both contemporary sources and firsthand accounts, and in
secondary sources1115 written by historians and researchers after the war. War weariness
also affected both soldiers (combatant and support personnel), as well as civilians on the
home fronts. War weariness has also been used to understand the post-war world, and
conflicts today.1116
For the soldiers at the front and fighting the war in Europe, war weariness often
took the form of a longing for home, an end to the suffering, and expressions of how ‘fed
up’ they were becoming with all the discomfort and danger. At other times, troops
expressed discontent with how the war was being prosecuted, and desired an end to the
war itself, or at least their own personal participation in it. And others took this a step
further, seeking ways to escape the front or evade duty, if only for a short respite lest they
would ‘crack’ or breakdown shortly. Some accounts, such as letters, are also difficult
sources to assess, in part because of the censors, self-censorship (soldiers often did not
want to worry those at home), and cultural attitudes regarding masculinity and having a
‘stiff upper lip’ in the face of adversity. A few examples should help illustrate how war
weariness began to take its toll on the troops near the end of the war. Corporal Frank
Davidson wrote to his sister from France on 14 July 1918, even before the heavy, nearlycontinuous fighting that began at Amiens. After thanking her for recent correspondence,

1115

Over the years my research has uncovered dozens of references to the phenomenon of war weariness, as well as of
the use of the term itself. See, for example, Babington, Capital Courts-Martial, 117; Boff, Winning and Losing on the
Western Front, 15, 93, 113; Hart, The Great War, 247, 302, 339; Herwig, The First World War, 287, 366; Kellett,
Combat Motivation, 177, 180, 265, 297; Lloyd, Hundred Days, 91, 203; Philpott, War of Attrition, 8, 281, 284, 287,
291, 253, 307, 313, 317, 325, 332; Stephenson, The Final Battle, xi, 8-9, 13, 29-30, 316 and Watson, Enduring the
Great War, 74, 154, 176; Rogers, ed., Gunner Ferguson’s Diary, 11; Travers, The Killing Ground, plate/photo
following page 136. These are just some of the historians who employed this term and concept.
1116 Weinberg, A World at Arms, 15, and Author Unknown, “Port in a Storm: The War in Yemen,” 40.

316

he reassured her that he was “feeling fine,” and that the weather had been good of late.
Later in the letter, however, he wrote that he
sure would like to make a trip home this year, as it is nearly three years since I left
and I have been over two years in France, and while there never out of hearing of
the guns, so you cannot wonder at our getting tired of the awful game…I am
living in hopes that we finish this job this year and then home again.1117
This letter was written before the start of the campaign, and the hard fighting and war
weariness of the next few months was somewhat offset or tempered by the successful
battles and prospect of victory.1118 Other soldiers, moreover, found the inner strength,
outlets, and other sustaining forces to carry on despite their war weariness. One soldier,
W.P. Lajoie, wrote on the opening day of Amiens that “it is a regular hell over here and
every man is fighting for all that is in him and facing death with a smile.” It is important
to note, however, that Lajoie was not combat infantry, where the heaviest casualties were
suffered and we see the largest percentage of war weary soldiers. Would many frontline
infantry have described their plight as ‘facing death with a smile?’ But his later remarks
expressed more war weariness, especially when he wrote that “everybody over here
thinks the fun will be over this fall…[and] I hope it is right for I have had pretty nearly
enough of fighting…[but] still, the war is not over yet, and we are too game to keep quiet,
as fight is our middle name.”1119 He admitted that he had had enough of the fighting, but
also that his pride and commitment ensured he continued, regardless of the consequences.
Other soldiers admitted that their thoughts often focussed on home and loved
ones,1120 and their hope to return shortly. This is not surprising given many soldiers’
youth, lack of international travel, and the regular hardships of combat. The reality of the
war, however, was a sobering prospect that dashed hopes for a quick and easy victory,
even at the end of the war. Sergeant T.P. Lapp wrote in August 1918 that “while we hope
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for an early finish we are not building any hopes on leaving the shores of France before
the close of 1919,” and that “the main point is – we must win, and win we will, regardless
of the time and price.” Not all were so sanguine about ultimate victory, however, and the
uncertainty over when the war would end, or even if it would end in victory, contributed
to the development of war weariness at this phase of the war. Others, moreover, were not
so sure that the ends justified the means, or that victory was worth the cost. Lapp admitted
that “I am writing this from a forward line where daily the price of blood is paid.”1121
How much more blood would have to be paid before final victory was achieved? Were
the soldiers merely sacrificial lambs led to the slaughter, mere blood offerings placed at
the altar to appease Ares or Mars? Some soldiers, certainly, were unwilling or unable to
endure long enough to find out. Others expressed discontent at their day to day lives, with
one writing that “we get very tired of the soldier life and I hope to be home this year,”
whereas others felt they had nothing to look forward to, such as rest or leave.1122 The
horizon only showed the enemy, further death, and suffering.
Deward Barnes of the 19th Battalion also made reference to the phenomenon of
war weariness, without actually using that term. He wrote on 2 October that he was “fed
up with war and have [therefore] neglected my diary.” Another soldier wrote in June
1918 that “I hope this year sees the finish of the war, but I think that the enemy is more
fed up than what we are,”1123 suggesting both the Entente and enemy troops were warweary. My research has suggested that being ‘fed up,’ and admitting as much, was in
many cases tantamount to an acknowledgment of war weariness.1124 Captain Harold
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McGill (31st Battalion) made reference to the “dreary monotony” of the war as very trying
on the troops. There were, of course, periods of intense activity and excitement which
punctuated these long stretches of monotony, but duty, day after day, with the attendant
“dirt, discomfort, noise and sights of blood and death gradually brought about that
condition in a man so graphically described as being ‘fed up.’”1125 Other soldiers were
also ‘fed up’ with the war, with their participation in it, as well as the implications of this
reality. A soldier of the 42nd Battalion admitted that he and his troops were ‘fed up’ by
delayed transports and having missed their breakfast. And though this was a seemingly
mundane issue, matters of food, water, leave, mail and parcels from home,1126 equipment
and supplies made an enormous difference to the health, morale, and well-being of the
troops. This soldier wrote later that they were “damp and depressed,” and “wet and boneweary,” from having to wait for transport – ultimately, this left them “fed up to the back
teeth.”1127 And John Becker of the 75th Battalion wrote that because he was so “fed up,”
orders were disobeyed and he was decidedly apathetic.1128 The editor of Deward Barnes’
journal, moreover, explained his ‘fed up’ attitude as based on the fact that Barnes returned
to the line (“misery”), coupled with “mild depression” and a “return to a hellish and
uncertain existence at the front.”1129 This sense of uncertainty, and the stresses and strains
characteristic of frontline combat, were contributing factors toward war weariness. It
must be noted here, however, that war weariness affected frontline troops, and those on
the lines of communication – none were immune to its effects. The Corps Commander
also made reference to the fact that the soldiers were worn out, and only wanted to be
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done with soldiering. In an address delivered before the Canadian Club in Toronto on 29
August 1919, Currie argued that
You cannot understand how sick we all were of the war, nor our anxiety of
finishing it as soon as possible, if there was any chance of success. Your sons and
brothers wanted to see it out. They wanted to be done with the cursed thing. They
never want to see any more war.1130
It is not clear how representative this view was – that the soldiers wanted to see the war
through, come what may – but certainly some soldiers were increasingly unable to carry
on, even if they had wanted to and been previously committed and dedicated.
Uses of the term war weariness itself are more infrequent, but can still be found in
the historical record among contemporary source material, official, and firsthand
accounts.1131 Captain Ralph Bell, for example, wrote that the matron who ran the local
estaminet never mentioned the war while the men were there, describing this as a “real
kindness to us war-weary people.”1132 This same soldier wrote that “war weariness” could
negatively affect a soldier’s judgment,1133 which could obviously be fatal or endanger the
entire unit in certain circumstances. References to war weariness at this phase of the war
can also be found in other firsthand accounts, both Allied and enemy.1134 War weariness
negatively affected the Canadian forces by the final months, and it is therefore a worthy
concept for understanding soldier experiences and the impact of war and combat on
individuals and military units.
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It is also important to note that despite the problems facing the Canadians by the
summer and autumn of 1918, as a whole the Corps itself did not break. This is especially
important as other formations and national armies on the Western Front experienced
serious problems after a similar period of combat and length of time in the field – most
armies experiences significant issues by mid to late-1917, including the French, Italian,
and British armies. These problems included disciplinary issues, a decline in
commitment, morale, and endurance, a reduction in military effectiveness, and
increasingly conditional service on the part of soldiers. The Canadians, on the other hand,
might be said to have bent, but did not break in 1918. There are a few explanations as to
why the Canadians were able to continue fighting despite their wear and tear. First of all,
the Corps leadership made a concerted effort to stave off the most pernicious effects of
war weariness, especially with their policies that encouraged a homogenous structure, and
with the adoption of tactical and technological improvements to assist the soldiers on the
battlefield. Secondly, in many ways the Corps was better than comparable units in the
French and British forces; their divisions were larger, had more firepower, increased
engineering and communications abilities, and a more stable leadership and
organisational structure. When the Corps faced serious difficulties in the final months of
the war, and when this wearing process was at its most pronounced, there were positive
aspects to help offset the stresses and strains that served, over time, to break other armies.
And this is also related to a third point, about how during the Hundred Days the results of
combat provided a welcome antidote to the worst aspects of war weariness. The act of
liberating civilians and settlements, the tangible successes as evidenced by the enormous
capture of enemy POWs, and the simple act of movement and advancing were welcome
by weary warriors. Fourthly, and in contradistinction to set-piece battles earlier in the
war, the operations of the Hundred Days proved surprisingly successful militarily.
Previously in the war, such as in 1916 or 1917, battles of similar magnitude would have
been catastrophic in terms of casualties and engendered a sense of futility and
hopelessness because of little gain. During the final months of the war, on the other hand,
these operations were remarkably successful – they were a pleasant surprise to these worn
veterans who had suffered for so long. Even with all the casualties and problems facing
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the troops between July and November 1918, they were successful, providing a powerful
antidote to disillusionment and war weariness verging on collapse. And finally, the Corps
was able to avoid complete breakdown and collapse because of the timing of the ceasefire
in November. Further action of this nature would have worn the soldiers and units of the
Corps perhaps beyond the point of no return. Instead, the Armistice provided relief, even
if the troops were unsure if fighting would eventually resume.
Ultimately, the Canadians and other Entente soldiers were victorious on the
Western Front, despite the collective and growing war weariness in the ranks. This can be
explained by the external realities and mitigating factors that acted as powerful antidotes
to the worst effects of war weariness. These included the prospect of ultimate victory;
tangible successes on the battlefield, including the enormous captures in POWs, weapons
and equipment; the liberation of civilians, towns, villages, and cities, as well as vast
swaths of countryside;1135 a continuing belief in the justice of the cause; the influx of
‘fresh’ and conscripted MSA men into the worn units of the Corps; the increasing reliance
on technology and more successful and refined tactics; the desire for souvenirs and
revenge; and the sense of uniqueness or superiority1136 on the part of Canadian troops,
and the acknowledgement that they were taking part in an historic moment.1137 And
finally, the decline of the German army and nation coupled with the conclusion of
hostilities that came with the signing of the Armistice happened at a fortuitous time,
ensuring that these worn units and war-weary soldiers would not have to continue
fighting throughout the winter of 1918 and into 1919. It is not certain they would have
been able to withstand such subsequent fighting.
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Conclusion
The experiences of Canadian soldiers in the First World War allows the historian
to discern some salient points. This project examined the contributing factors toward war
weariness, as well as its development, manifestations, impact, and potential responses.
This study also explored how morale, discipline, combat motivation, combat
effectiveness, and endurance affected war weariness and our understanding of the impact
of combat on both the individual and the collective. War weariness is closely related to
shell shock, war neuroses, and other psychiatric casualties of war, but there were
important distinctions. Shell shock debilitation reflected the inability of individuals to
continue with duty,1138 whereas war weariness was characterised by the unwillingness or
reluctance to carry on indefinitely. War weariness often developed over time in a
cumulative process, as veteran soldiers became worn down by over-use and the lack of
proper respite, relief, rotation, and genuine rest. Heavy casualties and the intensity of
fighting during the war, especially in the final months, ensured that these same troops
were used again and again in combat. Experienced soldiers were crucial to the overall
success of Entente arms, but the continued use of these same troops led to health and
morale problems, as well as war weariness and discontent. Outlets, material comforts,
support services, and ‘safety valves’ helped the soldiers endure, as did the tangible
evidence of success/military gain (such as effective combat operations and the seizing of
substantial enemy POWs). It is also fortuitous that the German Army – and nation –
collapsed when it did, as it is questionable if Allied soldiers could withstand more of this
intense combat for much longer.1139 War weariness and shell shock also existed on the
same spectrum, whereby the former was often an important marker on the road to shell
shock debilitation and breakdown.
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This project attempted to illustrate that war weariness could be minimised,
addressed, and partially neutralised with effective intervention strategies on the part of
military and medical authorities, and proper care of the troops. There were both physical
(material) and non-physical aspects of this care. Of the former, this included the
provisioning of sufficient water and edible food, as well as ensuring that equipment,
weapons, and supplies were plentiful and in good working order. Of non-material aspects
of endurance and care, it was important that the troops were psychologically committed to
the war effort and had coping strategies for dealing with the trauma and terror, stresses
and strains of war and especially combat. In many ways, the human element in combat
was crucial to success, and to our current understanding of often complex and confusing
events and historical processes.
This project sought to address some important questions as to the nature of
combat in the First World War, and how this impacted both individuals, at and behind the
front lines, and the larger unit of which they were a part. For example, did the army
husband its resources properly and address the issues that emerged in an effective way?
And were army policies conducive to the health and long-term stability of the troops
under its care? Chapter 1 on the legal and disciplinary system was designed to illustrate
that these structures were unable to properly deal with those soldiers who were
approaching the breaking point. The use of courts martial and military law could be a
rather blunt object; and as the purpose of the military authorities was to field the
maximum number of men as possible, maintain morale, provide a disincentive and
deterrent to soldiers, and punish troops guilty of dereliction of duty, individuals who had
broken down in combat or became war-weary were treated in a similar manner than to
those who willingly and consciously turned their back on duty. Many volunteers who
eventually succumbed to the enormous and cumulative pressures, stresses, and strains of
frontline service, who otherwise were honourable and committed, were caught up in this
system. The expectations of the army, high command, and leadership, moreover, did not
always match the reality on the ground. This was a unique and unprecedented war, in
many ways, and the troops were worn down over time and also responded in
unpredictable ways.
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Chapter 2 on the medical system facing the Canadians, was similar to the first in
outlining the structures in place to control and shape behaviour. I argued that with the
army medical system, the paramount desire to ensure manpower requirements were met
and that morale was prioritised above all else could actually backfire and exacerbate the
pre-existing problems facing the troops. Soldiers, including many war-weary ones, fell
through the cracks in the system and were not adequately cared for, thus ensuring that
they became a liability and an even larger problem further down the road. One of the
main dangers of war weariness during the war was its potential to transmute into more
serious shell shock debilitation. Furthermore, more localised and individual war
weariness could also become more widespread and collective, creating even more
problems for the medical and military authorities. In many ways, the leadership’s
response to war weariness was understandable, however. It was a concept not fully
understood at the time, akin to shell shock, and the army only had so many resources and
time to devote to certain problems. As a cost-benefit analysis, for authorities it seemed
that soldiers who were fed up or not faring well in combat, or those who were wearing
down but not yet unable to continue with duty (but only reluctant or unwilling), it was
simply not worth the resources to address their problems until it became more serious and
actually prevented them from carrying on.
Chapters 3 and 4 examined the aforementioned legal/disciplinary and medical
structures as they actually played out on the battlefield. To this end, two distinct time
periods were examined, April-August 1917 and July-November 1918. In the former
period, Chapter 3 looked at the Battle of Vimy Ridge and affiliated operations, to
understand how troops reacted to combat and how army authorities and structures dealt
with emerging problems. In the Vimy period, the (Canadian) systems in place were
mostly able to deal with issues as they developed. Substantial evidence on widespread
war weariness were lacking for this time period, which is perhaps counterintuitive
considering it was at this point in the war – the spring of 1917 – that other armies were
beginning to ‘crack’ and break down from the cumulative problems and thousands, if not
millions of casualties already suffered. For the Canadian forces, however, war weariness
did not yet appear to be a big problem, and thus the authorities were able to deal with

325

problems as they developed. This also meant, unfortunately, that the military and medical
authorities were less prepared to deal with problems related to war weariness, shell shock,
and other war neuroses when they did finally emerge in the final year of the war. During
the Vimy period the Corps leadership was largely able to accommodate medical and
morale problems and the beginnings of the wearing process. Fortunately, moreover, the
Vimy Battle and other operations in this period were relatively short and successful. And
this, combined with substantial preparations prior and extensive rest and respite periods
after Vimy, allowed for war weariness to remain at a simmer instead of boiling over into
more serious and long-term problems in this period.
The final months of the war, in the Hundred Days Campaign, was a different story
entirely. This was explored in Chapter 4, and it was during this period that the cumulative
stresses and strains imposed on the individual soldiers and their military units began to
take their toll. Though there were efforts on the part of the military and medical
authorities to deal with rising war weariness and other issues, they were unable to fully
and properly deal with them at this time. Authorities began to recognise emerging
problems, but the pace of operations and the urgency of the final campaign militated
against more substantive efforts. During this period war weariness became a problem for
the Canadian forces, but external factors and mitigation efforts prevented it from
seriously undermining the overall combat effectiveness of the Corps. In some cases
individuals and military units were worn down, destroyed, and unable to properly attain
objectives, but the influx of MSA soldiers and the increasing reliance on technology and
more effective tactics helped offset these disadvantages. Moreover, German decline also
served to mask the very real decline of the Canadian forces in this period. The tangible
successes of the final months of the war, including the seizure of thousands of prisoners,
guns, and other war material, in addition to capturing towns and liberating grateful French
and Belgian civilians acted as powerful antidotes to the very worst effects of war
weariness. And finally, it was fortuitous that the war ended when it did, as it was unlikely
that the Entente forces could withstand much more intense combat operations at this time.
War weariness and the negative impact of the war effort affected all combatant
armies and nations after a certain period of time. Even successful and ultimately victories
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armies experienced war weariness, as evidenced by the problems facing the French,
British, Italian, and Canadian forces by 1918 (by 1918 the Russians had already gone
beyond the point of no return). This speaks to an important point discerned from my years
of research, reflection, and writing on the subject, namely, that individual soldiers could
carry on with duty and endure the stresses and strains of war despite the onset and
development of war weariness. War weariness could shape behaviour and attitude in
subtle, yet important ways. It did not preclude soldiers from pressing on in battle, though
once individual and localised war weariness transmuted into collective or more general
war weariness, problems began to multiply. It was at this junction that military, medical,
and other authorities needed to intervene1140 to prevent deepening war weariness from
moving beyond the point of no return, and to prevent worn soldiers from becoming
debilitated by shell shock. It was thus crucial for the authorities to provide the troops with
mitigating factors and forces, and to allow them to develop coping mechanisms to help
them endure over time.1141 Both individuals and military units could become war weary,
and it was important to prevent defeatism, dissent, discontent, and demoralisation from
spreading. Of the troops in uniform, both combat soldiers at the front as well as support
personnel on the lines of communication experienced the negative impact of war and
combat over time. For those at the front such as infantry, however, the contributing
factors toward and manifestations of war weariness were more numerous and significant.
Mitigation efforts were important to implement on the battle fronts, partly to
ensure that protests surrounding local conditions and complaints about how the war was
prosecuted did not transform into protests about why the war was being prosecuted, or
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On the home fronts, interventionist and remedial policies could be either positive or negative. Regarding the latter,
this could take the form of silencing anti-war or anti-government dissent or the co-optation of certain segments of the
population. In terms of positive steps, addressing grievances and implementing reforms could help stave off widespread
discontent and prevent war weariness from boiling over into more dangerous expressions of discontent. On the battle
fronts, the government could provide the soldiers with ‘safety valves,’ outlets, distractions, and entertainment, as well
as use both ‘carrots and sticks’ to shape behaviour and thinking.
1141 The soldiers that managed to stay in the line and avoid permanent breakdown or shell shock debilitation did so for a
few reasons, including respite and relief, sleep, rest, leave, and rotation policies; mental and psychological coping
strategies (fatalism, apathy/indifference, forgetting, attitude, superstition/faith/religion); songs, music, humour, jokes,
parody, satire; unit cohesion, friendship, and camaraderie; connections with home, such as parcels, letters, leave, and
(photos of) loved ones; recognition, praise, awards; the use of ‘carrots and sticks;’ adrenaline and other chemical props
(alcohol, caffeine, nicotine); good tactics, leadership, communication, and teamwork; material comforts (like hot tea
and warm clothes); female companionship and sex; estaminets and entertainment. This list is of course not exhaustive.
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against the war in general. Some soldiers were able to endure the war and military service
without long-term medical and psychological problems, and some even came to enjoy
combat and killing.1142 Many soldiers on the Western Front, however, became ‘fed up’
with the way things were going and with the apparent ineffectiveness of attacks in 19151917, and thus it was important to provide them with reasons for continuing, despite all
the horror and bloodshed. Connections with home were important, whether that entailed
leave, newspapers from home, or the regular delivery of mail and parcels, this could not
be overlooked. Moreover, technological, doctrinal, and tactical developments needed to
be implemented, and if they had a tangible impact on the battlefield there might be hope
of a breakthrough. The veteran troops on the Western Front were not naïve, however, and
thus both political and military authorities needed to make it clear that all was being done
to defeat the enemy and win the war. This was just one reason why calls for the British
and other Entente governments to articulate war aims became so urgent by 1917; the
troops needed to know that the reasons for fighting, suffering, and dying were still valid
and actually worth laying down one’s life for. Exhortations to do one’s duty and protect
the Empire rang hollow after just a few short months of war.
Throughout the dissertation several different ideas, concepts, and themes were
explored. This included the types of casualties inflicted during the war, such as seemingly
‘legitimate’ battle wounds, versus that of suspicious psychiatric casualties or illnesses.
This provided the medical officers with a dilemma and some tension in their duties. It
could be quite difficult, for example, to determine which soldiers were genuinely unable
to withstand further service, those that were unwilling to further endure duty, and those
that were merely malingering or shirking duty. Moreover, some soldiers were certainly in
need of a break or rest behind the lines, as recognised by their own MOs, but were unable
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There was the concept of the ideal soldier or happy warrior during the war. One historian defined the happy warrior
as “marching the roads of France and Flanders with a jolly whistle and a bright smile that would not desert him, even in
death.” Were these soldiers merely new, ignorant of the reality of war, or naïve? Or were they perhaps mentally
unstable? Another historian argued that some soldiers and military institutions glorified and enjoyed killing, and sought
to brag and boast about their prowess in combat. Others have noted that only about 2% of soldiers exposed to battle will
not break down under stress eventually, perhaps because they are already psychopaths or mentally ill. And one veteran
also wrote that only 2% of soldiers can withstand combat indefinitely, but these are those predisposed to “aggressive
psychopathic personalities.” See Vance, Death So Noble, 257; Bourke, An Intimate History of Killing, especially
Chapter 2 ‘The Warrior Myth,’ pages 32-56; Gabriel, No More Heroes, 79, and Grossman, On Killing, 44.
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to be sent down the line due to restrictions on what constituted a genuine battle wound
and justifications for evacuation from the front. MO and CAMC tension also reflected the
difficulty in reconciling the needs of the collective – the army and the nation more
broadly – with that of the individual. The historical record suggests that in most cases the
needs of the army trumped that of the individual, and questions of morale and manpower
at the front took precedence over those of patient choice, genuine recovery, and effective
long-term treatment. In many ways, the individual soldier was merely a means to an end,
and more traditionally-minded authorities were comfortable with this state of affairs. It
was problematic, however, when these authorities refused to acknowledge the reality of
modern, industrial, attritional, total war and the inevitability of breakdown over time.
Simply banning the use of the term ‘shell shock,’ as the British high command sought to
do, was no solution to the problem. In many way, it actually exacerbated the problem.
Related to this concept was the idea of emotional versus physical breakdown. Troops
could suffer a breakdown in combat and be unable to continue based on the loss of will
and demoralisation, or because one’s body refused to cooperate and ‘betrayed the spirit.’
Another important aspect of the project was an exploration of preventative measures and
mitigating factors that allowed soldiers to endure the stresses and strains of war, if only
for a short while longer. These included chaplain, medical, or CO intervention at a timely
manner to address problems and prevent more permanent breakdown amongst soldiers at
the front. Other preventative measures included strong connections with home, and
alcohol, sufficient food and water, proper equipment, leadership, and support.
This dissertation also explored the distinction between the unwillingness to carry
on with combat and duty (war weariness) with that of the increasing inability to endure at
the front and on the lines of communication. Just where this transition occurred was
difficult to determine and was contextually based, but for soldiers who acknowledged that
they were not ‘wearing well’ and might soon breakdown or become permanently
debilitated, certain actions and attitudes were adopted to reduce or even evade
participation in duty. Soldiers might become overly cautious, for example, or attempt to
develop excuses to avoid further service in a hostile environment. Others feigned
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illness1143 or tried to get removed from duty for other reasons. For soldiers increasingly
desperate to escape the trenches or service altogether, however, even more drastic
measures were taken. Some soldiers administered a self-inflicted wound or illness in
order to be medically excused from duty, whereas others sought a Blighty wound that
could remove them from the line whilst still keeping (some semblance of) their honour.
Other desperate troops actually deserted the battlefield or went AWL to avoid further
service. The most desperate soldiers of all committed suicide, or acted in such a reckless
way that was tantamount to suicide; for these troops, death was preferable to the
uncertainty, suffering, and trauma that was service on the Western Front.
The era of the First World War was in many ways a watershed moment. The death
of millions of soldiers and civilians around the globe may have killed the Victorian and
Edwardian eras for good, and perhaps ushered in the modern world. And though it is
somewhat reductive to claim that an entire generation was lost due to the war, the
cultural, social, and political scars outlived the generation that fought and suffered during
the war years. For some nations like Britain and France, the nation and society could
never truly escape the clutches of the war and its profound impact on all matter of life in
these countries. For countries like Germany, Italy, and Russia, only subsequent and
traumatic events like Fascism and the Holocaust, Mussolini and occupation, the
Bolshevik Revolution and the ‘Great Patriotic War,’ respectively, could overshadow the
trauma that was the First World War. And it is also not too far of a stretch to argue that
the rise of Hitler and Mussolini, the Second World War, the Russian Revolution and the
Stalin years were the direct offspring of the First World War.
The aftermath of the war also helps us understand the post-war disillusionment so
prevalent in the English-speaking world after 1919. In Canada and much of the combatant
nations, the public was never fully exposed to the reality of the war. This was in large
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The historical record suggests that some soldiers used illness or health problems, both real and perceived, as a tool
or weapon to fight back against army discipline and the strictures imposed by military service. Because of this, we as
modern historians cannot always give these soldiers the benefit of the doubt. There were, for example, some
troublemakers and ‘bad apples’ in the ranks, but there were also troops who were driven to extreme measures like
administering a self-inflicted wound to escape the trenches and avoid further service for the foreseeable future. This all
serves to complicate the story.
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measure due to propaganda, censorship, and the silencing of anti-war dissent on a
systematic scale. When the soldiers did return to Canada after demobilisation, as opposed
to the trickle of returning soldiers during the war itself, the enormity of the conflict and
the enormous impact it had on thousands became evident. The war and its results would
have a profound impact on society, and pensions and other payments would shackle the
Dominion government for decades to come. This post-war disillusionment was also based
primarily on the period following the war, rather than during the war. Broken government
promises,1144 the lack of employment and sufficient housing, alienation from wider
society, the questioning of veterans’ masculinity in this environment, combined with
inflation, an economic downturn, rise of Fascism, and eventually the onset of the
Depression all served to engender this disillusionment. The post-war bitterness, cynicism,
and writings of the (usually) elite war poets was powerful, articulate, and haunting,
though largely unrepresentative of the wider veteran pool. Most soldiers during the war
did not believe the war was in vain, or that it was merely ‘mud, blood, folly, and futility.’
It was the post-war world and the problems of the period that led to a re-examination of
the purposes and results of the war. Of course, there was no single veteran experience,
and the importance of veterans’ organisations like the Legion and Great War Veterans
Association may have been overstated; less than half of all former soldiers joined these
veterans’ organisations. It is also important to remember that the governments of both
Canada and the UK were overwhelmed by a lack of money, resources, and bureaucracy to
deal with the enormous number of war veterans, casualties, and dependents. And the
onset of the Depression, the insularity of American thinking in this period, the reality of
post-war debt, and the desire of Ottawa to avoid charity long before the onset of the
welfare state helps explain this inability to cope with all the veterans and their needs.
The years following the First World War were crucial for how the veteran soldiers
approached their lives, as well as for how society more generally viewed the war. The
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Much of the disillusionment on the part of veterans was based on these broken promises. Various promises
emanating from London and Ottawa encouraged an increase in expectations. Some of these problems emanated from
the failure to attain fulfilling employment and dignity, national unity, international peace, imperial harmony, the
continued support for the League of Nations, as well as other unfulfilled promises.
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1922 British War Office Committee of Enquiry into ‘Shell Shock,’ debates over future
foreign policy and interventions abroad, and the problems surrounding the awarding of
pensions all illustrate that the history of the war was contested from the very beginning.
Debates over the Treaty of Versailles, the (impotence of) the League of Nations, the onset
of the Depression, emerging Pacifism, anti-war attitudes, and disillusionment all shaped
how historians after 1919, and wider society itself, understood and depicted the war. This,
in part, helps explain the inability or unwillingness of the victorious Entente powers to
prevent the rise of Fascism, and Italian and German aggression beginning in the 1930s.
The history and consequences of the war remained contested, and certain political leaders
were willing to re-shape the post-war order in violent ways.
The Second World War provided historians another opportunity to assess the
applicability and validity of conclusions made during and immediately following the First
World War. The lessons of the Great War were not always learned, or remembered, but
there were developments in enlistment, leave, and medical policy during 1939-1945 that
can be directly attributed to the experiences of 1914-1919. Studies related to war
weariness, in the guise of battle exhaustion and combat fatigue, in addition to continuing
research on shell shock and (what came to be known as) PTSD, continued the trend of
examining the impact of combat on the individual and the interplay between the
individual and the group. The Second World War provided much fodder for these studies,
and new research techniques, the use of questionnaires, an increased role for medical
specialists including psychiatrists, all assisted in this process. And after the Second World
War, studies on breakdown and the medical and psychological impact of combat
continued in the context of the Korean War, Vietnam War, and conflicts in the Balkans,
amongst other war zones and conflicts. And of course trauma and stress are an integral
part of the modern world. Everyone, in all walks of life, around the globe, experiences
trauma and stress at various points in their lives. Sometimes this is based on war and
conflict, at other times it emerges from poverty and oppression; at other points this stress
and trauma is caused by natural disaster, crime, religious fundamentalism, rape, or
violence. There are, moreover, professions that tend to have higher rates of stress and
exposure to trauma than other vocations. Of the former, air traffic controllers and
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surgeons might very well experience significant and dangerous levels of stress on the job,
on a regular basis. Medical problems, addiction, and all manner of social issues can be the
result. In terms of exposure to trauma, soldiers, first-responders, councillors/therapists, 91-1 dispatch operators, and others often suffer from PTSD and other reactions to high
levels of trauma, and these can be either direct or indirect. And even for regular civilians
in relatively ‘normal’ and stable professions, there are various sources of stress and strain
in the modern world. Some suffer from a lack of purpose, whereas others lament the
decline of organised religion and civic engagement; unemployment and insufficient
housing continue to plague the developed world, as do problems with education, rising
inequality, and health care. Isolation, loneliness, grief, and mental health problems can
also contribute to medical problems and other social, economic, and political issues.
And though the human element in combat and warfare will be relevant for
decades to come, how will trauma studies and those on the impact of combat on the
individual and military unit change with the emergence of modern technology? It is
difficult to predict how far and fast the technological revolution in military affairs will go,
but there are rapid changes that military historians and researchers need to be aware of. In
advanced economies, the shape of war (and military service) has changed dramatically
since the mid-20th Century. Reserve forces play an increasingly important role, and
though professional, volunteer, and career soldiers remain in Canada’s armed forces, the
international environment has changed in important ways. Civil wars, rudimentary
technology and tactics, and drawn-out conflicts will remain for the foreseeable future, but
in the developed world technology plays an increasingly prevalent role on the battlefield.
The use of autonomous weapons and vehicles, such as aerial and underwater drones,
coupled with other types of warfare (electronic, cultural, economic) indicate these
changes. Russian ‘hybrid’ warfare as displayed in eastern Ukraine and the seizure of the
Crimea, and the various loyalties and alliances as evident in Syria and Yemen, also
suggest this complexity. And yet even with the use of technology, drones, and
intercontinental ballistic missiles, there will always be room for the human element in
warfare. This also means that there will continue to be psychological problems for
combatants and veterans, and one need not look too far, even in Canada, for evidence of
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these problems. Suicide, homelessness, alcoholism, depression, dependency and other
issues continue to disturb former soldiers, a situation we Canadians should not tolerate.
As long as there is trauma and stress in the world, there will be a need to attempt to
understand the impact of these on the human body and mind. We ignore these serious
issues at our own peril.
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Appendix I – Charts and Graphs
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Figure 1 - Chart of Officers in the Canadian Expeditionary Force, July-November 1918 – Illustrates the Steady Decline of
Leaders in the CEF for the Final Months of the War – Statistics Taken from Nicholson, Canadian Expeditionary Force,
Appendix "C," Table 2: Strength at the End of Each Month from 30 September 1914 to November 1919, 547
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Other Ranks in the CEF, July – November 1918
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Figure 2 - Chart of ORs in the CEF, July - November 1918 - Illustrates the Heavy Casualties of the Canadian Forces in the
Final Months of the War – Statistics Taken from Nicholson, Canadian Expeditionary Force, Appendix "C," Table 2: Strength
at the End of Each Month from 30 September 1914 to November 1919, 547
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All Ranks in the CEF, July – November 1918
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Figure 3 - Chart of All Ranks in the CEF, July - November 1918 - Illustrates the Overall Decline in Numbers of the Canadian
Forces in the Final Months of the War – Statistics Taken from Nicholson, Canadian Expeditionary Force, Appendix "C,"
Table 2: Strength at the End of Each Month from 30 September 1914 to November 1919, 547
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Canadian Casualties by Month
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Figure 4 - Chart of Canadian Casualties by Month - Highlights the Enormous Casualties Suffered by the Canadian Corps in
the Final Months of the War – Statistics Taken From Bird, The Communication Trench, 141-142
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British Casualties on the Western Front by Month
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Figure 5 - Chart of British Casualties on the Western Front by Month - Illustrates the Deadly Nature, Pace, and Intensity of
the Fighting in the Final Months of the War – Statistics Taken from Churchill, The World Crisis, 845, Citing British War
Office, Statistics of the Military Effort, 253
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Casualties and Losses to the British Army on the Western Front,
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Figure 6 - Chart of British Army Casualties on the Western Front - Highlights the Enormous Casualties Suffered in the Final
Months of the War – Statistics Taken from Churchill, The World Crisis, 845, Citing British War Office, Statistics of the
Military Effort, 253
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Number of German Prisoners of War Captured by the British
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Figure 7 - Chart of German POWs Captured by the British Armies in France - Indicates the Substantial Number of German
Prisoners Captured and Surrendered in the Final Months of the War - Information Taken from British War Office, Statistics
of the Military Effort, 632
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Prisoners of War Captured by Entente and Associate Power
Armies, Between 18 July and 11 November 1918
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Figure 8 - Chart of POWs Captured in the Final Months of the War - The Enormous Number of Enemy Prisoners Captured in
the Final Months of the War Indicated the Steady Decline of German Fighting Power and the Hard Fighting of the Period Information Taken from Bird, The Communication Trench, 131
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Enemy Guns Captured Between 18 July and 11 November 1918
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Figure 9 - Chart of Enemy Guns Captured in the Final Months of the War - The Large Number of Guns Seized Reflected the
Loss of Will and Ability of the Enemy Forces – Information Taken from Bird, The Communication Trench, 131

Total Captures by the Canadian Corps, 8 August – 11 November
1918
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Figure 10 - Chart of Captures by the Canadian Corps in the Hundred Days Campaign – The Enormous Number of Enemy
Prisoners, Guns, Military Equipment, and Territory Seized Reflected the Hard Fighting of the Final Months of the War –
Information Taken from Currie, Corps Operations 1918, 84-85, Schreiber, Shock Army of the British Empire, 132, and
Humphries, ed., The Selected Papers of Sir Arthur Currie, 303
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Appendix II – Maps
The Military Hospital Commission in Canada

Figure 11 - Map of the Location of Facilities Pertaining to the Military Hospital Commission in Canada - Includes Location of
Hospital Accommodations, Convalescent Hospitals, and Tuberculosis Sanatoria, Soldiers Suffering from Shell Shock and other
Psychiatric Casualties were often sent back to Canada for potential Recovery - LAC, RG 9 III B2, Volume 3751
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Canadian Hospitals in the United Kingdom

Figure 12 - Map of Canadian Hospitals in the UK - LAC, RG 9 III B2, Volume 3686
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Consolidation Scheme for the Arleux-Acheville Operations

Figure 13 - Map of the
Consolidation Scheme
for the ArleuxAcheville Operations The Map Indicates the
Position of Lewis and
Machine Guns
Following the Battle of
Vimy Ridge - LAC, RG
9 III C1, Volume 3847,
Folder 54, File 1
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Communications Network at the Battle of Third Ypres

Figure 14 - Map Inidcating the Extent and Complexity of the Network of Air and Buried Cables at the Third Battle of Ypres LAC, RG 9 III C1, Volume 3853
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The Battle of Amiens

Figure 15 - Map of the Battle of Amiens, 8-12 August 1918 - Map Indicates the Advances of the Canadian Units in the Battle Originally Reproduced by the Army Survey Establishment for Nicholson, Canadian Expeditionary Force, between pages 412-

396

413, also found on the Veterans Affairs Canada Website, http://veterans.gc.ca/eng/rememberance/history/first-world-war/lasthundred-days?filter=range&start=1

The Battle of Arras

Figure 16 - Map of the Battle of Arras - Map Indicates the Canadian Area of Operations, Objectives, and Units Involved Found in Nicholson, Canadian Expeditionary Force, between 442 and 443, and Veterans Affairs Canada Website,
http://www.veterans.gc.ca/images/feature/hundreddays/maps/map-03_e.png
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The Advance to the Hindenburg Line and Canal du Nord

Figure 17 - Map of the Canadian Advance to Hindenburg Line and the Canal du Nord - Found in Nicholson, Canadian
Expeditionary Force, 439, and Veterans Affairs Canada Website,
http://www.veterans.gc.ca/images/feature/hundreddays/maps/map-02_e.png
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The Final Advance

Figure 18 - The Final Advances Beyond Cambrai and to Mons, October to 11 November 1918 - Found in Nicholson, Canadian
Expeditionary Force, between pages 472 and 473, and Veterans Affairs Canada Website,
http://www.veterans.gc.ca/images/feature/hundreddays/maps/map-06_e.png
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Appendix III – Photos and Images
Ambulance Lorry
.

Figure 19 - Contemporary Photograph Showing the Interior of an Ambulance Lorry - Illustrates how Stretchers were
Transported Behind the Lines for Evacuation and between Medical Facilities, and used in Conjunction with Mechanical
Transport, Light Railways, River Barges, and Draught Animals – LAC, RG 9 III B2
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Ambulance Lorry 2

Figure 20 - Royal Army Medical Corps and Canadian Army Medical Corps Ambulance Lorry - LAC, RG 9 III B2, 3686

401

Political Cartoon

Figure 21 - Political Cartoon poking
fun at the Hardships of Frontline
Service - Soldiers were often happy to
get a lift from lorries and motorcars,
despite the poor condition of many
roads in the War Zone. Published
October 1917 - Taken from the Ley
and Lois Smith Military History
Collection, Department of History,
University of Western Ontario, the
Records of Reverend Lt. Alexander
M. Gordon
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Invalided Soldiers

Figure 22 - Photo of Invalided Soldiers at Work in a Carpenter's Shop - After Being Evacuated from Europe, these Soldiers
attempt to stay busy and learn a new trade. The original caption reads "Here convalescent soldiers, strong enough to move
around, are taught carpentry or some other useful occupation whereby they may earn their livelihood and not become a
burden to Canada” - LAC, RG 9 III B2, Volume 3751, Folder 2-4-1, ‘Salvaging War’s Waste,’ by Adam Black.
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The Wastage of War

Figure 23 - Photo of Soldiers Working on Basket-Making - Photo Taken at a Sanatorium in Canada. These activities were good
for Soldier Morale, reminding them that though they were unable to continue soldiering, they could maintain their dignity and
contribute positively to society. These activities also often had a therapeutic aspect to them. Some companies also gave
preferential treatment to veterans in the hiring process – LAC, RG 9 III B2, Volume 3751, Folder 2-4-1, ‘Salvaging War’s
Waste,’ by Adam Black
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Helping with the Healing
Figure 24 - Photo of the Band of
the Granville Canadian Hospital These groups played an important
role in keeping the spirits of the
patients up - Dalhousie University
Archives and Special Collections,
Records of the No. 7 Overseas
Stationary Hospital, Folder 9.

The Healers

Figure 25 - Photo of the Nursing Sisters of the No. 7 Canadian Stationary Hospital, in thier gowns - Dalhousie University
Archives and Special Collections, Records of the No. 7 Overseas Stationary Hospital, Folder 9.77, 'MS-2-128, Laura May
Hubley.'
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The Spiritual Well-Being of the Soldiers
Figure 26 - Photo of
Catholic Padre
Canon Frederic Scott,
flanked by Majors
Alexander Gordon
(left) and E.E.
Graham - Medical
Personnel and the
Canadian Chaplain
Service helped with
the health and wellbeing of the soldiers
at the front, behind
the lines, and back in
the UK – Taken from
the Ley and Lois
Smith Military
History Collection,
Department of
History, University of
Western Ontario,
Records of Reverend
Alexander M. Gordon
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Padres and Chaplains
Figure 27 - Photo
of a Catholic
Sunday Service,
Seaford England,
June 1918 Chaplains played
a crucial role in
the maintenance
of soldier morale
- The Archives of
the Catholic
Diocese of
London,
Ontario, Bishop
M.F. Fallon,
'World War I
Photos - 1918'
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Humour Amongst the Suffering

Figure 28 - Photo of the Maple Leaves, a Canadian Concert Party - These concert parties were important for morale amongst
the soldiers, forced to endure the stresses and strains of war. Satire, humour, and other forms of entertainment also acted as
important 'safety valves,’ releasing pent-up emotion and allowing for the ridicule of the army system and superiors without
deteriorating into insubordination or indiscipline – Taken from the Ley and Lois Smith Military History Collection,
Department of History, University of Western Ontario, Records of Reverend Alexander M. Gordon

Connections with Home
Figure 29 - Photo of a Christmas Postcard Letters, Parcels, and Postcards played an
important role in the maintenance of Morale at the
front. It was crucial for the soldiers to know that
they were not forgotten by loved ones, and wider
society, at home - Taken from the Ley and Lois
Smith Military History Collection, Department of
History, University of Western Ontario, Records
of Reverend Alexander M. Gordon
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Intelligence Photos

Figure 30 - 3rd Canadian Division Intelligence Photos for Operations at Third Ypres - LAC, RG 9 III C1, Volume 3853,
Folder 68, File 7, ‘Passchendaele, Bellevue Spur, Operations 26/30-10-17’
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Passchendaele

Figure 31 - Intelligence Photograph - LAC, RG 9 III C1, Volume 3853, Folder 68, File 7, ‘Passchendaele, Bellevue Spur,
Operations 26/30-10-17’
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The Battle of Amiens

Figure 32 - Photo of Armoured Car going into Action at the Battle of Amiens - Library and Archives Canada/PA-003015,
taken from: http://www.veterans.gc.ca/eng/remembrance/history/first-world-war
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The Spoils of War

Figure 33 - Photo of Captured German Guns and Machine Guns in the Hundred Days- Captured in the fighting near Arras,
summer 1918. The Military Museums, W.A. Howard Library and Arthur J.E. Child Archives, TMM FOO 38, Gordon
Gilmour Fonds, Box 1 of 1, 3
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The Hard Fighting of the Hundred Days
Figure 34 - Photo of
German Barbed Wire at
the Hindenburg Line –
This was one of the most
heavily-fortified
positions on the Western
Front – The Military
Museums, W.A. Howard
Library and Arthur J.E.
Child Archives, TMM
FOO 38, Gordon
Gilmour Fonds, Box 1 of
1, Folder 6, ‘Series:
Photographs’
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Engineering Work in the Hundred Days

Figure 35 – Canadian Engineers Constructing a Bridge across Canal du Nord, during the Advance east of Arras, September,
1918 - LAC/PA-003456, taken from: http://www.veterans .gc.ca/eng/remembrance/history/first-world-war/last-hundreddays?filter=range&start=41
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The Canal du Nord

Figure 36 - Photo of the Canadian Engineers at the Canal du Nord - Contemporary view of a section of the Canal du Nord,
which the Canadians stormed on 27 September 1918 - The Military Museums, W.A. Howard Library and Arthur J.E. Child
Archives, TMM FOO 38, Gordon
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Cambrai, France
Figure 37 - Photo of the Hotel de
Ville, Cambrai - The Military
Museums, W.A. Howard Library
and Arthur J.E. Child Archives,
TMM FOO 38, Gordon Gilmour
Fonds, Box 1 of 1, 3-1-4, ‘Canada’s
Triumph: Amiens, Arras,
Cambrai.’

German Scorched Earth Policies and Defensive Destruction
Figure 38 - An explosion in
Cambrai - After the Germans
had departed, fires and
explosions continued. Firsthand
and official army accounts
indicate that the Germans
practised scorched earth tactics
during the final months of the
war, including the use of fires
and booby-traps to slow down
the attacking troops – The
Military Museums, W.A.
Howard Library and Arthur J.E.
Child Archives, TMM FOO 38,
Gordon Gilmour Fonds, Box 1 of
1, 3-1-4, ‘Canada’s Triumph:
Amiens, Arras, Cambrai.
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Death and Destruction

Figure 39 - Cambrai, October 1918 - The Military Museums, W.A. Howard Library and Arthur J.E. Child Archives, TMM
FOO 38, Gordon Gilmour Fonds, Box 1 of 1, 3-1-4, ‘Canada’s Triumph: Amiens, Arras, Cambrai
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The Final Battles

Figure 40 - Photo of Canadian Soldiers entering Valenciennes from the west - LAC/PA-003377, taken from
http://www.veterans.gc.ca/eng/remembrance/history/first-world-war/last-hundred-days?filter=range&start=81
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The End of the Road

Figure 41 - Photo of Canadians marching through the streets of Mons on the morning of 11 November 1918 - LAC/PA-003547,
taken from: http://www.veterans.gc.ca/eng/remembrance/history/first-world-war/last-hundred-days?filter=range&start=81

The War Comes Full Circle – Mons, Belgium
Figure 42 - Photo of Mons, Belgium - Taken from
the Ley and Lois Smith Military History
Collection, Department of History, University of
Western Ontario, Records of Reverend Lt.
Alexander M. Gordon
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